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ABSTRACT
The Concept of Mind and Political Theory
May, 1980
Mark R. Weaver, B.A., Ohio University
M. A-, University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly
This study examines the connections between mind and politics or,
more specifically, between basic assumptions and assertions concerning
knowledge and mind on the one hand and the analysis of political
behavior and political phenomena on the other. Although it begins with
a general survey of the explicit, systematic treatment of the connect-
ions between theories of mind and theories of politics in traditional
political philosophy, the principal focus of this dissertation is on
the implicit, fragmented views of knowledge and mind which are embedded
in contemporary explanatory frameworks and accounts of human behavior.
Drawing on recent work in linguistic philosophy of mind and and philos-
ophy of action, the contestable philosophical assumptions underpinnning
classical liberal political theory as well as contemporary approaches
to the study of political behavior and political psychology are anal-
yzed.
The major part of the dissertation concentrates on exploring and
assessing the work of Stuart Hampshire, a contemporary linguistic
philosopher, as it relates to the conceptual issues and problems
V
concerning the description and explanation of political behavior.
Hampshire's comprehensive critique of the empiricist conceptual frame-
work and his attempt to formulate an alternative account of thought and
action are examined in detail. This analysis of the conceptual issues
which are necessarily linked to any attempt to provide an adequate
account of human behavior includes such topics as the adequacy of a
dispositional treatment of mental concepts, the relationship between
beliefs and emotions, the role of intention in human behavior, the
unique problems of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and the
connections between knowledge and action.
The final section focuses on the implications of Hampshire's anal-
ysis of the conceptual issues concerning thought and action for
political theory and political inquiry. Among the major topics con-
sidered are the explication of the concepts of freedom, autonomy and
responsibility, the nature of description and its relation to evalua-
tion, and the structure of explanation and the role of theory in
political inquiry. In particular, Hampshire's conception of the
reflexive relation between theory and fact in the social and behavioral
sciences is developed and analyzed. In this context, this position is
assessed in relation to current debates concerning the notion of a
science of politics modeled after the natural sciences. It is argued
that although this view of explanation and theory in political inquiry
requires further development, it takes the first essential steps toward
resolving the serious conceptual and philosophical issues which now
confront the political theorist and researcher.
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CHAPTER I
MIND AND POLITICS
Philosophy of Mind and Political Theory
All of the major thinkers in the Western tradition of political
philosophy recognized the importance of the connections between mind
and politics or, more specifically, between philosophical issues
concerning knowledge, mind and action on the one hand and the analysis
and evaluation of political behavior and political institutions on the
other. Plato's Republic
,
which attempts to link a theory of social
structure with a particular conception of human nature, offers one of
the most powerful and influential of the treatments of mind and poli-
tics in Western political philosophy. Moreover, it sets out the basic
conceptual framework which, with certain modifications, dominated
ancient Greek and medieval philosophy and political thought. The Re-
public is therefore a useful starting point in an analysis of the
contributions and achievements as well as the deficiencies and failings
of the traditional treatment of mind and politics.
St<indard interpretations of the Republic have focused on Plato's
attempt to construct a vision of what the political system ought to be
like— an endeavor which he certainly considered to be one of the cen-
tral tasks of pnilosophy. The basic features of this ideal state are
quite clear. Building on the notion of the division of labor, he
constructs the picture of an ideal state in which the citizens are
divided into three classes. In this ideal state, each class is charged
1
2with a different economic and social function. The guardians, who are
denied private property and family life, are responsible for the orga-
nization and supervision of the state. The auxiliaries serve as the
soldiers, police and civil servants who defend the state and execute
the orders of the guardians. The third class, which is made up of the
laborers and artisans, produces the material goods necessary for social
survival. Social justice results from the harmonious cooperation of
these three separate parts of the state under the rule of the
guardians . ^
The centrality of the connections between mind and politics in
Plato's political theory becomes evident upon closer examination of
this account of the just state. In the first place, it must be noted
that Plato, in his account of the ideal state, moves from arguing that
class divisions are necessitated by the division of labor to contending
that human beings are by nature divided into classes because each
person is suited to perform only one of the three functions. The
foundation for this move is found in his account of human nature or the
human soul.
Plato's description of the individual soul mirrors his portrayal
of the ideal state. The soul, like the state, is made up of three
parts: reason, spirit and appetite. The healthy personality or just
soul is, again like the ideal state, an organic whole in which the
three parts operate under the dominance of their proper master, in this
case reason. In both the soul and state, justice is the harmonious
3coordination of separate parts of a single whole which are charged with
different functions.
Moreover, according to Plato's analysis, it is the dominance of
one of these parts of the soul that explains the obvious differences in
personality types and that ultimately determines the particular class
into which each person will fall. Although he recognizes the impor-
tance of education, training and other environmental factors, Plato
holds that people are born with the personality traits which make them
rulers, auxiliaries or laborers. Justice and harmony result when the
citizens in the various classes know their proper place in the social
order and concentrate on the performance of their given class
2
function.
The connections between mind and politics are also especially
evident in books eight and nine of the Republic where Plato examines
the various types of unhealthy personalities which correspond to the
different types of unjust states: the blind pursuit of honor which
dominates in the timocratic state; the love of wealth which charac-
terizes the oligarchic state; the impetuous pursuit of all desires,
impulses and appetites which typifies the democratic state; and the
total domination of the baser appetites in the tyrannical state. His
analysis of these stages of inevitable degeneration from the just state
and the just soul illustrates his conception of the reciprocal inter-
dependence of social order and human character. According to the
Platonic conception of mind and politics, corruption of the soul and
corruption of the state are integral dimensions of the same process.
4Plato clearly maintains that the founding of a just and harmo-
niously ordered state requires fundamental change in social structure
as well as in individual psychology. He suggests that there cannot be
a just state unless it is made up of just individuals, and that just
individuals are, for the most part, the products of a just state. In
short, Plato, utilizing a particular theory of human nature, attempts
to analyze the limits of what is possible given the type of personality
that dominates in a particular state or society, the likely develop-
ments within a given state or society, and the limits of what is
possible if fundamental alterations in the political system are made.
Although the above is only a brief and cursory summary of certain
of the arguments and themes in the Republic
. it does illustrate the
importance of the connections between mind and politics in Plato's
work. The Republic is not simply an abstract exercise in utopia-
building, but rather examines and criticizes the existing social order
and analyzes and explicates basic social, political and ethical con-
cepts which had become sources of confusion and disagreement. Plato's
analysis of the problems of justice and social order is expressly
connected to an account of fundamental human characteristics, powers
and activities that emerges from an examination of problems which cut
across the modern boundaries separating epistemology , philosophy of
mind, ethics, psychology and political science.
Of course, from the perspective of the mainstream political
scientist, the possible contribution of such a treatment of mind and
politics to our understanding of social structure, human nature, or the
5relationship between the two seems minimal at best. In the first
place, it appears that Plato's conception of the connections between
human nature and social structure is simply an elaborate analogy be-
tween a tripartite picture of the just state and a tripartite account
of the just soul. Alan R. White, for example, characterizes Plato's
portrayal of the soul as a "political theory of mind" in which "the
human mind is regarded as a microcosm of human politics."^ Thus, even
if it were granted that some background understanding of human nature
is essential to the analysis of political behavior and political in-
stitutions, the path to such understanding is not philosophical specu-
lation and the construction of simplistic analogies.
Yet while it is certainly true that an elaborate analogy between
the just state and the just soul does lie at the core of Plato's at-
tempt to link his theory of social structure with an account of human
nature, his analyses of mind, human nature and the connections between
mind and politics extend far beyond this metaphor. Despite the use of
analogies, the main arguments which Plato provides to support his
account of the soul or mind are largely independent of those used to
defend his conception of the ideal state. The more substantial foun-
dation of Plato's political theory is a conception of human nature
which is based upon analyses of such topics as the mind- body problem,
the relationship between reason and desire, and the connections between
knowledge and action. Moreover, the most serious objections to the
groundwork of Plato's political theory raised by later theorists center
not in his analogy drawing illegitimate connections between theory of
6mind and political theory, but rather in unresolved problems in the
philosophy of mind, philosophy of knowledge and metaphysics which were
to serve a secure foundation for this theory of the state.
The conceptual framework through which Plato identifies, clas-
sifies and characterizes human motivation and behavior is definitely
not as simplistic as White and other modern philosophers and social
scientists have often asserted. First, Plato bases his claim that the
soul is divided into different parts on the fact that there are inner
conflicts within the soul: a man who is thirsty and desires a drink
but who knows that the water is bad and desires not to drink, or a man
who feels a desire to look at corpses but is disgusted and angered by
such feelings and desires not to look. Moreover, although he inter-
prets such cases as supporting a tripartite conception of personality,
the fundamental division in his account of soul is a sharp distinction
between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Plato portrays
the personality or soul in terms of constant conflict between reason on
the one hand, and the various appetites, impulses, desires and emotions
on the other.
Reason, according to this influential conception of human nature,
must correct or restrain these nonrational forces if the soul is to be
just and happy. Individuals whose souls are not ruled by reason are
doomed to perpetual discontent because they must forever pursue bodily
appetites and pleasures which are without limit and therefore insa-
tiable. Only those souls in which reason has established an ordering
of desires can find true happiness. Also, for Plato, the question of
7whether or not a person is truly happy cannot be answered by a simple
introspection of his or her feelings at a particular moment, but rather
requires examination of the entire order or structuring of one's soul.
Thus, his theory of mind suggests an account of consciousness which
allows for extensive self-deception or "false consciousness" as in the
case of the despot or tyrant who deludes himself about his own inevi-
5tably unhappy condition.
In addition, like other Greek thinkers, most notably Socrates,
Plato is very much interested in the relationship between knowledge and
the well-being of the human soul as well as the central role of in-
dividual self-knowledge in our moral, social and political life. This
concern is most evident in the early sections of the Republic which are
written in the form of Socratic dialogues, exchanges of questions and
answers which are designed to elicit, clarify and analyze the parti-
cipant's opinions and convictions. The point or purpose of the
Socratic dialogue is to generate self-knowledge by forcing the par-
ticipants to first confront their own confusion and ignorance. The
knowledge generated is of a special kind in that it cannot simply be
transmitted in the form of laws or theorems but rather emerges from a
questioning process that reaches into one's own soul. Thus, the
Socratic dialogue rates the conviction of the participants in their
beliefs and the genuine give and take of intellectual endeavor as more
important than the attempt to arrive at certain truths through syste-
matic adherence to given standards of proof and argument.
°
8Philosophers and political theorists have commented extensively on
Plato's abandonment of the Socratic dialogue, execpt as a rhetorical
device, in the course of the Republic . Although Plato recognizes that
the Socratic method is often useful in clearing away false beliefs, he
seems to conclude that a positive method is necessary in order to
obtain true knowledge. He converts Socrates' argument that in order to
define a moral virtue such as justice, we must identify the essence of
the concept rather than simply giving examples of just behavior into a
position which holds that there must be a transcendental essence common
to all things of a particular kind. In addition, he abandons the
Socratic approach which emphasizes the moral reform of individual souls
through rational persuasion and attempts to legislate a new social
order in which the wise shall rule.
c
Yet, despite these much discussed differences between the posi-
tions staked out by Socrates and Plato, Plato remains preoccupied with
the problems confronting the Socratic conception of the relationship
between knowledge and virtue. As a result, the conceptual framework
through which he confronts philosophical and political problems is
radically different from that which has dominated the liberal political
tradition. For example, like Socrates, Plato makes no distinction
between the knowledge of effective or efficient means for arriving at a
given end and the knowledge of the particular end at which one is
aiming. In much the same way that one cannot administer medicine
without having an adequate conception of health, one cannot act cor-
rectly in politics and morals without understanding the purpose of
9moral and political discourse and activity. Plato follows Socrates in
holding that an individual must possess a certain kind of knowledge and
a proper psychic structure in order to live a just and good life. This
conception of an intimate relationship between self-knowledge on the
one hand and moral and political action on the other constitutes, as we
shall see, one of the most significant differences between classical
7
and liberal treatments of mind and politics.
The accounts of the internal conflict between the rational and
nonrational parts of the soul and of the connections between self-
knowledge and human action are but two features of the conceptions of
self, mind and knowledge which underpin the theory of the state pre-
sented in the Republic . As Plato's successors in the Western political
tradition recognized, effective criticism of these theories of mind and
knowledge undercuts the political theory which they support. It is for
this reason that much of the critical analysis of Plato' s political
theory has focused on his philosophy of mind and his epistenology as
well as the more specific connections which Plato himself makes between
mind and knowledge on the one hand and the theory of the just state on
the other.
Plato's portrayal of mind in terms of a fundamental division
between rational and irrational elements has been very influential in
various attempts to construct a theory of human nature throughout the
history of Western thought. However, there are serious conceptual
problems with this model of mind and significant weaknesses in the
arguments which Plato uses to support this model. Aristotle, for
10
example, challenges the notion that all desires are essentially ir-
rational products of the appetitive part of the soul which necessarily
conflict with the rational part of the soul. While Aristotle does not
deny that there are conflicts within the soul, he seems to contrast
rational and irrational desires rather than assume a fixed opposition
Qbetween reason and appetite. He thus challenges the Platonic con-
ception of personality by showing that Plato's analysis of inner con-
flicts does not provide adequate support for positing a sharp dichotomy
between rational and irrational parts of the soul.
In addition, certain of Plato's successors have challenged his
assigning reason and mind a special status in his portrayal of human
nature. Reason is here pictured as the one quality which sets human
beings apart from other animals and which constitutes their essential
nature. The powers of the human mind, as expressed in thought and
knowledge, are considered vastly superior to sensory experiences and
bodily pleasures, giving his account of mind a transcendental and
Puritanical flavor.
One of the principal supports for this conception which elevates
those rational faculties associated with the soul over those irrational
characteristics associated with the body is a mind-body dualism which
Q
Plato inherited from earlier Greek thought. The rational soul, the
true center of the self, is an independent entity or agency which
occupies the body for a relatively brief period of time. The body,
dwelling in the world of sense experience, is but a temporary dwelling
place from which the immortal soul will eventually depart. The ex-
11
posure of problems with this particular account of the relationship
between mind and body, like criticism of the account of internal con-
flicts within the soul, undercuts the Platonic conception of the di-
vision between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul, where
reason is supposed to restrain or correct man's nonrational impulses
and inclinations.
Of course, these points merely touch upon the complex set of
problems and topics that must be addressed in order to assess the
conception of soul or mind which provides the central core of Plato's
account of human nature. Yet, this brief discussion of Plato's con-
ception of mind and criticisms of it does provide an example of one of
the central dimensions of the connections between mind and politics as
these as presented and understood by the classical political theorists.
One of the most significant questions that can be raised in connection
to any theory of politics or society concerns the adequacy of the
conception of mind, the conceptual framework for classifying and char-
acterizing the fundamental facts about human thought and behavior,
which is used in describing, analyzing and evaluating political
behavior and institutions.
In addition, again as the Republic and later critiques of it
clearly illustrate, the connections between mind and politics extend
beyond the confines of philosophy of mind as narrowly construed.
Although the arguments in six of the ten books of the Republic are not
expressly linked to the Theory of the Forms, Plato's metaphysical and
epistemological views are, like his account of mind, central under-
12
pinnings of his political theory. Plato makes a fundamental distinc-
tion between belief, which is based upon uncertain and transitory sense
experiences, and knowledge, which is of unchanging objects apprehended
directly through reason. The world vre experience through the senses is
only a shadow, reflection or copy of the real world or ideas of Forms.
The Forms are immutable, transcendental, timeless, and independently
existing concept-objects which are the sources or causes of things in
this world and which can be known only through advanced philosophical
understanding
.
According to this doctrine, a person can know what a tree, in-
dividual, state, justice and goodness are only if he becomes, through
the use of speculative reason, acquainted with the relevant Forms. The
Forms provide an understanding of the relationship between universals
and particulars, a solid ground of certainty for claims to knowledge,
and absolute standards of moral and political conduct. As a meta-
physical doctrine regarding the nature of persons, objects and values,
and as an epistemological theory concerning knowledge of persons,
objects, and values, the Theory of the Forms permeates Plato's
political and ethical theories.
The most widely recognized and criticized direct connection be-
tween Plato's epistemological and metaphysical views on the one hand
and his political theory on the other is found in that section of the
Republic where he makes explicit use of the Theory of the Forms to
support his portrayal of the ideal state. Plato here argues that
only those who are born to be guardians (those having personalities
13
which are subject to the rule of reason) are fit to receive the
education which will enable them to know the Forms. All the other
citizens will be told a myth about the mixture of base and precious
metals in the soul to explain their place in the social and natural
order. Justice in the individual soul and in the state can be esta-
blished only where political power is wielded by those few guardians or
philosopher kings who can know the Forms.
Plato thus portrays the knowledge which is required to participate
in political decision-making as a matter of expertise, much like the
knowledge which is necessary in order to practice medicine. The Theory
of the Forms is openly used to justify the division between the few who
can recognize what is good, just and proper, and the many who must
accept the fact that their rulers know better than themselves what is
for their own good or in their own best interest.
Of course, there have been numerous objections to this elitist
doctrine and the idealist-intuitionist philosophical position which
supports it. For example, among many points which Aristotle makes
against this doctrine is his distinction between the kind of knowledge
which is characteristic of practical reasoning as oppposed to that
which typifies speculative or theoretical reasoning. Aristotle clas-
sifies speculative reasoning, which is the product of intellectual
training, as the process which governs philosophy, physics, mathe-
matics, and other subjects where knowledge is pursued for its own sake.
In contrast, practical reasoning, which is the product of habit and
14
experience, concerns the kind of knowledge pursued for the sake of
action as in ethics and politics.
This distinction between practical and theoretical reason and
knowledge as well as other elements in Aristotle's epistemological and
metaphysical doctrines provide a potential base for challenging the
elitist position linked to the Theory of the Forms. The connections
between knowledge and politics are quite evident here in that criticism
of the epistemological, metaphysical and metaethical positions which
are associated with the Theory of the Forms has extensively undercut
the theory of social structure advanced in the Republic .
At the same time, the most powerful and deepest connections be-
tween a certain political theory on the one hand and metaphysical and
epistemological theories on the other are much more subtle and indirect
than has so far been suggested. Basic metaphysical and epistemological
assumptions or positions, like assumptions or assertions concerning
mind and action, constitute the deepest levels of the conceptual frame-
work which is the basis of any attempted description, analysis and/or
evaluation of political phenomena. This framework includes fundamental
metaphysical stands on the nature of the world around us, the relation-
ships between the self and objects in this world, and the relationships
between the self and other persons. It also incorporates a set of
epistemological views concerning knowledge of the external world, other
persons and ourselves as well as views regarding the connections be-
tween such knowledge and human action. These metaphysical and epis-
temological assumptions and assertions are intimately linked to those
15
stated positions and implicit assumptions concerning the mind-body
relation, the relationship between reason and the appetites or pas-
sions, and other topics in philosophy of mind which form the core of a
conception of human nature, self or personality.
In short, there are a number of different ways in which a certain
political theory is connected to basic philosophical positions regard-
ing the nature of mind, knowledge and reality. The single most im-
portant of these connections is found in the conception of human nature
which, incorporating and reflecting these philosophical positions, is
an essential and ineliminable part of the conceptual framework through
which the political theorist perceives and interprets political
reality. One of the strongest attributes of classical political phi-
losophy is that the classical theorists recognized the importance of
this connection and typically attempted to set out, systematically and
clearly, the views of self, mind, knowledge and so on which underpinned
their theories of politics and society.
Of course, this does not mean that either the classical accounts
of self, knowledge and mind or the manner in_ which the classical theo-
rists treated the connections between mind and politics are free of
problems. Indeed, one of the basic reasons for the modern skeptical
attitude toward the traditional analyses of mind and politics is that
there are serious objections to not only the answers which the clas-
sical philosophers provided to the questions they raised but also the
manner in which they raised and attempted to answer these questions.
16
More specifically, there are powerful challenges to the basic concep-
tual framework, including the views of human knowledge, reality and
philosophy itself, which formed the common background of the ancient
and medieval treatments of mind and politics.
The essential features of this framework which dominated the
classical approach to mind and politics are set out by Plato. Plato
presents an idealist metaphysics and epistemology which portrays the
physical world as an illusion and our everyday understanding of this
world as worthless. He argues that the only way to obtain certain
knowledge of the real world, the world of universal, ideal and timeless
Forms, is through a kind of speculative reasoning modeled on mathe-
matics. According to this position, human beings can discover their
predetermined place in the natural order, as defined by the Forms,
through the use of their intellect.
This is the basic framework from which the classical and medieval
discussions of mind and politics never escaped. Traditional theories
of mind and politics rest upon this conception of a universal cosmic
order, an order of Forms or ideas, in which human beings have a given
and established place. To attain knowledge of the universal Forms or
ideas is considered the only path through which human beings can put
themselves in touch with the meaning and purpose incorporated in the
cosmic order. According to the classical view, it is the task of
philosophy to discover man's real nature and his place in the natural
order, to uncover the basic nature of human experience and existence.
It is assumed that philosophers can, through the use of pure and
17
abstract reason, determine the origin, basic components, and structure
of the universe. The traditional philosophers attempt, through de-
ductive metaphysics or system-building, to arrive at an understanding
of the ultimate nature of reality and knowledge, a seemingly solid
enough foundation for the analysis of mind and politics. ^"^
Certainly, there are significant differences which separate the
specific conceptions of self, knowledge and mind as well as the
theories of society and politics advanced by various philosophers in
the ancient and medieval periods. The philosophical, political and
social doctrines set out by Plato and Aristotle, for example, exhibit
some rather obvious differences. In particular, Aristotle is highly
critical of the Theory of the Forms and specifically rejects the
idealist position which holds that objects in this world are only
shadows, reflections or copies of unchanging Forms. Aristotle contends
that the basic particulars in the realm of sense experience and or-
dinary discourse, individual objects such as man or house, are real.
His major metaphysical concern is not with the question of whether or
not these things exist, but rather with understanding what they are, or
those identifying features of an object which make it the kind of thing
it is
.
Aristotle's analysis of the identification and classification of
objects proceeds in his terminology of form and matter, essence and
substance. He concludes that there is a universal and unchanging
element within each object which makes it what it is and which dis-
tinguishes it from other kinds of objects. Thus, the world around us
18
is not a mere copy of a transcendental world of ideas, but rather in-
corporates the universal and ideal. Although these universals or ideas
must be embodied in the world of particulars, they have a real, ob-
jective existence. Aristotle suggests that we attain knowledge of
these universals by examination of the physical world for hints of the
order of ideas, the reality lying behind sensible particulars, rather
than by turning completely away from our experience of the physical
world
.
Centering around his rejection of the Theory of the Forms,
Aristotle offers comprehensive and detailed analyses of problems
cutting across metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind which
call for drastic revisions in the Platonic views of self, knowledge and
mind. Yet, despite these significant differences between the
Aristotelian and Platonic theories of mind and politics, Aristotle
continues to work within the basic framework which portrays the
universe as a natural order of ideas.
If the Aristotelian view of the universe, each thing, including
man and the polls, has a distinct and unique place in the cosmic order
which is defined and determined by the order of ideas. At the top of
this universal order is the immaterial and unchanging Unmoved Mover
which is the source of all motion and change. Every other thing in the
natural order is seen as striving to realize its own appropriate form,
to fulfill its own nature or to achieve its own proper end. All the
key Aristotelian concepts are teleological , for knowledge of the things
19
in nature is necessarily knowledge of the final causes, ends or pur-
poses of things.
Like Socrates and Plato before him, Aristotle holds that human
beings can obtain knowledge of the essential and unchanging features of
a thing which lie behind its incidental and varying features. Thus,
the study of nature and things in nature is ultimately the study of the
order of universal ideas. Aristotle's notion of unchanging and time-
less ideas, universals or essences which are embodied in the physical
world is directly inherited from Plato. Like, Plato, Aristotle holds
that these ideas or universals have a real, objective existence, al-
though he tends to portray them as organizational principles which are
embodied in the world of particulars rather than as transcendent Forms.
According to the Aristotelian conception, the aim of the sciences is to
arrive at definitions which state the essence or essential properties
of things. In a very real sense, this doctrine of intelligible
essences and the Aristotelian conception of a unified universal order
15
present a revised version of the Platonic theory of ideas.
This doctrine of intelligible essences and the realted notion of
the universe as an order of ideas dominates classical and medieval
discussions of mind and politics. According to this classical view,
the study of morals and politics, is, like the study of nature, a
search for definitions which capture the essence or essential pro-
perties of those things being studied. It follows that the primary
concern of the study of morals and politics is the definition of man
who, as a part of the natural order, moves toward the realization of a
20
predetermined end or purpose which marks his particular place in this
order
.
The attempt to define man becomes a search for the essence of
man—that which is unique about him and which sets him apart from other
things in the universe. Cur understanding of morals and politics is,
according to this conception, dependent upon discovering those powers,
characteristics or activities which constitute his end or purpose and
which make him what he is. Knowledge of human nature, and in turn of
1
6
moral and political behavior, is knowledge of essences.
From his analysis of the functions of the soul, Aristotle con-
cludes that although man shares certain capacities with other forms of
life, intelligence belongs to man alone. Like Plato, he argues that it
is ultimately the power to reason which is exclusively human and which
constitutes the essence of human nature. Moreover, despite his re-
cognition of the importance of practical reasoning, he follows Plato in
characterizing speculative reasoning as the highest and most pleasant
form of human activity. Against the background of his notion of self-
sufficiency, Aristotle constructs an almost Platonic portrayal of the
ultimate end or purpose of human life in terms of philosophical con-
templation of timeless and unchanging ideas.
In short, although many of his arguments suggest an emphasis on
practical rationality, the importance of our sense experience of the
world around us, or developmental treatments of men and society,
Aristotle ultimately returns to a position which is very close to
Plato's Theory of the Forms. Aristotle's view of rationality as
21
marking the essence of human nature is tied to his conception of an
order of universals or ideas which establishes the pattern of all
processes of realization and development, which is on a separate and
higher metaphysical plane than the world we know through sense expe-
rience, and which can be apprehended by human beings only through the
17
use of speculative reason.
This general framework, particularly in the form of the scholastic
synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christian theology best respresented
by Aquinas, prevailed until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
This scholastic vision mirrored the Aristotelian portrayal of the
universe as a hierarchical and purposeful order in which each thing has
a proper and distinct place. Each thing is seen as having not only an
assigned meaning and purpose as part of God's creation but also as
having a natural motion or inherent activity in the service of God's
purposes. In this medieval framework, the earth remains the center of
the universe and man, at least in his ultimate heavenly state, remains
the highest purpose of God's creation. Any discussion of mind and pol-
itics necessarily begins with an account of man's established place in
the natural order, which can only be determined in relation to God's
overall plan.
The fact that this construct of a universal order of ideas or
Forms and the doctrine of essences were so closely associated with the
classical treatments of mind and politics is one of the principal
obstacles to recognizing the very real contributions of these analyses
of mind and politics. After all, the classical approach to mind and
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politics is directly tied to an outdated and discredited conception of
the scope and function of philosophy: the conception of philosophy as
a deductive or transcendental metaphysics which aims at discovering the
ultimate nature of reality. This conception of philosophy as a kind of
super-science which, through the use of "pure reason," deduces the
ultimate structure of reality, whether physical or social, is now
completely rejected. To the extent that the enterprise of mind and
politics is linked to this kind of deductive or transcendental .meta-
physics, it is perceived as a pre-scientif ic
,
speculative approach to
questions which can be properly answered only through rigorous appli-
cation of the scientific method.
Moreover, as we have seen, the classical approach to mind and
politics typically fits the following pattern: starting with a set of
epistemological and metaphysical doctrines, the theorist constructs a
conception of human nature from which a theory of politics or society
can be derived or deduced. This type of approach remains dominant even
among those theorists writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies who expressly reject the claims of transcendental metaphysics
and attempt to apply the emerging scientific methodology to the study
of mind and politics. During this period, theories of knowledge and
mind and the accounts of human nature they support are used to set the
limits of prudential rationality that would provide the foundation of a
stable civil order, to sketch the "natural" or "real" man as opposed to
his "social" and "artificial" counterpart, to outline the inherent
limitations of human character which require restraint or mobilization
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for social purposes, and to portray the extensive inherent potential
for development which requires certain social conditions to be re-
leased. These various accounts of knowledge, mind and human nature
serve as the foundations for competing traditions and perspectives
within Western ethical and political thought.
The organization of Hobbes' Leviathan
, which expressly rejects the
scholastic framework, provides one of the clearest and most systematic
examples of this approach to mind and politics. Hobbes' attempt to
establish a scientific approach to the study of politics begins with an
analysis of the basic building blocks of cognition and proceeds to
outline the mechanical apparatus involved in the basic "motions" of the
individual human being, including sense, imagination, speech, reason
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and the passions. Working outward from this mechanistic account of
individual belief, thought, motivation and behavior, he then formulates
a theory of human behavior in society which, focusing on man's inces-
sant desire for power, sets out the basic laws of human interaction and
prudential reason. This detailed account of human nature constructed
in the first part of Leviathan is clearly intended to put his following
theory of the commonwealth on a solid, scientific foundation. Thus,
Hobbes' political theory, including his analyses of sovereignty, the
basic determinants of conflict and stability, law and punishment and so
on, is supposed to be derived or deduced from his account of human
nature
.
Certainly, not all of the traditional theorists are this system-
atic or rely so extensively on the deductive method in tracing the
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connections between mind and politics. The traditional treatments of
mind and politics differ extensively in the degree of their detail and
thoroughness, in their major point of concern or emphasis, in their
methods of analysis, and in their background assumptions or the start-
ing points of their analyses. Yet traditional political philosophy
presents a general, inclusive picture of society, government and
politics which is linked to some view of human nature. Moreover, all
of the major classical theorists place a common emphasis on formulating
a coherent theory of human nature as an essential part of their
attempts to classify, explain and evaluate political institutions,
political behavior and political life.
One of the most important dimensions of traditional political
philosophy, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
is the criticism and construction of the theories of knowledge, mind
and action which underpin or support alternative political theories.
For example, an essential component of Rousseau's attempt to refute
Hobbes' political theory is his critique of the Hobbesian accounts of
motives, will and agency, reflection and consciousness, the relation-
ship between reason and the passions, the connections between language
and thought, the "natural"-"social" distinction, and other issues which
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reach into philosophy of mind and epistemology . Moreover, Rousseau's
alternative accounts of these topics form the core of the different
conception of human nature which serves as the grounding for his own
characterization of the causes of political conflict and stability,
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sovereignty, slavery, inequality and the other central ingredients of
his own political theory.
Thus, even those traditional political philosophers who reject the
construct of a transcendental order of ideas and the notion of phi-
losophy as deductive metaphysics follow Plato and Aristotle in addres-
sing the critical task of analyzing the philosophical premises of
competing theories of politics or social structure as well as the
constructive task of attempting to formulate a coherent and consistent
philosophical foundation for a theory of politics or society. From the
perspective of the mainstream political scientist, this treatment of
mind and politics still relies too extensively on a philosophical or
speculative approach which contributes very little to the principal
task of political science: the explanation and analysis of political
phenomena. In particular, the entire enterprise of mind and politics,
as well as the general, grand-scale theories of human nature, politics
and society which were the products of this enterprise, are associated
with two major characteristics of classical political philosophy which
are thought to set it fundamentally apart from political science. In
brief, as one recent text in research methodology states, "The study of
politics practiced during the classical period tended to be normative
21
in concern and deductive in method."
Thus, according to this portrayal of traditional political phi-
losophy, it is essentially normative in character and purpose and is
principally concerned with prescribing the ideal political system or
recommending particular political goals and values. This same text
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acknowledges Machiavelli as one of the few in "the classical period"
who attempted to explain the actual workings of government and polit-
ical institutions, but characterizes him as an exception to the rule:
... by and large students of politics in this period
turned their attention to Utopian states, to the justi-
fication of institutionalized value preferences, and,
rarely if ever, to the real-world operation of existing
22
governmental institutions.
In short, this perceived difference between traditional political
philosophy and political science rests upon the distinction between
facts and values, or between "is" and "ought." The classical theorists
wrote primarily to influence political beliefs, values and behavior, an
essentially normative activity, and were for the most part unconcerned
with making empirical statements or generalizations about actual po-
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litical behavior and institutions.
In other words, the conceptions of mind and knowledge and human
nature were formulated by the traditional theorists to support certain
sets of normative conclusions or particular political or social move-
ments. Tne theories of human nature presented by the traditional
political philosophers were designed for such purposes as to justify
the state by setting out the grounds of political obligation, to
rationalize and justify existing economic, social or political arrange-
ments and institutions, or to support and justify particular social and
political policies or more general policy orientations. Thus, while
the examination of the normative implications of a particular concep-
tion of human nature is a legitimate task, the traditional political
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philosophers either lacked completely any sense of the distinction
between facts and values or failed to set normative questions about
what human beings or society should be apart from empirical questions
about what human nature and society actually are.
In addition, as the text cited above also notes, the traditional
political philosophers lacked the sophisticated scientific techniques
and scientific methodology which have served as the foundation for the
most significant advances in political science. One of the principal
problems with traditional political philosophy is that the conception
of human nature which underpins a particular historical theory is
typically an b priori philosophical psychology or ai priori philoso-
phical anthropology. More generally, the grand-scale theories of
politics, society and human nature advanced by the classical theorists
not only lack adequate empirical support but also are so sweeping and
general that they are immune to refutation or objection on the basis of
empirical evidence. Moreover, any attempt to deduce or derive a theory
of politics or society from a conception of human nature or a parti-
cular metaphysics, no matter how systematic, is clearly at odds with
the methodological requirements of contemporary social science.
In short, the classical notion of essential and ineliminable
connections between mind and politics or between philosophy and
political inquiry is identified with the discredited attempt to derive
or deduce a normative political theory from an a priori conception of
human nature or an even more general metaphysical or epistemological
theory. According to the dominant conception of a science of politics.
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political science has, by adopting the scientific method, freed itself
from the philosophical dimension which was so central to traditional
political philosophy. It is still widely assumed that we have pro-
gressed (or are now progressing) from the kind of pre-scientif ic tradi-
tional political theory which necessarily rests on a priori philoso-
phical accounts of human nature, mind, action and so on, to a purely
empirical science of politics in which we can construct theories
exactly as in the physical sciences.
This dominant model of a science of politics or society, which is
frequently labeled the "positivist" model because it has been prin-
cipally influenced by the logical positivist account of the methodology
of the natural sciences, maintains that political inquiry, or, more
generally, the social and behavioral sciences, must be structured
according to the same methodological principles identified with the
natural sciences. According to this positivist conception of scien-
tific explanation, singular events or facts are explained in reference
to empirical generalizations or laws, and these laws are in turn ex-
plained in reference to a theory. Also, the prevailing account of a
genuine scientific theory, the so-called "orthodox view" of theories,
is that of a hypothetico-deductive system in which the laws or gen-
eralizations subsumed under the theory can be deduced from the basic
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principles of the theory.
However, this pervasive conception of a science of politics which
is completely distinct and autonomous from philosophy and which is
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structured according to the positivist formulation of the methodolog-
ical principles of the physical sciences is open to challenge either as
an account of the present state of the discipline or as a statement of
the ultimate goal and future direction of political inquiry. In the
first place, recent work in philosophy of science has raised serious
questions concerning the adequacy of the positivist model of the
structure of scientific explanation and scientific theory. Such works
as Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Stephen
Toulmin's Foresight and Understanding have challenged major features of
this positivist model by focusing attention on the conceptual framework
or scheme which is required to identify, classify and explain
phenomena
.
According to Kuhn and Toulmin, particular scientific theories as
well as the general framework common to a particular mode of inquiry
embody certain conceptual presuppositions about what is normal, to be
expected and requires no further explanation and what is abnormal,
unexpected and does require some explanation. Since the conceptual
presuppositions structure the basic processes of identification and
observation of phenomena as well as the processes of classification and
explanation, some of the basic tenets of the positivist conception of
the structure of scientific explanation and scientific theory are
brought into question. Kuhn, Toulmin and others have contested such
major features of the positivist model as the standard account of the
relationship between theory and fact which underpins the predominant
treatment of issues concerning the testing and validation of theories
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as well as the distinction between the "theoretical" and "observa-
tional" languages of a theory which has been central to the orthodox
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view of theories
.
In addition to this work focusing on the adequacy of the posi-
tivist conception of the methodological principles of the natural
sciences, there is an additional challenge to the positivist model of a
science of politics or society which concentrates on the problems
confronting those who attempt to apply the scientific methodology
developed in the natural sciences to the study of human society and
behavior. For example, some recent work concerning the methodology of
political science in particular and of the social and behavioral
sciences in general suggests that this problem of conceptual presup-
positions is even more acute when the phenomena to be explained are
human behavior and activity. In an article titled "Neutrality in
Political Science," Charles Taylor maintains that one of the essential
conceptual presuppositions of the explanatory frameworks used in
political inquiry is what he calls a "schedule of human needs, wants
.,26
and purposes."
According to Taylor, such a schedule of human needs, wants and
purposes is one of the minimal requirements of a conceptual framework
which is adequate for explaining political behavior and processes as
opposed to offering simply a descriptive account of political phe-
nomena. Of course, if a particular schedule of human needs is mistaken
in some fundamental way, the explanatory framework which incorporates
or presupposes it cannot provide an adequate and accurate explanation
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of political behavior and other political phenomena. In short,
Taylor's thesis suggests that a careful reconsideration of at least
part of the traditional account of the connections between mind and
politics is mandated. As he states,
A conception of human needs thus enters into a given
political theory, and cannot be considered something
extraneous which we later add to the framework to yield
27
a set of value judgements.
Similar conclusions are reached in J. Donald Moon's analysis of
the structure of social scientific explanation and theory, "The Logic
of Political Inqiury: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives." Moon
demonstrates how Half Dahrendorf's and Chalmers Johnson's theories of
social change implicitly incorporate and depend upon "certain funda-
28
mental conceptions about human needs and purposes ..." More gen-
erally, one of the essential characteristics of all explanatory theo-
ries generated in the social sciences ". . . is that they make implicit
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assumptions regarding human motivation, sociality and rationality."
In short, the explanatory theories utilized in contemporary political
science, like the theoretical frameworks sketched by the traditional
political philosophers, "presuppose a particular 'model of man'."
As both Taylor and Moon recognize, the explanatory power of the
theories developed in the social and behavioral sciences rests, at
least in part, on the conception of human nature which is incorporated,
whether unreflectively and fragmentarily or reflectively and systema-
tically, into a particular theoretical framework. Clearly, further
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analysis of this problem of conceptual presuppostions
, particularly
those concerning human motivation and behavior, and of what this
problem means in terms of the structure and function of explanation and
theory in the social sciences is necessary.'^'' Yet it is clear that the
political scientist cannot afford to simply assume that an approach to
the study of politics, society and human behavior based upon scientific
techniques and methods is automatically and completely presupposition-
less. The task of examining the possible connections between these
conceptual presuppositions, which center in a conception of human
nature or a model of man, and the explanation and analysis of political
phenomena marks one of the fundamental links between traditional po-
litical philosophy and modern empirical theory.
Of course, this does not mean that the political theorist and
researcher can return to the program of deductive metaphysics or the
construction of the kind of a priori conceptions of man and mind which
typified the traditional treatment of mind and politics. It is clear
that any conception of human nature which is fabricated in isolation
from empirical research on human motivation and behavior or which is
immune to objection or refutation on the basis of such research is
unacceptable. At a minimum, an adequate conception of human nature
must necessarily incorporate the work which has been done in the social
and behavioral sciences on the following topics: the analysis of the
basic appetites, drives or instincts within the personality or psyche
and the psychic processes through which these forces are shaped, chan-
nelled or controlled; analysis of the alteration of these basic psychic
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forces through environmental, social or cultural arrangements and
processes; and analysis of those environmental factors and conditions
which are conducive to human satisfaction, happiness, fulfillment or
development as opposed to those social processes, arrangements and
structures which block such end states and cause insecurity, anxiety
32
and frustration.
Yet while the discoveries and findings emerging from research on
these topics hopefully will displace the a priori models of man which
continue to infect explanatory frameworks and theories, it cannot
simply be assumed that all philosophical questions raised by the
traditional theorists in their discussions of mind and politics will
automatically disappear with the advance of the social and behavioral
sciences. Many of the most significant disagreements separating the
traditional accounts of human nature concern such issues as the free
will-determinist debate, the materialist-dualist debate, and the
controversy concerning the nature of moral values and their relation-
ship to statements of fact. The questions raised in these debates are
partially if not principally philosophical or conceptual questions as
opposed to empirical questions. This certainly does not mean that "the
facts" are irrelevant to attempts to answer these questions, but it
does mean that such questions and controversies cannot be resolved
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solely on the basis of scientific discovery and observation. In
other words, many of the most important of the persistent controversies
about human nature are not simply disagreements "about the facts," but
rather are more fundamental disagreements concerning the conceptual
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framework through which we identify and classify the facts about human
thought, motivation and behavior.
Certainly, many of these questions and controversies have been
reformulated, and the prevailing conception of the philosopher's
approach to these questions has changed since the traditional theorists
addressed the connections between mind and politics. But the essential
nature and relevance of these problems has not changed, and contem-
porary philosophy of mind and philosophy of action still focus on many
of the same issues and problems addressed by the traditional philoso-
phers. For example, various problems and controversies arise in
relation to the cognitive concepts, including perception, knowledge,
belief, memory, understanding, thinking and imagination; the will
concepts such as intention, choice, decision, wish and will; and the
emotion, feeling or sensation concepts including anger, fear, pleasure,
pain and desire. Also, there are fundamental disagreements concerning
the division of mind into separate departments, capacities or parts,
the relationships among these various parts, and the implications of
these competing conceptual divisions or departmentalizations of the
mind. Moreover, the unconscious, dreams and conscience bear directly
on these debates concerning the classification of mental capacities,
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powers or features.
In addition, philosophy of mind remains at the heart of any theory
of human nature not only because of the problems and controversies
centering in particular "mental concepts" but also because of more
general and broader philosophical issues which clearly have not been
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resolved by empirical studies of man and mind. There are general level
questions about the nature of mind or mental phenomena, including those
regarding whether there is such a "thing" as mind and whether human
thought and action, particularly the "higher" forms of thought and
intentional action, can be explained by the application of genuine laws
or law-like generalizations. Also, philosophers still confront
troublesome questions about the relationships between mind and body,
between our own minds and the minds of others, and between the mind and
the "external" world.
While analysis of these concepts and problems in philosophy of
mind certainly does not constitute the whole of the attempt to con-
struct a coherent and adequate theory of human nature, these conceptual
and philosophical issues remain an essential component of any theory of
human nature. Thus, the accounts of mind and personality, which are an
inherent part of every conceptual framework that is used in the ex-
planation as well as the evaluation of political behavior and insti-
tutions, provide the clearest and most direct example of the continued
importance of the connections between mind and politics. In addition,
as the traditional political philosophers again recognized, the con-
ceptual framework through which one classifies and explains human
behavior as well as political phenomena also rests on more general
philosophical positions and assumptions. For example, a particular
account of the structure and limits of human knowledge is closely tied
to the model of mind and man, the conception of the nature and scope of
political inquiry, and other central components of a given conceptual
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framework utilized in analyzing political phenomena. The most impor-
tant conceptual problems and controversies concerning thought and
action reach into epistemology
,
metaphysics, philosophy of meaning,
ethics and metaethics
.
The most important insight offered by the traditional analyses of
mind and politics is that it is impossible to explain or evaluate human
action, including the various kinds of activity of interest to the
political scientist, without a background framework which includes a
complex set of positions or assumptions on self, mind and knowledge.
The issues surrounding thought and action have been a central battle-
ground in political theory not simply because the traditional theorists
mistakenly incorporated a philosophical, pre-scientif ic , normative
dimension in their attempts to sketch a theory of human nature.
Rather, implicit or explicit stands on the fundamental conceptual and
philosophical issues concerning mind, knowledge and self constitute the
ineradicable core of any theory of human nature and in turn of any
explanatory framework used in political inquiry. Thus, the underlying
classificatory system used to identify and distinguish basic human
powers, characteristics and activities is an essential part of the
foundation for our attempt to explain and evaluate the political world.
Two Recent Analyses of Mind and Politics
Two of the most comprehensive recent attempts to examine the
connections between mind and politics in relation to contemporary
political inquiry and political theory are Ellen Meiksins Wood's _
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and Politics and Roberto Mangaberia Unger's Knowledge and Politics
.
Both Wood and Linger view the connections between certain conceptions of
knowledge, mind and self on the one hand and particular political and
ethical theories on the other as central and universal features present
in all political theories. They regard the modern tendency to treat
philosophy and political inquiry as separate and unrelated disciplines
as a denial of one of the most important themes developed in tradi-
tional political philosophy.
Unger, for example, writes:
until the present time, few ideas were so widely shared
among thinkers of the most diverse persuasions as the
belief that the decisive question for political thought
is 'What can we know?' This belief was accompanied by
the doctrine that the manner in which we solve the
problems of the theory of knowledge in turn depends on
the way we answer questions in political thought.
In his view, this traditional conception of knowledge and politics
makes little sense to contemporary political scientists and political
theorists only because Anglo-American analytic philosophy, remains
preoccupied with "technical riddles" and narrow problems rather than
the more significant and broader range philosophical questions ad-
dressed by the traditional theorists. He suggests that contemporary
philosophers and political scientists must abandon this "false and
nefarious" modern view, which creates artificial barriers between the
philosophy of knowledge and the study of politics, and return to the
"true and beneficial" ancient view, which explicitly acknowledges the
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reciprocal interdependence of theories of knowledge and theories of
37politics
.
This traditional conception of knowledge and politics is portrayed
as correctly focusing on the connections among four interrelated levels
of inquiry and activity: the attempt to answer fundamental philoso-
phical and religious questions about the nature of the world, man's
place in and knowledge of the world, and the existence of God; the
construction of psychological theories of human nature, personality or
self; the systematic study of society, politics and ethics; and thought
and action in the realm of practical politics and morals. Unger's
thesis is that any comprehensive and systematic political theory is a
theory of knowledge and politics because it necessarily incorporates,
implies or rests upon a related set of explicit positions or implicit
assumptions at each of these levels.
Although political theorists, particularly modern ones, often fail
to state or even recognize these positions and assumptions, it is still
possible to identify the fundamental "principles, premises or postu-
lates" which are operative on each of the different levels and which
serve to unify a particular theory of knowledge and politics. The
identification and examination of the principles and premises which
underpin competing conceptions of knowledge and politics remain among
the most significant tasks facing the political theorist.
Unger's thesis does not entail the view that the form and content
of theories of politics simply follow from or are completely determined
by underlying philosophical or religious frameworks. The argument is
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that there is a complex series of connections among basic philosophical
and religious issues and the attempts to construct an adequate theory
of human nature and a systematic theory of politics. These connections
are, Unger argues, particularly evident in the conceptions of indi-
viduality and sociality, which are two of the central features of any
political or social theory. The notions of individuality and sociality
are interdependent because it is impossible to provide a conception of
what a person is without including an account of the relationships
among persons or to advance a notion of society independently of some
interpretation of the nature of individuals. Moreover, both concep-
tions have common origins in that one's views of personality and
society are necessarily rooted in a more fundamental conception of
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human nature or self.
There is virtually no discussion of any recent empirical research
on personality in Knowledge and Politics , and Unger focuses exclusively
on the philosophical or conceptual issues involved in the attempt to
lay out a theory of human nature. The three elements which form this
philosophical core of any conception of human nature, whether or not
they are specifically acknowledged or addressed, are: the relationship
between self and nature, the relationship between self and other in-
dividuals, and the relationship between the abstract and the concrete
self.^^ Unger holds that any account of these relationships is closely
tied not only to various issues concerning the nature of human know-
ledge and the human mind but also to fundamental metaphysical problems
concerning universals and particulars and the relationship of wholes
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and parts. This is the grounding for his claim that themes in meta-
physics, epistemology and philosophy of mind do form the basis of much
of our thinking about human nature, politics and ethics. It is also
the principal support for his assertion that the basic problems con-
fronting philosophy, particularly metaphysics, and the social sciences
must be resolved simultaneously if they are ever to be resolved.
There are a number of striking similarities between Unger's
analysis of the connections between knowledge and politics and Wood's
examination of the connections between mind and politics. Wood does
not like Linger expressly contrast traditional and modern views of mind
and politics, but she does offer a parallel treatment of the "affini-
ties" among certain theories of cognition, individuality and politics
as universal features of political theory which traditional theorists
often addressed and modern theorists tend to neglect. Although she
acknowledges that discussions of will, desires and the passions seem
more visibly connected to political and moral theory than questions
concerning cognition, she writes:
Nevertheless, it is the fundamental premise of this
study that moral and even political implications can be
drawn from epistemological theories and their underlying
conceptions of mind; that sometimes, in fact, the ulti-
mate meaning of a theory of mind may be seen as a moral
or political one; and that sometimes epistemology may,
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so to speak, be read as political theory.
Wood supports Unger in arguing that the notion of a connection
between mind and politics does not simply mean that conceptions of
knowledge and mind serve as the foundation for moral and political
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theories. She suggests that theories of knowledge and mind can also be
"derived" from political or moral doctrines. However, she makes no
attempt to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of
such connections, and simply claims to investigate the affinities
between mind and politics, whatever the order of the relationship might
prove to be in particular cases.
The similarity between Wood's and Unger's essays is not confined
to a common emphasis on the importance of the connections between mind
and politics but also extends to their characterizations of and pro-
posals for investigating these connections. Wood suggests that fun-
damental philosophical problems, basic issues in political and moral
theory, and questions surrounding the attempt to construct a science of
politics are tied together because they share a particular pattern or
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mode of thought and logic. The proper focus for the political
theorist attempting to examine such a pattern or mode is the notion of
individualism and the problem of the relationship between man's in-
dividuality and his sociality.
According to Wood, mind and politics are directly connected in
that any conception of individualism is rooted in a conception of
individuality which in turn is connected to philosophical accounts of
the self, of the relationship between the self and the external world,
and of the relationship between the self and other persons. Thus, the
various debates concerning individualism and individuality, which bear
directly on our attempts to understand human nature and social life,
cannot proceed in isolation from a series of philosophical issues
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including the "subject-object relation," the nature of reason and
thought, and the nature of consciousness.
These philosophical issues concerning self and mind, which are
ineradicable elements in any attempt to sketch a coherent account of
individuality or human nature, are linked to the most problematic and
most important concepts used in political discourse and political
inquiry. Wood points to disagreements concerning the nature of human
freedom and the nature of social bonds as the two most significant
examples of this connection.
In short, two of the most fundamental political
concepts
—
liberty and community—can be regarded as two
aspects of the self's relation to other. In other
words, a conception of the self (and, hence ultimately,
a theory of mind) is an implicit unifying factor in
•political theory—uniting two of its most essential
questions ; and liberty and community are two sides of
the same coin. I would argue, then, that certain
theories of mind and the conceptions of the self they
imply tend to encourage or support certain social and
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political ideas.
In short, both Wood and Linger identify the principal connections
between mind and politics as centering in the theories of self, human
nature or individuality incorporated in competing theoretical frame-
works. They contend that at the core of any comprehensive attempt to
construct a theory of politics is a set of assumptions or positions
concerning mind, knowledge, reality and related topics. They further
suggest that these general level philosophical issues must be con-
fronted before we can even begin to discuss the more technical problems
relating to the scientific study of human behavior and politics.
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The Wood-Unger thesis that there are such fundamental and per-
vasive connections between mind and politics clearly challenges the
dominant tendency to assume that modern political inquiry has, by
adopting the scientific method, freed itself from the philosophical
difficulties discussed by traditional political theorists. Since the
plausability of a particular theory of politics rests, at least in
part, on the adequacy of underlying assumptions regarding mind, know-
ledge and the world, philosophy of mind, epistemology and metaphysics
remain important background elements in any attempt to describe or
explain political phenomena.
Moreover, Unger and Wood contend not only that contemporary Anglo-
American social science and social theory continue to rest on such a
set of assumptions, but also that these background assumptions are
fundamentally mistaken. Both theorists argue that the major philos-
ophical underpinnings of the dominant conception of a science of
politics, especially as revealed in its treatment of the notions of
individualism and community, are found in the metaphysics, epistemology
and philosophy of mind articulated by the early British empiricist
philosophers
.
Wood approaches the investigation of the linkages between modern
political science and classical liberal philosophy from an avowedly
Marxist perspective. She states.
In a very important sense, the prevailing trends in
modern especially American social science, particularly
in the last two or three decades, has (sic) represented
a return to early pre-Marxist materialism-empiricism;
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and to the extent that it adheres to the premises of
these earlier doctrines, it tends to secrete similar
social and political values.
Although her critique of these premises is not well organized, the
three major targets of her attack are clearly the prevailing concep-
tions of a science of politics, of society, and of human nature, which
Wood believes are the direct inheritance of classical liberalism. She
attempts to build on the Marxist critique of classical liberal theory,
arguing that these conceptions carry "implicit ideological assumptions"
about the relationship between the study of politics and political
activity, the ideal society, and the nature of human activity and
rationality.
Mind and Politics links "a strong faith in an exact social
science" with the advocacy of liberal doctrines and portrays the modern
"inclination toward a Newtonian science of society and politics" as a
bias inherited from the eighteenth century liberal theorists. ' Al-
though Wood fails to discuss the major philosophical issues connected
with the positivist model of scientific explanation and to confront the
contemporary debate regarding the use of models borrowed from the
physical sciences for studying human behavior and social life, she does
suggest that a blind "faith in precise prediction, quantification and
measurement" has prevented political scientists working within the
liberal tradition from perceiving the basic traditional insights into
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both the subject matter and the enterprise of political inquiry.
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However, her claims that contemporary political science entails a
reduction of human action to animal behavior and that it treats social
forces as if they were natural forces rest not on detailed analyses of
action, causation and related concepts but rather on a sketchy contrast
between the modern emphasis on observable behavior, social roles and
functions on the one hand and Greek and Marxist notions of purposeful
action and human ends on the other. Wood believes that the major
failing of the dominant models and approaches used in American pol-
itical science is their implicit denial of the human capacity to act so
as to alter social reality, giving them a pervasive status quo orien-
tation. This is a central support for her argument that the "empi-
rical" definitions offered by the "new" political science, far from
being value-free or value-neutral, incorporate the basic values of
liberal-capitalist society.
This assault on the "new" science of politics rests on the
argument that the liberal adoption of a mechanistic approach for the
study of social forces and personality destroys the important contri-
butions to our understanding of society and human nature offered by
traditional political theory. Modern political science is charac-
terized as an "atomistic pluralism" which accepts as given the
classical liberal view of society as simply a collection of autonomous
individuals or a web of conflicting interests. As numerous critics of
liberalism have noted, given this view of society, the public interest
or common good tends to be treated as nothing more than the sum of
individual interests or individual desires. Wood emphasizes the extent
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to which this conception obliterates classical and Marxist notions of
shared social purposes and common values which could become the basis
of political activity aimed at social change. Within the liberal
framework, society is pictured as an artificial mechanism designed to
maximize the opportunities for individual want-satisfaction and
politics is reduced to "a regulatory 'homeostatic' mechanism subor-
47dinate to the existing social order."
According to Wood, this mechanistic view of society both supports
and is supported by a mechanistic conception of individuality. Both
the early and modern liberal treatments of thought and action are
portrayed as breaking with the traditional conceptions of man which
recognize "his 'subjectivity,' his creative self-activity, his role as
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a conscious, purposeful actor." The traditional identification of
the essence of human nature with the capacity to act in pursuit of
conscious, rational purposes is contrasted with the liberal treatment
of human purposes and rationality in terms of the maximization of
utilities
.
Game theory and voting behavior studies are cited as illustrations
of the continued reliance of a liberal view of human nature which
equates rational behavior with the most predictable behavior and there-
by reduces human rationality to the "functionality of a machine."
Thus, the basic line of continuity between the "new" political science
and classical liberal theory is found in their common dependence on
"the simplistic psychology of empiricism-liberalism" first formulated
by Hobbes and advanced most uncompromisingly by Bentham. In short, the
47
modern notions of the empirical study of politics, society and human
behavior are underpinned by the same theory of human nature which Marx
exposed as:
. . .
not only scientifically inaccurate in that it
tended to oversimplify the nature of man, but morally
wrong, insofar as it encouraged the treatment of men as
things . . .''^
Mind and Politics is an attempt to trace the central weaknesses of
this view of human nature in particular, and of liberal political
theory and the "new" science of politics in general, to the underlying
empiricist philosophical assumptions regarding self, mind and know-
ledge. Wood focuses in the work of the classical liberals, particu-
larly Locke, Hume and J. S. Mill, who provide the most systematic and
conscious efforts to link liberal political doctrines with an empir-
icist metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. According to
her sketch of the general features of this empiricist framework, its
central feature is that the mind plays an essentially passive role in
"the constitution of experience" or "the creation of the basic con-
5
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stituents of knowledge." The empiricist conceptions of mind and
knowledge therefore rest on the metaphysical notion of "an indepen-
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dently existing given standing over and against the subject." This
view of the mind as only a passive recipient of given experience fails
to provide a base for developing an adequate theory of consciousness
because it "equates consciousness with sensation and feeling and the
kind of awareness they imply. "^^ Moreover, the resulting view of
the
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self as nothing but a bundle of perceptions denies not only "any dis-
tinctive consciousness of self" but also all social and historical
factors in the development of self and consciousness. Thus, since the
self or ego is taken as a universal, ahistorical and presocial "fact of
human existence," the identification of self or ego with egoism and
possessiveness becomes a matter of definition.
Wood's sketchy summaries of the specific theories advanced by the
various liberal philosophers and of the common features of the clas-
sical liberal framework are inadequate. In addition, her critique of
the empiricist account of mind focuses not on objections based on
philosophical analysis or empirical research, but rather on exposing
the "tensions" between the empiricist view of mind and the moral and
political doctrines advanced by the classical liberals. For example,
she argues that the highest and most noble liberal ideals, represented
by Hume's notions of 'community,' and 'sympathy' as well as Locke's
conception of 'liberty' and moral premises, cannot be supported by a
theory of mind which denies any distinctive consciousness of self and
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portrays individuals as being naturally isolated and egotistical.
Certainly, such an analysis of the internal consistency of the
liberal treatment of mind and politics is important. Moreover, Wood's
essay does offer some useful insights into certain of the most sig-
nificant conceptual problems inherent in the early liberal framework.
For example, she suggests that Hume's account of sympathy, which
requires a translation of one's beliefs about the feelings of others
into feelings of one's owi:, is impossible given his own treatment of
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reason as totally separated from the emotions. However, instead of
providing a sustained analysis of the conceptual problems and debates
concerning such topics in philosophy of mind, she concentrates on
sketching a moral and political critique of particular components of
the classical liberal account of mind and politics.
The most solid and convincing parts of this critique of the
liberal theory of mind and politics are those which follow Macpherson's
analysis of possessive individualism, the definition of self through
57the acquisition and possession of property. The argument is that the
modern liberal moral and political framework, as revealed by the
notions of liberty and society, remains bound by the conceptual li-
mitations imposed by the version of individualism which emerges from
the classical empiricist account of mind. She writes,
The model of liberalism is characterized by a conception
of liberty in which human freedom is not incompatible
with subjection even to objective forces external to the
individual; and a conception of community as externa-
lized, perhaps enforced coexistence, assuming atomistic
relationships among individuals and, insofar as indi-
viduality tends to be equated with atomism and priva-
tization, an essential antagonism between individuality
and sociality.
Wood thus links the passive empiricist theory of mind to both a
kind of society in which individuals are treated as role-occupants or
objects and a kind of social theory which functions to justify such a
society. Her main indictment of the empiricist account is that it
supports the reduction, externalization and ob jectif ication of human
life and activity which is characteristic of liberal society and
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liberal political theory. The only foundation for a new society and a
new form of social theory is an alternative account of mind which can
eliminate the basic tensions, particularly that between individuality
and society, pervasive throughout the liberal framework.
Knowledge and Politics is a similar attempt to trace the under-
pinnings of the modern science of politics or society to the classical
liberal philosophical framework, but Unger's analysis of these con-
nections is more comprehensive and more complex than Wood's. Unger
acknowledges that the contemporary social sciences have moved beyond
the classical liberal conceptions of human nature and society where
these conceptions represented an obvious barrier to the empirical study
of the subject matter of a particular discipline. However, he contends
that each discipline has attained at best only a "partial criticism" of
the entire liberal framework:
Each science refuses to accept the premises of liberal
theory that bear most directly on its chosen subject
matter, while continuing to rely, unavowedly and
unknowingly, on principles drawn from other branches of
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the system of liberalism.
For example, while political scientists studying political sociali-
zation have abandoned the classical liberal portrayal of the individual
as a pre-social, autonomous, rational being, they may continue to
incorporate other basic features of liberal psychology which are less
directly connected to their own concerns.
In order to focus on the liberal framework as a whole, we must
begin to view liberalism not simply as a set of political doctrines
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concerning the distribution of power and wealth but as "a metaphysical
conception of the mind and society" as well.^^ Modern political
scientists fail to see the liberal framework in this way because they,
unlike the classical liberals, do not recognize the central connections
between theories of mind and theories of politics. Since contemporary
philosophers and social scientists working in the liberal tradition
remain unaware of these connections, the first problem is one of
attempting to expose the "unreflective view of mind," and of person-
ality and society, which constitute "the premises on which much of our
contemporary philosophy and social science is built. "^^ It is Unger's
contention that these unreflective views of mind and personality are
simply unsystematic and watered-down derivatives of the classical
liberal formulation.
This unreflective view of mind and the liberal theory of person-
ality are analyzed in terms of three "unifying principles" which
characterize empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind. The first
principle, "the principle of reason and desire," portrays the self as
being composed of two totally separate parts, reason and desire, with
desire considered the sole source of activity and motivation in the
personality. Secondly, according to "the principle of arbitrary
desire," desires are not subject to rational criticism or correction
and there is no basis for judging any desire superior to another.
Thirdly, "the principle of analysis," states that human knowledge is
constructed from and can be reduced to the basic building blocks of
elementary sensations or ideas.
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Unger contends that these three empiricist premises regarding mind
and knowledge give rise to contradictions or antinomies which make it
impossible to formulate an adequate theory of personality within the
liberal framework. His critique of these basic features of the em-
piricist account of mind is more comprehensive than Wood's, but it does
not adequately investigate the many problems and topics which it
raises. For example, he attempts to demonstrate that the liberal model
of mind and man cannot satisfy the minimal requirements of any coherent
Co
theory of personality. However, here, as elsewhere, Unger raises
important questions concerning central tenets of the liberal framework,
but he fails to address these questions in the context of a sustained
analysis of the relevant problems and issues in philosophy of mind and
philosophy of action.
The critique of liberal political theory advanced in Knowledge and
Politics focuses on the unreflective view of society which is submerged
in the conceptual framework of contemporary political philosophy and
social science. As before, this unreflective view is presented in
terms of three underlying principles: 1) "the principle of values and
rules" portrays mutual hostility and antagonism as the basic fact of
social existence and champions law, punishment and fear as the only
guarantees of order and liberty; 2) "the principle of subjective value"
treats all values as individual and subjective; and 3) "the principle
of individualism" views a group or community as "simply a collection of
individuals."^^
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Just as the premises of the liberal view of mind will not support
an adequate theory of knowledge or personality, the premises of the
liberal view of society preclude the possibility of arriving at
coherent, adequate theories of legislation and adjudication. Unger
raises a number of objections to these premises or principles which
parallel comments made by other critics of liberal political theory,
but his major emphasis is again on the contradictions or antinomies,
particularly that between values and rules, generated by the liberal
premises
.
Unger perceives a direct connection between mind and politics in
contemporary liberal thought in that the principles of the unreflective
views of mind and society, as well as the resulting antinomies between
reason and desire and between values and rules, are reciprocally inter-
dependent. The major defect of liberal psychology, namely its ren-
dering the moral life as "opaque to the mind," is the "reverse side" of
the central weakness of liberal political theory, its view of society
as being held together by rules and threats rather than shared values
and common beliefs.^^
Moreover, the analytical conception of knowledge and the indi-
vidualist conception of society are "twins" to the extent that they
.
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both reflect an aggregative view of wholes as the sum of their parts.
Thus, according to Unger 's analysis, one cannot fully comprehend the
reciprocal interdependence of liberal theories of mind and politics
without examining the metaphysical views which underpin the entire
liberal framework. The antinomies between reason and desire and be-
tween values and rules can be traced to the more basic antinomy of
theory and fact. In other words, the modern views of mind and society
are grounded in conceptions of nature and science which incorporate the
contradictory positions that all facts are mediated through theory and
that it is possible to independently compare theory with fact.
Finally, all three of these major contradictions within liberal
thought as well as the problem concerning the relationship between
parts and wholes are rooted in the rejection of the traditional
doctrine of intelligible essences and are therefore "expressions of the
en
more fundamental problem of the universal and the particular." These
contradictions, which are evidence of the inadequacy of the modern
liberal conceptions of mind, personality, society, and nature, cannot
be resolved or reconciled within the liberal conceptual framework.
Such a reconciliation requires a radical reconstruction of the basic
premises or our thinking about mind, knowledge, self, society and
nature, beginning with an alternative notion of the relationship
between universals and particulars.
Of course, such an examination of the internal constitution of
liberalism as a system of ideas is considered only a first step toward
the necessary analysis of liberalism as a mode of social conciousness
and a type of social organization. Unger characterizes the liberal
conciousness in terms of a manipulative and instrumental view of man's
relationship to nature, an individualist conception of interpersonal
relationships, and an ambivalent attitude toward a person's work and
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place in the social order. This conciousness represents a seculari-
zation of the idea of transcendence, where the distinction between soul
and body becomes an opposition between reason and desire.
This interpretation of the liberal consciousness is accompanied by
an equally harsh indictment of the liberal social order and the "master
institution" of the liberal state, bureaucracy. Liberal society is
unstable because of the tensions it generates, particularly those
between the principles of class and role and between the experience of
70domination and "the ideal of organization by impersonal rules." More
significantly, liberal society provides no natural basis for the
definition of individuality or community because individuals are iso-
lated and reduced to mere role-occupants.
In short, Unger like Wood perceives moral and political connec-
tions between the liberal-empiricist view of mind on the one hand and a
society which reduces persons to objects and a type of social science
that serves to justify this society on the other. Both critics agree
that the basic tensions, antinomies or contradictions pervasive in
liberalism as a theoretical framework and as a form of social life can
be overcome only with the construction of an alternative society, an
alternative social science and alternative conceptions of mind and
personality.
Wood and Unger regard their critiques of the philosophical frame-
work of liberalism as merely the first step in an attempt to put the
study of mind and politics on a more secure foundation. Both theorists
offer alternative conceptions of knowledge, mind and self which are
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designed to correct the major deficiencies of the liberal-empiricist
framework and to eliminate the tensions or contradictions pervasive
throughout liberal thought and society.
Wood advocates a "Kantian" theory of mind which portrays mind as
being self-active and autonomous by acknowledging the mind's "original
7
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role in the creation of the basic constituents of knowledge." In
contrast to the empiricist account of mind and knowledge which rests on
a dualism of independently existing objects and passively experiencing
subjects, "Kantian" epistemology is characterized as a dialectical
effort to unite subject and object by demonstrating that "... the
object—the objectivity of perception, which is experience— is created
72by the subject and not simply given."
Wood utilizes examples taken from the work of a number of dif-
ferent philosophers and social theorists who are classified as
"Kantians" in her attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the con-
ceptions of mind and self which follow from this epistemological frame-
work. She argues that Kant's distinction between perception and
experience lays the goundwork for an adequate theory of consciousness
by destroying the empiricist identification of consciousness with
sensual awareness and by acknowledging man's experience of himself "as
intelligence, as a free and spontaneous being ..." Rousseau's
conception of compassion and Piaget's notion of the process of rejec-
tion are cited as "Kantian"-based challenges to the Humean dualism of
reason and passion which reestablished the interdependence of intellect
and the emotions. Finally, Piaget's account of ego-development is used
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to illustrate the manner in which the "Kantian" conception of mind
underpins a theory that treats the ego as a social product and connects
infantile egocentrism with a lack of ego-consciousness.'''^
The presentation of this "Kantian" theory of mind is much more
disjointed and far less systematic than the characterization of the
liberal-empiricist theory. Wood suggests that the "Kantian" model
cannot be analyzed using the same methods applied to the liberal model
because it is not a closed system fully articulated in the work of a
few theorists, but rather a "revolutionary process" which begins with
Kant's epistemology and is still being elaborated by developments
within socialism.
The central figure in this process is Marx who transforms the
"Kantian" conception of mind, with its emphasis on "subjectivity," its
reunification of subject and object, and its epistemological theory of
the active subject, into a new theory of society and social action as
well as a new vision of human nature and community. Whereas the empi-
ricist account of mind supports an essentially negative view of human
freedom, an atomistic conception of community, and a perpetual antag-
onism between individuality and sociality,
The contrasting "Kantian" model is characterized by a
conception of freedom as self-activity, autonomy, and
transcendence of objective determination; and a
conception of community as an integral part of the human
psyche, united in consciousness with individuality so
that society and individuality—which here does not
simply mean atomism or privatization, but the impulse
toward self-activity, creativity, and self-
development—are not antagonistic but mutually
^. 74
supportive
.
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Thus the controversy between the empiricist and "Kantian" models is not
merely an "epistemological quibble," but rather an argument about the
nature of personality, community and the proper approach to the study
of human behavior and society.
In sum, Marx's elaboration of the "Kantian" conception of mind is
the basis of: 1) a transformation of liberal or metaphysical indi-
vidualism into Marxist or dialectical individualism which defines both
human nature and freedom in terms of "self-activity, self-creation and
self-realization;" 2) a transformation of civil society into human
society where the dualism between public and private is overthrown and
where people interact as persons rather than role occupants; 3) a
transformation of the tension between individuality and sociality into
a dialectical interaction in which individual self-consciousness and a
sense of community interact and develop in a dynamic process; and U) a
transformation of social theory and social science from a static
justification of the existing social order into a dynamic union of
theory and practice which acknowledges revolutionary practice as a new
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form of social consciousness. Wood interprets Marxist theory as both
a sketch of the political and moral implications of the "Kantian"
theory of mind and an analysis of the requisite social conditions for
implementing these moral and political directives.
Although Unger characterizes Marxism as among the most compre-
hensive and most influential of the "partial critiques" of liberal
thought, he holds that it cannot provide an adequate foundation for a
radically different theory of mind and politics. His own "positive
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program," which is designed to present such an alternative theory,
consists of three parts: the theory of the welfare-corporate state, a
theory of the self or human nature, and the theory of organic groups.
The theory of the welfare-corporate state is an attempt to examine
the basic historical trends or tendencies affecting the liberal
consciousness and the liberal social order. A growing concern for
preservation rather than exploitation of the natural order, a devel-
oping interest in "the idea of communities of shared purpose," and a
tendency toward "the acceptance of the sanctity of one's station and
its duties" are cited as evidence of an emerging rejection of the
7 6dominant transcendent consciousness. In addition, the liberal social
order is portrayed as moving toward a radically new form in that the
principle of role or merit is triumphing over class domination and is
in turn being challenged by the claims of community and democracy.
Although these fundamental changes universally call for a drastic
reformation of liberal philosophical premises and provide the social
conditions to make such a reformation possible, the ultimate forms that
this new conciousness and new social order will take are not completely
determined by historical factors. The emerging conciousness shows
signs of becoming either a secular version of the doctrine of immanence
or a synthesis of transcendence and immanence. Similarly, the emerging
social order reveals competing inclinations toward either increasingly
hierarchial or increasingly egalitarian forms of social life.
Unger concludes that analysis of the contemporary historical and
social situation can only identify the possibilities for future
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development presented by this situation. Since such investigations
cannot provide the guidance necessary if we are to take full advantage
of the choices inherent in our changing modes of life, we must confront
the basic issues of mind and politics: What is human nature or the
nature of the self? What is the nature of the good? What form of
community is conducive to the development of human nature and the good
life?
The remaining part of Unger's "positive program," which revolves
around his theory of self, is an attempt to provide a systematic,
coherent set of answers to these questions. He characterizes his
conception of the self as the "classic" theory of human nature to which
"all the great thinkers of Europe have contributed," citing "special
guidance" from Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel and
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Marx. This theory is comprised of three basic elements: l)the ideal
of harmony which states that the self must be both separate from nature
and at one with it; 2) the ideal of sympathy which means that the self
must be independent of others yet reconciled with them: and 3) the
ideal of concrete universality which establishes an inner connection
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between species and the individual.
These three different aspects of the basic problem of the rela-
tionship between self and the world are presented both as "facts" in
that they "describe striving simplied in the very nature of person-
ality," and as "ideals," in that they are the sole basis for making
political and moral judgements in the absence of divine revelation or
the discovery of "objective" values. In its general form, this
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theory of the self simply states that the self must be both separate
from the world and at the same time reconciled with it.
Knowledge and Politics posits a direct link between the descrip-
tive and the evaluative because a particular theory of good emerges
from this account of human nature or self: "to achieve the good is to
80become even more perfectly what, as a human being, one is." Unger
contends that his theory of human nature and account of the good
incorporate the best of both the liberal and classical theories.
Although the libe^-al approach to the study of human nature properly
focuses on the connections between what we call 'good' on the one hand
and human desires and well-being on the other, it reduces the good to
what people desire, divorces the empirical study of human nature from
ethical discussion of the good life, and ignores the union of self and
world inherent in the ideal of self. The classical approach recognizes
that the term 'good' is more than a label applied to things which
people find desirable, emphasizes the union of self and world, and
attempts to ground moral and political doctrines in a conception of
universal human nature. However, it ignores the social and historical
factors that shape human desires and human values and thus sanctifies
as universal a partial and limited moral vision.
Unger 's "synthesis" of these two views identifies the good with
the development and realization of human nature, characterizing human
nature as being whatever does not arise from domination. It focuses
not on the wants and values of people in particular social settings or
historical periods but rather on examining the circumstances under
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which such wants and values become truly representative of "what is
distinctive to each of them and to mankind as a whole," There is a
"unitary human nature" but it is revealed anad developed in history
through a spiral of diminishing domination and increasing community.
Although Unger's view is, like the classical conception, teleological
,
he insists that it is presumptous to attempt to sketch the final out-
come of this spiral. Both our knowledge of human nature and human
nature itself "evolve in accordance with the dialectic of theory and
politics ."^^
The final part of Unger's "positive program" is an account of the
ideal community which is implied by his theories of self and the good.
The theory of organic groups is designed to state the political im-
plications of this view of the good and to suggest how the ideal self
can be realized in society. Unger argues that we can move toward the
development and realization of human nature only in a universal society
characterized in terms of the following ideas: 1) "the community of
life," focusing on the importance of face to face relationships and
diverse, multi-purpose groups; 2) "the democracy of ends," requiring
the transformation of bureaucracies into communities through a demo-
cratic rather than meritocratic distribution of power; and 3) "the
division of labor," calling for limited specialization and emphasizing
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individual opportunity to experiment with different forms of life.
Although Unger contends that such a vision is not Utopian or irrelevant
to contemporary politics and that philosophy and politics must "join
hands" to develop this theory as a real alternative, he acknowledges
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that the human capacity to achieve the good in history is subject to
fixed limits.
Indeed, the imperfection of human knowledge, human nature and
human society is a central theme in Knowledge and Politics
. Since
neither the ideal self nor the ideal community can ever be fully
realized, they must be regarded as "regulative ideals" rather than as
descriptions of future persons and societies. For example, the problem
of conflict between the individual and the social aspects of person-
ality can never be resolved in a social form of life because community
is, by its very nature, always on the verge of becoming oppression.
Moreover, given that the various notions used to characterize the
ideal self and the ideal society not only conflict but also reflect the
ever-present conflict between universalism and particularism, the
imperfection of knowledge, self and society cannot be finally and
forever resolved on a philosophical plane. For Unger the problem of
universals and particulars is simply the metaphysical aspect of the
problem of the self, and it is the attempt to reconcile the doctrines
of immanence and transcendence, the religious aspect of the same basic
problem, which is the more fundamental issue. In this analysis the
question of human imperfection is ultimately a religious question, and
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Knowledge and Politics ends with the appeal, "Speak, God."
The Need for an Alternative Approach to Mind and Politics
The preceeding section summarizes Wood's and Unger 's analyses of
the connections between mind and politics, their critiques of liberal
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assumptions concerning mind and politics and their attempts to develop
alternative, superior accounts of mind and politics. Their views are
set out in such detail because these two works represent the most
comprehensive and powerful treatments of these issues in relation to
contemporary political inquiry and political theory. They clearly
raise a number of important questions and pose serious challenges to
the prevailing set of philosophical and methodological assumptions in
the social and behavioral sciences. Yet, there are serious defici-
encies in their analyses of mind and politics, and an examination of
these deficiencies provides an agenda of topics and problems which must
be addressed in future discussion of the connections between mind and
politics, or between philosophy and political inquiry.
It is, of course, difficult to assess the kind of fundamental and
comprehensive critique of mainstream political science and political
theory which both Wood and Unger advance. They are, as we have seen,
challenging not only the dominant portrayals of mind and human nature
in the liberal political tradition but also the basic assumptions,
standards, methods and arguments which constitute Anglo-American
analytic philosophy and social science.
Unger, for example, expressly abandons "the heavy-handed though
frivolous sobriety" characteristic of analytic philosophy and insists
that the basic questions confronting philosophy and social theory can
be answered only by adopting a radically different conceptual framework
and a radically different conception of philosophy. Both critics
attack the dominant conception of a social science, contending that it
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is far from value-free because it incorporates liberal-capitalist
ideology, and that it has, by utilizing models borrowed from the
natural sciences, misconstrued the basic relationship between philos-
ophy and the social sciences. Moreover, Wood and Unger maintain that
the study of mind and politics is not an isolated, academic enterprise
but rather an integral part of the project of transforming human
relations, changing social consciousness and reorienting politics.
Their essays call for a drastic redrawing of the boundaries between
theory and practice, and among philosophy, the study of politics,
political action and, in Unger's argument, religion as well.
This kind of confrontation between competing conceptual frame-
works, paradigms or modes of thought raises unique problems and makes
the task of analysis and assessment especially difficult. Perhaps the
best way of getting a handle on the basic issues raised here is to
start by focusing on the alternative theories of mind and politics
advanced by Wood and Unger. After all, both authors utilize their
alternative accounts of mind and politics to provide the ultimate
support and foundation for virtually every other element in their
analyses. Yet, despite the fact that each position is made dependent
upon this claim to have layed out a superior theory of mind and poli-
tics, neither Wood nor Unger presents the kind of evidence and analysis
which is necessary to support such a claim.
Since Wood characterizes her alternative as a "Marxist" social
science constructed on a "Kantian" theory of mind, it would seem that
her "superior" theory of mind and politics is solidly grounded in
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powerful philosophical traditions which do offer coherent alternative
conceptions of knowledge, mind and self. However, instead of carefully
examining and building on Kant's critique of classical empiricist
epistemology and philosophy of mind, she constructs a simplistic
dichotomy which identifies as "Kantian" any theory acknowledging the
active role of mind and which labels as "empiricist" all theories
portraying the mind as passive. According to this categorization,
American pragmatism is "Kantian" in the sense that it recognizes that
mental activity introduces order into the world of conscious experi-
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ence. This is but one example of how Wood, by focusing exclusively
on this active-passive dichotomy, neglects other crucial dividing lines
in philosophy of mind as well as a number of serious problems, such as
those confronting the so-called doctrine of the transcendent will,
which must be addressed in any adequate attempt to support a Kantian
account of mind.
In addition, although Wood also claims to base her alternative
theory of mind and politics on Marxist theory, she simply fails to even
discuss the Marxist or Hegelian analyses of the complex historical,
political and economic factors affecting human knowledge and conscious-
ness. It may be true, as Wood suggests, that the Marxist tradition
corrects a serious liberal deficiency by focusing on the functions of
consciousness and self consciousness, as revealed by the theory of
ideology, in human self-interpretation and action. But Mind and Pol-
itics contains no real examination of the theory of ideology or the
Marxist conceptions of consciousness and self consciousness.
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Moreover, there is no analysis of the most significant debates
within contemporary Marxist discussion of issues in epistemology
, meta-
physics and ethics, and no attempt to support or justify Wood's own
interpretation of Marxism as an anti-materialist, moral indictment of
86the liberal-capitalist system. Finally, since there is no coherent
explanation of how Marx's conception of human nature or individuality
is related to his political and social theory, the connection between
mind and politics in Wood's own "superior" theory of mind and politics
remains fuzzy and ambiguous. In short, her presentation of the philo-
sophical foundation of this "Kantian-Marxist" alternative is strong in
advocacy but extremely weak in analysis.
Wood draws very little support for her theory of mind and politics
from the philosophical underpinnings of Kantian and Marxist theory, but
she relies even less on analysis of central topics in a mainstream,
Marxist or any other approach to contemporary social science. There is
no attempt to demonstrate the superiority or even the adequacy of the
"Kantian-Marxist" approach to mind and politics given our current
understanding of human motivation and behavior and of society and
politics. She fails to consider evidence which might be drawn from the
fields of political science, economics or sociology to support her case
for a "Marxist" social science.
It is clear that Wood chsllenges the standards of objectivity and
empirical veriflability which characterize the dominant conception of a
science of politics, but she nowhere discusses the structure of ex-
planation or the methods and approaches to be utilized in her Marxist
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alternative. Although she discusses the epistemological
,
psycholog-
ical, anthropological and political dimensions of the debate over mind
and human nature, she treats this debate principally in terms of
historical political theory, contrasting the classical empiricists
(including Hobbes
,
Locke, Hume and Mill) with the "Kantians" (including
Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Piaget) . There is virtually no dis-
cussion of most of the major issues dominating contemporary episte-
mology, psychology, anthropology and political science which might have
a direct bearing on her attempt to construct a superior theory of mind
and politics.
In her concluding chapter. Wood states that the controversy over
mind has been "transferred" from philosophy to social science in that
the "passive empiricism" which remains dominant in contemporary social
science is now challenged by a "theory of the creative mind" as ad-
vanced by Chomsky and Piaget. But instead of analyzing Chomsky's and
Piaget's theories or examining the evidence in support of them, she
focuses exclusively on the moral and political significance of the
controversy, which represents "a choice between different designs for
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man's life in society." Wood apparently thinks that such an approach
is appropriate because "ultimately no theory of human nature is empiri-
cally verifiable" and because we must consider the ethical and polit-
ical consequences of accepting a particular conception of man and mind
"after exhausting all 'scientific' evidence available to us at a given
time."^^ However, in Mind and Politics she proceeds as if we should
start with our moral and political conclusions about what human life
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and society should be like and, working from this ideal, construct a
theory of mind or human nature which is compatible with these
conclusions
.
The fact that a particular theory of mind or human nature does
have ethical or political implications does not automatically eliminate
the possiblity that we may discover scientific evidence which supports
or undercuts that theory. Certainly, competing conceptions of mind or
human nature have proved to be not fully testable, but they do fre-
quently incorporate or entail claims which must be assessed in light
of available evidence concerning human motivation and behavior.
Of course, one of the major contributions of Wood's work is its
focus on the conceptual and philosophical questions which must also be
addressed when one is examining and appraising alternative conceptions
of mind and man. But her analysis of the conceptual framework sup-
porting the "Kantian" account of mind and the "Marxian" theory of human
nature is fragmentary and incomplete. The reader does not even get a
clear sense of the conceptual choices involved here, and there is
certainly an inadequate presentation of the case for opting for the
"Kantian-Marxian" model rather than the empiricist conception of
mind
.
In addition, although Wood maintains that normative considerations
are relevant when making a choice between competing theories of mind
and human nature, she does not indicate how this normative dimension is
related to the empirical and conceptual questions concerning mind and
action. She does acknowledge that conceptions of mind and human nature
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must be supported by both sufficient "objective" evidence as well as an
adequate conceptual or philosophical foundation. Thus, it seems clear
that one cannot select a theory of mind or human nature solely on the
basis of its moral and political implications. However, the central
weakness of Mind and Politics is that it sets out her alternative
conception of mind in isolation from such empirical and conceptual
support, focusing almost exclusively on discussion of its moral and
political implications.
Wood's inability to provide a systematic and coherent philoso-
phical foundation for her alternative theory of mind and politics and
her presentation of this alternative in isolation from evidence con-
cerning human mind and behavior have the same root cause. Her analysis
represents a return to traditional political theory not only because
she accepts the notion of a direct connection between mind and politics
but also because she reverts to the standards, approach and mode of
argument used by the classical theorists in attempting to answer the
basic questions concerning mind and politics.
One of the clearest indicators of this return to the traditional
approach to mind and politics is found in Wood's rejection of the
dominant (liberal) conceptions of personality and community, which is
ultimately based upon the claim that:
In the final analysis, whether we approach the problem
(of a conception of human nature) from the point of view
of scientific psychology or philosophical anthropology,
we are left with our own perceptions, or own intro-
spection, our own experience of ourselves through which
we must interpret our data. Any theory of human nature
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must in the end be broken down to an irreducible and
unverifiable element of self-experience.^^
As she makes clear, this "evidence" of self-experience constitutes a
fundamental challenge to behavioral psychology in particular and
empiricist social science in general not because it makes some kind of
conceptual point, such as concerning the role of self-interpretation in
human behavior and human life, but rather because it affirms "a belief
90in man's fundamental creativity."
Wood follows the lead of Wolin, Strauss and other critics of the
"new" political science who anchor their critiques in various inter-
pretations of traditional political theory. She objects to the
interest orientation of liberal political theory and contemporary
political science, arguing that the liberal substitution of the notion
of 'interest' for the traditional concern with 'conscience' and 'soul'
has contributed to the conception of human beings as "externalized
creatures" or objects. The "empiricist" conception of human nature is
attacked as misreading the "evidence" of self-experience, as redefining
man's essence as a "receptacle for interests" and as neglecting man's
true essential nature or "inner being." Her alternative conception is
championed as recognizing sociality, self-realization and spontaneity
as principles which arise from the "inner needs" of "man's creative
nature" and which are known directly and intuitively through self-
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experience
.
This slippage into the terminology associated with the classical
doctrine of essences is neither accidental nor incidental, for Wood
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defends her alternative theory of mind and politics as if she were
writing in the classical period. Instead of examining empirical
evidence and philosophical issues connected to the notions of self-
experience, consciousness, desire, reason, interest and other related
concepts. Wood returns to the kind of a priori philosophical
anthropology which typified traditional political theory.
Unger's discussion of the criteria to be used in choosing a theory
of the self or theory of human nature represents a similar return to
the traditional treatment of mind and politics. Of course, he does
acknowledge that an adequate theory of human nature must be compatible
with an accurate historical analysis of the levels of social con-
sciousness and form of social order found in the liberal, welfare-
corporate and socialist states. Tnis historical analysis is advanced
as a framework for reexamination of theoretical issues which rests upon
a set of empirical claims about the characteristics of and tendencies
within these modes of life. In addition to this "appeal to history,"
Unger like Wood argues that in choosing among competing conceptions of
mind and human nature one must look into oneself and rely on one's own
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experience
.
Yet, Unger stresses that such historical evidence, even in com-
bination with "the evidence of critical self-understanding," does not
provide a conclusive and definitive account of human nature. This is
so principally because human nature itself is basically open-ended,
meaning that there is extensive potential for development toward
different ends inherent in human nature as it now exists. Given this
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open-ended feature of man and mind, the proper focus of any adequate
account of mind and human nature must be upon "our moral interest" as
the central factor in determining which human powers, characteristics
and activities are so essential to human life that they must be further
developed and realized. In other words,
. . . the theory of human nature must build on a moral
vision that partly precedes it but that is constantly
refined, transformed, and vindicated through the
93development of the theory.
The theories of the self, of the good and of organic groups which
are presented in Knowledge and Politics are expressly designed to fill
in the content of this guiding moral vision. According to Unger's own
statement of this task, it represents a full scale return to the
central core of the traditional treatment of mind and politics. He
specifically aligns himself with the mainstream of classical political
theory which views the formulation of an ideal of self and an ideal of
community as theory's "highest calling."
Moreover, Unger contends that his theory of mind and politics,
unified by the theory of good, is not simply an a priori philosophical
psychology or a priori philosophical anthropology. His claim is that
it represents a significant advance over the political theories
advanced in the liberal tradition or generated by positivist social
science which always begin with or assume a static, ahistorical,
abstract conception of human nature.
He contrasts his view of mind and politics with these other
conceptions in the following way:
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Instead, it starts out from the idea that the
distinctive experience of personality is that of
confronting a certain set of intelligible, interrelated
problems that arise from one's dealings with nature,
with others, and with oneself."
It would seem, then, that the investigation of these philosophical and
conceptual problems concerning knowledge, mind and self provides the
foundation for developing an adequate theory of mind and politics.
However, Unger's approach to the connections between mind and pol-
itics makes only a minimal contribution to the analyses of these
problems. Indeed, he cuts his own essay almost completely apart from
all modern attempts to clarify and resolve these issues as well as all
empirical evidence which might be relevant to these topics. He not
only dismisses all of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and the
contemporary social and behavioral sciences as embodying the liberal
account of mind and politics but also rejects Marxian theory, Freudian
psychology, the sociological contributions of Durkheim and Weber and
structuralism as merely "partial criticisms" of the liberal frame-
work.^^ As a result, the positive program set out in the final chapter
is inconsistent with his own statement of the proper starting point for
developing an adequate theory of mind and politics as well as the major
contributions of his earlier chapters. It substitutes a search for a
metaphysical-religious reconciliation or synthesis of opposing doc-
trines, which are themselves products of his own thought, for careful
analysis of philosophical issues concerning knowledge and mind.
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Of course, this is not to say that Unger's call for a "total
criticism" and radical restructuring of the conceptual framework which
continues to underpin liberal political theory and contemporary
political science can be dismissed out of hand. He has identified
certain problematic and contestable assumptions concerning knowledge
and mind in the basic framework used to explain and evaluate political
behavior, processes and institutions. Yet, his own program for in-
vestigating the problems and articulating a superior framework is
itself problematic and contestable.
Unger makes a valid point when he maintains that philosophical
analysis is not the whole of philosophy and that a more speculative
approach which focuses on the connections between mind and politics is
necessary. However, if the type of detailed and technical analysis of
particular problems and concepts which Unger ridicules is not the only
philosophical task, it does seem to be the necessary starting point in
any examination of the connections between issues in philosophy of mind
and epistemology and the study of politics. Without such analysis,
Unger cannot demonstrate the need for an alternative conceptual frame-
work. Moreover, he cannot advance alternative conceptions of self,
knowledge and mind which can be shown to be superior to existing
concepts unless he somehow makes his alternative scheme intelligible by
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relating it to certain of the concepts we already have.
Unger's essay provides such a powerful critique of the conceptual
scheme through which the liberal theorists and contemporary social
scientists classify and characterize human thought and action precisely
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because it does partially undertake such an analysis of those concep-
tual and philosophical issues. But this dimension of his work does not
receive sufficient attention and is ultimately incompatible with his
own vision of the philosopher's task and of the place of metaphysics in
philosophy and political theory.
In place of the "false and nefarious" modern view which severs the
connections between mind and politics linger seeks to construct an
alternative theory of mind and politics that:
. . . bridges the distance from the study of knowledge
to the understanding of individual conduct, from the
understanding of individual conduct to the science of
society, and from the science of society to the exercise
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of political choice . . .
This alternative theory of mind and politics is not systematically
founded on careful examination of issues concerning knowledge, human
motivation and behavior, the structure of scientific explanation, and
of political choice and activity. Rather, it is founded on the kind of
transcendental metaphysics and system-building which characterized the
classical treatment of mind and politics.
Certainly, Unger himself seems to reject the notion of a complete
and perfect picture of ultimate reality sought by transcendental meta-
physics as antithetical to the inherent limitations of human knowledge
and understanding. At the same time, it is this model of transcen-
dental knowledge which is reflected in his own attempt to formulate a
comprehensive theory of mind and politics by reconciling or synthe-
sizing competing philosophical and religious views. His approach to
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the issues of mind and politics turns away from any extensive analysis
of the structure and possible limits of human knowledge and the
implications of this analysis for political theory and political
science, and returns to the classical vision of a theory of politics
based upon that perfect knowledge which can be found only in the
transcendental realm of ideas.
Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics are certainly
significant works because they focus attention on the frequently
ignored connections between theories of knowledge and mind on the one
hand and social, political and ethical theories on the other. As both
authors argue, the traditional political philosophers did recognize the
significance of these connections, especially as embodied in the
conceptions of human nature or individuality which were explicitly or
implicitly incorporated in ethical and political theories. Since
conceptions of human nature or personality remain an essential part of
any conceptual framework used to explain and evaluate political
behavior, the traditional discussions of the conceptual and philo-
sophical issues concerning self, knowledge and mind are still relevant
to political theory and political science.
Moreover, Wood and Unger's indictment of the neglect of these
connections in Anglo-American philosophy and social science stands on
strong ground. Reflecting a powerful positivist influence, analytic
philosophers and contemporary social scientists have standardly
asserted or assumed that there is no connection, either logical or
practical, between doing epistemology or philosophy of mind and the
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study of politics or ethics. Since this exclusion of moral and
political "recommendation" or "attitudes" from philosophy and social
science has been regarded as a major advance over traditional political
philosophy, analytic philosophy and mainstream social science have
typically rejected central elements of the traditional treatment of
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mind and politics as completely mistaken.
Clearly, Wood and Unger challenge certain of the most fundamental
categories and classifications which have been central to analytic
philosophy and the positivist model of a science of politics or
society. They contend that the imposition of these categories and
classifications upon traditional political philosophy has typically
resulted in gross distortion and misrepresentation of traditional
treatments of mind and politics. The embarrasingly crude caricature of
Hegel which has dominated Anglo-American philosophy and political
theory until very recently can be cited as a particularly strong
indicator of such blatant misrepresentation.
However, Wood and Unger seem to suggest that the entire attempt to
develop a scientific theory of human nature or politics as well as the
whole set of distinctions and classifications which mark the "modern"
or "scientific" perspective are simply part of an arbitrary framework
blocking a proper appreciation of traditional theories of mind and pol-
itics. Unger, for example, points to Plato's conception of "a science
of ideals" as overcoming the liberal principle of reason and desire by
.
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denying that what ought to be and what is are not wholly different.
Although he does not advocate returning to this conception, he does
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hold that Plato's failure to differentiate between description and
evaluation in his theory of human nature is a valid approach with equal
standing to those theories of politics which do incorporate this
distinction. He presents a theory of self which is supposed to unite
the best of this Platonic or traditional conception with its "ob-
jective" view of the good and the liberal or modern conception which is
based on a "subjective" view of the good.
This is a fundamentally misconceived notion of how to make use of
what is offered by Plato and other classical theorists' treatments of
mind and politics. The need is not for a synthesis which somehow both
transcends and preserves Plato's views but rather for careful investi-
gation of what his analysis of the connections between mind and poli-
tics can contribute to our understanding of the logic of moral dis-
course, the structure of explanation used in political inquiry, and the
relationship between the two. The basic problem with analytic inter-
pretations of traditional theories of human nature and politics is not
that the liberal conception of human nature rests on a partial truth
which must be reconciled with another partial turth represented by
classical philosophy and political theory, but rather that analytic
theorists have tended to treat the fact-value distinction as a
dichotomy into which all statements about human nature can be neatly
classified.
""^^
Plato and other traditional political theorists make
substantial contributions to our understanding of human nature, ethics
and politics not because their accounts lack such distinctions as that
between facts and values which are recognized in modern philosophy and
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social science, but despite their failure to make these significant
distinctions and the crudeness of their accounts of mind and
psychological theories.
In short, one of the major failings of the Wood-Unger approach to
mind and politics is that they do not address the difficult questions
which arise when we attempt to assess traditional or contemporary
theories of mind, human nature and politics. For example, there is no
real effort to differentiate those essential and ineliminable connec-
tions between mind and politics which are present in any conceptual
framework used to explain and evaluate political behavior from those
illegitimate and improper connections between mind and politics which
were drawn by political philosophers attempting to deduce or derive a
theory of society or politics from a theory of self or mind. In other
words, these authors do not confront in sufficient detail the problems
and topics centering around the concepts of knowledge, mind and action
which, according to their own analyses of mind and politics, must be
faced by the political theorist and the political scientist.
The inadequacy of their analyses of the basic issues surrounding
mind and knowledge is evident in their most extensive and most effec-
tive discussion of these issues, which are found in their critiques of
the liberal-empiricist framework. Since both Unger and Wood believe
that the conceptions of knowledge, mind and self formulated by the
early British empiricists continue to have a pervasive influence in
liberal political theory and mainstream social science, they regard the
critical reexamination of these philosophical doctrines as an essential
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part of the attempt to set out a more adequate account of thought and
action. Here they clearly identify some of the more problematic
features of this empiricist account of knowledge and mind, most notably
the notion of man as simply a passive observer rather than an agent in
the world and the notion of reason as the servant of the passions.
However, their analyses of the basic themes which unified the early
empiricist conceptions of knowledge and mind are not systematic and
comprehensive, as illustrated by their inadequate treatment of such
central components of the empiricist framework as its conception of
self-knowledge. Moreover, despite some promising suggestions, both
authors fail to demonstrate the full force of the connections between
the empiricist accounts of knowledge and mind and classical liberal
political theory.
In addition, both Unger and Wood frequently proceed as if any and
all criticism of the early liberal-empiricist account of mind and poli-
tics applies, totally and without qualification, to contemporary Anglo-
American philosophy, political theory and political science. They
ignore the most important developments in recent linguistic philosophy
as well as the genuine contributions to our understanding of human
motivation and behavior and of social structure and political insti-
tutions which have emerged from the social and behavioral sciences. Of
course, as they argue, it is still possible that the unreflective
assumptions incorporated in the conceptual framework utilized by con-
temporary philosophers and social scientists, while not identical to
the classical liberal view of mind and politics, continue to rest on
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the basic premises and the fundamental core of that liberal view. But
such a claim certainly requires the support of a more extensive
examination of these unreflective assumptions present in contemporary
political theory and political science than is provided by either of
these authors.
The inadequacy of V/ood's and Unger's investigation of the most
crucial issues centering in philosophy of mind is even more prominent
in their presentations of their alternative theories of mind and poli-
tics. Certainly, the attempt to replace the set of unreflective,
liberal assumptions with more coherent, more adequate accounts of
knowledge, mind and action must proceed on the basis of analysis of
issues which cut across metaphysics, epistemology
,
philosophy of mind
and philosophy of action. But Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Pol-
itics ignore or treat cavalierly such topics as the problems concerning
the limitations and possible distortions inherent in the perceiver's or
knower's point of view, the important problems concerning the identi-
fication and classification of mental as opposed to physical phenomena,
and the role of language or a particular scheme of classification in
channeling or limiting human thought or action.
Moreover, the authors neglect or only cursorily address those
problems and topics which lie at the heart of any account of mind or
human nature, including the mind-body problem or the relationship
between thought and action, the special characteristics of self-
knowledge and the role of such knowledge in human behavior, and the
relationship between self-knowledge and empirical knowledge. There is
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also no analysis of the full range of mental concepts from the sen-
sations to the "higher" mental terms such as beliefs and intentions, of
the relationship between reason and the passions, emotions and desires,
of the role of choice and deliberation in human behavior, or of the
basic elements of consciousness and self-consciousness.
Finally and perhaps most crucially since these authors are at-
tempting to generate coherent theories of mind and politics, there is
no careful consideration of the implications of basic changes in our
conceptions of mind and knowledge for political theory and political
science. Most surprisingly, these works fail to make any contribution
to clarifying or resolving those traditional philosophical contro-
versies, as, for example, the free-will determinist debate, which have
been high on the agenda of the historical political theorists. In
addition, there is little real analysis of those concepts such as
freedom and responsibility which are both central to the explanation of
political behavior and the same time linked to the concepts of mind,
knowledge and so on.
More generally. Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics
present a confusing and fragmentary account of the relationship
between descriptive concepts or statements on the one hand and norma-
tive concepts or statements on the other. They make no substantial
contribution to analysis of the relationship between theory and fact in
the social and behavioral sciences, ignoring even the partial and
limited treatment of this relationship present in current discussion of
the problem of the self-fulfilling prophecy or the self-fulfilling
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prediction. Even such general concerns which seem most directly
relevant to their own focus on philosophical issues, such as the epis-
temological situation of the political scientist and how it compares
with the epistemological situation of the political agent, are ne-
glected. In short, these two works make only a minimal contribution to
any adequate discussion of the proper model of political inquiry and of
the structure of explanation and theory in political inquiry.
Unger and Wood may be correct in calling for a radical reformu-
lation of the entire philosophical framework which underpins the
contemporary approach to the study of human action, society and
politics. Moreover, despite the deficiencies of their analyses, they
have demonstrated the need for a reexamination of the basic philoso-
phical and methodological assumptions which underpin the positivist
model of political science. However, the only viable path toward this
systematic reexamination or revolutionary formulation of the conceptual
framework used in the explanation and evaluation of political behavior,
processes and institutions is a detailed investigation of those
conceptual and philosophical issues which reach across metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy
of social science. The return to the kind of a priori philosophical
anthropology or a priori philosophical psychology utilized by the
traditional political philosophers or to a type of deductive meta-
physics aimed at reconciling or synthesizing polar opposites is an
untenable alternative. Systematic and detailed investigation of the
philosophical assumptions of liberal political theory and positivist
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social science is being undertaken from a variety of different phi-
losophical perspectives, including Marxism, phenomenology and exis-
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tentialism. The tragedy of the Wood-Unger approach to mind and pol-
itics is that these authors cut themselves off from all of these more
methodical and extensive examinations of the crucial issues of mind and
politics
.
One of the most rigorous and thorough reevaluations of empiricist
assumptions has been initiated by a number of philosophers and social
theorists working within the analytic tradition. Discussion of issues
in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action remains at the forefront
of contemporary linguistic philosophy, and from this work have emerged
forceful challenges to basic components of the classical empiricist
account of thought and action. Moreover, there are a number of lin-
guistic philosophers or theorists influenced by linguistic philosophy,
most notably Stuart Hampshire, Charles Taylor and Alasdair Maclntyre,
who are exploring the connections between these philosophical issues
and current problems and concerns in political theory and political
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science
.
The focus of the remainder of this essay is on the work of these
linguistic theorists which bears most directly upon analysis of the
connections between mind and politics. The second and third chapters
focus on setting out the essential components of the classical liberal
conception of mind and politics and the basic philosophical and
conceptual assumptions which underpin the treatment of thought and
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action in contemporary political science as these have been charac-
terized and analyzed in recent linguistic philosophy. This approach is
taken because this work, which is completely ignored by Wood and
summarily dismissed by Unger, provides the kinds of systematic and
comprehensive presentation and analysis of both the classical liberal
framework and the contemporary, unreflective view of thought and action
that are lacking in Unger 's and Wood's presentation.
The final three chapters focus even more narrowly on the efforts
of one contemporary linguistic philosopher, Stuart Hampshire, to
formulate an alternative conception of thought and action and to
explore the implications of this revised conception of thought and
action for political theory and political science. From the beginning,
it must be made clear that this concentration on Hampshire's inves-
tigation of these topics does not rest upon any claim, explicit or
implicit, that he provides or even proposes a definitive and complete
resolution of the problems surrounding thought and action. Indeed,
Hampshire himself argues that there are reasons for treating any
philosophy of mind, no matter how systematic and well supported, as
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essentially contestable and open to challenge.
At the same time, his work does exhibit several characteristics
which make it quite valuable to the political theorist or political
scientist who wishes to explore further the connections between mind
and politics. In the first place, Hampshire's approach is a broad-
ranging analysis which focuses on the connections among several issues
and problems concerning knowledge, mind and self, but which is not
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detached from the more detailed and comprehensive treatments of
separate philosophical and conceptual problems or from recent empirical
research in the social and behavioral sciences. Moreover, his own
attempt to set out a more adequate account of thought and action is
thoroughly grounded in a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the
central deficiencies of the classical empiricist framework and of the
most important topics in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy
of action. Finally, in contrast to Wood and Unger, Hampshire's work
offers more sophisticated and more viable accounts of what answers
philosophical analysis can and cannot be expected to supply and of what
standards and criteria must be used in deciding between competing
conceptions of mind and personality.
In addition, Hampshire certainly does not attempt to construct a
unified theory of mind and politics, and he nowhere provides the kind
of systematic statement concerning these connections as is attempted in
Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics . However, a basic concern
with the connections between philosophical and conceptual issues
regarding knowledge, mind and self on the one hand and the most im-
portant issues in social, ethical and political theory on the other is
pervasive throughout his various books and articles. Also, although
Hampshire is interested in and has been influenced by the work of the
traditional philosophers, particularly Aristotle and Spinoza, he is not
solely or even principally interested in examining the theories of mind
and politics advanced by the traditional theorists. His major concern
is with the issues surrounding thought and action as they relate to
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contemporary ethical theory and social inquiry, and he focuses on the
connections between conceptual and philosophical issues and major
questions concerning the structure of explanation and theory in
contemporary social inquiry. In short, his analyses of such topics as
the relationship between explanation and evaluation or the relation
between theory and fact in social inquiry set the examination of the
connections between mind and politics on a much more substantial
foundation than is provided by Wood or Unger.
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diversity in the philosophical thought of the medieval period is
illustrated by the range of positions from realism to extreme
nominalism offered in discussions of universals and particulars.
Likewise, portrayals of human nature and politics ranged from
Augustine's emphasis on the need for a divine remaking of a human
nature corrupted in the Fall, on Tightness of will rather than
intelligence as the path toward realization of the limited
capacities inherent in human nature, and a generally pessimistic
view of the civil state to Acquinas' treatment of divine grace as
a natural step in the fulfillment of human nature rather than a
remaking of it, emphasis on man's rational capacities for under-
standing the natural law, and generally optimistic view of human
nature, society and the state.
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CHAPTER II
THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL TREATMENT OF MIND AND POLITICS
The Cartesian Spectatorial Account of Knowledge
The classical liberal account of mind and politics emerged during
the heyday of mind and politics. This account is most explicitly
formulated in the work of Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill, who com-
bined an interest of social, ethical and political issues (as the
founders of liberal theory) with a concern for resolving central philo-
sophical problems (as the founders of the empirciist tradition). Thus,
the liberal theorists, like the classical thinkers, perceived a direct
relationship between fundamental problems in metaphysics, epistemology
and philosophy of mind on the one hand and the study of human nature,
morals and politics on the other. Yet, although they acknowledged the
significance of the connections between mind and politics, they strong-
ly objected to the specific theories of mind, human nature and politics
which had been advanced by the classical and medieval philosophers.
The British liberals attacked not only the content of traditional
views of reality, mind and knowledge but also the manner in which
earlier philosophers had posed and attempted to resolve basic problems
in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and epistemology. Like the rationa-
list philosophers of the seventeenth century, the liberal-empiricist
philosophers rejected the traditional conceptions of philosophy and
science as incompatible with the new understanding of man and the
universe emerging from the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and
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seventeenth centuries. The classical liberal accounts of self, know-
ledge and mind represented a systematic challenge to the entire philos-
ophical framework within which classical discussion of mind and pol-
itics had proceeded since Plato.
It was, of course, the Copernican revolution that marked the
fundamental break with the classical and medieval conceptual framework
which identified the real world with certain ideas or powers lying
beyond the physical world. The work, which was begun by Copernicus,
continued by Galileo and Kepler, and culminated in Newton destroyed
this view of the universe and of man's place in and knowledge of it.
The real world was increasingly viewed not as a hierarchical order of
meanings, essences or purposes which could be known through deductive
metaphysics or religious insight but rather as a series of contingent
1
correlations linking different observable phenomena.
The Aristotelian view of explanation in terms of final causes or
purposes and as exposing the essential nature of a thing was replaced
by a model of explanation which applied mathematics and precise methods
of measurement in attempting to account for the efficient causes of
particular events. The new scientific or experimental method champion-
ed the notion that theories must be testable, excluding the traditional
attempts to explain why things must be as they are on the basis of
unknowable final causes. According to this alternative model of ex-
planation, to explain is to reduce a complex whole into its basic parts
and then examine how the various parts are combined to form or function
2
as a whole.
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This combination of a new method of explanation and the atomistic
metaphysics associated with the scientific revolution undercut the
classical and medieval notions of the special status of man in the
universe and the special nature of the study of human nature, morals
and politics. Man lost his unique standing as a creature close to the
top of the hierarchical natural order and became simply one creature
among many. Human nature was increasingly viewed not as the product of
an overall design or as the fulfillment of ideal ends or purposes but
rather as a more or less coincidental and mechanistic arrangement of
certain parts and functions.
Accordingly, a proper understanding of the nature of man could
only be the product of a scientific study of human motivation and
behavior, not a search for essential qualities or powers. Moreover,
the scientific or experimental method increasingly came to be seen as
the single valid method of acquiring knowledge. Especially after
Newton, the attempt to construct an adequate account of human nature
became identified with the attempt to provide mechanistic explanations
of observable processes and behaviors.
Of course, it was generally acknowledged that man continued to
have a somewhat special status because he could gain direct access to
the workings of his own mind through introspection or reflection.
However, these "internal" contents of consciousness were typically
viewed as a given set of "ideas" or phenomena which could be studied in
the same way that we examine objects in the "external" world. More-
over, although Newton and most of the other early proponents of these
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mechanistic and atomistic views of man and mind actually held some
variant of dualism which left room for the "spiritual" aspects of human
nature emphasized in Christian thought, the new method of inquiry they
championed tended to ignore or make this "spiritual" half of hunan na-
ture superfluous.
One of the leading advocates of this new scientific approach to
human nature was Hume who sought to apply Newtonian methods to the
investigation of human knowledge and the human mind. His goal was to
develop a Newtonian theory of mind based upon the universal, scientific
principles which govern the workings of the mind. According to this
conception, which was widely shared by the liberal theorists, philos-
ophy became a kind of general science of the mind. The attempt to go
further by entering speculative philosophy and making deductions con-
cerning the ultimate nature of reality was rejected as a violation of
Newtonian methodology. Thus, Hume's philosophy aimed at becoming a
truly experimental science of human nature. He held that only such a
science of human nature could provide the foundation necessary for
testing the speculative conceptions of mind and man advanced by the
classical, medieval and rationalist philosophers.
Hume perceived the attempt to arrive at a true understanding of
human nature or mind not as an isolated, autonomous discipline but
rather as providing the basis for resolving the central problems of
ethical and political theory. The application of the methods of the
natural sciences to the study of mind and human nature was to have a
direct and immediate impact upon morals and politics. Hume believed
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that an understanding of the passions which move men to act and of the
conflicting impulses and instincts inherent in human nature would
provide a groundwork for the construction of political arrangements
providing stability, order and peace. This conception was represen-
tative of the general liberal view of the connections between mind and
politics. Although the speculative philosophers were not mistaken in
attempting to draw such connections, their pre-scientif ic , a priori
accounts contributed little to our understanding of mind and politics.
The classical liberal theorists held that we must utilize a scientific
approach to the study of human nature if we are to answer the funda-
mental questions concerning mind and knowledge and provide workable
solutions to ethical and political problems.
The liberal-treatment of mind and politics cannot be understood
apart from this transition from the classical-medieval to the modern
views of reality, nature and man. At the same time, the dominant
portrayal of this transition as merely a by-product of the emergence of
the empirical sciences from speculative philosophy or as simply a
progression from the darkness of metaphysical-religious illusion to the
light of established scientific fact is fundamentally mistaken and
misleading. The acceptance of the scientific method and of certain
conclusions reached through its application does not mark the final end
of the age of philosophy and the beginning of an age of science wherein
all philosophical problems disappear automatically.
Although it is true that the scientific revolution represented a
devastating challenge to the classical portrayal of the scope and
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methods cf philosophy, it is also true that it raised a series of
complex problems spanning metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of
mind. The seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers were pri-
marily concerned with epistemological questions about the existence of
other minds, the reality of the external world, the possibility of a
Pi^iori knowledge, the nature of sensation, the role of introspection
and related issues which were directly related to the attempted appli-
cation of the scientific method to the study of knowledge, mind and
human nature.
The transition from the classical to the modern framework for
viewing knowledge, mind, self and man's place in the universe is tied
not only to the scientific revolution but also to a closely-related
epistemological and conceptual revolution. As Charles Taylor notes,
one way of looking at this transformation in the basic conceptual
framework is to interpret it as "an epistemological revolution with
anthropological consequences."^ The liberal attempt to put the study
of man, mind, morals and politics on a solid, scientific foundation
does entail a drastic redefinition of human nature or self. This
redefinition of human nature, which is a central feature of liberal
political and ethical thought, is underpinned by a conceptual and epis-
temological revolution as well as the scientific revolution.
In the classical and medieval framework, the soul or mind was
considered a reflection of the cosmic order, human knowledge resulted
from rational contemplation of the order of ideas, and man was defined
in terms of his assigned station in the natural order. In the emerging
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framework, the human mind was increasingly viewed in terms of experi-
ence and consciousness which are private and unique to each individual,
human knowledge was obtained through an individual effort to work
"outward" from the given contents of one's own consciousness, and man,
who was considered an individual first and foremost, was self-defining
in that there was no pre-established place for him in the natural
order. The classical philosophers simply did not share these views of
private experience, consciousness, individuality and self which have
been central parts of the conceptual framework common to Western phi-
losophers and political theorists since the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Tne theories of knowledge and mind advanced by the early
British empiricists were essential features of the redefinition of
human nature which stood at the very center of liberal political and
ethical theory.
As we have seen, Wood, Unger and other traditional critics of this
liberal framework suggest that the basic problem here is the liberal
adoption of a scientific methodology which neglects or negates the
spiritual or essential characteristics of human beings recognized and
emphasized by the classical theorists. This is a misleading and mis-
directed objection to the liberal framework which does not come to
terms with the central issues involved in this liberal reorientation of
philosophy and political theory or the crucial questions regarding the
connections between mind and politics.
The real source of potential problems in this liberal approach to
mind and politics is not simply that it attempts to be scientific, but
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rather that it ultimately rests on the same kind of contestable phil-
osophical positions and assumptions as do the classical theories of
mind and politics. The proper question is whether this approach, which
attempts to utilize the scientific method but which still relies on
fundamental conceptual choices and philosophical doctrines, is adequate
to the task of identifying, classifying and explaining the central
components of human motivation and behavior. This question cannot be
answered without critical analysis and assessment of the empiricist
conceptions of knowledge, mind and self which underpin the liberal
explanation and evaluation of politics.
The early liberal conceptions of knowledge, mind and politics
cannot be understood apart from the fundamental epistemological refor-
mulation initiated by Descartes. Descartes can be considered the first
"modern" philosopher in that he offered one of the earliest, most
comprehensive and most influential attempts to resolve the epistemolo-
gical and metaphysical questions tied to the advances in the sciences
and mathematics. Although he did want to reconcile the new framework
which was emerging from work in mathematics and the sciences with
Christian theology, Descartes was not concerned with mind and politics
in the same sense that he had no major interest in the political and
social issues of the time. However, his proposed solution to basic
philosophical difficulties left a lasting imprint on all successive
theories of mind and politics.
For example, he articulated new standards of argument and proof as
he attempted to reform all traditional areas of rational inquiry,
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including philosophy, by introducing the rigor characteristic of mathe-
matics and the sciences. In addition, he made epistemological ques-
tions about the basis of human knowledge rather than metaphysical
questions about the nature of the world the starting point in philos-
ophy. Finally, Descartes firmly established the "egocentric approach"
by making the question "What do I know?" the basic and most fundamental
7question of philosophy.
According to the Cartesian method of doubt, this question can only
be answered by breaking down all complex "ideas" into their component
parts and, by systematically rejecting all "ideas" against which one
can imagine the least ground of doubt, uncovering certain "clear and
distinct ideas" which provide an indubitable and certain foundation for
human knowledge. He notes that it is possible to doubt that one's
perceptions actually correspond to the real world or that one actually
has a body. However, a person cannot doubt his own existence because
he must exist in order to entertain this doubt.
In short, cogito ergo sum is the basic indubitable proposition
which places human knowledge on a solid and secure footing. The at-
tempt to prove the existence of the external world, of one's own body,
or other "ideas" which are not self-guaranteeing must proceed like a
mathematical proof beginning with the contents of one's own conscious-
ness. Of course, Descartes 's argument incorporates a transcendental
step, for he uses his proof of God's existence as the ultimate guaran-
tee that we are not substantially deceived in our beliefs about the
existence of the world and our bodies.
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For the most part, the leading philosophers of the seventeenth
century continued to work within the confines of the rationalist frame-
work articulated by Descartes. They followed Descartes in viewing the
basic materials of human knowledge, including knowledge of the external
world, as "ideas" originating in the understanding or intellect rather
than in sense experience. According to the rationalist doctrine of
innate "ideas," the mind is pre-equipped with certain "ideas" such as
"God," "mind" and "matter" and does not have to derive them from expe-
rience. In addition, the rationalist philosophers of the seventeenth
century generally accepted the Cartesian vision of all human knowledge
as a single, unified, deductive system, resting upon basic propositions
discoverable through reason. They attempted to examine this hierarchi-
cal order of propositions central to metaphysics and epistemology by
utilizing the rigorous techniques of the mathematician.
The eighteenth century empiricist philosophers challenged this
rationalist framework as well as the medieval perspective it sought to
replace as fundamentally out of step with the basic insights offered by
advances in the sciences. One of the main targets of the classical
British empiricists was the rationalist notion that there are "ideas"
with which we are born or which are presented to us by an undeceiving
God. According to the empiricist position, illustrated by Locke, all
"ideas" were ultimately derived from sense experience.
Locke held that although there are complex "ideas" which may
involve the mind in some active sense, these complex "ideas" are ul-
timately reducible to simple "ideas" which are the products of sense
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experience rather than original contributions of the mind. In general,
the British empiricists acknowledged two kinds of such simple "ideas."
First, they recognized "external" sensations, or what Locke labeled
"ideas of sensation," which involve the use of sense organs, give us
information about the external world and are fully sensuous in nature.
In addition, they focused on "internal" sensations, or "ideas of re-
flection" in Locke's terminology, which, while not involving sense
organs, similarly allow us to "perceive" our own internal states (feel-
ings, pains, etc.) and our own mental operations (thinking, believing,
9hoping, etc.). Our knowledge of these simple "ideas" or sensations,
whether external or internal, was considered direct, immediate and
certain.
Given this view that we can know things only through our sense
impressions of them, it is clear that the empiricists could not accept
the rationalist conception of the body of human knowledge as a deduc-
tive system, based upon certain propositions discovered through reason.
The British empiricists regarded this rationalist account of the source
and structure of knowledge as fundamentally misconceived as the medie-
val view of metaphysics as a science of the final causes of things.
This notion that a priori reasoning cannot establish anything about the
nature of reality has been one of the central unifying themes in the
empiricist tradition
.
Although there were and are a number of significant disagreements
among empiricists concerning the details of a theory of knowledge, the
empiricist philosophers have generally held that all human knowledge
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can be constructed out of or built up from certain basic, indubitable
elements given in our sense experience. The simple "ideas" or sensa-
tions which can be known directly by acquaintance have been treated as
the building blocks out of which the rest of human knowledge can be
constructed. Our knowledge of external objects, according to this
account, must remain indirect and derivative. All that we can properly
claim to know is ultimately based upon or reducible to the association
of certain "ideas" with basic sensations, to experience at its most
1
1
fundamental and primitive level.
The empiricist rejection of the rationalist accounts of the
materials of knowledge and of the foundations of our body of knowledge
pointed Anglo-American analytic philosophy in a direction which is
radically different from and fundamentally opposed to developments in
continental epistemology and metaphysics. At the same time, there are
important similarities in the epistemological frameworks utilized by
the rationalist and empiricist philosophers which are neglected if one
focuses exclusively on empiricist efforts to fill in details of the
attempted construction of all knowledge out of sense impressions.
After all, the classical empiricists followed Descartes in con-
sidering epistemology rather than metaphysics the correct starting
point in philosophy. They like Descartes set themselves the task of
formulating a final answer to the challenge of skepticism by locating a
source of knowledge which is free from the possibility of error and
certain. Moreover, the British empiricists incorporated the egocentric
approach which is tied to the Cartesian method of doubt. In short.
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although they rejected Descartes' transcendental and deductive solu-
tion, the empiricists followed him in making the search for certainty
an appeal to a form of direct personal verification provided by the
1
2
data of consciousness.
The classical empiricists offered a different path to the goal of
certain knowledge, but the basic framework within which they confronted
epistemological issues remained fundamentally Cartesian. In a sense,
both Descartes and the early empiricists worked within the confines of
a standard account of knowledge which had been dominant since Plato and
Aristotle. Richard Rorty, a contemporary analytic philosopher, labels
this account the "spectatorial" account of knowledge and characterizes
it as maintaining:
. . . that the acquisition of knowledge presupposes the
presentation of something "immediately given" to the
mind, where the mind is conceived of as a sort of "im-
material eye," and where "immediately" means, at a
minimum, "without the mediation of language."
The central common feature of the Cartesian and empiricist epistemo-
logical frameworks is the systematic and uncompromising formulation of
this spectatorial account found in the "doctrine of ideas" or "way of
14
ideas" advanced by Descartes and taken over by the empiricists.
Both the seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers portrayed
"ideas" as the objects of the mind when it thinks, where thinking
includes sense perception and sensation. In fact, the term 'ideas' was
used to label a category which includes sense perceptions, sensations,
passions, mental images, thoughts, concepts, and propositions. This
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conception of 'ideas' contained, implied or supported certain views of
the relationship between the self and the external world, the relation
between the self and other persons, the relation between body and mind,
as well as other issues central to any account of human nature. Al-
though there was a significant shift in terminology as empiricist phi-
losophers adopted an increasingly sophisticated classification of
mental terms, the spectatorial account of knowledge as embodied in the
"doctrine of ideas," with its corresponding views of mind and man,
remained a central part of the empiricist framework.
There are as Rorty suggests, three principal elements in this
Cartesian spectatorial account, as it appears in the "doctrine of
ideas," which bear directly on philosophy of mind. The first of these
three elements is the notion that "ideas" are objects which are im-
mediately given to the mind. As we have seen, Descartes' attempt to
resolve the problems concerning human knowledge proceeds from his proof
of his own existence and subsequent examination of the "ideas" which
are present in his own consciousness.
The fundamental assumption in this Cartesian approach is that the
correct starting point is the ego to which only "ideas" are present.
An "idea" is any object which can be contemplated by the Cartesian ego,
but it is an object of a very special kind in that it is supposed to
carry no "existential commitment" to anything besides the ego presented
with such an "idea." Thus, "ideas" are objects which can be con-
templated without logical commitment to anything other than the con-
templating ego. Moreover, for Descartes, "ideas" are the paradigm case
Ill
of objects because they are the objects which mediate or form the
interface between the ego and the external world The existence of
objects or other egos in the external world can only be established by
working "outward" from those "ideas" which are immediately given to the
isolated Cartesian ego.
The classical empiricists followed Descartes in treating "ideas"
as the objects which are immediately given to the mind. Locke, for
example, states:
Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath
no other immediate object but its own ideas, which
it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our
17knowledge is only conversant about them.
In similar fashion, Hume argues that only "perceptions or impressions
1
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and ideas" are immediately present in the mind. As we have seen, the
British empiricists reject the notion that any of these "ideas" are
innate and contend that all complex "ideas" are formed by combining,
with the help of memory and imagination, "ideas" which we have acquired
through experience. The focus in the empiricist tradition thus in-
creasingly shifts from "ideas" to sensations, impressions, sense expe-
riences or what come to be called sense data.
Yet, although the terminology of "ideas" is gradually replaced by
the language of sense experience, the Cartesian notion of basic units
which are immediately given or directly present to consciousness re-
mains. The empiricists continue to assume that what we experience is
presented individually in the form of atomic units, whether "ideas,"
impressions or sense data. These atomic units are supposed to carry no
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"existential commitment": a description of them is a description of
how things appear to the individual with no strings attached to any
1
9
external reality. Sense experience, which is taken to be private,
simple and incorrigible, becomes the interface between the Cartesian
ego and the external world. The existence of objects and persons in
the external world can only be established by working "outward" from
the foundation of experience which is immediately given to the
Cartesian ego.
A second element in this variant of the spectatorial account of
knowledge is the view of the mind as some kind of "immaterial eye=' and
of reason as some form of mental vision. Descartes systematically
incorporates this notion of an inner mental vision, which is suggested
20by various expressions in ordinary discourse, into his theory of
knowledge. This conception of mental vision does not follow simply
from a mistaken identification of "ideas" with images, although both
Descartes and the British empiricists do often treat "ideas" as if they
were images or pictures. Rather, the central feature of this view is
21
the conception of "ideas" as the objects of an inner mental vision.
Descartes explicitly compares the processes involved in "mental in-
tuition" to the visual process and argues that a person must examine
his "ideas" by "isolating them from each other and scrutinizing them
22
separately with steadfast mental gaze."
In the Cartesian spectatorial account of knowledge, vision becomes
the one model for viewing our thinking and reasoning processes.
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Thought and reason are simply efforts to "see" more clearly and dis-
tinctly the idea-objects which are immediately given to consciousness.
In Descartes' work this notion of intellectual vision is linked to his
treatment of perception as largely a rational process of seeing through
something or "the active rendering of the object transparent to the
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mind."^
Moreover, Descartes' portrayal of this inner vision is tied to his
contention that our inner perception can take one to a direct, immedi-
ate awareness and understanding of his own essential nature.
Descartes' belief that a person can have, in Norman Malcolm's words, "a
clear and distinct perception of himself as a thinking and unextended
thing," is an essential component of his view of the essence of human
nature as a thinking, noncorporeal thing or substance. However, the
fundamental assumption underpinning this conception of an inner mental
vision is the portrayal of the attempt to understand one's own mental
processes and states as a process parallel to visual perception of the
external world.
Although the empiricist philosophers offer a radically different
account of perception and reject the Cartesian claim that man can have
a direct and immediate awareness of his essential self as a thinking
being, they remain committed to this model of mental vision as appro-
priate for discussing the acquisition of knowledge about the workings
of one's own mind. Such observation of our mental operations is,
according to the classical empiricists, a fundamental source of our
simple "ideas." Locke, for example, argues that we obtain our "ideas"
of doubting, imagining, remembering and other mental processes by
observing the performance of these processes in our own minds.
This notion of an inner perception of the workings of one's own
mind, which Locke calls "reflection" and by the late nineteenth century
was commonly termed "introspection," is a central theme in empiricist
epistemology and philosophy of mind. The British empiricists follow
Descartes in making this notion of an inner mental vision, a non-
optical "look" at what is happening in one's own mind, a principal part
of their portrayals of self-awareness and self-knowledge. The class-
ical empiricist epistemological framework retains as one of its most
fundamental assumptions this Cartesian view that human beings can
perceive the contents of their own minds in much the same way that they
perceive objects in the external world.
The combination of this view of "ideas" as the only immediate
objects of the mind and the notion that we become aware of our "ideas"
through a form of mental vision clearly has significant implications
concerning the relationship between words and ideas or between language
and thought. Indeed, a third major element in the Cartesian specta-
torial account of knowledge is the view that we can become directly
aware of our "ideas" without the mediation of language. Clearly the
whole point and purpose of the Cartesian method of examining our
"ideas" with "a steadfast mental gaze" is to leave behind the dis-
torting effects of words, particularly those in the Aristotelian-
medieval conceptual framework, and put ourselves directly in touch with
our own "ideas."
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According to this Cartesian account, it is the philosopher's task
to strip away the artificial layer of public discourse in order to
uncover the basic chain of "ideas" which is inner, mental discourse.
Thus, the Cartesian framework advances the fundamental claim that an
individual can break out of the system of identification and class-
ification embodied in his language and find direct, intuitive knowledge
of his own "ideas." The key assumption which underpins this claim is
the view of thought as solely a matter of internal, mental discourse,
conceptions or "ideas" which are prior to and, at their most funda-
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mental level, completely autonomous from public language.
Whereas Descartes only lays the groundwork for or at most suggests
such a view of the relationship between thought and language, the
classical empiricists fully articulated the view, in Malcolm's words,
2 g
"of language standing in a purely external relation to the speaker."
Locke, for example, seems to hold that words are simply marks or labels
for "ideas" in the speaker's mind. He states.
Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand
for nothing but the idea in the mind of him that uses
29
them
.
Such a conception of words as labels necessarily presupposes that there
are "ideas," mental states or experiences which exist prior to and
independently of our knowledge or our labeling of them. Locke states
in general terms what must also apply to an individual's use of mental
terms: "In the beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the
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idea before one gave it a name."^ Locke thus illustrates the classi-
cal empiricist tendency to view the function of language as narrowly
restricted to the inner recording of one's own "ideas" and to the
attempt to communicate such "ideas" with others.
This classical empiricist view of the relationship between lan-
guage and thought raises a number of serious problems which have been
addressed repeatedly by succeeding philosophers in the empiricist
tradition. For example, since the matching of mental terms and "ideas"
results from each individual's reflecting on or introspecting his own
private stock of "ideas" and is purely an individual matter, the ques-
tion of whether different persons are using the same words to label the
same "ideas", a prerequisite of communication, must be confronted. In
short, the very possibility of communication remains problematic as
long as one remains within the confines of this spectatorial framework.
In addition, given that a person's "ideas" are, in Locke's words,
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"all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others" and
that one can have direct knowledge of his own "ideas" only, the sole
basis that one could have for believing in the existence of other minds
with similar "ideas" is reasoning by analogy. Thus, this spectatorial
framework seems to lead directly to solipsism, a position which holds
that one has no solid ground for supposing that there are "ideas,"
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thoughts or experiences other than his own. These are but two of a
whole series of interrelated problems which flow directly out of this
third component of the spectatorial account of knowledge s-t out by
Descartes and the early empiricists.
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Much of the criticism of the empiricist epistemological framework,
particularly within recent linguistic philosophy, has centered around
the conception of the relation between thought and language presented
in the standard empiricist formulation that words signify "ideas."
Numerous objections have been raised against this account of human
knowledge which focuses exclusively on individual "ideas," sensations
or experience and which severs the connections between knowledge and a
shared public language and a shared public world. Ian Hacking, for
example, has argued that the major problem with the empiricist account
of the relationship between thought and language is not simply that the
empiricists held a crude referential theory of meaning, but rather that
they "had no theories of meaning of the sense now given to the
phrase.""^ Hacking's point is that theories of meaning have to do
"with the essentially public features of language," and the classical
empiricists' acceptance of a Cartesian conception of "ideas" as im-
mediate private objects of an inner mental vision precludes the con-
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struction of such a theory.
Like Descartes, the early empiricist philosophers set out a kind
of "epistemological individualism" which assumes or asserts that the
source of all knowledge lies within the individual mind and its private
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mental discourse of "ideas" or the sensations which it receives. In
this Cartesian-empiricist spectatorial account of knowledge, the in-
dividual knower is abstracted from the linguistic and social context
within which he experiences, perceives and acts in the world around
him. This epistemological framework is linked to the approach to the
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study of politics and society utilized by the classical liberal the-
orists and to liberal political theory in general in a variety of dif-
ferent ways. In particular, the epistemological conception of the in-
dividual knower as a passive recipient of "ideas" or experiences di-
rectly supports the conception of individualism which permeates early
liberal political theory. Thus, the account of mind which flows out of
this epistemological individualism constitutes the most powerful and
most visible of the complex connections between the empiricist epis
temological framework and liberal political theory.
The Classical Empiricist Account of Mind
The Cartesian-empiricist spectatorial account of knowledge con-
tains, implies or supports a series of themes which are central com-
ponents of the general account of mind shared by the early British em-
piricists. In particular, there are four major themes in empiricist
philosophy of mind which flow from this epistemological individualism
and which provide central components of the view of human nature that
underpins classical liberal political theory. The themes are: 1) a
dualistic account of the relationship between mind and body, 2) the
notion that consciousness is given and transparent, 3) the view of
reason as the servant of the passions, and 4) the portrayal of self-
knowledge as being no different in kind from knowledge of the external
world. The tenability of the liberal account of human nature in par-
itcular and liberal theory in general is heavily dependent upon the
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coherence and adequacy of these central components of the empiricist
account of mind.
The problematic dualistic account of the mind-body relationship,
which has dominated empiricist philosophy of mind and the treatment of
thought and action in the liberal political tradition, is closely tied
to the spectatorial account of knowledge formulated by Descartes and
the early empiricists. This is not to say that Descartes and the em-
piricists introduced dualism, for both philosophical discussion of and
ordinary discourse about knowledge and mind contained dualistic ele-
ments long before the philosophical contributions of the seventeenth
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and eighteenth centuries. Moreover, in modern discourse we continue
to distinguish between "physicalistic" statements describing physical
events
,
properties and processes which can be made about any physical
object including the human body and "mentalistic" statements describing
thoughts, feelings and motives which can only be made about people or
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beings to whom we attribute consciousness. However, the Cartesian-
empiricist epistemological framework does entail a particular version
of mind-body dualism which reaches far beyond any dualist conception
implicit in ordinary usuage and which has exerted a tremendous influ-
ence on the portrayal of human thought and action in the liberal tra-
dition .
This Cartesian-empiricist account of the mind-body relationship
emerges directly from the spectatorial account of knowledge which
portrays the construction of the existence of persons and physical
objects out of "ideas" or sense impressions as a purely intellectual
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operation. This epistemological framework explicitly legislates a
division between an "outer" world and an "inner" world and charac-
terizes each in detail. The "outer" public world consists of persons
and objects and our knowledge of these remains derivative, inferential
and uncertain. In contrast, the "inner," private world consists of
"ideas" and sense impressions, our knowledge of which is direct, im-
mediate and certain.
The body belongs, of course, in the former world because it is
located in space, subject to physical laws and can be perceived by
outside observers. In contrast, the mind occupies the latter world
because it is a bodiless, nonspatial "thing" which is pre-stocked with
private "ideas," experiences and impressions and ultimately independent
of the physical world. Although this dualistic account does not auto-
matically rule out the possibility that both mind and body are united
in the whole person or self, it consistently portrays mind and body as
essentially separable. In addition, in that the spectatorial account
pictures the construction of the physical world as a purely intellec-
tual process and presents man as primarily a passive spectator in the
world, it tends to identify mind as the central or essential component
of the self.^^
One of the primary objectives of Descartes' dualistic account is
to reconcile the apparent incompatibility of the Christian emphasis on
human spirituality and the soul with the emerging scientific framework
which seeks to provide mechanistic explanations for all phenomena. He
argues that there are two basic kinds of things in the world, thought
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and matter, neither of which can be reduced to or explained in terms of
the other. Human beings are special in that they are combinations or
unions of minds which think and bodies which are subject to the un-
iversal laws of the physical sciences.
Although Descartes recognizes that mind and body interact and even
suggests that such interaction might take place in the pineal gland, he
insists that mind and body are essentially distinct and fundamentally
different substances. He thus rejects the Aristotelian notion that it
is soul or mind which makes the body alive. In the Cartesian account,
the body is a purely mechanical system, and we can explain the func-
tions and processes of living bodies on the basis of mechanical prin-
ciples.
The mind, in contrast, is a pure thinking, nonextended substance
which cannot be explained in terms of or reduced to mechanical prin-
ciples. Moreover, Descartes' "mental substance" or "pure ego" theory
of mind portrays the mind as constituting the essence of the self.
Indeed, the Cartesian account of mind is very much in line with the
classical and medieval conceptions in that it pictures the mind as a
spiritual substance which is connected only contingently and tempor-
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arily with the body.
Descartes, however, bases his claim that mind constitutes the
essence of self on his method of doubt rather than the citing of class-
ical or theological sources. He argues, as we have seen, that whereas
a person can doubt that his body exists, he cannot doubt that he as a
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thinking being exists. Thus, in part, his defense of the identifi-
cation of self with mind is based on the conceptual possibility that
one could exist as a disembodied mind. More importantly, Descartes
takes this argument to demonstrate that one can have a clear and dis-
tinct "idea" of his essential nature or of himself as a thinking being.
The classical empiricist philosophers reject this Cartesian con-
ception of mind as an immaterial substance and the notion that one can
perceive one's self as a thinking being as hopelessly confused. In
general, the empiricists attempted to remove the remaining spiritua-
listic elements from the discussion of mind and to model their own the-
ories of mind after Newtonian physics. One of the most influential of
these early empiricist portrayals of mind is Hume's account of mind as
a "bundle" or "theater" of passing, separate sensations or perceptions.
Hume argues that one cannot have a direct perception of himself as an
unex tended and thinking being because the mind itself is:
. . . nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an incon-
ceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and
movement.
Although our powers of inner perception or introspection can
illuminate specific "ideas" or impressions, we cannot in this way
discover a unique substance which we would call "self." What we call
"persons" or "selves" are simply bundles or collections of "ideas,"
perceptions and experiences. Hume himself expresses reservations about
this conception because it cannot account for the unity of self or
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mind, or what Hume calls "the real simplicity and identity of mind,"
through all these changes in our perceptions and experiences.^^
Such difficulties are inherent in the empiricist account of mind
not only because it is linked to an atomistic view of experience but
also because it continues to incorporate Descartes' dualistic view of
mind and body. Like Descartes, the classical empiricists tend to
accept the notion that mind is, in some fundamental sense, distinct
from body. They convert the Cartesian image of a disembodied conscious
being who comes pre-stocked with "ideas" into a picture of a disem-
bodied conscious being who is merely a passive recipient of experience.
The empiricist philosophers also follow Descartes in treating this
picture of a passive spectator who views the world from some dimen-
sionless point as the paradigm case for examining the central questions
concerning mind, knowledge and self. In addition, they make the search
for the unity of mind the key to "discovering" the self or to resolving
what has come to be called the problem of personal identity. Either
explicitly or implicitly, the empiricists equate the self or person
with a mind or consciousness which is conceived of as essentially
45bodiless
.
This vision of the mind as a passive recipient of given experi-
ences which does not require corporeal embodiment for its essential
functions has exerted a tremendous influence in discussions of human
action and of the relationship between thought and action in the lib-
eral empiricist tradition. A Cartesian dualism does systematically
infect the standard empiricist treatment of actions as bodily movements
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which are proceeded by and caused by mental events, characterized in
terms of wills, volitions or intentions. As Gilbert Ryle argues, "the
official doctrine" or "the official theory" of mind in the empiricist
philosophical tradition does divide each individual's life and activity
into
:
. . .
two collateral histories, one consisting of what
happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what
46happens in and to his mind.
The interaction between mind and body, the transactions between this
"inner," private history of mind and this "outer," public history of
47body, "remain mysterious."
This dualist account of the mind-body relationship is closely tied
to the doctrine of epistemological individualism and has exerted a
pervasive influence throughout the history of Anglo-American philosophy
and political theory. It has been extensively criticized from a va-
riety of different philosophical perspectives, particularly those which
have treated seriously Hegel's attempt to set out an alternative con-
ception of the relationship between thought and action. Since the
publication of Ryle's The Concept of Mind as well as Wittgenstein's
later work, linguistic philosophers have joined this search for a more
viable account of the relationship between mind and body or between
thought and action.
Certainly, Ryle's specific diagnosis of the basic problems in-
herent in "the official doctrine" and the alternative "behavioralist"
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account of mind which he advances remain matters of controversy.^^
More generally, no single, universally accepted account of thought and
action has emerged from such reexaminations of the standard empiricist
portrayal of mind and body. However, linguistic philosophers, fol-
lowing the lead of Ryle and Wittgenstein, have pushed this analysis of
the mind-body problem into a wide-ranging reassessment of the basic
features of empiricist philosophy of mind, including its views of con-
sciousness, self-consciousness and introspection.
A second major theme in classical empiricist discussions of mind,
the notion that consciousness is both given and transparent, also
follows directly from the Cartesian epistemological framework adopted
by the empiricists. According to this spectatorial account of know-
ledge, knowledge of one's own "ideas" or the contents of one's own con-
sciousness is direct and certain, whereas knowledge of objects and
events in the external world is indirect and uncertain. This view
assigns a definite epistemological primacy to the processes of reflec-
tion or introspection because it is assumed that the mind can, through
a kind of non-sensuous vision, directly perceive at least some of its
own states and operations. Also, this epistemological framework por-
trays the basic data of consciousness as private and accessible only
through this process.
What this view suggests is that we can differentiate among the
mental concepts in our language only by introspectively examining the
qualitatively distinct "ideas," experiences, states or operations for
which each mental word is a label. These "ideas" and experiences are
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considered to be the ultimate data of consciousness in that they simply
happen to people and cannot be further broken down or analyzed. A per-
son has an epistemologically "privileged access" to these mental
phenomena because he knows directly and immediately whether or not they
are presently occurring in his own mind.^° The implication of this
doctrine, which was recognized by Descartes, is that first person
reports of such mental events or "ideas" are immune from error. Al-
though many of the empiricists refuse to accept this conclusion, they
generally adopt this Cartesian portrayal of the basic contents of our
5
1
minds as being given and transparent.
It is the concept of pain which best seems to substantiate this
empiricist notion of the transparency and giveness of consciousness.
Pain is generally considered a kind of bodily sensation, and it seems
clear that being in pain entails experiencing this particular kind of
sensation. As a sensation, pain is something which happens to a person
or which he simply experiences. Moreover, a person knows directly,
immediately and certainly whether or not he is, at some point in time,
experiencing a pain sensation. It would appear that he cannot be
mistaken about the fact (except perhaps as to the classification of a
particular sensation as pain rather than discomfort or some other
sensation), and that he is thus the final court of appeal when asked
whether he is in pain. Finally, it is in the case of such sensations
as pain that it seems most reasonable to treat our mental concepts as
simply labels for independently existing experiences.
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The discussion of pain and similar bodily sensations has been
emphasized by philosophers in the empiricist tradition precisely
because such cases provide the most secure ground for the claim that
consciousness is given and transparent. However, even here, post-
Wittgensteinian philosophy and recent scientific research have raised
serious objections to the Cartesian-empiricist account of such sen-
sations, our knowledge of them, and our use of sensation words. In
any case, the Cartesian-empiricist framework is clearly mistaken in
that it tends to treat pain or sensations in general as the paradigm
case of "ideas," mental experiences and mental processes.
For example, the early empiricist philosophers typically assume
that the term 'pleasure' is like 'pain' a label for a particular kind
of feeling or sensation which lies at the opposite end of the same
scale of given and transparent experience. Thus, Locke classifies both
pain and pleasure as "simple ideas which we receive from both sensa-
tions and reflection;" Hume treats pain and pleasure as "impressions of
sensation;" and Mill portrays pain and pleasure as ultimate unanalyz-
able copies of sensation or the product of some combination of sen-
sation and "ideas." According to the British empiricists, what makes
something pleasurable or painful is that it is accompanied by one of
the series of feelings or experiences on the pain-to-pleasure scale.
Pleasures are treated as inner, private, given and transparent expe-
riences exactly like sensations.
The classical empiricists also follow Descartes in treating the
"passions of the soul" as certain kinds of conscious qualities, states
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or feelings which are like sensations in that the soul or mind pas-
sively experiences them. Hume, for example, classifies the passions as
"impressions of reflection," particular kinds of experience which
result from the interaction of our "ideas" and sensations. Again, the
mind is portrayed as a passive observer which can directly perceive the
passions which are given or presented to it. Emotion words, such as
'anger,' 'resentment,' and 'fear,' are apparently, like sensation
words, simply labels for corresponding private mental events or basic,
unanalyzable qualities of consciousness. Moreover, it is this unique
inner experience, feeling or conscious quality which makes each emotion
what it is and which differentiates it from all other emotions.
It follows that one can know his emotions only in the same direct
and immediate way that he can know his sensations: by discovering and
observing through introspection the particular feelings or experiences
which are already present in his consciousness. This 'feeling theory'
of the emotions treats the relationships between an emotion and the
beliefs connected to it, between an emotion and its object, and between
an emotion and its behavioral manifestations as all contingent. In-
deed, Hume, who most consistently and systematically advances this
position, cannot account for the fact that the emotion of pride is
typically associated with things that belong to us or achievements in
which we have played a part rather than with objects, events or acti-
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vities which are completely unrelated to us.
A final example of the empiricist treatment of mental concepts as
labels for the immediate contents of our consciousness which are given
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and transparent is found in their portrayal of the concept of desire.
William P. Alston calls this account "the phenomenological view of
desire" and lists the following sub-categories where desire is cha-
racterized as:
A felt urge or impulse to get X (Hume).
An uneasiness occasioned by the absence of X (Locke).
An idea of X as pleasant, or with pleasant associations,
or an expectation that X will be pleasant (Mill).
Thus, the classical empiricists tend to identify desires, as well as
pleasures and emotions, with particular feelings or sensations which
are given or presented to the mind and made transparent to the mind
through introspection.
This notion that the basic contents of consciousness are given and
transparent, which flows directly from the central assumptions of the
spectatorial account of knowledge, is, like the dualist account of mind
and body, a significant factor in liberal-empiricist discussions of
human action. It lends support to the view that the basic data of con-
sciousness
—
pains, pleasures, passions and desires—are inner forces
which cause us to act as we do. In this way, the portrayal of con-
sciousness as given and transparent underpins the empiricist effort to
explain human action by simply discovering the basic inner forces
57
inherent in human nature or personality.
Moreover, this view of consciousness is a major obstacle to the
development of an adequate theory of consciousness throughout the
liberal-empiricist tradition. Since our pleasures, emotions, desires
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and the other contents of consciousness are taken as given, the empir-
icist philosophers tend to ignore the manner in which certain histor-
ical conditions and social arrangements reinforce or alter existing and
generate new pleasures, emotions and desires. As Hume states.
The same motives always produce the same actions; the
same events follow the same causes. Ambition, avarice,
self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public
spirit—these passions mixed in various degrees and
distributed through society, have been, from the be-
ginning of the world, and still are, the source of all
the actions and enterprises which have ever been ob-
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served among mankind.
The liberal-empiricist conception of mind acknowledges the variety of
human passions and desires, but holds that the basic passions and
desires, the inner motivations of human behavior, are the same in all
societies and in all historical periods.
In addition, because they take the contents of consciousness as
transparent, the empiricists tend to neglect the various ways in which
our understanding of our own states of mind may be mistaken, distorted
or simply confused. The empiricist conception of mind is incompatible
with any sociological theory which maintains or suggests that an in-
dividual's understanding of his own desires and emotions may be in-
adequate because of certain false beliefs about their origin or nature.
It is also incompatible with a psychological theory of human motivation
and behavior which recognizes the possibility of unconscious desires
which are not immediately transparent to each individual. Finally, the
standard empiricist account of mind simply neglects the common situa-
tions in everyday life where individuals are uncertain or unclear about
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what they desire or want. For all these reasons as well as those
discussed above, the empiricist portrayal of the roles of consciousness
and self-consciousness in human activity and life, which is directly
supported by this notion of consciousness as given and transparent, is
simplistic and naive.
A third, closely-related theme which is central to the accounts of
mind and man offered by the British empiricists is the antithesis
between reason and passion emphasized in Unger's critique. In part,
this view is directly linked to the revised conception of reason ad-
vanced by the empiricist philosophers. Whereas Plato and most of the
classical and medieval theorists identified reason with the entire
scope of human knowledge and inquiry, the empiricists adopted a much
more limited view of the domain of reason. The empiricist tradition
stresses the contrast between reason, which is identified with specula-
tive thinking or abstract reasoning, and experience, which is the basis
of all human knowledge acquired through the use of the senses, inclu-
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ding observational and experimental science.
This revised conception of reason is tied to an extensive reformu-
lation of the classical conception of the relationship between the
rational and irrational components of human nature. The empiricist
philosophers reject this classical position represented by Plato's
account of reason and the just soul. As we have seen, Plato portrays
the healthy personality as one in which certain ends or goals are
apprehended through reason, and the appetites are directed or control-
led in order to attain these goals or ends. In contrast, the unhealthy
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or unjust soul is one which is under the unbridled dominance of ir-
rational appetites and desires. According to this Platonic view, human
action and human nature can be understood only in terms of a constant
conflict between reason and such irrational forces as appetites or
desires, where reason is supposed to restrain or correct man's non-
rational impulses and inclinations.
The empiricist position, which is most fully and systematically
articulated by Hume, holds that this notion of reason controlling or
even coming into conflict with the appetites or passions is nonsen-
sical. Since Hume characterizes reason as the ability to make deduc-
tive and inductive inferences, it is clear that reason cannot provide
the goals or ends of human action as supposed by the classical the-
ories. The role of reason is restricted to the discovery of relevant
facts concerning, and the calculation of the best means of achieving,
goals and ends which cannot themselves be derived from reason.
The ends or goals of human behavior are dictated by the passions
and desires which give rise to volitions and move people to act. This
is the view behind Hume's often-quoted statement that:
Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions,
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
6
1
and obey them.
Reason itself can never produce a volition or action and cannot even
function so as to oppose the inclinations, impulses, desires or
passions which are presented to our minds. Any inclination or impulse
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to act in a certain way can be countered only by an opposing incli-
nation or impulse. Thus, the only way in which we can legitimately
label any action "irrational" is if it is based on mistaken factual
data or a mistaken evaluation of the best means for attaining a given
end
.
This view of reason as the slave of the passions clearly has
direct and immediate implications on ethical theory. For, if the ends
and goals of human action are given by the passions, impulses or ap-
petites and cannot properly be characterized as rational or irrational,
it is clear that the making of moral judgments about the goodness or
badness of human ends or actions cannot be a rational enterprise. Hume
follows this line of thought to its logical conclusion. He states:
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of
6 3
the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Since the whole point or purpose of moral judgments is to guide human
action, they cannot be judgments of reason if reason can never move us
to action. Hume attempts to offer an alternative grounding of ethics
upon the passions and sentiments which are shared by all human
beings
.
Within the liberal tradition, discussion of this view of reason as
the servant of the passions has typically focused on Hume's account of
moral judgement and its ethical implications. This treatment is mis-
leading in that it suggests that this view of reason and the passions
is solely an ethical doctrine and that Hume's uncompromising statement
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of it is somewhat of an aberration in liberal-empiricist theory. How-
ever, although other empiricist thinkers seem to hold both reason and
moral judgment in higher esteem than does Hume, the empiricist attempts
to explain as well as to evaluate human action systematically incor-
porate this notion of an antithesis between reason and the passions.
All the various accounts of human nature offered by the classical
empiricists repeat, in a number of different forms, the basic view of
man being moved by pleasure and pain. According to this framework
shared by the liberal theorists, those objects or states of affairs
which are found, in the course of individual experience, to be assoc-
iated with pleasure become desired. Those objects or states of affairs
which are associated with painful experiences come to be avoided.
Thus, it is the prospect of pleasure and pain, arousing the appetites,
passions and desires, which ultimately determines the goals or ends of
human action.
This general empiricist account of the relationship between
thought and action portrays the impulses, desires and other immediate
contents of the mind as causing volitions, acts of will or intentions,
which in turn cause certain behaviors or actions. In the various
accounts of the human mind, human nature and human behavior advanced by
the early empiricists, reason and deliberation become only secondary
intervening variables in the causal chain linking the passions and
65
actions
.
Although these accounts of the relationships between thought and
action and between reason and the passions are defended as the result
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of an emerging scientific understanding of human motivation and
behavior, they clearly rest on a set of philosophical assumptions
regarding mind and knowledge. These basic assumptions are not unique
to Hume's specific treatment of knowledge and mind, but rather follow
directly from the conception of the abstract, asocial spectator and the
related notion that consciousness is given and transparent. The por-
trayal of "ideas" as objects which are immediately presented to the
mind and which can be perceived through a form of mental vision without
the mediation of language supports an artificial and limited view of
the reasoning process.
In particular, these philosophical assumptions reduce reason to an
egocentric and arbitrary process, denying the essentially public cha-
racter of all uses of reason. A major part of the problem with the
empiricist portrayal of reason is certainly the notion of thought as
prior to and autonomous of language, which blocks an adequate under-
standing of the function of language as a vehicle for reason. More-
over, because it pictures the mind as coming pre-stocked with "ideas"
and the basic epistemological problem as one of working outward from
these "ideas," the spectatorial framework necessarily distorts the
reasoning process by ignoring the fact that, in Richard Peters' words,
. . . even when it takes place in the individual's head,
it is an internalization of public procedures—those of
criticism, the production of counter-examples and the
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suggestion of different points of view.
In addition, this view of reason as the servant of the passions is
dependent on the identification of passions with inner experiences or
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felt qualities of consciousness which are given and transparent. The
notion that passions as well as pleasures and desires are experiences
which are immediately presented and openly accessable to the mind
automatically makes them immune to rational criticism or correction.
For example, Hume's treatment of a passion as an event which is di-
rectly observable to the person experiencing it makes the connection
between a passion and its object into a purely contingent one. He,
like the other empiricists, works within a framework that ignores the
links between the passions and our beliefs or between the emotions and
cognition. Although he focuses attention on what he calls the "dis-
interested passions" which he thinks are sometimes confused with
reason, the assumption that all passions are inner experiences blinds
Hume to the manner in which these so-called "disinterested passions"
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are intimately tied to the use of reason.
Hume certainly sets out this doctrine in greater detail and ex-
plores its implications more thoroughly than do the other liberal the-
orists. Yet, the essential core of this view of the relationship
between reason and the passions is not a unique feature of Hume's moral
theory but rather constitutes a central feature of the common concep-
tual framework through which the British liberals evaluate and explain
human behavior. In this dual role, the conception of reason as the
servant of the passions is one of the most powerful and most lasting of
the influences of empiricist philosophy of mind upon liberal political
theory.
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There is also a fourth theme in empiricist philosophy of mind
which is implicit in the empiricist assumptions and positions already
discussed but which merits additional attention. The fourth feature of
the empiricist account of mind with significant implications for pol-
itical theory is a severance of the connection between knowledge and
action which the classical thinkers considered central to philosophy of
mind. Classical philosophy treats knowledge of persons, particularly
self-knowledge, and the connection between such knowledge and human
behavior as topics closely related to the study of ethics and politics.
Classical epistemological discussions focus on the manner in which
persons arrive at such knowledge and on the manner in which they hold
their beliefs rather than the truth-content of human knowledge and
beliefs. In contrast, the spectatorial framework advanced by Descartes
and the classical empiricists emphasizes certainty rather than con-
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viction as the essential element in the quest for knowledge. This
spectatorial account of knowledge portrays the attempt to discover a
solid, certain base of knowledge within the individual mind as the
primary task of philosophy.
The Cartesian-empiricist epistemological framework, with its con-
ception of "ideas" as objects, of an inner mental vision, and of
thought as independent of and prior to language, systematically ab-
stracts human knowledge from the methods by which it is acquired and
the uses to which it is put. It creates an artificial and abstract
picture in which knowledge has no ties with learning, skills or ac-
tions. The image that emerges from this framework presents the mind
a£
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a dimensionless, passive spectator of given contents of consciousness
and man as simply a passive spectator of rather than an active agent in
70the world.
This neglect of the relationship between knowledge and action is,
of course, closely intertwined with the other themes commonly advanced
in empiricist theories of mind. It is tied to the dualist account
which confines the question of the unity of the self to a discussion of
the unity of a mind confronted by an endless series of separate per-
ceptions and impressions, and which treats the body and bodily move-
ments as essentially irrelevant to our understanding of knowledge and
mind. In addition, this neglect of the links between knowledge and
action is closely connected to the notion that consciousness is given
and transparent. Since a person has a direct and infallible access to
the contents of his own mind through reflection and introspection,
there are no special problems associated with self-knowledge that might
bear on discussions of human action and human nature. Self-knowledge,
self-reflection, self-introspection and self-consciousness are all
reduced to an unproblematic kind of inner, non-sensuous perception.
The empiricist tendency to sever the connections between knowledge
and action is also tied to the notion of reason as the servant of the
passions. The empiricist theorists discuss epistemic rationality in
detail, but they do not address the series of issues surrounding prac-
tical rationality. Thus, their limited conception of reason ignores
the human capacity to guide behavior in accordance with purposes and
intentions, to make choices between alternative actions, and at least
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on some occasions, to recognize that certain factors in their environ-
ment or in their own character are influencing their own behavior and
to attempt to free themselves of this influence.
The empiricist theories fail to recognize the full implications of
the facts that human action is goal-oriented and that human reasoning
concerns the proper ends of human action as well as the appropriate
means for attaining these ends. To the extent that the early British
empiricists concern themselves with human action at all, they view it
as being completely determined by given passions, desires, pleasures
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and pains and as essentially non-rational in nature. In short, given
the assumptions in empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind, it
is impossible to even make sense of the classical treatments of the
reciprocal relationship between knowledge and action.
Although Descartes and many of the classical empiricists were
concerned with at least some of the issues regarding the knowledge of
persons and self-knowledge in particular, the epistemological framework
they constructed portrays mathematical and scientific knowledge as the
proper models for all forms of human knowledge. Philosophy in the em-
piricist tradition remained preoccupied with epistemological issues
concerning knowledge of the external world and remained isolated from
the efforts of Continental philosophers to resolve the issues sur-
rounding self-knowledge and self-consciousness set out by Hegel. The
empiricist focus on the attainment of certain knowledge within the in-
dividual mind resulted in a general neglect of those traditional areas
of human knowledge where the prospects of achieving such certainty
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seemed remote. Thus, as several linguistic philosophers have sug-
gested, the neglect of problems concerning self-knowledge and self-
interpretation in the Cartesian-empiricist accounts of mind and know-
ledge is not unrelated to the general neglect of such subjects as
history and aesthetics in the empiricist tradition.
Of course, the preceeding sketch of certain of the general themes
in classical empiricist philosophy of mind and the attempt to trace the
connections between this account of mind and the spectatorial framework
as embodied in "the doctrine of ideas" do not constitute comprehensive
and complete discussions of Cartesian or British empiricist episte-
mology and philosophy of mind. The outline of the spectatorial frame-
work simply attempts to trace certain connections between Cartesian and
empiricist thought which have been frequently ignored by those working
within as well as those working outside of the empiricist tradition.
One could also focus on other elements in Descartes' work which have
influenced radically different interpretations of knowledge, mind and
self as, for example, the connections between Cartesian philosophy and
73phenomenology.
In addition, the general account of empiricist views of knowledge
and mind offered here cannot capture the complex details of and sig-
nificant differences among the specific theories advanced by Locke,
Hume, Mill and other empiricist philosophers. A full analysis of em-
piricist epistemology and philosophy of mind would require examination
of many topics ignored here and a more comprehensive treatment of the
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technical difficulties associated with those topics which are ad-
dressed. The sketch of the classical empiricist account of mind merely
attempts to identify some of the major themes in empiricist philosophy
which have had a significant impact upon liberal political and ethical
theory and v^ich are now being questioned and reevaluated by many
contemporary linguistic philosophers.
My claim is that these empiricist theories of knowledge and mind
constitute an essential part of the foundation or support for the
analysis and evaluation of political behavior and political institu-
tions presented by the British liberals. Therefore, the political the-
orist who seeks to understand and assess the central doctrines of
classical liberal political theory cannot afford to ignore the con-
nections between mind and politics. To the extent that the basic
assumptions and positions of the empiricist philosophical framework are
mistaken, misleading or open to challenge, the political doctrines of
classical liberalism are, at least in part, undermined.
The Redefinition of Human Nature
and the Study of Politics
It is certainly not true that liberal political and ethical theory
simply follow from or are merely an extension of the empiricist account
of knowledge and mind. One cannot achieve an adequate understanding of
early liberal political and ethical theory by treating it in abstrac-
tion from such important factors as the historical and social context
within which the liberal theorists worked. For example, not only is
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the Protestant Reformation like the Copernican revolution an important
element in the increased focus on the individual and individual con-
science, but religious conflict and consequent civil war are dominant
factors affecting the ethical and political thought of the period.
The early British liberals confront the problem of establishing
peace and order in the absence of religious homogeneity and what could
be presumed to be universally agreed upon natural laws. This concern
is reflected in their preoccupation with questions regarding the basis
of the legitimate authority exercised by the state or the sovereign and
the grounds of political obligation. The liberal theorists attempt to
show why and in what circumstances human beings should submit to go-
vernment, what particular forms of government are best, and if and
under what conditions revolution against government is justified.
Moreover, especially since Marx's influential analysis of the
ideological function of theories of ethics, government and politics, it
is clear that the political theorist cannot treat political and ethical
doctrines in isolation from basic changes in the economic and social
structure and their connections to political conflicts and changes in
the distribution of political power. Certainly, the political and
ethical stands defended by liberal thinkers often reflect direct in-
terests in or ties to positions associated with particular sides or
parties in political contests such as that between parliament and the
monarchy. More fundamentally, liberal political theory cannot be
abstracted from the development of the capitalist mode of production
143
and exchange and the emergence of a new, powerful class, the bour-
geoisie. As any of the standard approaches to historical political
theory acknowledges, liberalism itself is fundamentally a class move-
ment which was primarily concerned with abolishing medieval restric-
tions on commerce and industry, and liberal political theory can only
74be fully understood in this context.
What this means, of course, is that the major components of lib-
eral political theory, such as the particular theory of human nature
advanced by the classical liberal theorists, are directly tied to the
interests of this emerging class. Thus, to ignore how the theories of
human nature and self advanced by liberal theorists functioned as
justifications and defenses of the capitalist system, particularly the
economic activities and political needs of the bourgeoisie, would be to
neglect a central dimension of liberal political and ethical thought.
Finally, again as each of the established approaches to the study
of historical political theory emphasizes, no political theory, however
revolutionary and radical, is written on a blank slate. Liberal pol-
itical theory in general and the liberal theory of human nature in
particular do not represent a complete and final break with the rest of
the Western political tradition. Not only do elements of this liberal
individualist theory appear repeatedly in various pre-liberal accounts
of human nature, but the liberal theorists themselves remain, in cer-
tain ways, under the direct influence of the classical and medieval
tradition.'''^
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These are legitimate reasons against treating liberal political
and ethical theory as simply a superstructure which is built upon,
completely supported by, and determined by a foundation or base con-
sisting solely of empiricist philosophy. At the same time, liberal
political theory does constitute a radical change in the conceptual
framework through which we examine the central questions concerning
government, politics and social life. Analysis of the connections
between mind and politics is essential in understanding and assessing
this conceptual framework and the approach to the study of politics and
government which it supports. Indeed, analysis of the linkages between
empiricist philosophical assumptions and liberal political theory is
necessary in order to understand the resiliency and strength of stan-
dard liberal assertions regarding political behavior and political
life.
In part, the importance of these connections, at least as they are
revealed in the liberal redefinition of human nature, is widely acknow-
ledged in the standard texts on historical political theory. In other
words, it is commonly understood that at the core of the classical lib-
eral theories and ethics is a fundamental redefinition of human nature
and of the individual's political, social and moral relationships with
other persons. Moreover, this redefinition of human nature, which is
considered a major dividing line between classical and modern political
theory, has been generally identified with the doctrine of psycholog-
ical egoism. For example, George Sabine's classic text, A History of
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Political Theory
,
characterizes this fundamental reformulation as
resting upon:
. . .
the assumption that human nature is essentially
selfish, and that the effective motives on which a
statesman must rely are egoistic, such as the desire for
security in the masses and the desire for power in
rulers.
. . . Human nature, moreover, is profoundly
aggressive and acquisitive; men aim to keep what they
have and to acquire more. Neither in power nor in
possessions is there any normal limit to human desires,
while both power and possessions are always limited by
natural scarcity. Accordingly, men are always in a
condition of strife and competition which threatens open
anarchy unless restrained by the force behind the law,
while the power of the ruler is built upon the very
imminence of anarchy and the fact that security is
7 f\
possible only when government is strong.
This notion of individualism is, according to Sabine, a major theme in
77the political thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Sabine traces the development of this conception of egoistic in-
dividualism in classical liberal thought which culminates in the pol-
itical and ethical theories of the Philosophical Radicals, most notably
Bentham, and the laissez faire doctrines of the classical British
economists, represented by Ricardo. Thus, this view of human beings as
motivated solely by egoistic self-interest systematically infects
classical liberal social, political and ethical thought and is most
clearly and most uncompromisingly established as the principal foun-
dation of classical liberal theory by the utilitarians and the early
British economists. Bentham, for example, specifically ties his theory
of legislation, his approach to the study of politics in general and
his ethical theory, all of which are united by the greatest happiness
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principle, to a theory of human nature that is "supposed to be appli-
cable in all times and in all places."'''^ Similarly, the classical
study of economic behavior and the market mechanism: "... was con-
ceived to depend upon the general laws of human nature stated by the
associational and hedonistic psychology that Bentham had used."'''^ In
short, Sabine like most scholars of historical political theory acknow-
ledges that this redefinition of human nature is a central and highly
significant component of classical liberal political, economic and
social theory.
In addition, Sabine recognizes, at least in part, the importance
of the connections between mind and politics as these are exhibited in
this conception of human nature. He states.
Liberalism had always claimed that it rested upon an
empirical foundation, but empiricism had been understood
to mean an individual psychology developed from the "new
way of ideas" that Locke had considered to be the ori-
ginal insight of his Essay .
This clearly suggests that the classical liberal studies of politics
and society, particularly as these are directly tied to egoistic in-
dividualism, rest upon a number of unexamined assumptions or tacit
premises which emerge from empiricist philosophy. Moreover, while
Sabine does not explore these connections in the systematic manner
attempted by Unger and Wood, his critique of the two major deficiencies
of classical liberal theory—a critique which he traces to a second
phase of liberalism beginning with John Stuart Mill—parallels the
Unger-Wood analysis of the changed conceptions of individuality and
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sociality which underpin the classical liberal theory of personality or
human nature.
In the first place, Sabine examines the difficulties inherent in
the classical liberal notion that one can proceed from a basic set of
general laws of human nature, which are universal and unchanging, to an
analysis of the political and economic behavior of human beings in
particular social settings and historical periods. In part, this
treatment of human motivation and behavior is problematic because it
treats the individual as completely detached from any "social milieu "
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or cultural, social and historical setting. As Sabine recognizes,
this asocial, ahistorical view of the individual is most explicitly
formulated in the early liberal attempts to differentiate between
"natural man" and "social man." According to this "state of nature"
model, human nature is that which is natural, given and unchanging as
opposed to that which is artificial, conventional and variable in human
motivation and behavior. The conception portrays the individual as at
least logically if not historically an isolated, autonomous and self-
sufficient unit and expressly rejects the classical view of man as by
nature a social or political animal.
However, as Sabine suggests, this conception of the individual as
completely abstracted from society and history is not simply associated
with the state of nature model but rather constitutes an essential
underpinning of the explanatory framework utilized by all the classical
liberal theorists. In other words, the notion that any form of politi-
cal and economic behavior in any social setting can be adequately
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explained in terms of pleasures and pains, and the desires and passions
which they arouse, presupposes this picture of the abstract individual.
Sabine does not examine the connections between such a conception of
individualism and empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind,
but he does set out the connections between this view of individualism
and liberal views of society and the study of society.
In particular, Sabine emphasizes that the liberal redefinition of
human nature entails a radically different way of conceptualizing
society and social relationships than that which dominated medieval
political thought. In contrast to the medieval conception of the state
or society as an organic entity, the classical liberals hold that:
Society is merely an "artificial" body, a collective
term for the fact that human beings find it individually
8 3
advantageous to exchange goals and services.
Classical liberal theory consistently portrays society as the creation
of an agreement or series of arrangements between autonomous, self-
sufficient individuals which is designed to serve their individualistic
and self-centered desires and interests. Again, it is the early lib-
eral theorists who most clearly set out this notion of society and the
state as a contractual agreement supposed to serve a limited set of in-
dividual interests. However, this same basic conception of society and
social institutions as compacts among pre-social yet rational, pur-
posive and language-using individuals remains a basic common denomi-
nator of classical liberal theory through its utilitarian phase.
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Indeed, as Sabine points out, Bentham's perspective rejects as
completely fictitious the very notion of a "corporate body" including
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society or the state. Society or the state becomes nothing but a
collection of egoistic individuals whose happiness both constitutes
what is good for the individual and can be summed up to calculate the
good of all. Thus, throughout classical liberal thought, membership in
society or social groups can be analyzed either in terms of a contrac-
tual relationship among self-interested, autonomous individuals or as
an instrumental and practical arrangement designed to serve given in-
dividual desires and interests. The various social, moral and polit-
ical aspects of human life are treated as compacts or instrumental
devices which are responses to and which can be evaluated in terms of
the established needs, preferences or interests of egoistic indivi-
duals. This conception of sociality is a second crucial dimension of
the theory of egoistic individualism as summarized and analyzed by
Sabine.
Sabine not only recognizes the centrality of the abstract con-
ception of the individual and this instrumental view of social institu-
tions and relationships to the theory of egoistic individualism but
also acknowledges the connections between these reformulations of in-
dividuality and sociality and the classical liberal approach to the
study of politics, economics, society and ethics. He again follows
Mill in citing the systematic neglect of historical change and social
development as the second major deficiency of classical liberal the-
ory. This classical liberal failure to realize the importance of
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historical and social development is linked to an approach to social
inquiry that takes self-sufficient, self-interested individuals as the
basic units or atomic parts out of which social institutions are con-
structed and in terms of which social institutions are to be explained.
After all, it is only within the context of the standard early
liberal characterizations of all individual behavior as determined by
pains and pleasures and of all social institutions as instrumental
arrangements which must be rationally constructed for proper management
of these given motivating forces that Bentham could aspire to be the
"Newton of the moral sciences. "^^ Moreover, as Sabine emphasizes, this
aspiration and the conception of the study of society and human life
which underpins it are not unique to utilitarian ethics. Classical
British economic theory, like classical liberal political theory in
general, is characterized in terms of this same conception of the
nature and scope of social inquiry:
It was a kind of Newtonianism which regarded institut-
ions and their history as scientifically irrelevant,
because they are reducible to habits of thought and
action which can be fully explained by rather simple
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laws of human behavior.
In other words, the basic inadequacies of classical liberal analyses of
social institutions and human behavior are not simply attributable to
the specific psychological theory they formulated but rather are in-
herent in the very conceptualizations of individuality and sociality
which permeate classical liberal political, social and ethical theory.
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Sabine thus acknowledges the important links between the indivi-
dualistic theories of politics, economics and ethics set out by the
classical liberals on the one hand and the type of "methodological in-
dividualism" which is basic to their conception of the proper approach
to the study of social institutions and human behavior on the other.
The classical liberals clearly do attempt to construct a science of
society or politics upon the supposedly solid foundation of universal
laws of human motivation and behavior which apply in all times and in
all places. This is an extreme form of methodological individualism
which maintains that all social behavior, institutions, relationships
and so on are simply instrumental pacts or arrangements which can be
fully analyzed and explained in terms of the sensations, desires and
interests of abstract, asocial individuals.
Unfortunately, Sabine's analysis of the methodological and philos-
ophical assumptions underpinning classical liberal theory breaks off at
this point. As we have seen, his analysis of classical liberal theory
does identify the conception of the abstract individual and the instru-
mental view of society and social institutions as central dimensions of
the liberal redefinition of human nature. He also traces certain of
the connections among these conceptions of individuality and sociality,
the radical form of methodological individualism inherent in the class-
ical liberal approach to social science, and the individualistic theo-
ries of politics, ethics and society championed by the early liberal
thinkers. Finally, he suggests that classical liberal theory.
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particularly its adherence to methodological individualism, is related
to empiricist positions set out in Locke's doctrine of the "way of
ideas
However, Sabine does not examine any further these connections
between empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind on the one
hand and, on the other, the classical liberal redefinition of human na-
ture in particular and early liberal social and ethical theory in
general. This failure to pursue the connections between mind and pol-
itics is a significant factor affecting his assessment of the defi-
ciences and contributions of classical liberal theory as well as his
analysis of the transition from classical to modern liberal theory.
Certainly, this in no way suggests that one must automatically
reject Sabine's argument that classical liberal theory with its empha-
sis on the individual does represent, despite its deficiencies, some
important advances in our understanding of the basic role, purposes and
function of government. For example, classical liberal theory, parti-
cularly in its utilitarian phase, does acknowledge that what people
want and what gives people pleasure are relevant considerations when
discussing moral conduct and public policy. Traditional theories of
mind and politics all too frequently portray the gratification of
pleasure or desire as necessarily wrong and consider human happiness
only in transcendental or ideal terms. In addition, the conception of
each individual as the best judge of his own interest counters any
elitist position which holds that a select few can legitimately claim
to know what is good for or in the best interests of the majority of
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citizens. The notion that the happiness or pleasure of each individual
counts equally also has sweeping democratic implications.
Moreover, the liberal view of the state as a device designed to
serve human desires and interests rather than some kind of super-entity
with its own will and purposes has fundamentally altered our perception
of the basis of and the proper function of government. The early lib-
eral emphasis on individual or natural rights which each person has
simply by virtue of being human and which no government can legiti-
mately violate clearly has radical implications. Also, the conceptions
of consent as the only legitimate basis of government and of satis-
faction of human needs, desires and interests as the only legitimate
justification of government are anti-authoritarian ideals. In addi-
tion, the notion of political representation as the representation of
individual preferences has been instrumental in the gradual extension
of the right to vote in liberal democracies.
Finally, classical liberal ethical and political theory does, in
various forms and to differing degrees, champion such basic human
ideals as individual freedom, autonomy, privacy, dignity and self-
development. Classical liberal political theory also generally sup-
ports, as a means for realizing these goals, such ideas as limited
government, constitutional guarantees, freedom of expression, religious
toleration and other notions which have become inextricably tied to the
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modern conceptions of democracy and democratic government.
Yet, despite these contributions and achievements which are gene-
rally credited to the classical liberal doctrine, succeeding liberal
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theorists found it necessary to question, challenge and revise certain
of the essential components of classical liberal theory. Later liberal
theorists challenged such standard notions as the completely negative
role of the state, particularly in relation to economic activities and
the "negative" conception of freedom as simply the absence of external
constraints. Moreover, as Sabine points out, such reevaluations of
classical liberal views concerning the nature of the state or the
nature of liberty entailed a deeper reassessment of the theory of
egoistic individualism with its underlying conceptions of individuality
and sociality.
In fact, the classical liberal conception of human beings as
motivated entirely by egoistic self-interests increasingly became the
focus of these revisions attempted within the liberal tradition. The
conception of human nature, especially as set out by Bentham and James
Mill, was identified as a major obstacle blocking adequate understand-
ing of moral values, individual behavior, and social relationships and
institutions. Thus, beginning with John Stuart Mill, one of the prin-
cipal concerns of liberal theory was to bring this utilitarian image of
man as a rational pursuer of his own given desires and interests into
line with the traditional moral values and moral judgments embodied in
ordinary discourse and everyday human activity.
The dilemmas faced by those who inherited this theoretical frame-
work founded on psychological egoism are quite evident. For example,
it is clear that if each person can act only in his own self-interest,
then traditional and everyday discussions of ethics and politics in
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terms of a vocabulary of duties, obligations, honor or chivalry—
a
vocabulary which seems to identify "selfless" or "altruistic" behavior
with virtuous behavior— are meaningless. Faced with a host of such
difficulties, Mill and many other liberal theorists began to perceive
egoistic individualism and its underlying conceptions of individuality
and sociality as incompatible with the moral dimension of human be-
havior and the moral values of community life.
Many nineteenth and twentieth century liberal philosophers and
social theorists, either by explicitly borrowing from other philosoph-
ical traditions or in further attempts to develop a more adequate, more
inclusive framework for the study of human behavior and politics, have
offered numerous critiques and reformulations of psychological egoism
and the attendant conceptions of the abstract individual and of society
as merely an instrumental arrangement among such individuals. For
example, T. H. Green and John Dewey, representing two different strands
of liberal thought, both attempted to rectify what they perceived as a
fundamental deficiency in classical liberal theory by welding concep-
tions of individual self-realization and community to liberal indivi-
dual ism.
Sabine treats such revision of the doctrine of egoistic indivi-
dualism as one of the principal dividing lines between two distinct but
related periods of liberalism: the classical version of liberalism
which reaches its culmination in Bentham's utilitarianism and the
modern phase of liberalism which begins in a transitional period marked
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by John Stuart Mill. According to Sabine's account of the develop-
ment of liberalism, the core of the classical liberal doctrine is saved
from its own excesses, which, as we have seen, center in the conception
of egoistic individualism, by two successive waves of revision. The
first of these waves consists chiefly of Mill's work as modified and
reinforced by the contributions of Herbert Spencer. The second wave is
Oxford Idealism, particularly as formulated by T. H. Green.
Mill, is, in this account, the central transitional figure because
he recognizes the inadequacy of and attempts to rectify the simplistic
classification of human motivation and behavior endemic to egoistic in-
dividualism as well as the classical liberal neglect of social insti-
tutions and social change which follow from the purely instrumental
view of society. Sabine emphasizes that Mill's transitional work
repeatedly shows the strains between his formal allegiance to utili-
tarian premises and numerous far-reaching qualifications and revisions
which cannot ultimately be reconciled with his starting principles.
But Mill's struggle clearly points the way, and succeeding liberal the-
orists are able to wrest themselves free of the restrictive confines of
egoistic individualism. Of course, classical liberal theory and modern
liberal theory share a common core in that they are both, in a funda-
mental sense, "individualist." However, modern liberalism not only
stresses "individualism" in the sense that it views the individual as
the source of value but also combines this individualism with a genuine
conception of community, emphasizing that the relationships between
94
individuals are essentially moral relations.
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Indeed, these revisions have been so successful and so complete
that the term "liberalism," at least in its "general sense," is now
"nearly equivalent" to the term "democracy." Modern liberalism stands
for "popular institutions of government" and champions "political
institutions that acknowledge certain broad principles of social phi-
95losophy or of political morality
. .
." Sabine, following the lead
of Frederick M. Watkins, characterizes liberalism "as the culmination
of the whole 'Western political tradition' or 'the secular form of
96Western civilization.'"
Of course, our concern here is not with Sabine's general thesis
concerning the place of liberalism in the Western tradition or in the
modern world but rather, more narrowly, with his claim that the major
conceptual problems which he associates with the classical liberal
doctrine of egoistic individualism have been resolved or eliminated by
Mill and other liberal theorists. Certainly, it would be a mistake to
treat all liberal political and ethical thought as identical with the
brand of utilitarianism sketched by Bentham. From Mill onward, nu-
merous liberal theorists acknowledge that psychological egoism and its
underpinning conceptions of individuality and sociality represent an
artifically restricted conception of human nature which does not allow
for the full diversity and complexity of human motivation and social
behavior
.
At the same time, the basic elements of psychological egoism—the
portrayal of human beings as always acting to maximize their own plea-
sure, happiness, want-satisfaction or self-interest—reappear again and
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again throughout the liberal tradition. This basic conceptual scheme
for classifying and characterizing human motivation and behavior does
remain part of the background against which various liberal theorists
attempt to explain and evaluate political phenomena. The tenacity and
durability of this conceptual scheme become clearer if we examine
carefully Mill's attempt to reformulate the liberal approach to the
study of politics and society.
As Sabine points out, Mill's work clearly shows the tensions and
inconsistencies characteristic of a transitional stage in political
thought. In regard to his account of the scientific study of society
and politics, Mill does seem to follow the pattern described by Sabine:
first he sets out a number of principles which follow from the liberal-
utilitarian framework he inherited, and then he proceeds to make a
series of significant revisions which are ultimately incompatible with
these stated premises. Thus, Mill's own statement concerning method in
the social sciences adheres to the extreme methodological individualism
of the classical liberal theorists:
The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be,
nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of
human beings united together in the social state. Men,
however, in a state of society, are still men; their
actions and passions are obedient to the laws of indivi-
dual human nature. . . . Human beings in society have
no properties but those which are derived from, and may
be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual
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man
.
This statement seems fully compatible with the classical liberal
conception of a science of society according to which one can achieve
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an understanding of society simply by piecing it together from the
psychological make-up of the individual, the basic unit or building-
block of society. Study of the basic psychological laws of human na-
ture, which are universal and unchanging, provides the necessary and
sufficient basis for the study of politics in all social settings and
in all historical periods. In short. Mill's position seems to follow
the Humean conception of a science of politics or society which is
deduced from a theory of human nature where "human nature" means the
psychological characteristics of abstract individuals.
However, Mill does not consistently adhere to any such formulation
of a science of politics or society entirely built upon an analysis of
the psychological attributes of abstract, asocial individuals. Again,
as Sabine emphasizes, one of Mill's principal concerns is "to modify
the empiricism in which he was bred" by rectifying the neglect of
social institutions, historical change and cultural variation which had
been characteristic of the classical liberal-utilitarian approach to
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social science. Mill clearly attempts to incorporate the evolu-
tionary, developmental conceptions of society and social institutions
which he finds in the social philosophies of Coleridge and Comte into
his vision of a more comprehensive approach to the study of politics
and society. Although Mill retains the notion that psychology is the
fundamental science of human behavior, he holds that this deductive
explanation of political behavior and events in terms of basic psy-
chological laws must be supplemented by an indirect inductive method
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which attempts to establish general laws of historical development and
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social change.
Mill does make a significant contribution to a major change in the
prevailing conception of the proper methods and procedures to be fol-
lowed in a genuinely scientific approach to the study of society and
politics. After Mill, the explanation of political phenomena is in-
creasingly detached from the classical liberal conception of a deduc-
tive science of politics and is increasingly identified with an
approach which stresses the roles of observation and induction in
social science. Moreover, as Sabine argues, this emphasis on examining
the sociological dimension of human behavior does undercut the sim-
plistic accounts of individual motivation and behavior as well as the
instrumental conception of social institutions which dominated class-
ical liberal theory.
At the same time, there are fundamental similarities between
Mill's revised account of explanation in the social sciences and the
classical liberal conception of a science of politics or society.
These connections which link Mill's work to the philosophical framework
of classical liberalism are deeper and more basic than simply his
unwillingness or inability to depart with the notion that a science of
politics can be deduced from a more general science of human nature.
For even if it were granted that Mill abandons this Humean conception
of a deductive science of politics, his account of the structure of
explanation clearly retains Humean conceptions of agency and causality,
or what he would call Humean conceptions of Liberty and Necessity. It
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is upon this philosophical base that Mill, like Hume and the other
classical liberals, portrays the study of politics and human behavior
as resting upon the same methods and techniques which are used in the
natural sciences.
As Mill explicitly states in the second chapter of Book VI of his
System of Logic
,
Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philo-
sophical Necessity is simply this: that, given the
motives which are present to an individual's mind, and
given likewise the character and disposition of the in-
dividual, the manner in which he might act might be
unerringly inferred; that if we know the person
thoroughly, and know all the inducements which are
acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as
much certainty as we can predict any physical event.
^"^^
Since human behavior is like all other physical events subject to
certain constant laws, human behavior is to be explained in the same
way that the natural scientist explains natural phenomena. Such ex-
plantion typically provides an account of the internal causal connec-
tions between various states of mind ("laws of mind") and of those
states of mind which are "produced directly by" states of the body
(laws of physical science) which together constitute the basic causal
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chain behind any particular human behavior. Human action is thus
determined by beliefs, desires and other mental contents in much the
same way that the collapse of a bridge is determined by certain phy-
sical factors.
This is, of course, the same framework for classifying and
characterizing human thought and action which was formulated by the
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classical empiricists, and it rests upon the same set of positions and
assumptions concerning the nature of reality, knowledge and mind.
Mill's framework for viewing thought and action, his model of man or
human nature, is dependent upon a metaphysics which views the universe
as a set of atomic phenomena that are only connected through series of
contingent correlations, an epistemology which makes the individual
mind, already pre-stocked with "ideas," the focus of the search for
certain knowledge, and a philosophy of mind which offers contestable
accounts of the mind-body relation, of the nature of the passions and
other contents of consciousness, of the relationship between reason and
the passions, and of the role of self-knowledge in human action.
It is this philosophical framework, particularly the classical
empiricist account of mind, which is the source of the pervasive in-
fluence of the doctrine of egoistic individualism in liberal accounts
of human motivation and behavior. The dualistic account of the mind-
body relationship divides an individual's life into two collateral
histories whose interaction can only be accounted for in causal terms.
The notion that consciousness is given and transparent portrays
desires, passions and other mental states as private mental events
which can be identified introspectively , independently of their be-
havioral manifestations. Moreover, these basic contents of conscious-
ness are treated as given, the dominant motivating forces of human na-
ture in all places and all times. Reason and deliberation are only
secondary intervening variables in the causal chain which links the
passions, desires and so on to certain behaviors or actions. Self-
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knowledge or self-consciousness is simply a matter of introspective
awareness of independently existing "objects" and can affect not the
slightest change in these "objects."
This empiricist framework establishes conceptual limits concerning
the kinds of desires, pleasures and passions, and in turn, motives and
interests, which individuals can have. According to the empiricist
account of mind, the pleasures and desires which determine an indivi-
dual's interests and his behavior are conscious events or occurrences
which are experienced privately by isolated, autonomous individuals.
An individual's interest in an external object or state of affairs is
always reducible to and can be analyzed in terms of his own pleasure
function or egoistic desires and preferences. By treating all plea-
sures and desires as the private experiences of independent centers of
consciousness, this framework conceptually eliminates the possibility
that individuals might have or develop desires, pleasures and interests
which make, in Robert Paul Wolff's words, "essential reference to
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reciprocal states of awareness among two or more persons."
In this way, the conceptual limitations established by the empir-
icist accounts of knowledge and mind make some variant of psychological
egoism true by definition. In its "hard" versions, all possible social
or altruistic feelings, desires, motives, interests or behaviors are
reduced to egoistic ones. By definition what seems to be altruistic is
simply some form of misunderstood or masked self-interest or self-
satisfaction. Moreover, even in its "soft" variants which acknowledge
the possibility of genuinely altruistic motives and behavior, the
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springboard of such altruism is identified as some kind of "natural"
feeling of sympathy or compassion or some kind of "natural" want or
desire to live in harmony with others. This "soft" but still thor-
oughly individualistic framework takes such feelings or desires as
given and mandates a sharp dichotomy between altruistically motivated
actions and egoistically motivated actions by ruling out all the more
complex emotional states, feelings and desires which do involve re-
1 03
ciprocal states of awareness among persons.
Certainly, Mill does not attempt to deduce a theory of politics or
society from an egoistic psychological theory which is in turn spe-
cifically linked to a particular theory of knowledge and theory of
mind. However, he approaches political issues and the study of pol-
itics within the conceptual framework of egoistic individualism which
is underpinned by empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind.
In other words, the conceptual framework into which the empirical facts
about politics, society and human motivation and behavior are fitted
retains at its very core major components of the classical empiricist
portrayal of thought and action.
An adequate assessment of Mill's account of explanation in the
social sciences or of the claims made in his analysis and evaluation of
political behavior, institutions and events requires careful reexami-
nation of this conceptual framework. It cannot simply be assumed that
further empirical research will rectify or eliminate any deficiencies
in this account because it is difficult even to determine to what
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extent the central issues here are empirical and to what extent they
are conceptual.
Mill is, as Sabine argues, a key transitional figure in the evo-
lution of liberal political thought. But ii is not the case, as Sabine
suggests, that after Mill and other liberal revisionists the connec-
tions between liberal political, social and ethical theory and the con-
ceptual problems concerning thought and action (which Sabine identifies
with the doctrine of egoistic individualism) simply disappear. From
Mill onward, the connections between mind and politics become less
direct, more complex and typically neglected features of the study of
political phenomena. In the shift from classical liberal to modern
liberal thought through such transitional figures as Mill, the egoistic
individualist views of human nature and human action appear less as
systematic models of human nature and human behavior which are ex-
pressly linked to philosophical accounts of knowledge and mind and more
as fragmental, hidden background assumptions in the conceptual frame-
work through which political phenomena are identified, classified,
explained and evaluated.
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Macpherson offers a similar type of challenge to those who hold
that liberal theory has been or can be "repaired" in the way
Sabine suggests. He argues that the "difficulties of modern lib-
eral democratic theory" lie in the possessive quality of the
conception of individualism which was inherited from the clas-
sical liberals. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Pos-
sessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962),
pp. 2-3.
CHAPTER III
THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF MIND AND POLITICS
"Psychological Man" and "Sociological Man"
The classical empiricist philosophers recognized that a theory of
human nature is an implicit part of any theory of politics and attemp-
ted to apply the Newtonian method to the study of mind and human nature
in order to provide a solid, scientific foundation for their ethical
and political theories. They developed an introspective theory of mind
which was designed to classify the various components or contents of
mind, to break these contents down into their most elementary or atomic
units, and to explain both the workings of the human mind as well as
the relationship between these inner workings and the external behavior
of human beings in terms of these basic atomic units. This psycho-
logical theory was intimately tied to an epistemological search for
certain "ideas," sense impressions or experiences which would provide
an indubitable foundation for the body of human knowledge. Thus, in
the entire history of political thought, the early British liberals
provide one of the clearest, most systematic examples of how political
theory is grounded in a particular theory of human nature, in turn
supported by systematic theories of knowledge and mind.
This notion of explicit linkages between philosophy and political
theory, or more specifically between empiricist philosophy, particu-
larly the empiricist accounts of philosophy and mind, and liberal
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social, moral and ethical theory, did not die out completely with the
classical liberals. For example, Bertrand Russell not only acknow-
ledged that the empiricist view of knowledge does have political impli-
cations, but also contended that empiricism is "the only philosophy
that affords a theoretical justification of democracy in its temper of
1
mind." However, this traditional liberal conception of intimate
connections between (empiricist) philosophy and (liberal) political
theory has been overthrown and is now largely rejected in contemporary
Anglo-American philosophy and social science.
Despite his general claim concerning empiricist philosophy and
liberal democratic theory, Russell's own detailed analyses of meta-
physical and epistemological issues were never linked to his political
thought in the same way that substantive philosophical theses were used
to support and defend the political theories of the classical thinkers,
including Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel as well as Locke, Hume and the
early liberals. Indeed, as Stuart Hampshire has argued:
. . . Russell did not apply to politics the analytic
methods which he called for in the theory of knowledge.
He made no solid contribution to political philosophy,
although he thought continuously about politics from
2
1914 onward.
Although Russell was deeply concerned and actively involved in the
central political debates of his time, including nuclear disarmament
and American intervention in Vietnam, his political and moral positions
remained divorced from his epistemological and metaphysical doctrines.
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In this way, Russell is a true representative of the prevailing
"positivist" conception of the relationship between philosophy and
political science and theory set out in the first chapter of this
3
essay. In general, the last fifty years of Anglo-American philosophy
has, under the influence of logical positivism, championed the view
that there is no logical connection between technical philosophical
issues on the one hand and moral and political issues on the other.
^
More importantly, mainstream American political science has, for the
most part, remained isolated from the most far-reaching and fundamental
critiques, reassessments and reformulations of this positivist con-
ception. Contemporary political research and theory continues to
articulate or rest upon a conception of a science of politics which
has, by adopting the same methodology used in the physical sciences,
freed itself of the philosophical, normative and speculative diffi-
culties addressed by traditional political philosophy.
One of the most important dimensions of this perceived advance of
the modern social and behavioral sciences over traditional political
philosophy is the contrast between the speculative, a priori accounts
of human nature set out by the traditional theorists and the contem-
porary conceptions of "psychological man" and "sociological man."
Clearly, there is a tremendous gap between the classical liberal char-
acterization of thought and action which is tied to the doctrine of
abstract individualism and conceptualization of human motivation and
behavior which has emerged from the social and behavioral sciences.
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Thus, few political scientists, particularly those focusing on the
study of political behavior, deny that there are important connections
between the study of political institutions and processes and the study
of human motivation and behavior. Not only do many political scien-
tists now acknowledge that the theoretical frameworks used in research
incorporate background assumptions concerning personality and moti-
vation, but the used of concepts expressly borrowed from psychology in
5
research on political behavior is on the increase as well.
However, researchers focusing on political behavior emphasize the
radical differences between this conception of certain basic connec-
tions between psychology and political science and the classical
liberal treatment of mind and politics. After all, the models of per-
sonality utilized on contemporary political science are grounded not in
the philosophical underpinnings of the doctrine of abstract indivi-
dualism but rather on the major development in our understanding of
human character, motivation and behavior achieved in the social and
behavioral sciences. Even the terminology of human nature which per-
vaded the classical liberal treatment of mind and politics has been
discredited by the reconceptualization of human motivation and behavior
tied to the emergence of psychology as a separate and autonomous dis-
cipline in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Charles Darwin's Origin of Species , published in 1859, marked one
of these major shifts which set the modern view of personality apart
from traditional views of human nature, including the classical empiri-
cist account. Darwin's conception of human beings as, like other
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animals, the products of an evolutionary process represented a funda-
mental challenge to any surviving elements of the religious and meta-
physical frameworks which stressed the unique character of human nature
as established by God or a purposive order. More importantly, his
evolutionary doctrine was advanced not as a general theory of human na-
ture grounded in certain philosophical theses, but rather as a sci-
entific theory supported by a set of empirical observations. From
Darwin to the present, the attempt to explain human nature has been
identified with the study of man as an organism which developed through
an evolutionary process and the study of mind as an organ which devel-
oped in and through man's successful adaptation to his environment.
Darwin's theory was thus considered a significant step in the emergence
of psychology from philosophy as a separate discipline which attempts
to follow the lead of the natural sciences in uncovering the biological
foundations of human motivation and behavior.^
Of course, the early empiricists themselves are considered key
transitional figures in this break of psychology with philosophy in
that they attempted to convert philosophy into a science of the mind
and to remake the study of human nature into a scientific enterprise.
However, the empiricists lacked the kind of understanding of human
beings as the end results of an evolutionary process as well as the
kind of thoroughly naturalistic and mechanistic explanatory framework
offered by Darwin's evolutionary doctrine. In the post Darwinian era,
psychologists held that there was no longer any need for the kind of
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speculative, philosophically-grounded models of human nature sketched
by the classical empiricists.
This reconceptualization of human nature was reflected in the
abandonment of the search for the universal wants and needs of "natural
man" and the initiation of a search for the biological base of human
wants and needs within the human organism. In other words, psycho-
logists discarded the speculative and introspective approach of the
early empiricists and began to establish laboratories in which the
experimental method would become the basis for a genuinely scientific
understanding of human nature. Whereas the early empiricist philoso-
phers had suggested that one study human nature by "looking" into
oneself or examining one's own "ideas" and experiences, later empirical
psychology increasingly adopted the standpoint of the detached observer
7
as the proper basis for the study of human nature and human behavior.
The Darwinian revolution was thus a major factor in the eventual
rejection, by psychologists and other social scientists, of the very
terminology of human nature tied to the classical liberal treatment of
mind and politics. According to this post-Darwinian perspective, the
early liberals had, like the traditional political philosophers, of-
fered theories of human nature which were based on a priori , philo-
sophical assumptions about the nature of man or human action. Late
nineteenth and twentieth century social scientists and theorists sus-
pected that the variety among the competing, incompatible accounts of
human nature set out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was
itself the reflection of a prevailing tendency to promote theories of
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personality on the basis of their ethical, political or social impli-
cations rather than on scientific, objective grounds.® The demand for
scientific objectivity as the basis for the study of man seemed to
preclude the mentalistic psychology, the speculation about "natural
man," and the philosophical discussions of theories of knowledge and
mind which constituted central elements of the early liberal-empiricist
accounts of human nature.
Freud was a second major figure whose contributions to our under-
standing of the human mind and personality set these modern conceptions
apart from the classical liberal views of man and mind. He revolu-
tionized thinking about the workings of the mind, particularly our
conception of the scope and power of human rationality, through his
attempts to demonstrate that much human behavior is the result of
motives of which we are not even aware. Freudian psychology portrayed
the personality as a complex combination of conscious, partially con-
scious and unconscious desires, thoughts and beliefs. He offered a
systematic model of mind in terms of the human organism's inherent
psychic energy and attempted to outline the central characteristics of
and relationships between what he considered the three basic components
of the human psyche: the id, the ego and the superego.
According to Freud, the first of these three parts, the id
. . .
contains everything that is inherited, that is
present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution
—
above all, therefore the instincts, which originate in
9
the somatic organization . . .
The id, which constitutes the entire psychological structure of the
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newborn child, is a powerful, chaotic mass of undirected and undif-
ferentiated drives and forces including the fundamental physiological
wants as well as the basic sexual and aggressive instincts. The id has
"no direct relation with the external world" and operates according to
the pleasure principle, seeking immediate gratification of the primi-
tive drives and instincts and avoiding pain or discomfort . The id
attempts to eliminate frustration and tension through impulsive motor
activity and image formation or wish fulfillment. However, since the
newborn child's wants are not always immediately satisfied, the id is
inevitably subject to some frustration and tension.
The two remaining components of the psyche, the ego and the super-
ego, emerge in consequent stages of the organism's biological develop-
ment. The ego is formed as reality impinges upon the id and is thus
the product of the process of interaction between the child and the ex-
ternal world, including the child's parents. The ego develops as the
child develops powers of perception, thought and memory which allow it
to deal with the external world so as to satisfy the basic needs and
desires of the organism. As a kind of intermediary between the id and
external reality, the ego operates according to the reality principle
and introduces "an intellective activity" into the organism's efforts
to satisfy its basic drives and instincts.
The third component of Freud's model, the superego, develops
through the interaction between the child and the various agents of the
socialization process, especially the parents. The superego emerges
with the internalization of parental commands and conceptions of right
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and good (ego-ideals) and conceptions of wrong and bad (conscience).
As, in Calvin Hall's words, "the moral or judicial branch of the per-
12
sonality," the superego is charged with the task of regulating the
basic sexual and aggressive instincts inherent in the id. Thus, the
superego is an agent of civilization which operates within the indi-
vidual personality "like a garrison in a conquered city."^^
The tension between the instinctual, biologically-given demands of
the id and the demands of culture as interalized in the superego in-
evitably produces conflicts within the personality. It is the function
of the ego to attempt to reconcile the sexual and aggressive drives of
the id, the superego's internalized feelings of right and wrong, and
the demands of reality itself. According to Freudian theory, the
primary defense mechanism used by the ego to protect the personality
and to deal with anxiety and guilt is repression, although other
defense mechanisms such as rationalization, projection, reaction
formation and regression are also used. These notions of inevitable
conflict in the personality and of defense mechanisms to deal with such
conflict are central features of the Freudian account of human nature.
The Freudian view of man is thus pessimistic, for he holds that a
certain amount of repression of the orgaism's basic drives and in-
stincts is necessary for the maintenance and progress of civilization.
Freud's theory of personality clearly presents a powerful chal-
lenge to certain of the central components of the early liberal notions
of human nature and of a science of human nature. In offering a dy-
namic theory of the unconscious, Freud emphasized that the "inner life"
186
represented by dreams, wishes and fantasy is as important as observable
behavior in the attempt to understand human motivation and action.
However, Freudian psychology is not "mentalistic" in the same sense as
classical liberal psychology. His emphasis, reflecting post-Darwinian
trends, is upon uncovering the biological, organic base of the mental
life of human beings. The unconscious is advanced as a theoretical
construct which is utilized to explain empirical correlations between
certain kinds of childhood experiences and certain personality traits
14
exhibited later in life.
In addition, the Freudian conception of unconscious desires and
thoughts is incompatible with the introspective psychology advanced by
the early British empiricists. His examination of unconscious moti-
vation reveals the fundamental shallowness and inadequacy of the li-
beral-empiricist treatment of desires and other mental contents as, in
all cases, given and transparent. Psychoanalysis itself is a technique
which aims at enabling the patient to become aware of motives and
desires which previously have been unconscious factors influencing his
behavior. The psychoanalytic tradition emphasizes the difficulties
inherent in this process of becoming aware of certain motives and
desires which are already influencing our behavior, portraying this
process as involving much more than simply an intellectual apprehension
of given objects or forces.
Psycholanalysis can thus be viewed as an attempt to extend the
realm of rational control which a person has over his own feelings,
beliefs and actions. In a sense, Freudian psychoanalysis represents a
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return to the classical or Socratic conception of mind where self-
knowledge, which is considered radically different from knowledge of
the external world, is a focal point in the relationship between
thought and action. Within the Freudian framework, the problems con-
cerning self-knowledge take on an added significance and must be ap-
proached differently than they were within the classical empiricist
framework.
Of course, many of Freud's central conceptions have been criti-
cized as ambiguous or inaccurate, and there is a series of continuing
controversies regarding the adequacy or validity of the Freudian theory
of human nature. Within the psychoanalytic tradition, Adler and other
neo-Freudian analysists have objected that Freud places too much em-
phasis on sexual instincts and neglects other instinctual urges, that
he pays insufficient attention to the ego and ego-development, or that
he ignores significant social influences on human motivation and be-
havior. Adherents of other schools of psychology have raised more
fundamental objections to explanations in terms of unconscious psychic
factors, claiming that such postulating of unobservable entities repre-
sents a return to pre-scienti f ic theorizing about human nature. These
controversies are compounded by other factors, including the complexity
and scope of the Freudian conception of the unconscious which is di-
rectly connected to theories and analyses of infantile sexuality,
psycho-social development, repression, sublimation and fantasy. In
addition, the primary concern of psychoanalysis has been with the
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treatment of cases rather than the testing of hypotheses concerning
human nature.
Yet, whatever the outcome of these various debates, it is clear
that Freudian theory has fundamentally revised the conceptual framework
within which we think about and discuss human nature and human beha-
vior. Freud not only introduced many additional concepts and new
interpretations of human behavior but also altered the basic distinc-
tions, classifications and assumptions which were implicit in previous
theories of and everyday accounts of thought and action. In short,
Freud revolutionized the basic material from which any future theory of
human nature would have to be constructed. This Freudian revolution
constitutes another fundamental dividing line separating the liberal-
empiricist conception of human nature from contemporary accounts of
personality and human behavior.
The emergence of the behaviorist school of psychology in the
twentieth century marked yet another major break with the kind of
thinking about mind and human nature characteristic of the classical
empiricists. In a sense, the behaviorist movement was but another
step taken in the name of the empiricist's own goal of constructing a
truly scientific theory of mind or human nature. However, the beha-
viorists believed that the achievement of such a scientific psychology
required sweeping changes in the methods and concepts that were central
in traditional treatments of human nature, including the "mentalistic"
psychology constructed by the early empiricists. In addition, the be-
haviorist theorists called for a fundamental shift away from the
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Darwinian-Freudian emphasis on the biological, genetic base of the
human organism toward an emphasis on the environmental factors which
shape human behavior. Representative of this behaviorist perspective
was Pavlov's Conditioned Reflexes
,
published in 1927, which maintained
that the learning processes of the higher vertebrates could be explain-
ed in terms of a model of stimulus, neural processes, and response.
In this country, the most influential of the early behaviorists
was J. B. Watson, who constructed a powerful defense of a learning
theory based solely on the description of observable behavior.
Watson's central aim was to make psychology genuinely scientific by
following more rigorously and completely than ever before the suc-
cessful example of the physical sciences. He argued that in order to
accomplish this goal, psychology must be firmly grounded on objective
methods which allow different observers to observe the same events and
processes
.
Since the states of consciousness emphasized by earlier psycho-
logical theories are private and non-observable, the traditional at-
tempts to develop a theory of personality based on introspection had to
be dismissed as hopelessly subjective. Only scientific observation and
measurement of external behaviors could provide the necessary data for
an empirically-based psychology. Watson and McDougall's The Battle of
Behaviorism clearly states how extensively the accepted conceptual
framework must be revised in order to accomplish this goal:
The behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem
of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval subjective
terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire,
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purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were
originally defined. ... The behaviorist asks: Why
don't we make what we can observe the real field of psy-
chology? Let us limit ourselves to things that can be
observed and formulate laws concerning only the observ-
17
able things.
Watson and other early behaviorists held that it is possible to
explain all animal and human behavior completely in terms of only those
concepts which make reference to observable events and objects. The
various "mentalistic" concepts such as consciousness, which were cen-
tral terms in the hypothetical constructs advanced in traditional phi-
losophy of mind, were rejected as inherently problematic and irrelevant
to the construction of a truly scientific psychology. The behaviorists
concentrated on the search for empirical correlations between the
observable responses of the organism and the observable features of the
organism's environment (stimuli). The various studies conducted within
this stimulus-response framework suggested that human beings are much
more manipulable or maleable than the earlier psychologists who em-
phasized inherent or genetic factors had thought.
Watson went even further, claiming:
Give me a dozen healthy infants . . . and I'll guarantee
to take any one at random and train him to become any
type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer,
artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggarman and
thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies,
1
8
abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.
This seemed to represent a return to the Lockean conception of the
human mind as a blank slate upon which virtually anything could be
written given the proper environmental influences or conditioning.
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However, the kind of hard or radical behaviorism which Watson cham-
pioned did not simply emphasize environmental over hereditary factors
in explaining human behavior, but rather challenged the very notion
that there was any set of characteristics or qualities which could be
labeled "human nature." In contrast to Pavlov, who had acknowledged
the role of the organism in determining human behavior, Watson's pre-
occupation with the observable led him to an environmental determinist
position denying any sense to traditional conceptions of human nature.
B. F. Skinner, the modern champion of radical behaviorism, ad-
vances a theory of operant conditioning which characterizes all learn-
ing and behavior in terms of a history of positive and negative rein-
forcements. Skinner follows Watson in stressing the necessity of
eliminating the language of goals, intentions, and purposes from scien-
tific attempts to explain human motivation and behavior. In Beyond
Freedom and Dignity he explicitly rejects the kind of causal chain
connecting "ideas" and action posited by the early empiricists,
stating
:
. . . we do, indeed, feel things inside our own skins,
but we do not feel the things that we have invented to
explain behavior. ... We do feel certain states of
our bodies associated with behavior, but . . . they are
20
by products and not to be mistaken for causes.
Moreover, he like Watson is an environmental determinist who rejects
any notion of an internal structure of inherent instincts, driven or
unconscious urges.
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Skinner, like Watson before him, rejects not only the mentalistic,
introspective psychology of classical empiricism but also the notion
that there is a valid, objective basis for discussing or attempting to
construct a model of human nature. The radical behaviorists view the
tendency to attribute the behavior of individuals to some kind of
internal force or structure called human nature as a hold-over from
pre-scientific
,
religious and metaphysical conceptions of human beings
2
1
and their place in the universe. The problems and issues associated
with traditional accounts of human nature are banished to the black
box, and the psychologist concentrates on the observable components of
22the stimulus-response paradigm. This behaviorist rejection of the
notion that we can meaningfully speak of a human nature systematically
infected twentieth century psychological thought and contributed ex-
tensively to the suspicion with which modern social scientists treat
23
all accounts of human nature.
Of course, there are many significant differences separating the
various psychologists who consider themselves "behaviorists," and not
all of those who adhere to the basic tenets of behaviorism accept this
"radical" doctrine set out by Watson and Skinner. More moderate be-
haviorists tend to avoid such forms of "metaphysical" behaviorism which
claim that consciousness does not exist and to champion various brands
of "methodological" behaviorism which centers in the more limited claim
that consciousness cannot be studied according to objective, scien-
tific methods. In addition, the moderate behaviorists have increas-
ingly acknowledged the importance of "intervening variables" between
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the stimulus and response ends of the model and have offered hypotheses
about capacities within the organism, such as "drives" or a "drive-
reduction structure," in their attempts to explain human behavior.
They do continue to insist, however, that a scientific psychology must
avoid reference to unobservable inner processes and must always link
theoretical terms with observable factors.
In general, behaviorists
, whether radical or moderate, have argued
that internal psychological constructs must be avoided, placed an
emphasis on the study of observable behavior, aimed at discovering laws
of animal and human behavior, attempted to reduce behavior to its
simplist and most basic elements, adhered to some version of the
stimulus-response paradigm, and emphasized environmental rather than
25
genetic determinants of behavior. Under the influence of this be-
haviorist program, modern psychology has moved steadily away from the
conceptions of human nature and of a science of human nature as set
forth by the early empiricists. In fact, the research of behaviorist
psychologists has. proved instrumental in directing attention to and
attempting to correct many of the most obvious weaknesses in the em-
piricist models of man and mind. For example, numerous psychologists
have made use of the behaviorist methodology to reexamine the a priori
conception of human nature as inherently aggressive, competative and
egoistic. More importantly, like the Darwinian and Freudian theories,
behaviorism has altered certain of the basic concepts and classifica-
tions used to describe and explain human thought and action.
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While this brief summary does not constitute a comprehensive
survey of the modern psychology, it does illustrate the wide gap sepa-
rating the contemporary conception of "psychological man" from the
classical liberal portrayal of human nature which is emphasized by
contemporary researchers studying political behavior. This contem-
porary view of of "psychological man" is clearly not simply an exten-
sion of the early empiricist account of human nature but rather is a
composite of several different, sometimes competing and sometimes
complementary developments in psychology in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. The psychological theories attached to the
classical liberal doctrine of abstract individualism have been made
obsolete by such changes as Darwin's substitution of the biological for
the philosophical mode of thinking about mind and personality, the
Freudian emphasis on the power of unconscious motivation and rejection
of the notion of consciousness as fully transparent, and the behav-
iorist critique of the introspective approach and general challenge to
the Cartesian-empiricist dualistic account of mind and body. This
constitutes a central underpinning of the prevailing assumption that
contemporary accounts of political motivation and behavior are far
removed from the classical liberal doctrine of egoistic individualism
supported by an introspective psychology and an individualistic episte-
mology and philosophy of mind.
In addition, although these advances in our conception of "psy-
chological man" were significant factors in the general decline of the
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kind of theorizing about human nature characteristic of historical pol-
itical thought, these changes do not fully account for either the
distance separating the classical-liberal account of human nature from
the modern conception of personality or for the general abandonment of
the terminology of human nature in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century political and social theory. The classical liberal
treatment of mind and politics was made obsolete primarily not by these
revisions in the conception of "psychological man" but rather by
equally fundamental changes in the prevailing conceptions of "socio-
logical man" and of the nature of a science of politics and society.
In other words, the ground-breaking anthropological and sociological
studies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries identified signi-
ficant differences not only among the individuals living in different
social and cultural settings but also among the workings and function
of the basic social arrangements and practices which influenced human
character and behavior. These discoveries, as Mill had recognized,
mandated fundamental revision of the theory of abstract individualism
and the conception of a science of politics or society derived or
deduced from such a theory.
Focusing on the contributions of sociology, Dennis Wrong states:
All the great nineteenth and early twentieth century
sociologists saw it as one of their major tasks to
expose the unreality of such abstractions as economic
man, the gain-seeker of the classical economists; pol-
itical man, the power-seeker of the Machiavellian tra-
dition in political science; self-preserving man, the
security-seeker of Hobbes and Darwin; sexual or li-
bidinal man, the pleasure-seeker of doctrinaire
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Freudianism; and even religious man, the God-seeker of
the theologians.^^
The main point here is, of course, that despite the very real advances
in our understanding of individual psychology, such conceptions of
human nature as are presented in the Darwinian and doctrinaire Freudian
accounts of human nature remain one-sided. In a sense, the image of
the abstract individual persists because of a general neglect of the
sociological and cultural dimensions of human life and behavior.
Although very real and significant differences divide the founders
of modern sociology, including such diverse thinkers such as Marx,
Durkheim, Weber, and Mosca, they do place common emphasis on analysis
of the social, historical and institutional factors which influence
human motivation and behavior. The conception of the abstract indivi-
dual, whether in the doctrine of egoistic individualism set out by the
classical liberals or implicit in the various theories of "psycholog-
ical man," disappears only as sociologists and anthropologists detail
the variety of human motivation and behavior as mediated by the basic
social relationships and institutions—economic, political, familial,
religious and so on—which are essential components of all human life
and activity. In short, it is only with this sociological perspective
which views men and women as essentially social beings that social and
political theorists have the conceptual base for moving beyond the con-
ception of abstract individualism.
This sociological reconceptualization of the basic notions of in-
dividuality and sociality and the consequent redefiniton of the nature
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and scope of social science and theory completely undercuts the class-
ical liberal approach to mind and politics. The early liberals, as we
have seen, portray social institutions and relationships as instru-
mental devices constructed by asocial or pre-social human beings in
order to satisfy or realize certain pre-established desires, needs or
interest. However, society, according to this sociological perspec-
tive, is not simply a set of contractual, artificial arrangements
designed to serve the independent and prior desires and interests of
abstract individuals. Rather, society is a complex web of values,
norms, roles, relationships and customs which do not merely confront
the individual as external barriers or constraints but are internalized
by individuals thus shaping their desires and interests. Personality
and even individual identity are the products of a socialization pro-
cess which can be characterized in terms of internalization of
socially-defined norms and values, the adoption of socially-defined
27
roles and so on.
The basic core of this model of "sociological man" is a focus on
social interaction, relationships, arrangements and institutions as
significant factors influencing individual character and behavior.
Although the various social theorists and sociologists certainly do
advance more specific and detailed accounts of human nature, the nature
of society and social relationships, and the connections between human
nature and society, these accounts very extensively.
Marx, for example, sets out a view of human nature that emphasizes
the extent to which human motivation is the product of the
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socialization processes of various social systems. At the same time,
he acknowledges certain species needs and powers which are blunted by
particular forms of social organization and structure. His account of
social relations and social order focuses on the conflicts of interest
and the power relationships among the different classes of society.
But this analysis of existing social structures is coupled with a
vision of a future society in which such conflicts of interests are
eliminated and these power relationships evolve into "truly human"
relationships. In a fundamental sense, both human nature and society
are, for Marx, productions or creations of human activity, and one of
the central tasks of social theory is to promote the conscious control
28
of this activity.
However, the more specific conceptions of "sociological man" which
have exerted the greatest influence in American social science present
fundamentally different accounts of human nature and society. One
alternative conception of human nature is summarized accurately if
crudely by Durkheim's statement that "Individual natures are merely the
indeterminate material which the social factor moulds and trans-
29forms." In other words, this more detailed account of "sociological
man" moves from a general emphasis on the social influences on human
character and behavior to the thesis that individual character is
molded by social institutions and norms and that individual behavior is
determined by common norms and institutional factors. Individuals are
the products of a socialization process in the sense that they
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internalize socially-defined values, norms and roles and then conform
to these in their behavior.
In addition, this Durkheimian perspective focuses on the problem
of order in human society and views consensus or shared norms and
values rather than conflict of interest or power relationships as the
most basic feature of social structure and social life. Thus, the
social order is based upon a shared value and belief system which
assigns to various individuals the rights and duties corresponding to
their place, function or role in the social order. The socialization
process through which individuals internalize and accept as legitimate
this value system is the basic source of social order and social
cohesion . "^^
This is, of course, a simplified summary of a complex set of
issues at the base of social and political theory, but this contrast
between the general model of "sociological man" and the more specific
theories of human nature and social structure which have filled out
this general model is essential to understanding recent debates con-
cerning "sociological man" and "psychological man." For it is essen-
tially that derivative of the Durkheimian perspective called function-
alism, particularly as revised and expanded by Parsons, which has been
the most influential variant of the conception of "sociological man" in
32
American social science and theory.
Although there are significant differences between the early and
more recent versions of functionalism as well as among the various
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contemporary functionalist approaches (such as structural function-
alism," "systems analysis" and "general systems theory"), the adherents
of this approach have consistently emphasized that political and social
behavior can only be understood by examining its institutional and
cultural context. In all its forms, the functionalist approach has
rejected all attempts to explain political and social behavior by
reducing it to the thoughts, desires or interests of individuals. It
has focused on the examination of patterns of behavior, as tied to
patterns of group-orientation, patterns of social interaction, and
normative patterns in a society, in maintaining the social or political
system as a whole. Functionalism is thus one of the major contemporary
approaches to the study of society and politics which acknowledges the
central importance of sociological influences on human character,
thought and behavior.
At the same time, it has been criticized as having an inherently
conservative or status quo orientation because of what Wrong calls its
"overintegrated view of society" or its preoccupation with questions
concerning social order or system maintenance and neglect of questions
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concerning social conflict and the distribution of power. Moreover,
critics have charged that American social science has, under the in-
fluence of functionalism, moved toward a kind of "sociological deter-
minist" conception of personality and behavior. In other words, the
implicit functionalist conception of personality which is embedded in
contemporary explanatory frameworks typically ignores the crucial psy-
chological factors affecting social behavior and institutions and thus
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lies at the extreme opposite end of the spectrum from the classical
liberal conception of human nature.
For example, Abraham Maslow maintains that:
A total cultural determinism is still the official,
orthodox doctrine of many or most of the sociologists
and anthropologists. Ihe doctrine not only denies
intrinsic higher motivations, but comes perilously close
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sometimes to denying "human nature" itself.
Two of the most powerful critiques of this conception of personality
are set out by George C. Homans , who labels this conception a "social
mold theory of human nature," and Dennis Wrong, who calls it "an over-
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socialized conception of man." In general, their argument can be
summarized as holding that in contrast to the classical liberals who
advanced an abstract, asocial conception of human nature and an overin-
dividualized conception of society, contemporary social scientists
standardly proceed with an oversocialized conception of human nature
and an overintegrated conception of society.
Wrong's argument is particularly important because it, in a sense,
formulates the dominant position concerning what is wrong with the
contemporary social and behavioral sciences and what must be done to
correct this problem. He identifies two basic components of the over-
socialized conception of human nature which is implicit in the con-
ceptual framework used in contemporary sociology. First, this implicit
model of man treats human nature as simply a product of the "inter-
nalization of social norms," where internalization is equated with
"learning" or "habit-formation .
"^^ Thus, this model of human nature
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completely neglects Freud's insights concerning the inner tension
generated by the inevitable conflict between such internalized norms
and basic instinctual urges. Secondly, contemporary sociologists have
constructed an "extremely one-sided view of human nature" by focusing
exclusively on one motive, "the desire to achieve a favorable self-
image ... by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others," as
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underlying all human behavior. Again, the basic insights into the
internal or organic determinants of human motivation and behavior which
are stressed by the Freudian model of "psychological man" are ignored.
Wrong's thesis is that American social scientists must abandon
this unreflective , oversocialized model of man and develop "a more
complex, dialectical conception of human nature." Although he uses
the example of the more balanced, traditional notion of human nature as
divided between a "social man" and a "natural man," his is certainly
neither a call for a return to the speculative conceptions of human na-
ture constructed by the traditional theorists nor an argument for
reconsideration of the conceptual and philosophical issues concerning
thought and action. All that is needed is a conception of human nature
which integrates Freud's conception of man "as a social animal without
being entirely a socialized animal" with the very real advances in our
understanding of the institutional and social influences on human
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character and behavior offered by modern sociology.
It is in this sense that Wrong accurately summarizes the pre-
vailing view of the remaining agenda of the social and behaviorial
sciences concerning the construction of an adequate conception of human
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nature, particularly as this agenda is set out in the contemporary
literature on political motivation and behavior. The basic task is to
push beyond the unnecessary debates between the champions of "psycho-
logical man" and "sociological man" and reconcile these two indispen-
sible sides of a truly comprehensive conception of personality. Of
course, it is assumed that each of these conceptions rests on a solid,
scientific base and is far removed from the classical liberal doctrine
of abstract individualism linked to empiricist theories of knowledge
and mind.
Moreover, it is assumed that the troublesome philosophical issues
addressed by the early liberals or associated with traditional dis-
cussions of thought and action in general have been eliminated or
resolved by these two major avenues of advance in the social and be-
havioral sciences. Certainly, there are some remaining difficulties
which must be addressed through careful analysis of the problematic
boundary area where psychological and sociological factors interact or
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overlap. But this is, of course, a task for empirical research and
not discussion of the outdated philosophical issues associated with
traditional treatments of thought and action or mind and politics.
Personality and Politics
Many political scientists acknowledge that since politics is
largely a matter of human behavior, the study of human motivation and
personality is necessarily a central dimension in the study of
politics. In fact, the field of political psychology or the study of
204
personality and politics is a rapidly growing area of specialization in
the discipline. Although this field encompasses a wide range of dif-
ferent kinds of approaches to the study of personality and political
behavior, a general consensus concerning the basic concerns, methods
and problems of the field clearly emerges in the works of its leading
scholars, typified by James C. Davies
, "Where From and Where To?",
Jeanne K. Knutson, "Personality in the Study of Politics," Fred I.
Greenstein, "Political Psychology: A Pluralistic Universe," and other
articles in The Handbook of Political Psychology as well as in
Greenstein' s Personality and Politics and his article, "Personality and
4
1
Politics," in the second volume of the Handbook of Political Science
.
The following statement by Knutson provides a representative summary of
this prevailing perspective on personality and politics:
In political psychology, it has become a truism that
personality— in some unspecified way—affects political
beliefs and activity. This assumption can be traced
back to Plato, who expresssed a concern with the pro-
motion of personality growth supportive of the polity.
It received general professional acceptance through the
seminal work of Harold Laswell, whose books ( Psycho-
pathology and Politics , Power and Personality ) advanced
the thesis that political behavior results from intra-
psychic predispositions being displaced on public
objects. Yet, in all the years since Laswell's early
work, the assumption that personality at least partially
determines political beliefs and political behavior has
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received inadequate critical analysis.
In other words, although the publication of Laswell's Psychopathology
and Politics in 1930 marks the beginning of the modern union between
psychology and political science, the historical roots of the study of
personality and politics lie in classical political theory. Moreover,
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while there are definite advances in our understanding of the general
linkages between personality and political beliefs and behavior, more
detailed analysis of the specific nature of these linkages is
necessary
.
This identification of the modern study of political psychology
with the major concerns of the historical theorists is very strong.
For example, James Davies criticizes the studies of political behavior
in mainstream political science as being unimaginative, assembly line
work which focuses on the "epiphinomenal" or the study of "manifest
effects" and which ignores the most significant issues regarding the
connections between personality and politics. The principal exceptions
to this prevailing interest in "precisely validating the self-evident"
are found in the work of those theorists and researchers who return to
the traditional task of attempting:
... to establish the fundamental linkages between
people and institutions, in stable and in turbulent
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times, that Hobbes attempted.
He points to such contributions as his own Human Nature in Politics ,
Bay's The Structure of Freedom , Lane's Political Thinking and Con-
sciousness and Knutson's Human Basis of the Polity as combining a
contemporary research orientation and methodology with "an awareness of
the intellectual heritage in political theory."
Heinz Eulau, one of the leading figures in the behavioral movement
in political science, certainly does not share this critical view of
the contributions of recent studies of political behavior. However, he
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does hold a similar view of contemporary research in this field as a
continuation of the historical tradition with its emphasis on the
connections between human nature and political institutions and pro-
cesses. As he states,
What makes the so-called classic theories great are
their sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit assumptions
about human nature in politics.
In his view, the modern behavioral approach itself is "a direct and
genuine descendent of the classical tradition" because it corrects the
pre-behavioral preoccupation with the study of institutions and con-
stitutions and "returns to the study of man as the root of politics. "^^
Of course, although contemporary students of political psychology
and political behavior acknowledge th intellectual and historical roots
of the enterprise in traditional political philosophy, they emphasize
that these traditional accounts of the connections among human nature,
political beliefs and behavior, and political institutions and pro-
cesses tend to be vague, a priori and in conflict with the findings of
empirical research. Eulau puts the objection in the following way:
But to say that a man's personality has something to do
^7
with his political behavior is not saying very much.
Contemporary researchers studying political behavior and political psy-
chology insist upon specifying exactly what the study of personality
can contribute to our understanding of political behavior. Their
emphasis is on empirical research which utilizes the tremendous advance
in conceptual and technical tools separating modern political science
from historical political philosophy.
207
Thus, in general, current approaches used in the analysis of pol-
itical psychology and political behavior are thought to represent not a
revolt against the classical traditional of political theory but rather
a technological breakthrough which promises solution (or dissolution)
of the problems inherent in classical accounts of human nature and pol-
itics. This technological breakthrough, a social scientific method-
ology which makes use of the insights offered by both the conception of
"psychological man" as well as that of "sociological man," is con-
sidered one of the most significant steps in the "linear aevelopment"
marking the emergence of the social* and behavioral sciences from the
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philosophical treatments of mind and politics.
One of the most frequently cited differences between the contem-
porary and traditional approaches to the analysis of personality and
politics is the rejection of the kind of grand-scale theories of human
nature utilized or articulated by the historical theorists. According
to the present view of this enterprise, the analysis of political psy-
chology or political behavior can progress only if we strip from the
conception of personality those philosophical, metaphysical and pre-
scientific elements which became attached to it in classical discus-
sions of human nature. Moreover, the notion that such a systematic
and comprehensive theory of personality is necessary to the study of
political behavior or political psychology is itself considered highly
suspect. Most contemporary political scientists consider the attempt
to construct such a comprehensive, general-level theory not as a pre-
requisite to research in the field but rather as an obstacle which
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would hinder future research. In general, modern students of political
psychology and political behavior favor the utilization of a variety of
different research strategies, holding that any consistent, systematic
theory of personality must be built from the ground up in the basis of
research findings rather than imposed from the top down on the basis of
50philosophical assumptions.
Greenstein's summary and assessment of the various approaches now
used in the study of political behavior and personality clearly il-
lustrates this prevailing view of broad-scale treatments of human na-
ture and of the connections between human nature and politics. He
advances the following classification of works on political behavior
and personality: 1) those which aim at discovering the characteristics
shared by all men as part of their basic nature, 2) those which focus
on characteristics shared by some men, i.e. similar personality types,
and 3) those which concentrate on those characteristics which are
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unique to a particular individual and shared by no other men.
Greenstein argues that the first approach is inherently problematic not
only because ". , . it is difficult to find satisfactory analytic
leverage for studying invariant universals ('human nature') . . ." but
also because of ". . . the absence of variation that can be explained
by standard correlational or experimental means." In each of his
various discussions of the existing literature on personality and pol-
itics, he sets aside "... 'human nature' as an intractable if un-
doubtedly highly important congeries of issues . . ." and proceeds to
examine those analyses of political behavior and personality which
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utilize the latter two approaches in the above classification to make
more solid and lasting contributions to the field.
In general, any discussion of personality or political behavior
raising philosophical or general level issues concerning thought and
action is interpreted as an attempt to find a "master theory" of per-
sonality that is to serve as the basis for theory or research in the
field. To adopt such an approach is to return to the search for man's
universal or essential nature and to the "broad, almost metaphysical
accounts of society in terms of human 'stuff of society" which are
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tied to the traditional accounts of human nature. Any such slippage
into the philosophical, speculative language associated with tradi-
tional accounts of human nature can only be an obstacle to proper
empirical analysis of the socialization process, personality develop-
ment and other essential ingredients of an adequate theory of person-
ality.
Moreover, to examine the connections between personality and pol-
itics with such a philosophical terminology and orientation is to
return to the traditional speculative treatment of the connections
between mind and politics. Greenstein, for example, characterizes such
works as Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents , Norman 0. Brown's
Life Against Death , and Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization as
being so speculative, general and metaphysical that they do not make
any real contributions to the study of personality and politics.
Though sometimes stimulating, the works have "a short citational
half-life" because they are essentially philosophical psychologies or
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philosophical treatments of man and society. All such general,
speculative and philosophical approaches to mind and politics simply
present obstacles to empirical study of the actual relationship between
the psychological make-up of individuals and political structures and
arrangements
.
Greenstein and most of the other leading scholars in the field
maintain that the real progress in our understanding of political be-
havior and political psychology has resulted from individual case
studies of political actors and typological, multi-case studies of pol-
itical actors. Included in the case study category are such works on
individuals in general populations as Lane's Political Ideology as well
as the kind of psychological analyses of public figures or political
leaders illustrated by Wolfenstein' s The Revolutionary Personality:
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Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi . The second category of typological,
multi-case studies encompasses a wide range of studies: simple classi-
fications of political actors in terms of a single "psychological
variable" or "trait" such as "efficacy" or "self-esteem"; more complex
typologies, such as that of the "authoritarian personality," vriiich
attempt to identify "syndromes" of interrelated "traits" or charac-
teristics affecting political behavior; and attempts to explain pol-
itical behavior utilizing complex, holistic theories of personality
which entail accounts of the basic structures and dynamics of the
entire personality.^'''
Of course, significant differences continue to divide these
various studies of political behavior and political psychology which
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frequently draw on competing sets of concepts and theories from psycho-
logy. There is clearly no universally agreed upon theory of person-
ality which unifies these various approaches to the study of person-
ality and politics. However, even though the controversial state of
the psychological literature on personality is sometimes cited as a
principal barrier to further progress in political psychology, the
major scholars in the field hold that a general consensus has been
achieved in the most fundamental areas.
Thus, despite the variation in the details of the different the-
ories of personality, the dominant approaches to the study of political
behavior and political psychology share certain basic assumptions and
assertions concerning personality. First, personality is standardly
defined in terms of a set of "psychological predispositions," "internal
dispositions" or "stable attributes" that comprise the "physical under-
pinnings of personality," the basic psychological structure against
which the individual confronts the situational context of political
CO
belief and behavior. Second, it is also standardly assumed that this
set of "psychological predispositions" or "attributes" is stable or
consistent, providing the individual with an established or fixed
orientation to his environment.
The third common assertion or assumption underpinning these var-
ious approaches to the study of political behavior or political psy-
chology is the notion that these "psychological predispositions" deter-
mine or are causally connected to political beliefs and political be-
haviors. Of course, researchers in this field continually caution that
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the relationship between a particular disposition and a particular be-
havior varies according to the specific situation. However, even the
more limited typologies which do not attempt to set out a comprehensive
theory of personality incorporate a "covert causal theory" that posits
certain connections between the psychological characteristics of in-
dividuals and their political beliefs and behaviors.
Finally, the conceptions of personality utilized in analyses of
political behavior and political psychology are increasingly tied to
the standards of methodological behaviorism. In particular, the cur-
rent conception of personality is closely associated with the require-
ment that psychological concepts must be defined in behavioral and
observational terms and with the conviction that the study of person-
ality must be approached from a behavioral perspective. As Knutson
states, "... personality can be understood only as an inference from
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behavior .
"
In addition to this emerging consensus concerning the basic out-
line of a definition of personality, there is also general agreement
that a "multivariate approach" is essential to the analysis of pol-
itical attitudes and behavior. One of the most widely used and dis-
cussed examples of this multivariate approach is M. Brewster Smith's "A
Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," which presents an
anlytic model to be used as an organizational framework in the study of
6
1
political behavior and political psychology. His model consists of
five basic components or panels: 1) distant social antecedents, 2)
social environment as a context for the development of personality and
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the acquisition of attitutes
, 3) personality processes and disposi-
tions, 4) the situation as the immediate antecedent of action, and 5)
political behavior.
The central and most detailed component of Smith's map, which
concerns the psychological factors influencing political behavior,
focuses on attitudes, defined as
. . . dispositions, when they represent integrations of
cognitive, emotional and connative tendencies around a
psychological object such as a political figure or
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issue
.
His model is designed to clarify not only problems concerning the
relationship between an individual's attitudes and his political be-
havior but also those concerning the function of attitudes in relation
6 3
to the "ongoing operations of the person's psychological economy."
Within this third panel of Smith's map, the central linkages between
attitudes and the "functional bases of attitudes" in the deeper per-
sonality structure are classified in terms of object appraisal, the
mediation of self-other relationships, and externalization and ego
defense.
The focus of Smith's model, reflecting the principal concern of
political psychology, is upon the internal and psychological, as op-
posed to the social and environmental, determinants of political be-
havior. However, social and environmental factors are treated as
essential to the explanation of political behavior and are classified
in terms of the remaining three categories: the immediate situational
context of a particular behavior; the immediate social environment
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(including information, social norms, basic life situations, etc.)
which shapes the individual's psychological development; and the distal
or remote social environment which includes basic historical, economic,
political and social factors indirectly influencing behavior.
This multivariate approach represented by Smith's map is consi-
dered a fundamental advance over the kind of philosophical speculation
about human nature characteristic of traditional political theory
because it relies on analytic models which generate testable propo-
sitions about the specific causal relationships between personality
characteristics and political behavior. In particular, such a multi-
variate approach places a dual emphasis on both the psychological as
well as the sociological influences on human behavior. According to
Smith, this approach thus transcends the "silly and outmoded" debate
regarding whether psychological or sociological factors are the key
determinants of behavior and provides a research framework which treats
64
both sets of factors as "jointly indispensible .
"
In other words, research concerning behavior and political psycho-
logy can now proceed within a behavioral-functional framework which
leaves the unanswered questions concerning personality and politics to
be resolved by empirical discovery. The leading scholars in the field
champion the basic behavioral equation, B = f (OE )~human behavior is a
function or product of the interaction between the organism and the
environment—or the modified behaviorist paradigm, stimulus-organism-
response, as providing an analytical framework which combines the
central insights of our understanding of "psychological man" and
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"sociological man." This framework is a vehicle which allows the
study of personality and politics to move beyond the kind of "explana-
tory one-sidedness" characteristic of those traditional accounts of
human nature that were committed on philosophical grounds to either an
exclusively sociological or an exclusively psychological view of man.^^
According to the prevailing view of the study of personality and
politics, the basic task now confronting the field is analysis of the
empirical links in the causal chain which connects underlying person-
ality structure on the one hand and the social and political structure
on the other. Contemporary studies of political behavior and political
psychology explicitly or implicitly posit the following links in this
causal chain: 1) basic psychological dispositions, 2) the environ-
mental influences of childhood, 3) adult personality structure and
characteristics, 4) conscious adult attitudes, beliefs and political
orientations, 5) immediate environmental influences, 6) individual pol-
itical behavior, and 7) collective or aggregative political structures
and processes
.
Most of the current work in the field tends to focus on examining
the linkages among the first six components of this causal chain con-
necting personality and politics. Moreover, although there are at-
tempts to link the "micro-phenomena" of individual personality cha-
racteristics and behavior with the collective, "macro-phenomena" of
political structures and processes (what Greenstein calls "analyses of
aggregation"), these attempts to bridge the final, and most important
for the political scientist, connection between individual behavior and
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socio-political outcomes are acknowledged to be inadequate .^^ As Neil
Smelser admits.
We do not at the present have the methodological ca-
pacity to argue causally from a mixture of aggregative
states of individual members of a system to a global
6Q
characteristic of a system.
In addition, as Greenstein repeatedly points out, at this level of
study of the macro-phenomena of politics the happy synthesis between
"psychological man" and "sociological man" breaks down. Such analyses
of large-scale political practices and institutional patterns typically
either ignore psychological factors completely or return to some var-
70iant of "psychological reductionism .
"
Of course, this failure to deliver on the one topic which is the
focal point of the enterprise of personality and politics, namely the
relationship between personality characteristics and behaviors on the
one hand and political structures and processes on the other, is some-
what of an embarassment to political psychology and, more generally, to
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the behavioral movement to which it is attached. Moreover, the
various responses to this perceived dilemma by the most important
researchers in political behavior and political psychology reveal an
inability to come to terms with the most fundamental problems and
issues concerning personality and politics.
Greenstein acknowledges the necessity of conceptual and theo-
retical clarification to eliminate conceptual confusions, calls for
more emphasis on the standards and criteria which must be applied when
presenting, analyzing and interpreting evidence, and insists upon more
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adequate measures of dependent and independent variables. He also
restates his call for "methodological pluralism" and research flex-
. . . 72ibility. In short, the same combination of rigorous standards and
diverse research approaches which achieved such success at the micro-
level will eventually solve the problems faced at the macro-level.
Davies, as we have seen, is more critical of the "printout" orien-
tation of contemporary research in political behavior and maintains
that students of personality and politics must follow Hobbes in fo-
cusing on the connections between people and institutions. What he
then argues is that the major deficiencies evident in recent work on
political psychology stem from the dominance of conceptions of per-
sonality which either treat organic factors in an "unnecessarily vague"
manner or completely ignore the organism and concentrate exclusively on
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environmental variables. Much like Wrong, he maintains that the
basic corrective is simply an increased concern with the organic
factors influencing human behavior.
More specifically, Davies champions Maslow's theory of a hierarchy
of needs as providing the kind of biologically-based theory of human
needs and personality which will put the study of political beliefs,
attitudes and behavior on a solid, scientific foundation. Ultimately,
he views the relationship of psychology to political science to be
directly parallel to the relationships of organic chemistry to biology
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and of physics to chemistry. Modern psychology is presently devel-
oping the type of comprehensive, empirical theory of personality which
will eventually serve as the base for a science of politics that is
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free of the conceptual and philosophical problems inherent in tradi-
tional discussions of mind and politics.
A similar conception of the relationship between psychology and
political science is set out in John C. Wahlke's 1978 Presidential
Address to the American Political Science Association, "Pre-
75Behavioralism in Political Science." Acknowledging the present
dissatisfaction with the achievements of the research on political be-
havior since the so-cslled "behavioral revolution" in the discipline,
Wahlke argues that the very real problems in this work have nothing to
do with the dominant methodology or its epistemological premises.
Rather, the basic problem common to this extensive body of research is
that it continues to use "deficient and inappropriate concepts" and
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remains in a "pre-behavioral stage" of development.
He offers a detailed, extensive list of the principal failings of
contemporary research on political behavior which includes such cri-
ticisms as that it concentrates on a very limited range of theoretical
problems, it overemphasizes voting behavior, it focuses almost exclu-
sively on individual political actors, and ignores "macro-level"
topics, it is preoccupied with the study of attitudes and neglects be-
havior, and so on. All these various problems are then attributed to
two fundamental conceptual shortcomings: this research is not really
"anchored in macro-level political theory" and this research incor-
porates a "deficient general behavioral theory" or a "flawed conception
77
of human nature."
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Wahlke like Davies argues that these various deficiencies can be
remedied only by systematically building future research on an empir-
ical theory of the individual human organism. Despite its methodo-
logical rigor, contemporary research on political behavior still as-
sumes or works from:
... a dualistic, half-empirical, half metaphysical
conception of the human individual, in which the body is
governed by inner mental impulses which lead to chosen
78destinations and goals.
The elimination of this flawed, largely unreflective conception of per-
sonality will require more than borrowing a few more concepts from psy-
chology. Rather, the program of political behavior research must be
totally rebuilt on the knowledge of the human organism emerging from
the "biobehavioral sciences."
This is, of course, essentially the same conception of a science
of politics resting on a science of human behavior and the workings of
the human organism presented by Davies. As Wahlke states.
The desired relationship between political science and
the biobehavioral sciences is analgous to the relation-
ship between astronomy on the one hand and physics and
79
chemistry on the other.
After all, the people studied by the political scientist are just as
subject to the "laws of behavioral dynamics" as the phenomena studied
by the astronomer are subject to the laws of physics and chemistry.
The political scientist who ignores these basic laws determining or-
ganic functions and processes simply cannot explain political behavior.
He is in the same untenable position as the would-be astronomer who
220
attempts to explain the movements of celestial bodies in isolation from
the laws of physics.
It must also be noted that for both Wahlke and Davies, this con-
ception of a science of politics founded on the biobehavioral sciences
represents the kind of synthesis between the models of "psychological
man" and "sociological man" that is now required in the contemporary
study of political behavior and political psychology. According to
Wahlke, this approach rectifies the present imbalance inherent in the
"two dimensional, oversimplified, supercognitive
,
social-psychological
8
1
model of the acting individual." Furthermore, it takes us beyond the
dogmatic debates about the relative significance of genetic and cul-
tural determinants of human behavior and character and recognizes "the
82inseparable independence of both." In short, this model of political
science provides a framework within which the real puzzles concerning
personality and politics, including the question of nature and nuture,
can be resolved through a systematic program of research.
Certainly, Wahlke 's vision of a political science securely founded
on the laws of biobehavioral sciences is not shared by all political
scientists or all those now doing research on political behavior.
However, it does accurately reflect one of the growing trends in the
discipline which is very much in evidence in the literature on "bio-
politics" and the use of "psychophysiological" and "psychophysical"
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methods in the study of political attitudes at Stony Brook. More
importantly, Wahlke's statement is fully representative of the most
basic assumptions about human thought and action which are incorporated
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in mainstream political science. Although he clearly pushes these
basic propositions concerning the nature of human thought and behavior
further than most of his colleagues, he works with essentially the same
conceptual framework which dominates not only contemporary political
science but also American social and behavioral science in general.
As one major aspect of this framework, Davies, Greenstein, Wahlke
and others concerned with the study of personality and politics hold
that the answers to the most pressing problems concerning political be-
havior and political psychology will be provided by empirical research
guided by ever more rigorous application of scientific methods and
techniques. In other words, they share a positivist conception of a
science of politics, which, through the application of the same meth-
odology used in the natural sciences, can achieve the same kind of
knowledge of political attitudes and behavior that has already been
attained in the physical sciences.
According to this positivist model, the modern study of person-
ality and politics is free of the kinds of philosophical and conceptual
issues addressed in the traditional accounts of mind and politics.
More specifically, the conceptions of personality which ground con-
temporary research do not rest on the kinds of contestable philosoph-
ical assumptions which infected the classical conceptions of human na-
ture. Of course, the general methodological and epistemological prem-
ises of the scientific approach to the study of political behavior and
of modern personality theory itself are acknowledged. Yet, these
epistemological questions are not examined in detail, and the modern
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conceptions of political behavior and personality are clearly consid-
ered to be independent of the problematic and contestable issues in
philosophy of mind and philosophy of action.
However, careful examination of the personality and politics
literature or of the general explanatory frameworks used in the study
of political processes and behavior indicates that this is not the
case. In fact, at several crucial points, the conceptual framework
which dominates contemporary political research and empirical theory
incorporates what are basically empiricist assumptions about knowledge,
mind and action. Many of the acknowledged problems concerning the
study of political behavior and political psychology are, at least in
part, conceptual or philosophical issues which are linked to the em-
piricist distinctions and categories implicit in the dominant classi-
ficatory framework. Although this certainly does not mean that em-
pirical research is irrelevant to the attempt to answer the central
questions regarding personality and politics, such research alone
cannot be expected to resolve the most fundamental issues and problems
concerning the explanation of political behavior, political attitudes
and so on. Only an approach vrfiich combines careful assessment of the
data provided by such research with a systematic reassessment of the
prevailing classif icatory framework promises to resolve the problems
addressed by Greenstein and Wahlke.
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The Empiricist Conception of Mind
The characterization of the conception of mind which is implicit
in contemporary work on political behavior and political psychology as
"empiricist" does not rest on the implausible claim that contemporary
conceptions of political behavior and personality are identical to the
account of mind which supported classical liberal political theory. As
we have seen, developments in the social and behavioral sciences have
destroyed the classical liberal attempt to reduce human nature or per-
sonality to the psychological attributes of abstract, asocial indivi-
duals. The doctrine of abstract individualism as embodied in the
introspective psychology and, in turn, the uncompromising epistemo-
logical individualism of classical empiricism is clearly not the pre-
vailing conception of personality underpinning contemporary political
theory and research.
In addition, contemporary political science does not, like early
liberal theory, treat society or political institutions as simply
aggregations or collections of abstract individuals. Again, the class-
ical empiricist notion that political institutions or arrangements can
be explained in terms of the given desires and interests of autonomous,
pre-social individuals has been soundly rejected. Modern researchers
studying political behavior repeatedly emphasize that their approach
synthesizes the perspectives of both "sociological man" and "psycho-
logical man." In other words, they expressly acknowledge that we must
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examine both how political institutions and "political culture" in-
fluence individual traits, attitudes and behavior as well as how in-
dividual traits, attitudes and behaviors influence political insti-
84tutions and political life.
At the same time, certain elements of the doctrine of abstract in-
dividualism live on in the form af basic background assumptions con-
cerning mind, knowledge and reality. These assumptions, which center
in an essentially empiricist account of mind, are extremely difficult
to identify and assess because they are not expressly acknowledged or
defended but rather lie hidden in the deepest, most fundamental levels
of the conceptual scheme used to classify and explain political be-
havior. Political scientists, even those specializing in the study of
personality and politics, are unaware of the connections between their
theories of political behavior and significant conceptual and philo-
sophical issues concerning thought and action. Thus, the task of
drawing out these hidden, implicit connections between mind and pol-
itics as these are incorporated into modern political science is a
formidable one.
Certainly, the prevailing account of the nature and scope of the
study of personality and politics and the conceptions of personality
advanced by the researchers investigating political behavior and pol-
itical psychology do provide some intimations of these background
assumptions concerning knowledge, mind and action. For example, al-
though the leading scholars in the field locate the historical roots o
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the study of personality and politics in traditional political philo-
sophy, they insist that the kind of speculative, philosophical concerns
of the classical thinkers are quite irrelevant to the contemporary task
of explaining political behavior. On the basis of our scientific
methodology, we have moved from traditional philosophical speculation
about the linkages between mind and politics to empirical research
which is uncovering the actual relationships among individual person-
ality characteristics, individual attitudes and behaviors, and pol-
itical structures and arrangements.
In addition, as we have seen, the conceptual framework which
guides this research is either a covert or explicit causal theory that
posits certain definite connections among basic psychological charac-
teristics, individual attitudes and behaviors, and political processes
and events. There are obvious affinities between these various analy-
tical models illustrated by Smith's map and the empiricist conceptual
framework of a mechanistic, causal theory linking bodily happenings
with internal, mental events. However, as modern specialists in the
field of political psychology are quick to point out, these contem-
porary analytical models, unlike the early liberal approach to the
study of politics, specifically include the distal as well as the
immediate social environmental influences on individual character,
attitudes and behavior.
More importantly, they hold that the conception of the individual
which constitutes the central feature of these modern analytic models
is far removed from the kind of a priori , philosophical conception of
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human nature advanced by the early liberals. The conceptions of per-
sonality that underpin modern research on political behavior draw on
the increased knowledge of the human organism which is offered by psy-
chological investigation of personality and human behavior. Although,
as we have seen, contemporary studies of political behavior and pol-
itical psychology build on various psychological theories, the pre-
dominant influence is clearly that of psychological behaviorism.
One of the most important common features of the mainstream li-
terature on personality and politics is an insistence on the metho-
dological requirement that all psychological concepts must be defined
in behavioral and observational terms. Indeed, the most visible dif-
ference between the conception of mind advanced by the early empiri-
cists and any conception of mind which could be reasonably attributed
to the dominant characterization of personality in recent research on
political behavior is the treatment of personality characteristics as
psychological dispositions or predispositions.
Thus, in contrast to the classical empiricist theory of mind in
which all mental concepts seem to be simply labels corresponding to
private, inner events or states, the prevailing behavioral ist perspec-
tive portrays such "mental" terms as dispositions to respond to par-
ticular stimuli in certain ways. Of course, whereas the early empiri-
cists treated various mental states as given, this alternative behav-
ioralist account emphasizes that basic psychological dispositions are
shaped by, in their terminology, a particular history of conditioning
or reinforcement.
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However, those doing research in political behavior would cer-
tainly reject any characterization of such a shift to a dispositional
account of central psychological terms as some kind of difference
between competing philosophies of mind. In their view, this conception
of psychological traits or characteristics as dispositions, like the
rejection of philosophical, speculative issues concerning human nature
or mind and the various causal theories used to guide research, is not
dependent upon any contestable philosophy of mind but rather simply one
of a number of technical advances linked to the rigorous application of
a scientific methodology to the study of human behavior. In short, the
attempt to find an implicit conception of mind embedded in contemporary
approaches to the study of personality and politics is doomed to fail
because no such philosophical conception is present.
After all, according to the mainstream perspective, the contem-
porary approach to the study of personality and politics is based upon
a closer relationship between psychology and political science and an
abandonment of the traditional linkage between philosophy and the study
of politics. Research into political behavior draws from or builds
upon the concepts, theories and empirical findings of psychology and
follows the lead of behavioral psychology in adopting the same meth-
odology which achieved such success in the natural sciences.
Given this acknowledged relationship between contemporary research
on political behavior and behaviorist psychology, it would seem that
this conception of a science of politics and political behavior which
is free of challengeable philosophical assumptions is open to the same
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objections which have been raised against psychological behaviorism.
Critics of behaviorism have linked certain of its basic tenets as well
as its general conceptual framework to classical empiricist as well as
logical positivist views on experience, mind and body, observation,
language and so on.^^
In particular, recent linguistic challenges to psychological be-
haviorism have focused on the attempt to explain human behavior solely
in terms of concepts which designate observable objects and events. As
we have seen, the radical or strict variants of behaviorism insist that
a genuine science of human behavior c?n only be achieved through the
complete elimination of all "subjective" or "mentalistic" terms, in-
cluding purposes, intentions, and reasons, and by accepting only di-
rectly observable variables as being theoretically significant.^^ Be-
havioral psychologists have standardly focused on two major kinds of
such variables, the observable stimuli which influence an organism and
the observable behavioral responses made by the organism to particular
stimuli
.
In other words, behavioral psychology has attempted to break human
behavior down into more basic, more primitive units or variables which
can be characterized in terms of a purely mechanical, causal and phy-
sical vocabulary. These units or variables are the "brute data" which
are independent of our conceptual and theoretical frameworks and pro-
87
vide the building blocks for a genuine science of behavior. The be-
havioral psychologist proceeds to try to discover the laws regarding
the connections between the stimuli and the responses which determine
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the pattern of individual behavior. All references to internal mental
states, such as an individual's ideas, beliefs and attitudes, are
either, at the most, totally unnecessary to or, at the least, to be
avoided in our explanations of his behavior.
Although this approach clearly rejects the "mentalistic , " intro-
spective conception of mind championed by classical empiricism, it
remains closely linked to the radical empiricism of the logical posi-
tivists. For example, Clark Hull's Principles of Behavior
, one of the
"classical" statements of psychological behaviorism, offers a vision of
a science of human behavior in which the "secondary principles" of "so-
called purposive behavior" are deduced from or analyzed into "more
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elementary objective primary principles." The mentalistic concepts
and "anthropormorphic subjectivism" pervasive in traditional and or-
dinary language accounts of human behavior must be either reduced into
an observation language suitable for a science of human behavior or
eliminated as part of the untestsble speculations of metaphysics and
purposivism
.
Hull's conception of a genuine science of human behavior provides
a clear illustration of the basic ties between psychological behav-
iorism and logical positivism. He shares not only the positivist
conceptions of a hypothetico-deductive science based on "explicit and
exact systematic formulation, with empirical verification at every
possible point" and of the social sciences following the pattern of
development of the physical sciences, but also the positivist concep-
tion of the reduction of subjective, purposive concepts to a more
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primitive terminology which is causal, mechanistic and observational.^^
Most importantly, he like the logical positivists takes it as a given
that the kind of reductions he proposes are possible. He takes this as
a given because he, again like the positivists, assumes that reality
itself is made up of "a complex of basic, simple elements. "^^ Ulti-
mately, Hull's notion of a "data language," a basic set of observa-
tional concepts to which all other concepts must be reducible, depends
upon the same kind of a priori conception of reality that underpinned
the program of reductive analysis or the "reductionist paradigm. "^^
Of course, this is but a simple illustration of the complex his-
torical and conceptual connections between psychological behaviorism
and logical positivism. In addition, there have been several signi-
ficant reformulations of behaviorism, and Hull's statement can hardly
be treated as representative of all psychologists who now consider
themselves behaviorists . At the same time, this is a clear example of
the significance of questions concerning the philosophical assumptions
incorporated in the conceptual frameworks used to describe and explain
human behavior. Moreover, critics of behaviorist psychology continue
to challenge certain of its philosophical underpinnings. The contin-
uing debates over the use of purposive and intentional concepts in
explanation as well as the role of so-called teleological or purposive
explanations as opposed to causal, mechanistic explanations represent
one of the most extensive treatments of the linkages between issues in
philosophy of mind and philosophy of action on the one hand and the
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attempt to explain human behavior on the other.
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As we have seen, there is no treatment of such challenges or
questions concerning the attempted explanation of human behavior in
causal, mechanistic terms in the mainstream literature on personality
and politics. In general, those investigating political behavior
consider such charges of "reductionism" and the issues concerning
purposive and causal explanations to be completely irrelevant to the
behavioral movement in political science. After all, research in pol-
itical behavior has certainly not followed radical psychological be-
haviorism in attempting to eliminate all subjective, "mentalistic"
concepts or in attempting to reduce political behavior to patterns of
observable behavior.
After noting the decline of this kind of "pristine behaviorism"
within psychology itself, David Easton states:
Aside from a rather quaint, not entirely consistent, and
for that matter, not too intelligible formal adoption of
Watsonian behaviorism by A. F. Bentley in his Process of
Government , I know of no one associated with political
research who has advocated a position that even begins
to approximate so rigid an exclusion of subjective data.
Ideas, motives, feelings, attitudes, all appear as
important variables. By design at least, students of
political behavior have given no indication of intending
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to adopt a behavioralistic posture.
In short, research in political behavior has never been based upon any
such rejection or attempted reduction of subjective or "mentalistic"
terms including beliefs, attitudes, and values. Indeed, the mainstream
research literature has consistently stressed that it is impossible to
understand an individual's political behavior in isolation from his
ideas, desires, feelings, attitudes, beliefs and values.
232
In addition, there has been no movement which aims at reducing
political behavior to sets of movements or physical behaviors or at
characterizing all political activity in terms of observable physical
stimuli and behavioral responses. Behavioral political scientists have
long acknowledged that the most important types of political behavior
are not only purposive but also follow certain institutional or social
rules. It is clear, for example, that there are a number of different
overt behaviors or physical motions which could constitute the pol-
itical behavior of voting or civil disobedience. Thus, Eulau argues
that the behavioral approach to the study of politics simply focuses on
the individual as the basic empirical unit of analysis and attempts to
explain political processes and systems in terms of individual be-
havior. But this research approach certainly does not require that we
treat individual behavior outside of the institutional rules and social
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setting which assign significance and meaning to that behavior.
Defenders of the behavioral approach argue that given this dual
emphasis on the importance of individual beliefs, attitudes and values
as reflected in behavior as well as the institutional rules and social
setting within which political behavior takes place, behavioral pol-
itical research, with the exception of Bentley's crude formulation of
it, cannot be charged with ignoring the so-called problem of meaning.
Indeed, the more sophisticated advocates of behavioralism have acknow-
ledged that the standpoint of the observer in the social sciences is
not identical to that of the observer in the physical sciences pre-
cisely because he must come to terms with the meanings of particular
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situations and behaviors for the agents involved, not simply physical
events and movements. In their characterizations of the process of
observation they not only acknowledge that there must be some "unity of
meanings" between observer and observed but also recognize the assign-
ment of false meaning by the observer to the agent's own view of his
situation and/or behavior as a major source of error in the observation
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of political behavior.
Yet, while this is acknowledged as a source of unique difficulties
which set, the study of human behavior apart from the study of mole-
cules or atoms, it is seen as a problem complicating the process of
discovery but not affecting the logic of verification. For example,
Muford Sibley maintains that:
Once concepts meaningful to both student and studied
have been discovered, the behavior of human beings in
politics can then be examined within the framework of
understanding thus demarcated. The investigation does,
of course, involve a more complicated process than that
connected with the study of purely natural phenomena,
but the fact that common meanings must be identified
before behavioral studies can proceed does not mean that
the procedure of verification and empirical validation
cannot take place by methods not unlike those utilized
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in the natural sciences.
Thus, the so-called problem of meaning is present in our attempts ot
construct survey research questions which are meaningful to respon-
dents, but it is irrelevant to the validation procedures which apply to
the research findings.
This points directly to an important theme which is stressed by
Easton, Eulau, Sibley and other champions of the behavioral revolution,
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namely that what is called behavioral political science is not an
attempt to build a science of politics upon psychological behaviorism
but rather a particular model of such a science of politics. As Easton
characterizes this model, it stresses the attempt to develop theories
with explanatory and predictive value, the verification and testing of
these theories, the quantification of data, the careful demarcation of
the distinct tasks of ethical evaluation and empirical explanation, the
systematization of research, and the integration of political science
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with the rest of the social and behavioral sciences. The common goal
of the behavioral movement is -the construction of, again in Easton'
s
words, "a science of politics modeled after the methodological assump-
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tions of the natural sciences." In short, the behavioral movement is
the official representative of the positivist conception of a science
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of politics or society.
This behavioral or positivist conception of a science of human be-
havior is underpinned by not only a particular epistemology and meta-
physics but also by a specific conception of mind and action. In other
words, fundamental empiricist assumptions about the nature of mind or
of thought and action as well as about the nature of reality and know-
ledge are attached to and provide crucial support for this model of
scientific explanation and theory. The task of uncovering the basic
philosophical assumptions supporting this approach to the study of pol-
itical behavior is so difficult precisely because these assumptions do
not lie close to the surface, embedded within the theories of person-
ality used in research on political behavior, but rather are submerged
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in the most fundamental levels of the conceptual scheme attached to the
positivist model. These philosophical assumptions can only be flushed
out by considering an alternative conception of thought and action and
examining its repercussions on political theory and political science.
At this point, only a rough outline of some of the contestable assump-
tions concerning knowledge, reality and mind which are linked to the
dominant account of the proper approach to the study of political be-
havior is possible.
The most obvious of these connections between the positivist model
of a science of politics and empiricist philosophy, both classical em-
piricism and logical positivism, is the epistemological one. The aim
of the behavioral approach is clearly the type of objective knowledge,
completely free from the problem of competing interpretations of pol-
itical behavior, which is linked to the empiricist quest for certainty.
Such a science of politics ultimately requires the discovery of certain
"brute data" which are given and independent of the conceptual and
theoretical frameworks we use in classifying and characterizing the
political world and which thus provide the basic building blocks neces-
sary to the empiricist conception of knowledge. Without the acqui-
sition of such brute data, the process of verification is
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impossible
.
Of course, this presupposes that social reality is made up of such
brute data. Although most political scientists generally avoid onto-
logical claims, it is exactly this assumption that underlies Easton's
plea that the social sciences:
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. . .
face up to the problem of locating stable units of
analysis which might possibly play the role in social
research that the particles of matter do in the physical
sciences
.
Certainly, Easton does not limit the search for such "universal
particles of political life" to individual characteristics and behavior
for he suggests that it may prove to be his own conception of "systems"
which will provide the "common variables" to unify the social and be-
havioral sciences. However, his notion of "stable units of analysis"
clearly envisions the kind of brute data necessary for a unified
science of society and human behavior:
Ideally, the units would be repetitious, ubiquitous, and
uniform, molecular rather than molar. In this way they
would constitute the particles, as it were, out of which
all social behavior is formed and which manifest them-
selves through different institutions, structures, and
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processes
.
In addition, he expresses his conviction that these "particles," which
must be there according to this empiricist conception of reality, will
be found. ^"^"^
What makes Easton 's statement exceptional is not simply that he
expressly lays out this conception of reality but also that he holds
that this search for brute data must continue. In contrast, most
research in political behavior proceeds according to the assumption
that we have already acquired the brute data which provide the foun-
dation for a genuine science of political behavior. Indeed, it is
exactly this presupposition which underpins the behavioralists ' claim
to have handled the problem posed by the fact that human behavior.
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unlike physical processes or animal behavior, involves subjective
meanings for the agents.
The behavioralists attempt to deal with this problem of meaning
principally through the use of survey research techniques, by asking
people questions about their beliefs, values, attitudes, and percep-
tions. Proper use of thse techniques is considered a difficult task,
particularly because certain of these beliefs, values, and so on are
not easily measured. However, it is assumed that, even though the
instruments which must be used to collect data concerning the meanings
of situations and behaviors for agents are different from those used in
the physical sciences, the basic procedures of this process are logi-
cally identical to the measurements made in physics or chemistry.
Thus, the beliefs, values, feelings, attitudes, perceptions or
goals of the individuals whose behavior is being studied, which are
reported to an interviewer or measured by some type of survey research
technique, are considered brute data. The mental states or processes
are treated as "properties" of the individual subject or "facts" about
him, and become some of the "variables" used to explain political be-
havior
.
Behavioral methodology has been used in a variety of different
ways to study these variables which constitute the meaning that agents
ascribe to their own situation and actions. In the voting studies,
political scientists have focused on "party identification" and a
number of other variables in order to explain the voting behavior of
general populations. The measurement of attitudes, perceptions, and s<
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on, has also been used in attempts to explain the behavior of decision
makers as in the analysis of the relationship between legislators'
perceptions of their constituents' desires and their own voting
records. In addition, the study and measurement of the internal vari-
ables affecting political behavior have been particularly important in
recent examinations of political culture, which has been characterized
as "the distribution of socially relevant attitudes in the population"
1 05
or as "the psychological dimension of the political system."
In all these studies, the goal is to discover correlations between
the independent variables of attitudes and values and the dependent
variables of various forms of political behavior. The process of
verifying these correlations, which are considered the major basis of
the expanding body of knowledge concerning political behavior, is
considered completely independent of any problems concerning the in-
terpretation of subjective meanings. But this, of course, presupposes
that the meanings of particular situations and behaviors for the agents
involved can be adequately captured by treating them as brute data or
facts about each individual.
It is precisely at this point that the conceptual framework at-
tached to this behavioralist methodology draws on an implicit and con-
testable conception of mind. In particular, this approach assumes that
all the meanings which are part of the political behavior to be ex-
plained are essentially individual ideas, attitudes and values or in-
dividual states of consciousness. These ideas, attitudes, beliefs and
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so on are treated as the given, and frequently transparent as wellj^'''
contents of individual consciousness. Such a conception of conscious-
ness or mind neglects or rules out those "intersubjective" meanings
which are grounded in a shared language, a common set of social prac-
tices and a common form of life and which cannot be adequately cha-
racterized as simply a concurrence of essentially individual attitudes,
values and goals.
^"^^
In addition, this approach to the study of political behavior
assumes that beliefs, attitudes, and values on the one hand and pol-
itical behaviors on the other are phenomena which are separately and
independently identifiable. This separation of the various states of
individual consciousness, which are supposed to constitute the meaning
of the situation and behavior for the agent, from the agent's observ-
able behaviors underpins the search for the correlations that are
considered the major components of our knowledge of political behavior.
This is, as we shall see, again a contestable assumption concerning
thought and action which has significant implications on the conception
of the relationship between theory and fact in the social and behav-
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loral sciences.
Finally, since this approach treats beliefs, attitudes, feelings,
emotions and other mental states as essentially separate and discrete
brute data, it ignores the crucial logical connections between certain
attitudes or emotions and the beliefs of the agent. It thus assumes an
account of mind which has an extremely narrow conception of rationality
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and which neglects certain of the most significant features of self-
knowledge and self-consciousness J ^° As is the case with these other
assumptions, challenges to this essentially empiricist conception of
mind undermine the conceptual scheme with which the behavioralist
classifies and characterizes political behavior.
These themes in the empiricist conception of mind and their con-
nections to the positivist conception of a science of politics will be
explored in more detail as we consider an alternative account of mind
and its implications for political theory and political science. The
most important point here is that the behavioral political scientist
cannot simply assume that, with the adoption of a methodology modeled
after the natural sciences, the study of political behavior is freed
from the type of philosophical and conceptual issues addressed by the
traditional theorists. Champions of the behavioral or positivist ap-
proach standardly reject traditional attempts to understand politics
and society as lacking objectivity because they were linked to specu-
lative, unsupported and vague theories of human nature. Yet, a similar
kind of conception of human nature, in the form of basic assumptions
about mind and action embedded within its classificatory scheme, in-
fects the positivist conception of a science of political behavior.
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CHAPTER IV
TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF MIND
The Critique of the Spectatorial Framework
Central components of this empiricist account of mind and know-
ledge which is implicit in the explanatory frameworks used in contem-
porary political science have been seriously challenged by recent work
in linguistic philosophy of mind. Since the publication of Gilbert
Ryle's The Concept of Mind in 19^9 and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosoph-
ical Investigations in 1953, Anglo-American philosophy of mind or phi-
losophical psychology has increasingly focused on examination of the
concept of action and such related concepts as motive, desire, purpose
and intention. These investigations of the relationship between
thought and action, the connections between belief and emotion, the
apparent incompatibility between causal, mechanistic explanations of
human behavior and the purposive view of human behavior reflected in
ordinary language and everyday accounts of human activity, and other
central topics and issues have identified significant conceptual pro-
blems in the standard Cartesian-empiricist account of mind.^
Moreover, a number of linguistic philosophers and social theorists
have, building on this work in philosophy of mind, explicitly charged
that there are deep-rooted conceptual confusions embedded in the ex-
planatory models which dominate American social and behavioral science.
Such works as A. R. Louch's Explanation and Human Action , R. S. Peter's
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The Concept of Motivation and Charles Taylor's The Explanation of
Behaviour have challenged established views on causal explanation, the
distinction between causal and teleological explanation, the notion of
a mechanical theory of human behavior, the distinction between action
and physical motion, and the role of intentionality in human action.^
Although the details of their specific critiques as well as their
alternative accounts of thought and action vary extensively, they have
clearly posed some common and powerful objections to the account of
mind attached to the positivist model of a science of politics.
These challenges emerging from linguistic philosophy of mind have
been ignored or summarily dismissed by mainstream political scientists
and theorists, particularly those concerned with the study of political
behavior and political psychology. Of course, this is hardly surpris-
ing since even recognition of the relevance of such analyses of the
conceptual and philosophical issues concerning thought and action is
precluded by the central assumptions underpinning the dominant concep-
tion of theory and explanation in American social science. Thus, from
the perspective of those who accept this conception, such "armchair
philosophizing" about the use of language, including the concepts used
to classify and characterize thought and action in ordinary discourse,
seems quite irrelevant to the descriptive and explanatory tasks con-
fronting the social scientist.
Much of the explicit as well as implicit resistence to the kind of
challenge advanced by Taylor, Louch and others centers in such a re-
jection of the value and significance of linguistic analysis for social
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science. This rejection of conceptual analysis or linguistic philos-
ophy is itself based on the dominant set of assumptions concerning the
proper boundaries between philosophy and social science. An example of
one of the more sophisticated versions of this argument is provided by
May Brodbeck's "Explanation, Prediction and Imperfect Knowledge."^
Brodbeck argues that linguistic philosophy is concerned solely with the
study of linguistic expressions as these are used in the process of
communication, whereas the social scientist is principally concerned
with the task of describing "the real world" and is only concerned with
the conceptual problems which relate to the connections between his de-
scriptive concepts and this world. The challenges to the dominant
model of scientific explanation which are grounded in linguistic phi-
losophy are flawed because linguistic philosophy itself is preoccupied
with the study of ordinary language as a medium for communicating with
other persons and neglects the study of language as it is used to
describe the world.
Utilizing the distinction between reference and significance,
Brodbeck charges that the Wittgensteinian "meaning as use" doctrine has
blurred the fundamental distinction between the concepts we use, which
are "contributions of the mind," and "what is not such a contribution,
but independently of the way we speak about it, is a matter of the way
the world goes."^ Thus, by ignoring the descriptive tasks which are
fundamental to language, the practioners of linguistic analysis ignore
"the world that language is supposed to be about.
"^ As a result, lin-
guistic theorists become entrapped in an unending attempt to unravel an
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infinite regress of related concepts or meanings which reveals nothing
about the basic ties between our concepts and the real world.
Brodbeck is here attempting to defend the covering law model of
explanation against arguments advanced by both its "moderate" and
"extremist" linguistic critics. At the center of her defense is the
claim
:
Our concepts may be open textured but the world is not.
If language is to be descriptive, it must indicate what
there is in the world, no matter how variably we talk
about it.^
Thus, the real debate between Brodbeck and these linguistic critics of
the dominant model of explanation is not, as she contends, over the
primacy of the descriptive or the communicative functions of language.
Rather, the fundamental disagreements concern the conceptions of lan-
guage, meaning, knowledge and reality which underpin the account of de-
scription she presents. Brodbeck' s case rests upon the notion of an
independent and objective reality or set of facts and the view that we
can provide a complete, neutral record or description of these facts
which is independent of our interpretation, conceptualization and clas-
sification of these facts. That is, of course, essentially the same
conception of "the given" which empiricist philosophers have typically
made the foundation of scientific objectivity and scientific knowledge.
As Hampshire has noted, this "view of 'the facts' which are al-
ready individuated in reality independently of our reference to them
..." has been extensively challenged and abandoned by Anglo-American
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philosophers since the work of Russell and the early Wittgenstein. In
general, linguistic philosophers hold that we simply cannot make the
kind of sharp distinction between the facts and our conceptualization
or interpretation of the facts which underpins Brodbeck's account of
description. Yet, as A. J. Ayer , who was at one time one of the
leading advocates of the logical positivist program and is certainly
not a radical critic of the empiricist framework, points out, this
certainly does not mean that linguistic philosophy is not concerned
with the real world or the relationship between language and the world:
I have argued that what passes for linguistic philos-
ophy, at least as it is represented in the works of such
authors as Wittgenstein and Ryle, is concerned with lan-
guage only to the extent that a study of language is
inseparable from a study of the facts which it is used
to describe.^
Ayer argues that what linguistic philosophy has inherited from
Wittgenstein is "a realization of the active part that language plays
in the constitution of the facts" and not a neglect of the real world
9
or of the descriptive tasks of language.
Much of recent analytic philosophy has followed Wittgenstein in
attempting to understand the structure of our thought about the world
through investigation of the structure of our language. In general
terms, linguistic philosophers hold that, given that we are human
beings, our reality is necessarily a conceptual reality. They focus on
the actual use of linguistic expressions and concepts because these
constitute "the sole and essential point of contact" between human
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beings and the reality which they wish to describe and understand.
While they do not maintain that language is prior to all experience of
this reality, linguistic philosophers generally emphasize that language
is prior to our characterization and interpretation of experience.''^
Of course, this does not mean that linguistic philosophers are in
agreement concerning what, if anything, such investigations of our lan-
guage can possibly contribute to the study of society or politics or,
more generally, concerning the relationship between philosophy and so-
cial science. Indeed, there is extensive disagreement among contempo-
rary linguistic philosophers regarding the nature, tasks and methods of
philosophy itself, and there is no single "school" of linguistic phi-
losophy unified by a common program and approach. Certainly, all the
variants of linguistic philosophy do have common roots in the so-called
"linguistic turn," characterized by a prevailing concern with inves-
tigation of language as the most promising path toward clarifying,
resolving, dissolving or reformulating philosophical problems. Richard
Rorty characterizes linguistic philosophy in general terms as:
. . .
the view that philosophical problems are problems
which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming
language, or by understanding more about the language we
presently use .
""^
But this characterization itself points to what is widely con-
sidered a central dividing line in recent analytic philosophy, namely
that between ideal language philosophy, which attempts to salvage part
of the program of reductive analysis by reformulating it as an
attempted construction of an artificial language, and ordinary language
255
philosophy, which stresses description of actual linguistic usage. In
addition, there are a number of other controversies and divisions
within recent linguistic philosophy which are not fully captured in
this general distinction between ideal language philosophy and ordinary
language philosophy. Of these controversies, one of the most signi-
ficant concerns whether analysis of language is only useful in clearing
away the misconceptions and difficulties attributed to traditional
statements of philosophical issues or can also provide some insight
into the structure of the world which language is used to describe. In
short, there is no concensus among linguistic philosophers concerning
the basic nature and tasks of the enterprise of philosophy, let alone
the relationship between philosophy and social science.
However, it certainly would be inaccurate to construct a general
account of the linguistic view of the relationship between philosophy
and social science on the basis of a generalization which assimilates
all the various linguistic approaches and techniques to either a form
of "therapeutic positivism" or a preoccupation with "very detailed and
14
minute studies of ordinary language." Therapeutic positivism, a
doctrine which has been attributed to Ryle, Wittgenstein and Waisman,
portrays philosophical questions as merely conceptual puzzles or mis-
understandings of language which will disappear with careful analysis
of ordinary language and the elimination of confusing and ambiguous use
of words. The detailed study of ordinary language, an approach
usually identified with Austin, reflects not simply an interest in
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resolving philosophical puzzles, but an interest "in the study of lan-
guage for its own sake."''^
Given such views, it definitely seems that the possible connec-
tions between philosophy and social science are quite limited. This is
so not only because the nature and scope of philosophical concerns seem
so narrow here but also because such positions seem to assume that
"ordinary language is in order, just as it is" and to make ordinary
language the final court of appeal in all philosophical and conceptual
disputes .
'^'^
But all linguistic philosophy does not fit into such a formula-
tion. Certain philosophers working in the linguistic tradition speci-
fically acknowledge that philosophers must do more than simply describe
the use of various linguistic expressions. Peter Strawson, for ex-
ample, has stated:
So, for the old, limited and theory-ridden programme of
analysis, we are to substitute a different aim; that of
coming to understand philosophically puzzling concepts
by carefully and accurately noting the ways in which the
related linguistic expressions are actually used in
discourse. Of course, not all features of these ex-
pressions will be relevant to the philosopher's task.
It is his special skill to discern which are relevant,
1 g
and how they are relevant.
Strawson emphasizes that he is not simply concerned with how our
conceptual equipment functions, but also and more importantly, with why
it functions in the ways that it does. This latter question of why we
use our language in certain ways is considered more central to the phi-
losophers task because it concerns, again in Strawson' s words, "how the
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nature of our thinking is rooted in the nature of the world and in our
own natures. "^^
Hampshire advances a similar conception of the philosopher's
essential task. He, much like Strawson, suggests that linguistic phi-
losophers can move beyond analysis of our present linguistic practices
and attempt to discover the necessary conditions for the possibility of
language itself. This enterprise is portrayed as simply a return to
what has been the central question in "the critical stage of philosophy
since Kant:"
. . . what are the conditions necessary for making
statements and for making any recognizable distinctions
20between truth and falsity in referring to reality.
Both Hampshire and Strawson are concerned with exhibiting those fea-
tures of language which are necessary if true statements are to be
distinguished from false statements as opposed to those features which
21
belong to particular languages.
This is certainly not the only or even the dominant characteri-
zation of the goals and methods of linguistic philosophy, and it is
22
certainly not above challenge or controversy. However, this ap-
proach, especially as developed by Hampshire, is very important and
merits the attention of social theorists concerned with the problems
relating to the classification and explanation of thought and action.
This work has such significance because it forces critical reexami-
nation of the dominant assumptions concerning knowledge and mind and
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investigates the basic requisites of an adequate account of knowledge
and mind.
In more general terms, Rorty suggests that such an analysis of the
epistemological difficulties inherent in the spectatorial account of
knowledge is a more significant development within analytic philosophy
than the linguistic turn itself. Its importance lies, of course, in
the intimate relationship between this spectatorial epistemological
framework and the problems it generates in other fields of philosophy,
such as the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind. Indeed, as Rorty
points out,
If the traditional "spectatorial" account of knowledge
is overthrown, the account of knowledge which replaces
it will lead to reformulations everywhere else in phi-
losophy, particularly in metaphilosophy . Specifically,
the contrast between "science" and "philosophy" . . .
23
may come to seem artificial and pointless.
Certainly, as we shall see, Hampshire makes no such grade-scale
claims based upon his wide-ranging analyses of questions concerning
identification, classification, description, knowledge, mind and ac-
tion. In fact, he specifically cautions that "we have no final insight
into the essence of man and of the mind, we have no final insight into
the essence of philosophy. ..." Yet, he does set out an alterna-
tive account of knowledge and mind and examines the implications of
this alternative philosophical framework for moral theory, political
theory and social science.
Hampshire's and Strawson's analyses of the architectonic features
of our conceptual system share a common starting point and reach
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strikingly similar conclusions. Strawson's Individuals begins with an
examination of the conditions which must hold if identifying references
to particulars can be made and understood in our discourse. Under the
heading of "indentif ication of particulars," he focuses on a speech
situation in which a speaker makes a reference to a particular or thing
and a listener is able to identify this same particular or thing, and
investigates the criteria and tests used for such "hearer's identi-
25
fication .
"
Later in his argument, the term reidentification is used to dis-
tinguish the kind of case in which one identifies a particular thing
encountered or described on one occasion as being "the same" as that
26
encountered or described on another occasion. His essay explores the
criteria which are necessary in order to determine whether or not
something is "the same" in these two kinds of cases and examines the
basic facts or conditions which we must allow for in our use of the
term 'identify.' Strawson argues that the methods and criteria of
identification must allow for "the discontinuities and limits of ob-
servation" which are inherent in the basic facts of human experience.
Among such facts are the follov;ing:
. . .
that the field of our observation is limited; that
we go to sleep; that we move. That is to say they must
allow for the facts that we cannot at any moment observe
the whole of the spatial framework we use, that there is
no part of it that we can observe continuously, and that
27
we ourselves do not occupy a fixed position in it.
In less systematic and more general terms, Hampshire's Thought and
Action also opens with an examination of our ability to identify and
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refer to enduring objects or things in our environment as a fundamental
prerequisite of our being able to communicate with one another about
the world. Thus, Hampshire like Strawson follows Wittgenstein in
focusing on language as a means of singling out and directing attention
to certain elements of reality and experience. Rejecting the notion
that language simply mirrors reality, he advances two general rules
which are necessary to correlate verbal signs with recurrent elements
in reality and experience; rules of classification which allow us to
single out certain elements in reality or experience as being "the
same," and rules of identification, which are necessary if we are to
28differentiate one element from another.
Hampshire also holds that the use of such criteria of classifica-
tion and identification does not arise simply from the grammar of
particular languages but rather "is a necessity in any language what-
29
ever in which statements are made and contradicted." Moreover, he
agrees that there are certain basic and essential facts about the human
situation which do establish limits on our methods of and criteria for
identifying particulars and, in turn, upon language and thought.
Hampshire's analysis of these facts which must be allowed for in
identification is more difficult to follow because it is tightly woven
into a number of other arguments and theses. In particular, he em-
phasizes that we must approach with extreme caution any attempt to
distinguish between the limitations on our ways of talking and thinking
about the world and ourselves which are imposed by the nature of human
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experience and those which are established by the peculiar set of iden-
tifications and classifications embodied in a particular language.
Thought and Action attempts to remove from the discussion of our con-
ceptual framework any vestiges of:
. . . the assumption that there must be natural, pre-
social units already discriminated as the ultimate
subjects of reference in our experience: that social
convention and artificiality enters only at the second
tier of language, resting on a first tier of basic and
natural discrimination which is independent of any
30institutions of social life.
This, of course, challenges the very basis of the distinction
between what is "natural" and what is "conventional" which has played
such a central role in liberal-empiricist accounts of human nature and
experience. It is not reality itself but rather our "practical needs"
and the "grammar of actual languages" that establish the limits on the
variety of objects of reference which we can single out and the variety
of resemblances between objects which we can pick out. Since our
principles of individuation and classification are acquired through our
language, art and "forms of social life," the possibility of returning
"to a state of nature and to an innocent eye" is forever closed, but
the possibility of developing new principles of individuation and clas-
sification and new descriptions of the world and of ourselves remains
31
forever open.
There is then, from the beginning, an important difference between
Hampshire's and Strawson's analyses of the basic features of our
conceptual framework. Strawson's main concern is with the tasks of
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"descriptive metaphysics" which attempts "to describe the actual struc-
ture of our thought about the world" or "to lay bare the most general
features of our conceptual system."-^ According to Strawson, "there is
a massive core of human thinking which has no history.
. .
," a set of
concepts and categories which are characteristic of the least refined
rather than the most refined forms of thought and discourse but which
constitute "the indispensible core of the conceptual equipment of the
3-3
most sophisticated human beings. "•^' His avowed task is to expose the
basic structure and interrelationships of this indispensible core of
our conceptual apparatus which does not lie on the "surface" of our
language but rather is deeply "submerged" within it.
In contrast, Hampshire does not classify his work as an exercise
in deductive metaphysics and is principally concerned with questions
concerning thought and action. Since many of the most important con-
cepts we use in discussing and thinking about our beliefs, emotions and
behavior operate at the most sophisticated levels of our conceptual
framework and are undergoing continual evolution, it is clear that our
understanding of this level of language and thought must be primarily
historical in nature. At the same time, Hampshire seems to hold with
Strawson that there are certain features of language and thought which
are essential and unchanging because they follow from certain basic
facts about human beings and their situation in the physical and social
world around them. Analysis of these features constitutes the starting
point in Hampshire's investigation of knowledge and mind.
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Hampshire and Strawson are in general agreement concerning the
basic features of our conceptual framework which are forced upon us by
the nature of human experience and the requirements of communication.
First, since we must locate some persisting and recurrent objects in
order to communicate about the world, reality must be conceived as
consisting of such objects, things or particulars. In Hampshire's
words.
Singling out elements in reality as constant objects of
reference is singling out persisting things. I am in
effect arguing that we must unavoidably think of reality
as consisting of persisting things of different types
and kinds.
Strawson makes the same point in more philosophical language by simply
35
stating that "our ontology comprises objective particulars." Both
philosophers regard our ability to discriminate and identify persisting
things in our environment not as something contingent and accidental
but rather as a necessary and essential condition of human life. It is
thus essential that our general conceptual scheme, with which we dis-
cuss and think about the world, contains such things or particulars as
36
"historical occurrences, material objects, people and their shadows."
A second, closely related feature of the conceptual scheme through
which we come to terms with the world is the framework of spatial and
temporal relations—a framework which serves to unify our picture of
the world. Both philosophers consider the spatio-temporal system basic
because it provides us with a common, unifying framework which gives
each person a definite place or point of reference in his immediate
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environment and assigns each element a unique relationship with other
elements in the system, including individual persons. According to
Strawson, it is only against the background of this "framework of our
knowledge of the world and its history" that we can move beyond "story-
^7
relative" identification of particulars. He concludes that:
. . . particular-identification in general rests ulti-
mately on the possibility of locating the particular
things we speak of in a single unified spatio-temporal
38
system.
This does not simply mean that we as speakers occasionally use
dating and placing references in our discourse about the world, but
rather that the spatio-temporal framework "always and necessarily"
underpins our attempts to identify and add new particulars to our con-
ceptual scheme. This framework has a "particular comprehensiveness and
pervasiveness" which is connected to the nature of human experience and
"our practical requirements in identification." Thus, the system of
spatial and temporal relations is something more than "a contingent
matter about empirical reality" because it "conditions our whole way of
talking and thinking" and is absolutely central to our conception of
39
reality.
As we have seen, Hampshire emphasizes that our conceptual system
is continually changing as new forms of social life evolve. However,
as he notes
,
The world is always open to conceptual re-arrangement.
But the re-arrangement is only the addition of new tiers
of discrimination to a foundation that remains constant:
the recognition of persisting things singled out by
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active observers who have a statable standpoint as
objects among other objects.
He like Strawson focuses on the individual speaker's or thinker's place
in the system of spatial and temporal relations as establishing the
frame of reference which conditions our talk and thought about the
world. Although Hampshire does not investigate the function of the
spatio-temporal framework as carefully and systematically as Strawson,
he clearly assigns a kind of primacy to the "spatio-temporal continuity
which is characteristic of physical things." He emphasizes that
elements in reality have a "history" which accounts for how they come
42
to be standing in particular relations with an observer. Moreover,
his portrayals of pointing as the natural foundation for reference and
of touch as "the most authoritative of the senses" are extensions of
his belief that the spatio-temporal framework constitutes a central
43
part of the constant foundation of our conceptual system.
The third significant feature of our conceptual scheme is that,
from the point of view of particular identification, material objects
and persons rather than sense data or sense impressions constitute the
basic particulars in our ontology. Hampshire states:
Ordinary physical objects, and more important, persons,
are the plain and unavoidable cases of particular things
44
that retain their identity through change.
In part, this claim rests on the argument that sense impressions, which
do not meet the identif lability requirements of publicity and obser-
vability, cannot be identified without reference to physical objects or
material bodies. In this vein, Hampshire contends that we can pick
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out, classify and describe our sensations and impressions only within
the context of a language which already provides a means for identi-
fying and referring to physical objects/^ Strawson holds a similar
view of the "unique and fundamental" role of material bodies in partic-
46
ular identification.
Hampshire and Strawson not only maintain that sense impressions
cannot be identified without reference to material bodies, but also
argue that sense impressions, sense data, sensations and other kinds of
"private particulars" exhibit " identif lability—dependence" on another
class of particulars, persons. Thus, it is ridiculous to think of
sense impressions as the basic particulars in our conceptual scheme
because we always make at least an implicit reference to a particular
person whenever we attempt to pick out or describe private particulars.
Strawson contends that such an implicit reference to a particular
individual is "essential to the identif icatory force of demonstrative
phrases referring to private experiences. Similarly, Hampshire holds
that sensations are more like situations than material objects because
there are no principles of individuation attached to our concepts of
48
'situation' or 'sensation.' Moreover, it is the unique and funda-
mental role of persons in particular-identification which follows
directly from the nature of our spatio-temporal framework:
It is unavoidable that any speaker or thinker should
carry with him the idea of referring to at least one
persisting object, namely, himself. With this idea he
carries the idea of himself as an object changing his
relation to constant objects around him, and to objects
around him changing in relation to himself. He can
therefore attach even his most impressionistic and
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subjective descriptions to a particular position in
space and time, and because of this there arises the
possibility of incompatible statements referring to the
same subject.
In sum, Hampshire and Strawson view these features of our concep-
tual scheme—the conception of reality as consisting of persisting
things, the framework of spatial and temporal relations, and material
bodies and persons as the basic particulars—as essential and basic in
the sense that they are imposed upon us by the nature of human exper-
ience and the requirements of communication. In other words, these
features are not accidental or incidental, but rather are necessary and
unavoidable given the nature of man as a bodily creature in a world of
objects and given that there are certain "necessary feature(s) of any
system of communication in which true statements are distinguished from
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false. ..." Of course, this is not to deny that if the world we
confronted in our daily lives was radically different, if human
experience was different, or if human beings were different, our con-
ceptual system itself would have a different structure.
Moreover, when Hampshire and Strawson characterize such features
as being "necessary," "unavoidable," or "primitive," they are suggest-
ing neither that such conceptions as material bodies or persons func-
tion as the given terms in an axiomatic system in which all additional
terms are defined in terms of these primitive ones, nor that the con-
ceptions of material bodies and persons be assigned the same kind of
privileged metaphysical and epistemological status granted to sense
impressions in empiricist philosophy. Rather, such features of our
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conceptual scheme are considered unavoidable, necessary and primitive
because they reflect the basic features of human experience and the
shared social interests which condition our attempts to observe and
describe the world, to communicate with other persons, and to act in
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the world.
Both philosophers hold that the analysis of these necesary fea-
tures of our conceptual system has important implications for philos-
ophical discussions of perception, knowledge, mind, action and ethics.
However, neither philosopher attempts to derive final and definitive
theories of knowledge and mind from such an analysis. Hampshire, who
explores the implications of these essential features of our conceptual
scheme much more extensively than Strawson, states that the limits
established by our conceptual framework can be "expressed as truisms
about language as an institution, or as truisms about the human mind in
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its relation to the external world." But he immediately cautions:
We cannot claim an absolute and unconditional finality
for these truisms, since the deduction of them is always
a deduction within language as we know it. But the
deduction only shows that we are not in a position to
describe any alternative forms of communication between
intentional agents which do not exemplify these
truisms
.
This is clearly not an attempt to deduce ontological conclusions from
linguistic analysis or to develop unchallengable theories of knowledge
and mind on the basis of the study of certain features of our present
conceptual scheme.
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Certainly, both philosophers do suggest that examination of the
fundamental features of this framework not only exhibits the central
deficiencies of the empiricist treatment of perception, knowledge, mind
and action, but also points the continuing efforts to resolve philos-
ophical problems concerning these topics in a certain direction. It is
Hampshire who offers the more comprehensive and sustained attack on em-
piricist positions, although Strawson's analysis supports his argument
at several key points. In addition, Hampshire explores much more
extensively the alternative accounts of knowledge and mind which begin
to emerge from such an examination of the basic features of our concep-
tual system, but there are again basic similarities between the two
works, particularly between Strawson's analysis of the concept of
person and Hampshire's conception of the unity of thought and action.
The connections which Hampshire sees between this analysis of our
conceptual framework and the central philosophical issues concerning
knowledge and mind are not clear at first glance. In the first chapter
of Thought and Action
,
Hampshire raises issues which bear upon phenome-
nalism, sensationalism, idealism, sense data theories, introspection
and numerous other philosophical doctrines. His approach to these
issues is difficult to follow not only because his general argument
moves rapidly from topic to topic and then back again, but also because
he uses none of the established philosophical terminology which domi-
nates the standard treatments of these problems. In addition, he fails
to identify, either in the text or through footnotes, either those phi-
losophical positions which he opposes or those which have influenced,
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support, or are compatible with his own. Yet, it is clear that one of
the major targets of his criticisms is the portrayal of perception and
knowledge which emerged from classical analysis and logical positivism.
Moreover, despite the frequently noted similarities between Hampshire's
work and that of continental and traditional philosophers, it is clear
that his critique of positivist positions is, for the most part built
upon a foundation layed by other philosophers working within the
analytic tradition.
For example, many of the arguments in Thought and Action are
directed against the position known as (linguistic) phenomenalism,
which holds that all statements concerning physical objects are in
principle reducible to or translatable into statements about sense
data. Hampshire advances a number of different arguments against such
an attempted translation of statements about objects into statements
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which describe only momentary impressions. But there is certainly no
new ground being broken here, for the phenomenalist account of percep-
tion is closely tied to the verif iabil ity theory of meaning and has
been subjected to the same attacks directed against this theory. Under
the constant pressure of the various criticisms advanced by certain
analytic philosophers, the reducibility claim or translatability thesis
had been almost universally abandoned before the publication of Thought
and Action .
Of course, Hampshire voices objections not only to this trans-
latability thesis but also to the very conception of sense data and the
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so-called certainty claim, the notion that sense data or sense impres-
sions provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge. But again his
arguments do not depart radically from the general critique of "the
myth of sense data" which has been a central theme of recent linguistic
philosophy, resting on the work of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Quine
and others. The criticisms advanced in Thought and Action are but an
extension of a vast literature on phenomenalism which has questioned
the possiblility of constructing a "pure" sense data language or even
making a "pure" sense datum statement, pointed to the phenomenal ist '
s
inability to account for the publicity and persistence of objects, and
noted the phenomenal ist ' s neglect of the connections between the
" fragmentariness" of perception and the perceiver's bodily position and
57bodily movements.
Hampshire contends that sense data or sense impressions cannot be
identified without reference to the physical objects or events with
which they are associated, presenting a version of what Peter Machamer
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has labeled "the harmless view of sense data." Machamer places
Hampsnire in the same category with N. R. Hanson, G. E. M. Anscombe,
William Kneale and Anthony Quinton arguing:
What they all seem to have in common is that their sense
data are not certain and they are not in any sense more
fundamental than physical object seeing. In fact, they
are usually taken as being derivative from the physical
object use of perception verbs and meant to be used in
cases where caution or a particularly specific descrip-
5Q
tion is called for.-"^
Hampshire is thus but one of a number of contemporary analytic
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philosophers who challenge the certainty claim and the special onto-
logical status assigned to sense data which historically provided the
basic appeal of sense data theories.
It is only natural that Thought and Action should focus so ex-
tensively on discussion of sense data because the most detailed work on
perception and knowledge in recent analytic philosophy is found in the
debates on this topic. But those philosophers who are deeply immersed
in these issues find very little in Hampshire's work which contributes
to or advances discussion of the problems surrounding sense data. His
analysis concentrates not on setting out a detailed critique of phe-
nomenalism or presenting a strong case for the alternative "harmless"
view of sense data, but rather on exposing the connections between the
doctrines associated with logical positivism and more basic empiricist
assumptions. The thesis of phenomenalism is thus treated as a clear
illustration of the central deficiencies of the empiricist epistemolog-
ical framework. It is Hampshire's position that the problems which
continually reemerge in empiricist theories of perception and knowledge
can be resolved only through critical reassessment of the basic foun-
dations of such theories and not merely by increased attention to their
details
.
It is for this reason that the major thrust of the arguments in
the first chapter of Thought and Action is directed against the specta-
torial epistemological framework which the early analytic philosophers
took over from the classical empiricists. For example, Hampshire
states
:
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The deepest mistake in empiricist theories of percep-
tion, descending from Berkeley and Hume, has been the
representation of human beings as passive observers
receiving impressions from 'outside' of the mind where
the 'outside' includes their own bodies.
The standard Cartesian-empiricist starting point, a dimensionless con-
sciousness which is a passive recipient of sense impressions of
"ideas," is attacked as a logically inconsistent and totally inadequate
basis for developing coherent accounts of perception and knowledge.
The most fundamental problems embedded within this Cartesian spec-
tatorial framework are revealed by how radically the model of the
disembodied thinker departs from the conception of perception which is
deeply rooted in our conceptual framework. It requires that we treat
as matters of contingent fact the very conditions which are essential
to the notion of perception as well as to reference and identification.
Among these essential conditions are the facts that the body is the
medium of perception, that the perceiver has a point of view and oc-
cupies a definite position in time and space, that a person's percep-
tions change as he moves or changes his point of view, that a perceiver
can shift his point of view or perceptual field through his control
over his own body, that the perceiver acquires his principles of indi-
viduation and classification in the social context of communication
with other perceivers confronting the same conditions, and that the
perceiver interprets and assesses his perception against "a great bank
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of stored background knowledge."
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The empiricist starting point of a disembodied consciousness which
is a passive recipient of experiences not only cannot satisfy the
conditions of reference and identification which are necessary for
conscious thought, but also removes any consequent account of percep-
tion from these same conditions, thereby destroying the most basic
distinctions which are fundamental to any coherent theory of percep-
tion. In the Cartesian-empiricist framework, the distinction between
perceiver and object of perception collapses entirely, and there is no
point of view from which "here" can be differentiated from "there. "^^
Moreover, it becomes impossible to contrast "the appearance from the
reality" and we can no longer distinguish between genuine perception
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and illusion. Finally, because this spectatorial framework ulti-
mately severs the connection between an agent's sense organs, which as
part of his body, fall into the "external" realm, and his purposive
efforts to use and direct them, which fall within the "internal" pro-
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vince of mind, the notion of observation itself collapses entirely.
These arguments challenge the basic assumptions which underpin the
empiricist attempt to construct a world of persons and objects from a
private world of sense data or sense impressions. While this alterna-
tive position does not deny that we acquire our knowledge of the world
through our senses, it does abandon the traditional empiricist thesis
that sense impressions, directly presented to consciousness and in-
dubitable, provide the ultimate foundation for our knowledge of the
external world. Moreover, it rejects the notion that our experience of
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the external world is some kind of "synthesis of impressions" presented
to a passive observer.
Any adequate account of knowledge must come to terms with the
basic conditions of identification and perception, which establish that
human beings are both observers of and agents in the world or that per-
ception and action are essentially complementary. As Hampshire notes,
even scientific knowledge, which is the least anthropocentric in the
sense that scientific descriptions "make the minimum reference to
standard human interests and to the standpoint of the observer," is the
product of active interference with rather than passive observation of
the natural course of events. The empiricist account of knowledge
breaks these essential connections between perception and action and
between knowledge and action— a break which has radical consequences
throughout the liberal treatment of thought and action.
In addition, the empiricist conception of knowledge is artificial
and distorted because it treats human knowledge as something which must
somehow transcend the basic facts of human experience and communica-
tion. In particular, theories of knowledge which begin with the hypo-
thesis of the disembodied thinker do not acknowledge the standpoint of
the perceiver or knower in a world which extends beyond his experience
of it, and whose knowledge of the world is subject to the limitations
imposed by the nature of his perceptual apparatus as well as by the
nature of reality. This notion of a disembodied consciousness is, in a
sense, a remnant of the traditional metaphysical systems which aim for
a kind of perfect knowledge transcending human experience, and it
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provides no solid ground for developing an account of knowledge which
acknowledges the very real limits imposed by the human situation .
^'^
Thought and Action thus offers a broad-ranging attack on the
central core of the Cartesian-empiricist epistemological framework
discussed in the second chapter of this essay. Several other linguis-
tic philosophers, who have examined particular elements of this frame-
work in greater detail, provide, at least in part, support for certain
of Hampshire's arguments. For example, numerous analytic philosophers
are challenging the Cartesian quest for certain truths as the only
answer to skepticism and are instead reexamining the grounds of
Cartesian skepticism from which empiricist epistemology has tradition-
68
ally proceeded. Moreover, in more general terms, there are marked
similarities between arguments in Thought and Action and G. E. M.
Anscombe's challenge to the prevailing "incorrigibly contemplative
conception of knowledge," John Dewey's criticisms of "the spectatorial
conception of knowledge," and the Hegelian and Marxist critiques of the
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spectatorial framework.
One of the major weaknesses of Thought and Action in particular
and Hampshire's work in general is his failure to make explicit the
linkages between his wide-ranging indictments of positivist and empiri-
cist philosophical assumptions and the more detailed analyses of per-
ception and knowledge offered in recent linguistic philosophy or in
other philosophical traditions such as American pragmatism or Marxism.
This failure to marshall supporting evidence for his critique of the
Cartesian spectatorial account of knowledge is one of the major reasons
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why some critics have dismissed Thought and Action as a "discursive
essay on a group of related concepts" or characterized his treatment of
important topics as neither rational nor analytic, but rather "deter-
minately literary and at the same time deliberately abstract .
"'''^
However, such charges are misleading in the sense that Hampshire him-
self is firmly committed to the standard analytic emphasis on attention
to detail, step by step analysis, precision and clarity as the fun-
7
1
damental basis of philosophical insight.
Certainly, Hampshire does suggest, in his introduction to Thought
and Action
, that
:
. . .
there are purposes and interests which require
that accurate and step-by-step analysis should not
always be preferred to a more general survey and more
72tentative opinions, even in philosophy.
The major contribution of this book and of Hampshire's work in general
is just such a survey which focuses on tracing the connections between
issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics and
political theory. But this certainly does not mean that Hampshire is
returning to the conception of philosophy as deductive metaphysics or
system building. He is attempting to set out and reassess the basic
features of the general philosophical framework within which empiricist
theorists have treated these issues.
The major thesis of Hampshire's reevalution of the empiricist
epistemological framework is that any coherent account of perception or
knowledge necessarily starts, not with the notion of a Cartesian dis-
embodied consciousness but rather with the conception of a "finite
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observer" who perceives the world through his body, who is a self-
moving body in a world of objects, who can change "his own situation
and limited range of observation" through his control over his body,
and who learns to use his perceptual apparatus and body in the social
context of communication with other observers
.
'^^ The emphasis in this
account of perception and knowledge is upon the conception of point of
view, around which revolves such distinctions as those between per-
ceiver and the object perceived, sensation and perception, and illusion
and reality. This notion of point of view is treated as essential not
because it is derived from a particular philosophical theory of per-
ception or knowledge but rather because it is a central component of
the conceptual framework which is fundamental and necessary to identi-
fication and perception.
One of Hampshire's central points is that even in the most ele-
mentary forms of perception an observer continually makes allowances
and adjustments for the limitations and potential distortions which are
inherent in the particular point of view from which he presently
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observes the external world. The proper path for resolving the
philosophical problems of perception and knowledge is not by sketching
an abstract reconstruction of this situation which attempts to
guarantee certainty by eliminating point of view from perception, but
rather by carefully examining the manner in which we can and do
compensate for our unavoidably limited point of view. The philosopher
as well as the observer in everyday situations cannot escape the
constant and never-ending struggle to obtain knowledge which "is more
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and more objective, and less and less limited by our particular
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standpoint.
. . .
"
Moreover, just as the notion of perception makes no sense without
the conception of point of view, the notion of point of view requires
7 A
that observers be able to move about in the world. Thus, our under-
standing of perception and knowledge is necessarily linked to an anal-
ysis of intention and action. After all, my body is not simply the
medium of perception which occupies a certain position in time and
space, it is also "the instrument of my intentions," though an instru-
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ment of a very special kind since I cannot simply lay it aside. The
central claim advanced in Hampshire's analysis of the connections
between knowledge and action is that a person does not know his own
situation in the world through observation alone because he also has
direct knowledge of what he is doing or trying to do at any given
moment. The following quotations illustrate this conception of such
"direct knowledge:"
No knowledge is more direct and underived than this .
knowledge of the fact of my own intention to move or to
bring about a change.
''^^
I know directly whether I moved my arm or whether it
moved of its own accord. My knowledge is not derived
from some perception or sensation
."^^
It is essential to the idea of an action that a person's
knowledge that an action of his own action is not the
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conclusion of an inference.
The empiricist philosophical tradition has standardly begun with
the conception of a disembodied consciousness passively receiving ideas
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or impressions and focused on a person's "direct knowledge" of his own
ideas or impressions, which are treated as given and transparent ob-
jects. In contrast, Hampshire's alternative works from a notion of the
"necessary interconnection of the concepts of action, observation and
personality," and focuses on a person's direct, non-inferential, non-
8
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observational knowledge of his own intentions and actions. He con-
tends that it is this direct knowledge of what one is doing and trying
to do which is the fundamental core of one's consciousness and iden-
tity. More generally, analysis of this form of direct self-knowledge
is crucial to the entire range of topics in philosophy of mind and phi-
losophy of action: the mind-body relation, personal identity, con-
tinuity of experience, memory, consciousness and self-consciousness,
emotions, desires, the relation between reason and the passions, free-
dom and responsibility.
This conception of self-knowledge and the alternative "critical
theory of knowledge" which Hampshire advances must be examined in more
detail. But first, Hampshire's analysis of the connections between
knowledge and action or, more broadly, between thought and action must
be set out. His thesis is that the major problems in the accounts of
mind, action and freedom advanced by the empiricist philosophers are
directly linked to the deficiencies of this Cartesian spectatorial
framework. Thus, to treat these problems in philosophy of knowledge in
complete isolation from the most central issues in philosophy of mind
and action would be to follow the empiricists is severing the crucial
connections between knowledge and action.
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The Unity of Thought and ActioP and "the Metaphor of Shadow"
The critique of the empiricist account of mind and the attempt to
outline an alternative conception of mind presented in Thought and
Action are as difficult to follow as the earlier discussions of meta-
physical and epistemological issues, for again the argument winds
through a complex maze of topics and problems. However, it is clear
that the main targets of this critique are the central elements of the
conception of mind sketched by the early British empiricists, including
the four themes discussed in the second chapter of this essay: the
Cartesian account of the mind-body relationship, the view of the con-
tents of consciousness as given and transparent, the conception of
reason as the servant of the passions, and the portrayal of self-know-
ledge as identical in kind to empirical knowledge. In addition, it is
again evident that while Hampshire's analysis seems to draw from or
exhibit basic affinities with some of the non-linguistic attacks on the
Cartesian-empiricist theory of mind and consciousness, his own critique
and alternative account of thought and action are developed primarily
against the background of recent linguistic discussions of these is-
sues .
One of the main themes in Hampshire's analysis of mind is a re-
jection of Cartesian dualism. Of course, this is hardly a revolution-
ary thesis, for linguistic philosophers have been, since the publi-
cation of Ryle's The Concept of Mind , criticizing and seeking an al-
ternative to the dualist conception of mind which has long dominated
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the empiricist tradition. Yet, while Hampshire's general approach to
the mind-body problem is similar to that of other linguistic philos-
ophers, there are very real differences between his and the established
treatments of these topics. Hampshire sets out these differences most
clearly and comprehensively in his critique of Ryle's influential book.
Ryle attributes the principal weaknesses of "the official doc-
trine" of mind, which he calls the "dogma of the Ghost in the Machine,"
to the influence of Descartes and other seventeenth century speculative
philosophers. This "para-mechanical" portrayal of mind rests upon a
"category mistake" or "family of radical category mistakes" which
represent
:
. . . the facts of mental life as if they belonged to
one logical type of category (or range of types and
op
categories) when they actually belong to another.
Such category mistakes result from philosophical speculation about the
mind which artificially removes and abstracts mental concepts from
their established use in ordinary discourse. Although Ryle is not
consistent in establishing the philosophical grounds of his critique,
he, at certain points, clearly argues that Descartes' speculative
account of mind conflicts "with the whole body of what we know about
minds when we are not speculating about them" and can be overcome by
focusing on the logical categories and distinctions embedded within our
language
.
In his review of The Concept of Mind , Hampshire makes several
points that set apart his analysis of the Cartesian-empiricist
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dualistic account of mind from Ryle's attack on the dogma of the "Ghost
within the machine." In particular, he argues that "the first cardinal
mistake pervading the book" is Ryle's characterization of the concep-
tion of the mind as a ghost within a machine as a doctrine which was
artificially introduced by Descartes in particular and philosophers in
general. In fact, as even a cursory investigation of the historical
development of the concept of mind reveals, the dualist myth is "primi-
tive and natural" and is, for better of worse, "deeply embedded in the
84
vocabulary and structure of our languages."
Hampshire writes:
Professor Ryle is here protesting not (as he believes)
against a philosophical theory of mind
, but against a
universal feature of ordinary language itself—namely,
that most of its forms of description have been and are
being evolved by the constant transfer of terms from
application in one kind of context to application in
another, and in particular by the transfer of what were
originally physical descriptions (e.g. "wires and pul
leys," "impulses," "pushes and pulls," "agitations,"
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etc.) into psychological descriptions.
Because Ryle confuses what is a feature of ordinary language with the
particular epistemological and metaphysical claims set out by Descartes
and taken over by the empiricists, he never clearly identifies the
enemy he is fighting, the philosophical battlefield upon which he
chooses to fight, or the philosophical weapons which are appropriate to
the kind of war he is waging. As a result, Ryle is ultimately "be-
trayed into using the weapons of his enemy" and adopts central elements
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of the very Cartesian-empiricist framework he seeks to destroy.
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In the background of Hampshire's analysis of the mind-body rela-
tionship is a constant emphasis on the "firmly dualisitic" structure of
natural languages, which exhibit a complex, continually evolving set of
distinctions between the mental and the physical. Of course, this does
not somehow establish a dualistic theory of mind or make it immmune
from philosophical criticism, but it does require that the philosopher
must clearly distinguish between the dualistic aspects of language and
the particular characterization of the relationship between the mental
and the physical presented in the Cartesian-empiricist portrayals of
knowledge and mind.
The basic problem with the Cartesian account of mind and body is
not that it introduces a dualist myth but rather that its characteri-
zation of the relationship between mind and body starts with the spec-
tatorial conception of a disembodied consciousness or a transcendent
but passive observer. It is for this reason that the Cartesian-empiri-
cist portrayal of mind cannot provide coherent accounts of conscious-
ness, of action, or of the relationship between thought and action.
In contrast, Hampshire, building on the notion of point of view,
contends that it is the continuing awareness of one's own position in
the world which is the foundation of consciousness and sel f-conscious-
87
ness. A person distinguishes himself from the rest of the world, in
part, by characterizing his own situation as being "here" rather than
"there." If he were to think of himself as a Cartesian ego which is
removed from any real situation or position in the world, an individual
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would have no basis for distinguishing between himself and the rest of
the world and would lose all sense of his own identity.
In addition, building on his conception of persons as self-moving
bodies, Hampshire contends that a person also distinguishes himself
from other things in the world through his capacity to plan to change
his situation in the world by moving from "here" to "there." This
ability to initiate such change and to formualte intentions to do so
constitutes "the most unavoidable feature of our consciousness" and
89gives each individual "his sense of being in the world." By neglect-
ing this essential feature of human existence, the capacity to plan or
to formulate intentions, the conception of man as a disembodied con-
sciousness destroys one of the most fundamental distinctions in our
conceptual scheme, namely that between what a person does and what
happens to him. Ultimately, an individual's search for some kind of
guarantee of his own distinct existence ends not in the Cartesian
cogito but rather in his own references to himself as a source of
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purposive movement and intentional action.
It is, then, this combination of a person's perceptions of and
beliefs about his own situation and environment plus his immediate
intentions to alter his situation or point of view, the combination of
person as observer and person as agent, which constitutes the foun-
dation of consciousness.^^ By focusing on this foundation, which has
been completely neglected in the spectatorial framework, we can begin
to unravel the misleading and confused empiricist treatments of the
various issues in philosophy of mind. For example, we will look for
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the continuity of a person's consciousness not, as did the classical
empiricists, in "some blinding thread of memory running through the
separate data of consciousness," but rather "within the trajectory of
action, with its guiding intention.
. .
."^^ Similarly, we will drop
the efforts to distinguish waking life from sleep and dream-states on
the basis of passive awareness as opposed to unawareness of the ex-
ternal world and concentrate instead on "the consistent flow of in-
tention into action" which marks the essential difference between
waking experience and dream experience.
In short, Hampshire holds that we must reformulate the relation-
ship between thought and action which follows from the Cartesian-em-
piricist portrayal of "pure" thought as something prior to and com-
pletely independent of the use of language or the expression of thought
94m statement or behavior. A major element on this attempted reform-
ulation is his rejection of the possibility of making statements about
our ideas or immediate experience which are completely independent of
any bodily conditions. Throughout his discussions of identification,
perception, knowledge, mind and action, he emphasizes the unique and
special role of a person's body in his experience. Although the body
is in one sense an "external" object, it is also in another sense not
"external," since the "mind animates, and enters into, the movements
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and reactions" of the body.
A major theme throughout Hampshire's various writings on mind is
this notion of the unity of mind and body which follows from the
287
conception of action as "a combination of intention and physical move-
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ment." The constant flow of intention into action is the basis of
this unity of mind and body. Indeed, Hampshire seems to deny even the
logical possibility of existence in a disembodied state, as in the
survival of bodily death:
It is a necessary, and not a contingent, truth that my
body has not been removed, physically separated from
97
me
.
This clearly challenges the dominant view of mind, whether por-
trayed as a Cartesian mental substance or as a Humean series of ex-
periences, as logically distinct from and only contingently related to
the body. Yet, many of Hampshire's critics complain that here, as
elsewhere, Hampshire simply offers a quick overview of issues and
topics which are crucial to analysis of the mind-body relationship
(including the problem of personal identity, Wittgenstein's denial of
the possibility of a private language, the problem of other minds, the
so-called argument from analogy as a justification for believing in
other minds, as well as the possibility of disembodied existence) and
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fails to examine these complex problems in sufficient detail.
However, as before, Hampshire's main concern is not the clari-
fication and resolution of these specific problems in philosophy of
mind but rather a more general-level assessment of the overall coher-
ence of the empiricist framework within which these topics have been
raised and addressed. His principal interest here is clearly not with
the question of the logical possibility of existence in a disembodied
288
state. Instead, his concern is with the proper starting point or
paradigm for raising philosophical questions about thought and action.
Of course, he challenges such an assumption and offers an alter-
native approach to these questions which focuses on the notions of
agency and intentional ity as essential and fundamental dimensions of
our concept of person. Hampshire's position here is similar to
Strawson's contention that the concept of person is "primitive," mean-
ing that it cannot be analyzed in terms of or reduced to simpler ele-
ments as empiricist philosophers have typically held. Cn the basis of
his examination of the requirements for identifying particulars,
Strawson argues that the concept of a person is "logically prior to
that of an individual consciousness" and cannot be reduced to or under-
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stood as either "an embodied ego" or "an animated body."
In other words, the conception of a "pure" individual conscious-
ness or a "pure" ego, which has functioned as the most basic and fun-
damental unit of analysis in Cartesian-empiricist discussions of mind
and body, is itself "a secondary, non-primitive concept" which ulti-
mately must be understood or analyzed in terms of the concept of per-
son.
^"^"^ Although it is possible to conceive of a disembodied "person,"
he would lack both bodily sensations and perceptions of the world
around him as well as the power to initiate changes in the world (the
two factors which for both Hampshire and Strawson are absolutley cen-
tral to our conceptions of consciousness and person). Such a being is
best characterized, Strawson argues, as a "former person," for we can
make sense of such a conception of disembodied existence only against
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the background of the standard criteria of personal identity which
involve direct and indirect reference to the bodyJ*^^
According to this alternative philosophical perspective, we cannot
resolve the mind-body problem, the problem of personal identity and
related issues until we begin to focus on our public language, in its
depth and not simply its surface structure, rather than the private
"ideas" or experiences of Cartesian egos as the fundamental interface
between a person and the world around him. The search for an alter-
native conception of mind must begin with an investigation of the
conditions under which we do ascribe states of consciousness to our-
selves and to others. Moreover, this investigation will be primarily
concerned with the differences between mental concepts or predicates
which imply that the subject to whom they are attributed is conscious
and physical concepts or predicates which carry no such implication.
One of the principal supports of the conception of mind as some-
thing which is essentially separable from the body or of consciousness
as something which does not require corporeal embodiment was undercut
by Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of ideas, passions, and other
mental contents as given objects which can be directly known through
introspection. A central aspect of Hampshire's work is an attack on
the still influential "semi-Cartesian" view of the relationship between
mind and body, thought and action, or between feeling and behavior
which pictures persons as first distinguishing and identifying states
of mind, feelings, emotions and desires by their "phenomenological
feel" and then moving on to an independent consideration of the
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"typical manifestations in behaviour" linked to these private experi-
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^ences. One such enemy is the so-called privileged access doctrine
which portrays mental states as private experiences which are linked
causally and contingently to their behavioral manifestations
Hampshire's appraisal of this doctrine emerges directly from his
analysis of how we actually identify and classify mental contents in a
language in which true statements can be distinguished from false ones.
As we have seen, his examination of the essential features of our
conceptual scheme insists upon the logical primacy of the world of
persisting things which can be observed from various points of view.
He holds that this order of dependence which is inherent in our concep-
tual framework determines, at least in part, the "conditions of appli-
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cation" attached to our mental concepts.
According to this analysis of our conceptual scheme, the order of
dependence in the classification of mental states and behaviors es-
tablished by the Cartesian-empiricist portrayal of a pure ego working
"outwards" from its private "ideas" or experience is mistaken.
Hampshire's position is that t'-e order is just the reverse: our clas-
sifications of different mental states are made on the basis of our
classifications of particular patterns of behavior or expression under
certain sets of circumstances. This point is made as a part of a more
general theme which is central to all of Hampshire's work on thought
and action, namely that the "metaphor of 'shadow'" is "peculiarly
appropriate" to dicussion of thought, feeling and other aspects of
291
. ^ 105mmd. While he does not deny that "the play of the mind"—those
thoughts, beliefs, feelings and so on which are never expressed in be-
havior, judgement or statement—is real, he cautions:
But any description of it is derived from the descrip-
tion of its natural expression in speech and action, as
a description of the play of shadows is a description of
the movement of some corresponding bodies which are not
necessarily the bodies that cast the shadows. If we had
not encountered and classified the movement of bodies in
the way that we have, we would not interpret and de-
scribe the play of shadows in the way that we do.^*^^
Although Hampshire discusses this metaphor in only a few short
passages in various of his writings, its elements appear throughout all
his work on thought and action. It is clearly designed to provide an
alternative image to the spectatorial model of the "solitary thinker,
who has never used his language in communication with others" and the
Cartesian conceptions of "thought as an interior monologue, and of
107beliefs forming themselves in the mind, without being expressed."
In part, this conception of the shadow is based upon rejection of the
notions of language as a set of labels for given objects and "ideas"
and as an artificial, secondary layer added on to the more basic chain
of ideas which is "pure" thought.
Hampshire's account of mind not only stresses the essential con-
nection between language and thought but also emphasizes that language
has developed within the context of a basic need for communication
among people and "instituting and maintaining co-operation and the
forms of social life."^^^ Moreover, it is only at a later stage of the
development of language that individuals use language in forms of
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thought which are divorced from this communication process and its
social context.
This revised conception of the relationship between thought and
language is best illustrated by the connection between a belief and the
expression of it. Since a belief is essentially something which a
person is willing to express or affirm in a statement, the possibility
of having beliefs depends upon the possibility of expressing them in
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statements. In fact, we could not legitimately attribute beliefs to
beings who lacked a language in which their beliefs could be expressed.
Thus, contrary to what the Cartesian-empiricist model of mind assumes.
The expression of a belief is not the inessential act of
clothing it with words; it is the only way of making the
belief definite, as a belief in this statement rather
than that
.
However, in contrast to the public expression of assent to a
belief in a written or spoken statement, the kind of assent which takes
place only in an agent's own mind and is not communicated remains a
kind of "shadowy" assent, even to the agent himself:
I have to embody my thought, which is in this sense
parasitic upon its expression. The question of whether
I did or did not agree with, or accept it in my own
mind, that which you said to me at that moment has a
logical indef initeness that distinguishes it from the
question of whether I actually said "Yes" or "No." The
question of unexpressed agreement could never even have
risen if there had not been the possibility of my saying
"Yes" or "No." My unexpressed agreement simply
consisted in my disposition to say "Yes," which was for
some reason inhibited
. ^ ^
^
In this way, an agent's belief that a particular statement is true can
be considered a "disposition" (as we shall see, Hampshire does not use
293
this term in the prevailing manner) which can be inhibited or not, to
publically affirm that statement.
Yet, this is only part of what makes the metaphor of shadow so
appropriate to discussions of mind, for it is both the mental life of
feeling, including sensations, emotions and moods, as well as that of
thought which is "necessarily directed outwards" toward action or ex-
pression. This is not to deny that there is a central difference
between thought and feeling with regard to linguistic expression.
Because of the essential connections between thought and language, an
agent's thoughts can be completed, identified or "given" to another
simply through spoken or written expression of them. But this does not
hold in the case of feelings, for an agent cannot "give" his feelings
to another by simply describing them, and there is no sure way of
identifying one's feelings by following the established rules of lan-
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guage.
At the same time, the metaphor of shadow remains appropriate to
the "inner" life of feelings because
. . . there is still no sure way of identifying recur-
rent states of consciousness except by some reference to
the recurring situations in which they are enjoyed, and
113
to the behavior which is their natural expression.
In other words, the shadow metaphor is central to understanding the re-
lationship between an agent's feelings and behavior because the
"inner," private life of feeling is a development or derivate of the
"outer," public world of behavior .
^
^ Our "inner," unexpressed
feelings and other states of mind are, again in a certain sense,
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inclinations or dispositions to behave in certain ways which have been
inhibited or cut off from their natural expression.
This view of mental states clearly rests, in part, on the position
that we identify and classify particulars, including private partic-
ulars or states of mind, within a conceptual scheme which assigns a
logical priority to persisting things. But, in addition, the metaphor
of shadow draws upon the linguistic perspective which holds that a
detailed investigation of the more sophisticated distinctions and clas-
sifications embedded within our vocabulary of feelings and other mental
states necessarily involves examihation of the "forms of life" within
which we learn to use those mental concepts. As Hampshire states,
Entry into a certain "form of life" is a necessary
background to using and attaching a sense to these
concepts; namely, entry into that adult human form of
life which includes, among other things, the habit of
deliberately controlling the natural expression of
inclination, and includes also a growing knowledge of
1 15
restraining conventions of speech and behaviour.
Thus, when applied to a discussion of the development of an indi-
vidual person, the metaphor of shadow emphasizes that part of the
process of becoming an adult is learning to control and inhibit certain
inclinations
.
^ The development of this power of inhibition proceeds
hand in hand with the learning of language and the psychological vo-
cabulary which is embodied within that particular language. We clearly
cannot consider these processes as occurring within the private mind or
secluded life of an autonomous individual because each person learns to
apply this psychological vocabulary in a social world where there are
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established rules and conventions which frequently conflict with basic
instinctual urges and inclinations. Moreover, as in the case of
thought or beliefs which are not expressed in communication, the "full
inner life" of emotions, feelings and other states of mind which are
not expressed in behavior is the product of a later stage of develop-
ment constituted in this case by the power of intentional inhibi-
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tion
.
As an illustration, Hampshire outlines three crude stages of
inhibition or internalization in relation to anger: one moves from a
primitive stage, where the natural expression of anger is a form of
aggressive behavior; then to an intermediate stage where the "abstrac-
ted residue of aggressive behaviour remains" (such as a scowl or an
angry glance), but the rest of the behavior is inhibited; and in turn
to a final stage where all the natural behavioral as well as the facial
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expressions of anger can be intentionally controlled. The main
point here is that the behavior which naturally expresses an emotion or
feeling may be inhibited or not, but the behavior remains intrinsic to
1 1 9
and "is originally constitutive" of that particular emotion. It is
thus a mistake to view the expressive behavior as something which is
merely extrinsic to, added to, or correlated with the particular emo-
tion or feeling in question. An important part of the metaphor of sha-
dow is Hampshire's view that our entire psychological vocabulary is
founded on such essential linkages between inner feelings and certain
120
natural, standard patterns of behavior or expression.
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Yet, although Hampshire's account of the relationship between
thought and action treats the internal life of the mind as a shadowy
counterpart to the public world of language and behavior, he rejects
the kind of behavioral position which Ryle and other linguistic theo-
rists have attempted to substitute for Cartesian dualism. In fact, the
metaphor of shadow is an attempt to point to "a possible middle way"
between Cartesian dualism and the behavioralist reduction of "that
which is distinctively mental to its overt behavioral expression."
In part, his account of thought and action rests upon the linguistic
critique of the Cartesian notion that feelings, emotions, desires and
mental states are inner occurrences which can be differentiated from
one another on the basis of their felt qualities. At the same time,
the metaphor of shadow rejects the behavioralist alternative which
holds that every psychological concept designates no mental processes
or occurrences but rather only a pattern of behaviors or dispositions
to behave in certain ways.
In more positive terms, Hampshire's account of thought and action
is constructed upon his analysis of our conceptual structure, parti-
cularly the differences in the conditions of application attached to
mental concepts and those attached to physical concepts. Beyond this,
he follows Wittgenstein in holding that we must ultimately examine the
"forms of life" in which we learn to use our mental concepts. Finally,
throughout his work on thought and action, Hampshire attempts to draw
upon the insights of Freudian psychology and explores the connections
between the concepts used in ordinary language accounts of mind and
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action and the Freudian account of mind and behavior. In this view,
the examination of the use of mental concepts is only part of the phi-
losopher's concern for it is also part of his task:
... to explore ways of recovering for attention those
phenomena of the inner experience which are partly, or
even wholly, left out of account in the commonplace ex-
122planatory scheme.
In short, Hampshire's account of mind is an attempt to find a middle
position between the Cartesian privileged access doctrine and the be-
havioralist open access doctrine, principally by building on a com-
bination of linguistic philosophy and Freudian psychology.
Hampshire's attempt to move from the Cartesian and behavioralist
models of mind to this alternative is evident throughout his analyses
of various mental concepts, which draw heavily on recent linguistic
critiques of the classical empiricist assumptions concerning mind and
action. Starting with the notions of pleasure and pain, which have
been treated throughout the empiricist tradition as the ultimate de-
terminants of human behavior, Hampshire challenges the special emphasis
still frequently given to the concept of pain by linguistic philos-
ophers when they examine mental terms and the problems inherent in our
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attempts to characterize mental states and processes. Certainly, a
pain sensation seems to be a phenomenon which we passively experience,
which is fully transparent to the person experiencing it and which
clearly belongs to the "inner" private world as opposed to the "outer"
public world. It might seem then that the word pain is simply a label
for a particular kind of inner sensation, feeling, or occurrence.
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However, both 'pain,' which applies to sensations, and 'pleasure,'
which applies to a more complex range of states of mind and feelings,
are "special cases" because they imply that the person to whom they are
attributed has a reason for acting, and this implication is part of the
meaning of these concepts. Thus, it would not make sense for a
person to characterize something as pleasurable and deny that he had
any reason to seek or pursue it. Moreover, an agent who makes a first
person report that he is in pain may be in somewhat of a privileged
position in making this claim, but his statement conveys little spe-
cific information except that he has a reason or inclination to avoid
whatever it is that he is now experiencing. According to Hampshire,
To be in pain is to be disposed or inclined to react
with some movement of avoidance, although the notion may
be inhibited at will. The feeling is inconceivable
without the tendency to action, and the action is a
126
natural expression of the feeling.
Although the behavioralist position correctly captures this notion
of pains and pleasures as dispositions of avoidance and attraction, it
maintains that these patterns of avoidance and attraction can be iden-
tified and described solely on the basis of objective, scientific
observation of behavior. In contrast, the perspective Hampshire adopts
is one which emphasizes that we learn how to apply and use our sen-
sation words such as 'pain' neither as detached observers of our own
and other people's behavior nor as Cartesian egos introspecting our
inner "ideas" or experience. Rather, we learn to use such concepts in
the context of our attempts as intentional agents to satisfy our basic
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needs and interests in a world of persisting objects and in constant
interaction and communication with other intentional agents. ''^'^ As
Pitkin states in explaining Wittgenstein's view of pain and other
sensation words:
Talk about pain occurs among human beings who experience
and express pain and respond to it, in contexts invol-
ving such activities as comforting, helping,
apologizing, but also warning, threatening, punishing,
gloating. Part of what we learn in learning that pain
is, is that those in pain are (to be) comforted, gloated
over, and the like, and that we ourselves can expect
1 PR
such responses to indications of our pain.
These themes are, for the most part, implicit in Hampshire's
discussion of sensations rather than expressly defended, but they
constitute important background elements in his critiques of classical
empiricist and behavioralist accounts of mind. More explicit and
detailed indictments of empiricist assumptions concerning mind emerge
as he moves from discussion of sensations to consideration of more
complex and "higher" mental states. One of the central deficiencies
commonly found in the various accounts of mind advanced within the em-
piricist tradition is the focus on sensations, particularly pain and
pleasure, as either representative of or as completely determining the
other mental states. Building upon Spinoza's distinction between
active and passive states, Hampshire maintains that there is a broad-
ranging spectrum of mental states which cannot be adequately classified
or characterized in this way.
At one end of this continuum are the sensations and "blind
passions" which happen to a person or he passively experiences and
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which "do not require an appropriate object."^^ These mental states
are, in a sense, given and transparent to the person experiencing them
and thus seem to fit the characterization provided by the empiricist
account of mind. Yet, at the other end of this spectrum are "active
thinking, which is constituted as such by the requirement of appro-
priateness in its objects," and those states of mind which are thought-
dependent, or at least in part, products of an agent's thought pro-
130 ^
cesses. These thought-dependent mental states are neither given,
for they are altered with changes in thought, nor transparent, for the
person may very well be unsure or confused about his own mental states
if his thoughts are themselves confused.
Hampshire's use of this distinction between active and passive
states of mind does not commit him to Spinoza's thesis that an agent
can systematically and completely free himself from the influence of
passive mental states and be left with only those mental states and
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processes which are the product of his rational beliefs. His ac-
count of mind allows room for the kind of thought-dependent mental
states which emerge through such thought processes as imagination,
fantasy, day dreams or faith rather than what is properly characterized
as belief.
Moreover, there are those cases where a person comes to believe
that a particular mental state is inappropriate or irrational, but
remains under the sway of it. Hampshire offers the example of someone
who comes to believe that his fear of darkness is groundless, that
darkness offers no real harm or threat, but he remains "a passive
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victim of his fear." His fear of the dark may be thought-dependent in
ways that would be of interest to his psychoanalyst, but it is cer-
tainly not belief-dependent:
. . .
the fear is not in this case constituted by a
belief, e.g. the belief that the object feared is dan-
gerous, but by a fantasy or imagination.
. .
.^^^
Thus, although Hampshire does not always clearly differentiate between
thought-dependent and belief-dependent mental states, he does view the
latter as a subset of the former.
However, this is a very important subset, for examination of such
belief-dependent or "belief-impregnated" mental states is crucial to
achieving an adequate understanding of mind. For example, in focusing
on the various human emotions, there are clearly those cases, such as a
person who is infatuated with another, where the mental state is a kind
1 33
of "passive emotion" which happens to or "descends" upon him. Yet,
many of the most important emotion concepts which we use in describing
human motivation and behavior are not of this kind but rather are
belief-dependent. Among such belief-dependent emotions are resentment,
gratitude, remorse, regret, shame, confidence, hope and discouragement.
Such belief-dependent emotions cannot be identified and distin-
guished from one another either by introspecting some inner feeling or
sensation as the Cartesian position supposes or by observing certain
patterns of behavior as the behavioralist position requires. In order
to understand belief-dependent mental states, one must focus not only
on felt inclinations or dispositions to behave in certain ways, but
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also upon those beliefs which comprise a central element in the defi-
nitions of such states.
For example, the emotion of resentment is neither a unique sen-
sation nor simply a disposition to behave in a certain manner but
rather is necessarily connected to a particular belief or set of be-
liefs. To attribute the emotion of resentment to someone is to claim
that he believes that he has been wronged in relation to an established
1 34
set of conventions governing interpersonal relationships. If this
person comes to believe that what he originally interpreted as such a
wrong was the result of a misunderstanding of another's motives or be-
havior or a misreading of unfamiliar customs and practices, his emo-
tional state changes as well. Speaking more generally, Hampshire
states
:
If one is convinced that one's regret, shame, discour-
agement, disapproval, hope, confidence, admiration, are
utterly inappropriate to their objects, the state of
mind must disappear, even if some lingering affect,
pleasant or unpleasant, still associated with the ori-
ginal object, remains.
Hampshire's analysis of the concept of desire also makes use of
this distinction between active and passive mental states in attempting
to plot a middle course between Cartesian and behavioralist theories of
mind. Of course, as he recognizes, 'desire' is not an essentially
belief-dependent concept as are the more sophisticated emotion concepts
like 'resentment.' We can and do ascribe desires to animals or infants
who have neither a language in which to formulate their desires nor any
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beliefs about their desires. Since "desire presupposes only the ca-
pacity to act and to feel," as long as it acknowledges that desires are
linked to behavior as well as to the sensations of pleasure and pain,
the empiricist view of mind can provide a fairly adequate account of
the identification and classification of the non-thought-dependent
kinds of desires such as those arising from bodily needs.
However, the Cartesian and behavioralist portrayals of desire fare
much worse when one begins to consider the problems confronted in the
identification and classification of the desires of agents who are able
to communicate about their desires and have the capacity to reflect
upon, criticize and raise questions about their desires. The power to
communicate and to reflect self-consciously upon one's desires at any
given point in time necessarily extends the range of potential desires
and wants tremendously. This is so not only because certain of our
desires are thought-dependent or belief-dependent and could not arise
if we did not have the capacity of rational thought, but also because
self-conscious human beings can formulate a desire to change or modify
certain of their present desires and wants. As Hampshire points out.
One's desire to act in certain ways becomes something
that one may reflect upon, criticise, and abandon,
because of the criticism, and not merely something that
one has, as one has a sensation. Desires do not only
occur; they may also be formed as the outcome of a
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process of criticism.
Because fully developed human beings, in contrast to animals and
infants, can reflect upon, evaluate and criticize their desires, they
can intentionally alter their desires and therefore assume a kind of
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responsibility for their desires. "° Of couse
, this does not mean that
all desires are belief-dependent or even alterable through a process of
conscious reflection and criticism. In fact, one of the major themes
in Hampshire's account of mind is that the desires of a human being are
frequently unconscious, confused, ambiguous or conflicting. Yet,
failure to differentiate between those desires which are belief-
dependent and those which are not, or between those desires which are
characteristic of language users and conscious agents as opposed to
animals and infants, remains a fundamental deficiency in the various
empiricist accounts of mind.
From this brief summary of Hampshire's discussion of desires and
other states of mind, it is clear that his conception of belief-
dependent mental states not only challenges the Cartesian treatment of
mental contents as given and transparent occurrences but also presents
the behavioralist account of mind with some real difficulties. Since
some desires are dependent upon an agent's beliefs, which if altered
change the desires themselves, these belief-dependent desires cannot be
defined simply in terms of behavioral criteria. In addition, there is
always the possibility that an observer can make an error in character-
izing those beliefs or thoughts which enter into an agent's desires and
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thereby misrepresent his desires, his motivation, and his behavior.
This is but one way in which the explanation of human thought and
action is radically different from explaining the behavior of animals
or the movement of physical bodies. Any approach to the study of human
behavior resting upon this essentially empiricist characterization of
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desires, emotions and other mental states inevitably neglects and
ultimately cannot account for this difference.
Yet, while it is clear that Hampshire perceives these points as
fundamental objections to the behavioralist theory of mind, it seems
that his own alternative account of mind shares certain of the same
basic features with the behavioralist view. After all, his shadow
metapnor certainly stresses the primacy of the public and therefore
observable or audible expressions of belief and feeling. In fact, he
seems to adopt what is essentially a dispositional treatment of beliefs
and feelings in his account of the shadowy internal life of the
mind
.
However, although Hampshire frequently uses the term 'disposition'
in his analysis of mental concepts, he does not use this term in the
same way as it is used by other linguistic philosophers or psycholog-
ists. The dominant use of 'disposition' does remain tied to the dis-
positional account of mental concepts which has been, within the em-
piricist tradition, the most popular alternative to the discredited
classical empiricist conception of mental concepts as labels for intro-
spectable "inner" experiences. Hampshire rejects this dispositional
or behavioralist account of mind as but a modified version of the
mechanistic classical empiricist model of mind which portrays the mind
as an association of "ideas" governed by the same kind of laws we find
1 4
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in the physical sciences. Thus, while in a sense the behavioralist
account of mind is an alternative to Cartesian-empiricist dualism, it
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fails to provide a viable alternative because it continues to incor-
porate fundamental elements of the Cartesian-empiricist framework.
The contrast between Hampshire's account of mind and the behav-
ioral or dispositional treatment of mind is most systematically layed
out in Hampshire's critique of Ryle's attempted move to a type of
logical behavioralism. Ryle contends that many of the "cardinal con-
cepts" which we use to describe thought and action are actually "dis-
positional" concepts and not, as they have been treated under the
privileged access doctrine, "episodic" concepts. The myth of the ghost
in the machine is thus linked to a mistaken treatment of hypothetical
or quasi-hypothetical statements about human dispositions as if they
were categorical statements about private occurrences. Ryle argues:
. . . when we characterize people by mental predicates,
we are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly
processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we
are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways
in which those people conduct parts of their predomi-
1 42
nantly public behavior.
In other words, there is nothing in the "inner life" of the mind which
is unique and specifically "inner" and moreover, there is nothing
particularly significant about those aspects of our mental life which
remain "inner" because they are never expressed in behavior or state-
,
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ment
.
Certainly, Ryle acknowledges that the various mental concepts
which are of central concern to the philosopher and psychologist are
not "single-track" dispositions, but rather highly "generic"
dispositions which are indefinitely "heterogeneous" and cannot be
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characterized in a single type of action or reaction. Accordingly, we
must avoid the "epistemological trap" of expecting concepts like 'know'
and 'believe' to represent "one-pattern intellectual processes," and
acknowledge that they like other important mental concepts "signify
abilities, tendencies or proneness to do, not things of one unique
kind, but things of lots of different kinds. "^^^ Yet, although the
terms we use to characterize human dispositions are typically more
complex, they have the same basic structure as those dispositional
concepts which we use in describing animal behavior or physical
processes. Concepts like know, believe, aspire, proud, clever and
humorous which we use to describe thought and action are no different
in structure and function from such concepts as brittle, magnetised,
1 45
soluble and hard which we use to describe the physical world.
As Ryle makes clear, the behavioral or dispositional analysis of
mental states rests on the claim that to attribute a mental state or
character trait to someone is to make a set of hypothetical statements
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about that person's behavior under certain circumstances. In con-
trast, Hampshire argues that it is a mistake to treat statements about
human dispositions and descriptions of character as such hypothetical
or quasi-hypothetical statements. Statements about human dispositions
are radically different from statements concerning the "dispositional
properties" of material objects (e.g., soluble in aqua regia). For
example, while the statement that something is soluble in aqua regia
does not carry the implication that the object or material has ever
been dissolved in aqua regia, the statement that someone is generous
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does carry the implication that the person actually has acted in a
1 47generous manner on certain appropriate occassions.
In addition, whereas the dispositional properties of material ob-
jects are defined in terms of definite and specific reactions or events
which occur under carefully prescribed conditions, the various inci-
dents or behaviors which might be considered manifestations of a par-
ticular human disposition are "essentially various." The difficulty
here is not simply that human dispositions are more complex and the
variables affecting behavior cannot be controlled as in the laboratory,
but rather that the concepts used to characterize human dispositions
148
remain "essentially vague, summary, interpretive and indeterminate."
It is not just that the most important human dispositions can be ex-
pressed in an almost infinite variety of different behaviors, but more
importantly that our understanding of human dispositions is different
in kind from our understanding of dispositional properties. A state-
ment about human dispositions or character is "a summary and inter-
pretive statement of a tendency in human behavior and calculation," not
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a hypothetical statement about dispositional properties.
Although the conscious mind must be, given our present understand-
ing of it, treated "as, at least in part, a vastly complicated set of
dispositions of different orders of complexity," such mental disposi-
tions, in contrast to physical dispositional properties, must be in-
terpreted genetically or historically . We cannot at the present,
even though the theoretical possibility of doing so remains open,
extend the "scheme of past states determining future dispositions,"
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which we use in explaining the development of the body or other phy-
sical processes, to explain the development of human dispositions,
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emotions and character.
Of course, there are certain basic dispositions and character
traits which arise from primitive satisfactions or frustrations of
fundamental instinctual needs and which continue to influence a per-
son's present behavior and his immediate dispositions to behave in
152
certain ways. However, both the acquisition of further inclinations
or dispositions as well as the capcity to inhibit basic inclinations
are inextricably tied to a child's imitation of adult .behavior , the
learning of language and development of powers of communication, the
emergence of intentional states of mind, and the development of con-
scious memory.
We cannot specify the influence of primitive dispositions and
character traits on the continuing acquisition of dispositions and on
subsequent behavior or specify the influence of a person's immediate
dispositions on his actions unless we utilize a model of mind which
acknowledges these central components in the development of self-con-
sciousness and of the power of reflective choice. Such a conception of
mind stresses the use of memory, reflection and other powers of mind in
altering, modifying, or resisting the pattern of existing desires, dis-
positions, inclinations and so on which have in the past influenced a
person's behavior. The mechanistic account of mind, in both its clas-
sical empiricist and behavioralist forms, remains an obstacle to set-
ting out this kind of alternative model of mind.
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Hampshire argues that two of the most important elements in this
alternative account of mind are Spinoza's distinction between the
passive and active sides of mind and Freud's analysis of projection,
repression, displacement, and so on in the resolution of mental con-
flict. Moreover, he suggests that the substitution of a scheme of
explanation which stresses the roles of memory, reflection and choice
for the mechanistic, empiricist scheme of explanation remains in its
formative stages and requires much additional analysis before we can
15"^
fully realize its implications.
Although Hampshire nowhere presents a final and complete version
of such an interpretive account of human dispositions or of mind, his
entire effort to reformulate the relationship between thought and ac-
tion is an attempt to outline the general direction that this refor-
mulation must take. Near the beginning of his second chapter, "In-
tention and Action," in Thought and Action , he argues that we must set
out new distinctions in order to rectify the confused treatment of the
opposition between thought and action. He then starts by stating:
I shall assume that we can distinguish, in any activity
in which we are engaged, the predominant point or pur-
pose or end of that activity. At any time, when a man
is awake and conscious, there is at least one, and gen
erally more than one, answer that he would give to the
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question— 'What are you doing?'
Furthermore, there is a "logical connection" between what a person
thinks he is doing and what he intends to do, for a person cannot do
something intentionally without in some sense knowing what it is that
he is doing. It is in fact intentionality which constitutes the
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essential difference between human action and animal behavior, and it
is the concept of intention which is absolutely central to understand-
ing the relation between thought and action, the mind-body relation,
dispositional concepts and other mental concepts, and the other major
156topics revolving around mind and action.
In addition to this emphasis on intention, a second principal
theme in this attempted reformulation of the connections between
thought and action is that of the indeterminate nature of the concept
of action. Focusing on the concept of action as it is used in ordinary
discourse, Hampshire contends that there are certain features which are
standardly considered essential to action: an action is something a
person does rather than something which happens to him and is, there-
fore, in some sense, a product of his will; an action must be iden-
tified according to our temporal and spatial system, it is done at some
particular time and in a particular place; and an action, as opposed to
the shadowy life of the mind, "constitutes some recognisable change in
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the world .
"
But these and other such criteria which might be set out are not
exact, and the action remains indeterminate in a fundamental sense.
Since there are no atomic actions just as there are no atomic facts,
the problem we face in describing actions is parallel to that which we
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confront in our attempts to describe the world of objects. The
essential features of a particular action are not preselected and
identified for us, but rather must be distinguished and identified
according to the language and classif icatory scheme we use. An action
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is something which invites a description, and there is always the
possibility that different, even competing or contradictory description
can be given of the same action.
In addition, we cannot make the concept of action any more de-
terminate by limiting ourselves to those criteria used in the obser-
vation of overt behaviors and physical movements. An action is neces-
sarily something more than merely a combination of physical movements,
and when we observe an agent performing an action, "we normally see a
whole performance in a standard social setting, not simply a set of
159physical movements." However, this social setting does not give an
action a determinate content because there is no "s*-andard meaning"
assigned by social conventions unless this performance is purely sym-
bolic or ritualistic in nature. Moreover, any such performance or
action may be designed to hide the actual feelings, desires or inten-
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tions which "lie 'behind' it." This ever-present possibility that
an agent is purposely presenting potential observers with a deceptive
performance, which aims at concealing his real purposes, motive or
intentions, is a central feature of the concept of action and must be
taken into account in any adequate theory of human behavior or human
nature
.
In his analysis of the concept of action, Hampshire emphasizes
that there is one feature of the concept which remains fundamental and
basic despite its indeterminate nature. This essential feature of
action is that it always and necessarily has two faces or a dual
aspect: one being the attempt, intended effect or project and the
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other being the achievement, actual effect or result. This "double
face of human action" or "antithesis of attempt and success" is "es-
sential and ineliminable" however we choose to characterize or describe
a particular action. For any given action or performance, there is
always the logical possibility of intending or attempting to do some-
thing and failing to do or not succeeding in doing it.
As Hampshire recognizes, such a distinction may be very difficult
to apply in particular cases, especially for an observer attempting to
describe another person's action. Even the situation of the agent
himself, who is in the best position to know whether or not he really
intended or tried to bring about a certain result, can be extremely
complex and present a variety of difficulties in characterizing the two
faces of action. However, this distinction between attempt and
achievement is deeply embedded in our conceptual scheme and remains
crucial to the attempt to sketch adequate accounts of mind and action.
Hampshire holds that it is possible, by building on a foundation
which includes this dual face of action, to arrive at a more detailed
and sophisticated account of thought and action. But such an effort is
necessarily quite different from the attempts to devise a comprehensive
theory of mind or "scheme of deliberate action" which group the seem-
ingly infinite varieties of human motivation, purpose, intention and
behavior under a single heading such as Aristotle's "wanting" or Mill's
"happiness ." These traditional conceptions of thought and action
correctly insist that there must be some minimum of consistency between
what a person wants and what makes him happy on the one hand and his
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actual behaviors or actions on the other, if he is a rational and
intentional agent. However, the problem with such formulations of mind
and action is that they typically do not allow for the various levels
of rationality and deliberation, including half-intentional actions and
half-conscious thought as well as the various unconscious desires and
thoughts which influence human behavior.
Yet, although any adequate theory of thought and action must come
to terms with the unconscious as well as the partially conscious and
partly irrational aspects of human motivation and behavior, it is the
analysis of that "certain minimum of consistency and regularity," which
sets apart intentional human action from mere behavior or movement,
that is absolutely central to achieving a coherent account of mind and
action. The focus here is upon:
. . .
the requirements of connectedness, of a trajectory
of intention that fits a sequence of behavior into an
intelligible whole, intelligible as having a direction,
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the direction of means toward an end.
Rational action, in contrast to impulsive action is necessarily
governed by a "consistency of intention" and is part of a project or
policy "that wholly occupies a particular period of time, however
short. "^^^ It is, in the final analysis, this "inside" of an action,
which "is wholly in the thought and purpose of the agent," rather than
the external view of an action as some kind of change which he brings
about in the external world, that gives an action its sense and
meaning.
^^"^ An agent may make mistakes in characterizing his
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intentions and plans, or he may not be able to put into words what he
is doing or trying to do.
But there is a sense in which he unfailingly knows what
he is trying to do, in contrast with an observer, simply
because it is his intention and not anyone else'sJ^^
In Hampshire's account of thought and action, a special status is
assigned to an agent's own descriptions of his actions based upon his
knowledge of what it is that he is trying or intending to do. His
argument has moved from consideration of issues concerning knowledge to
discussion of topics in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action and
back again to the analysis of knowledge. In his account of mind,
action, intention and knowledge are all interconnected and any par-
ticular topic cannot be considered in isolation from the others. His
central indictment of both the classical empiricist and behavioral
account of mind is that they cannot provide adequate accounts of self-
knowledge and self-consciousness, chiefly because they treat all human
knowledge according to the model of empirical knowledge. In addition,
his own alternative account of mind stands or falls with his analysis
of a person's own knowledge of what he is attempting or planning to do
as a unique and highly significant kind of human knowledge.
Two Kinds of Knowledge and Self-Consciousness
As Hampshire acknowledges in his essay "Disposition and Memory,"
his philosophical analyses of the relation between mental states and
behavior, of the stages of human development "beginning with primitive
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behavior and ending with concealed emotion," or of the relation between
thought and action in general may appear to some to be simply a return
to the kind of a priori psychology characteristic of traditional phi-
169losophy of mind. Indeed, it does seem that the answers to the kinds
of questions he raises must be provided by observation of behavior and
scientific experiment, not by philosophical argument.
His reply to such objections is that any answers that we can
provide to these problems concerning such mental states as emotions,
sensations, desires, dispositions and intentions are necessarily part
of a "more general, and of course disputable theory of language" (and
theory of meaning) which conerns how mental concepts are to be applied
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in normal contexts. It is therefore proper that one begin with an
investigation of the use of mental concepts in ordinary discourse,
focusing on the conventions of application and methods of confirmation
which are attached to our statements about emotions, dispositions and
intentions
.
Through a descriptive analysis of the conventions of application
and confirmation of the various mental expressions in a particular
language, the philosopher can sketch "the outlines of the concept of
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mind, as it is embodied at any one time an any one language. ..."
At the same time, the philosopher can undertake a "more fundamental
inquiry" inherent in the contrast between those expressions concerning
mental terms whose conditions of application and confirmation seem
"entirely clear and unproblematical" because their conditions of cer-
tainty "have evident parallels in other familiar and unquestioned kinds
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of discourse" on the one hand, and on the other, those expressions
which seem to have doubtful conditions of certainty because they are
peculiar and without parallel in other kinds of discourse J '''^ Hamp-
shire suggests that philosophical doubt and skepticism regarding cer-
tain kinds of statements about mental states or characteristics is
essentially tied to such a comparison of the different degrees of cer-
tainty obtainable when we use various expressions. On the basis of
these comparisons, the philosopher may challenge the rules of appli-
cation and confirmation which govern our ordinary use of particular
types of statements about mental processes and states.
Of course, all such challenges to the conventions of application
and confirmation associated with particular expressions in our psycho-
logical vocabulary do not originate within philosophy. For example,
Freudian theory has played a leading role in altering the conditions of
use and the meaning of various concepts used in characterizing human
motivation and behavior. Yet, Hampshire does hold that the "weighted
and critical comparisons" of the methods of confirmation tied to dif-
ferent types of statements about mental states, characteristics and
activities remains a primary contribution which philosophers can make
to our understanding of mind and action. Thus, he disassociates his
own approach from that of those linguistic philosophers who, "in exag-
gerated respect for ordinary language," do not allow room for such
comparisons and doubts about certain of the expressions we use, thereby
173
refusing to enter "the domain of philosophy."
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The major deficiency of past philosophical inquiry concerning how
we apply and confirm statements about thought and action is that phi-
losophers traditionally selected one particular pattern of application
and confirmation as a standard and attempted to apply this standard to
all types of psychological expressions. As Hampshire states:
In any period there is a tendency to take one method of
confirmation, appropriate to some one type of expres-
sion, as the self-explanatory model to which all other
types of expression are to be assimilated.^''''^
For Hume and the classical empiricists, the model of certain knowledge
was provided by the standard of application and confirmation provided
by direct reports of one's own sensations, sense experiences and
feelings. When compared to this model of certainty, the standards of
certainty attached to other expressions, including statements about the
external world, seem problematic and open to question. In contrast,
for Ryle and the behavioralists the model of certain knowledge is
identified with the conditions of certainty appropriate to descriptions
of physical movements and behaviors. According to this model, it is
the certainty conditions tied to reports of sensations and other
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"inner" mental states which seem dubious and open to challenge.
The problem with both the classical empiricist and behavioralist
analyses of our psychological vocabulary is this attempt to make vari-
ous kinds of statements, each with their own appropriate methods of
confirmation, fit into one self-explanatory pattern. While Hampshire,
like philosophers within the empiricist-positivist tradition, is very
much concerned with the connections between meaning and confirmation
319
and with comparing the methods of confirmation attached to various
types of statements, he rejects this attempt to assign a certain kind
of statement a privileged status. Instead, the philosopher must begin
with a careful, unbiased analysis which allows for the possibilty that
there are different kinds of certainty and different kinds of knowledge
conveyed in different types of statements about mind and behavior J'''^
Hampshire's attempt to find a middle ground between Hume and Ryle
is, to a great extent, based upon his reexamination of the notion of
direct knowledge or "knowledge by acquaintance" in light of this analy-
sis of various types of certainty. Throughout his books and articles,
he repeatedly points to a distinction between two different kinds of
challenges or attempted rebuttals characteristically expressed in the
form of "How do you know?" or "What is your evidence?", which questions
whether a person has a reliable source of knowledge or is in a position
to know what he claims to know. In contrast, a second kind of chal-
lenge, summarized in the question "Are you sure?", is designed to force
a person to insure that he has not been careless or made a mistake in
utilizing what is standardly accepted as a legitimate source of or
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method of obtaining knowledge.
On the basis of this distinction between these two types of chal-
lenges to knowledge claims, Hampshire divides statements about mental
states, attitudes and feelings into two categories. The first grouping
consists of various statements which are open to both the challenge
"How do you know?" as well as the question "Are you sure?". Into this
category fall all "heterobiographical statements" or statements
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describing someone's sensations, feelings, or other states of mind
which are not first person reports.
In contrast, the second category is made up of those statements:
. . .
which show, in their grammar and vocabulary, that
the speaker is in the best possible position for claim-
ing to know that the statement is true, that he is the
authority, and that no question about the source of his
knowledge arises. . . .^"^^
The challenge "How do you know?" is out of order with regard to these
statements, although the question "Are you sure?" is clearly in order
because it is appropriate "to any claim to knowledge of any kind,
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whatever the grammar and the vocabulary of the statement may be."
Included in this second category are all "autobiographical statements"
or an agent's first person singular statements about his own sensa-
1 80
tions , what he wants to do, or what he intends to do.
Empiricist philosophers have typically focused on first person,
present tense reports of sensations and momentary feelings, which
belong to this latter classification, as incorrigible statements. Yet,
although it correctly emphasizes that a person is in the best possible
position for making statements about the sensations or feelings he is
experiencing, the empiricist account of such direct knowledge is in-
correct to the extent that it fails to acknowledge that a person
remains a fallible authority in such cases.
On the other hand, philosophers adopting a behavioralist position
have usually denied that such reports are really statements or know-
ledge claims or suggested that they are meaningful only to the extent
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that they can be supported or challenged on the basis of observable
behaviors. The behavioralist position has the advantages of
indentifying the limited nature of the knowledge or information con-
veyed by such first person reports and of acknowledging cases where
inductive evidence can be used to conclude that someone is mistaken in
making a particular claim about his own sensations. However, behav-
ioralists are themselves mistaken when they characterize a statement
such as "I am in pain" as involving no certainty and no knowledge or
when they suggest that such a statement standardly requires inductive
^ 181
support
.
Hampshire attempts to unravel these controversies about the notion
of direct knowledge of one's own mental states by starting with the
simple case where a person is genuinely uncertain about his claim to be
experiencing a particular sensation when challenges of the form "Are
you sure?" are pressed against him. He offers the example of someone
describing a particular pain sensation to a doctor who is pressing for
a more specific and exact description or characterization of his sen-
1 82
sation. Confronted with such questioning, the patient may be unsure
as to whether the sensation he experiences is properly characterized as
a pain or as a discomfort.
Hampshire is suggesting that the typical kind of uncertainty which
arises in relation to first person reports of sensations and momentary
feelings occurs when a person is forced to confront the possibility
that he is mistaken in his classification or description of a partic-
ular sensation or feeling. This type of uncertainty is essentially a
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"semantic uncertainty," a problem of matching the correct description
or classification with the phenomenon experienced. Of course, the cri-
teria used here are necessarily different from those which apply when
one attempts to insure that he is giving a correct description of a
physical object. Yet, in that it is an uncertainty about "matching up"
one of a set of possible descriptions with "an independent reality," it
is not essentially different from the kind of uncertainty which can
arise in connection with empirical statements
.
Hampshire's analysis of direct knowledge shifts emphasis from the
certainty conditions attached to first person reports of sensations to
those appropriate to first person statements concerning what a person
wants, plans or intends to do. Again, he focuses on the practical
example of a person being asked questions about what it is that he
wants or intends to do. As in the case of sensations, a person is in
the best position to know the answer to such questions, and the
challenge "How do you know?" is out of place. At the same time, there
are clear cases where an individual does not know or is uncertain about
what he wants or intends to do. Hampshire holds that these are genuine
cases of not knowing or uncertainty and, moreover, that investigation
of such cases is absolutely central to achieving an adequate
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understanding of the nature of self-knowledge.
From Hampshire's discussion of the spectrum of desires and other
mental states, it is clear that the situation confronted by someone who
is uncertain about what he wants to do or have is potentially much more
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complex than that of someone who is unsure of the proper classification
of a particular sensation. Of course, especially in relation to non-
thought-dependent desires, his uncertainty may be the same kind of
semantic uncertainty that a person faces in attempting to describe or
identify the sensations he passively experiences. He may be unsure,
both in his own reflection as well as in communicating with others,
which of a variety of different descriptions correctly characterizes
his already formed desires or wants.
However, because desires are not, at least in all cases, the kind
of given and transparent facts of consciousness pictured by the classi-
cal empiricist, a person who is attempting to answer a question or
resolve some doubt about what he wants may be confronted with a type of
uncertainty which is completely different from semantic uncertainty.
Someone may be unsure of what he wants to do or have because his de-
sires are themselves confused because they are conflicting, or simply
1
because they are not clearly formed.
In at least some of these cases where someone is unsure of what he
wants to do, particularly when the wants in question are thought-depen-
dent or belief-dependent, his uncertainty parallels that of someone who
is unsure about what he intends to do. In such instances, resolving an
uncertainty about what a person wants to do or coming to know what he
wants to do is very much like the formulation of an intention.
Hampshire writes
:
... he who is asked whether he wants to do X rather
than Y, and who hesitates and is not sure whether he
wants to do X or Y, has to think and to make up his
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mind; in this setting his thought will be a considera-
tion of the reasons that make X and Y desirable things
for him to do; the conclusion of his consideration will
be a decision, from which a definite desire emerges. He
now knows what he wants to do, because he has now formed
his desire, and not because he now knows how a pre-
existing desire is properly to be characterized.
. .
He is not in the position of a man who reports an
impulse or inclination that has occurred to him, as he
might report a sensastion. His position, in respect of
his claim to know what he wants, is more like that of a
man who announces his intention.
This kind of "intentional uncertainty" is not a semantic uncertainty
about the correct matching of a statement with an independent reality
and can only be resolved through a process of deliberation which cul-
minates in a decision or the formulation of an intention.
The situation of a person in a vacillating state of mind concern-
ing what he plans or intends to do is a genuine case of uncertainty, of
lacking a particular kind of knowledge. Likewise, his making up his
mind about or knowing what he will attempt to do is a genuine kind of
knowledge. Although this type of intentional uncertainty and the kind
of intentional knowledge it requires do not constitute the whole pic-
ture of self-knowledge, examination of their peculiarities, partic-
ularly how they differ from the types of uncertainty and knowledge
which have been emphasized in the empiricist tradition, is essential to
understanding the nature of self-knowledge and the connections between
knowledge and action.
The case of a person being questioned about his intentions is like
the previous examples of someone being questioned about his sensations
or his wants in that an inability to provide a correct description of
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what he intends or will try to do is a potential source of error and
uncertainty. Yet, intentional uncertainty is unique in that a person
cannot claim to have formed an intention to do something, but be un-
certain about what his intention is. If a person's intentions are
uncertain in this way, then he has no "fixed and formulated inten-
„188tions .
"
His knowledge of what he will try to do is necessarily direct
knowledge, the same kind of direct knowledge that he has of what he is
now doing. Just as his certainty about his present action is the cer-
tainty of what he is attempting to do, his certainty about his future
1 8Q
action is the certainty of what he will attempt to do. In addition,
such certainty about the future is inseparably connected to one's cer-
tainty about the present because:
. . . knowing what I am doing at this moment necessarily
involves knowing what I have just done and knowing what
1 90
I am immediately about to do . . . .
It is clear then that there are very real differences between
knowing what one wants and knowing what one intends to do as forms of
knowledge. The process of resolving uncertainty about what one wants
typically involves both discovery and decision, where one will be more
predominant depending on the nature and complexity of the desires in
question, but:
. . . coming to know what one will do is always and
necessarily a case of making a decision and is not a
1 91
case of making a discovery.
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It is because intentional knowledge is always a form of direct know-
ledge based upon decision and never a kind of reflexive or "double"
knowledge based upon discoveries about one's own mental states and
character that the phrase "knowing what one intends" is artificial and
1 Q2pointless whereas the phrase "knowing what one wants" is not.
Of course this does not mean that an agent's intentions are not
standardly formulated against the background of or based upon such
reflexive knowledge. The point is simply that intentions lie at the
opposite end of the spectrum of mental states from those types of
non-thought-dependent desires which one discovers through the process
of reflection. Hampshire holds that only by setting apart such "pure"
intentional knowledge do we achieve an adequate understanding of the
full range of mental states and of the complexities of human knowledge.
Building upon this analysis of intentional uncertainty and inten-
tional knowledge, Hampshire makes a crucial distinction between two
kinds of uncertainty and two kinds of knowledge about the future which
conerns all agents. This distinction draws out the implications of his
notion of the dual face of action as attempt and achievement.
The first type of uncertainty is that which can arise when an
agent is confronted with questions about the probable outcome of future
events and activities such as "What will happen?" or "Will you
succeed?". Such questions explicity call for the agent to make a
prediction based upon his empirical knowledge of the world and of his
situation in the world. It is, of course, absurd to think that one's
uncertainty about the future course of events could be resolved by a
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decision or the formulation of an intention. If he is uncertain about
what will happen on a future occasion or whether he will succeed in
accomplishing a given task, he needs additional empirical knowledge.
A second kind of uncertainty arises when someone cannot provide
answers to questions concerning what he plans to do or will do which
typically are expressed in the form "What will you do?" or "Will you
try?". In this case, the agent is being asked not to make a predic-
tion, but rather to make a decision or to state his intentions or
plans. Hampshire suggests that just as one cannot resolve doubts about
the future course of events through decision, there is something equal-
ly absurd in someone's attempting to resolve this kind of intentional
uncertainty through discovery of additional empirical knowledge. He
has in mind the picture of a person attempting to determine what he
will do or try to do (the attempt face of action) by predicting what he
will do on the basis of his knowledge of his own character or evidence
concerning his past successes and failures. As he states.
There seeems therefore an absurdity in behaviour— an
absurdity that is more than the infringement of a con
vention of language— in trying to find grounds for
1 93predicting what I myself will do.
An adequate account of the relationship between knowledge and
action requires recognition of this fundamental distinction between two
kinds of knowledge and of the different roles of prediction and
decision. Philosophers in the empiricist tradition have neglected
intentional knowledge and focused exclusively on empirical knowledge or
knowledge based upon evidence that an empirical statement is true.
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Empirical knowledge is knowledge of something that is independent of
the process of knowing and, as such, is open to both challenges con-
cerning the source of knowledge (How do you know?) as well as chal-
lenges aimed at the claim to knowledge (Are you sure?). When a claim
to empirical knowledge of the future or so-called "knowledge founded
upon induction" is challenged in this latter way, it:
. . . will normally be justified by appeal to some rule
of inference, itself an empirical proposition, which
links an observed fact with the predicted, but so far
194
unobserved, happening.
The empiricist tradition has tended to neglect or misrepresent the
second type of knowledge, intentional knowledge, which is most com-
pletely and purely embodied in someone's knowing what he will do.
Hampshire argues that the empiricist tradition has not adequately
examined such knowledge because it:
. . . has difficulty admitting that the very same pro-
cess of thought may be both a coming to be sure or to
know, that something is to be the case and a process of
making it the case. The reasoning that makes me sure
that something is true of me is sometimes also the
reasoning that makes it true of me—e.g., I have to
1 95
admit that I want X, or that I am trying to do X.
Not only is this kind of knowledge not open to challenges concerning
its source, but it also requires that challenges of the form "Are you
sure?" be handled or rebutted in a different manner. In particular, a
claim to such knowledge is standardly justified through reexamination
of the process of thought, deliberation or practical reasoning from
which it emerged.
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In short, this second category of knowledge does not conform to
the same certainty conditions which are attached to empirical know-
ledge. Because the empiricists and behavioral ists have not understood
the peculiarities and significance of such intentional knowledge, they
have distorted the relationship between these two different types of
knowledge which is essential to the conception of self-knowledge,
self-consciousness and freedom. Hampshire's own account of the rela-
tionship between intentional and empirical knowledge, or between de-
cision and prediction as well as the analyses of rationality and
self-consciousness which follow from this account are complex. The
difficulty of the topics themselves is compounded by the fact that his
discussions of these issues are scattered through a number of different
books and essays. It is thus not surprising that much of the critical
comment on Hampshire's work has mischaracterized his analysis of self-
knowledge by linking his views with radically different accounts of
self-knowledge or by treating a particular segment of his work in
isolation from the whole. The first step toward achieving an under-
standing of his treatment of self-knowledge, self-consciousness, self-
control and the relationship between reason and the passions is to
distinguish it from other positions with which it is mistakenly identi-
fied .
First, Hampshire's distinction between prediction and decision is
not meant to be the foundation of a comprehensive or complete cate-
gorization of all types of knowledge. As he acknowledges, one could
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also stress the contrast between knowledge of empirical facts and know-
ledge of mathematical and logical truths or Ryle's contrast between
"knowing how" and "knowing what."^^"^ Moreover, Hampshire recognizes
that there are many additional important distinctions which can be made
within the category of intentional knowledge. For example, as we have
seen, he emphasizes the significance of distinguishing "knowing what
one wants" from "knowing what one will do."
Yet, he holds that an investigation of the certainty conditions
attacthed to such expressions provides solid grounds for grouping these
distinct forms of knowledge into the category of intentional knowledge
and distinguishing this category from empirical knowledge. He chooses
to focus on this particular distinction because he believes that anal-
ysis of the relationship between intentional and empirical knowledge is
1 98
essential to unraveling the problem of human freedom.
Secondly, Hampshire's position does not entail the view that em-
pirical knowledge and intentional knowledge are "independent and un-
combinable" or that a person's knowledge of what he will do is unre-
199lated to his empirical knowledge of the world around him. In fact,
he repeatedly emphasizes the complementary and mutually dependent
nature of thse two types of knowledge and holds that one could not
possess either type of knowledge in isolation from the other. As he
states
,
Knowledge of the natural order derived from observation
is inconceivable without a decision to test this know-
ledge even if there is only the test that constitutes a
change of point of view in observation of external
objects. Correspondingly, a man who knows what he is
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doing, or will now do, must have some knowledge of, and
beliefs about, his own situation within the natural
200
order
.
His notion of the mutual dependence of thse two kinds of knowledge
follows directly from his rejection of the empiricist conception of
persons as detached and passive observers of the world and his adoption
of a conception of persons as objects moving among other objects in a
continual flow of intention into action. In addition, he expressly
rejects the separation of intentional knowledge from empirical know-
ledge which he attributes to the doctrine of the transcendent will
advanced by Kant, Schopenhauer, and the early Wittgenstein. In his
view, this doctrine, which separates one's self-knowledge, treated as
part of the domain of ideals and values, from his knowledge of fact,
can provide no coherent account of intentional action, deliberation or
moral judgment and artificially divorces the will from our desires and
interests .^'^^
It is this mistaken notion that Hampshire regards intentional
knowledge and empirical knowledge as independent and unrelated which
underpins the interpretation of his work either as an attempt to sub-
stitute the incorrigibility of one's reports of his intentions for the
empiricist incorrigibility of one's reports of his sensations or as a
portrayal of intentional knowledge as "not susceptible to chal-
lenge. However, as we have seen, Hampshire expressly acknowledges
that claims to intentional knowledge, such as the declaration of what
one will do on a future occasion, are not incorrigible and, like all
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forms of knowledge, remain open to certain kinds of challenges and
possibilities of error. In defending his position from criticism aimed
at Thought and Action and elaborating on his arguments, he specifically
acknowledges that there is an "inductive component" to one's knowledge
of his own future voluntary actions and that his claim to such know-
203ledge can be challenged on the basis of inductive arguments.
Freedom of the Individual provides two important examples of such
challenges and potential sources of error. First, an agent's claim to
know what he will do can be questioned on the grounds that he is making
faulty assumptions about the circumstances which he will confront when
he attempts to do what he intends to do. He may have underestimated
the difficulty of a task, have overestimated his own ability to perform
a task, or simply have not taken account of certain likely changes in
204
the circumstances in which he will act.
Secondly, his announcement of what he intends to do may be chal-
lenged as mistaken because he has a long record of making plans and
declaring his intentions to do something and then failing to carry out
these intentions. A common example is provided by persons who repeat-
edly state that they intend to give up smoking but in fact never do.
In such a case, someone's statement of what he will do is unreliable
not simply because he is not making a realistic appraisal of the dif-
ficulty of a task, but because he has frequently changed his mind in
similar past circumstances and has an established record of unreli-
..... 205
ability in carrying out his stated intentions.
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In short, a person's intentional knowledge of what he will do is
always, at least in part, dependent on his knowledge of the probable
course of events and of the general set of circumstances under which he
must carry out his intended course of action. As Hampshire states,
A error in judging the natural course of events may lead
to error in an agent's statements about his future
voluntary action; for he has to make some assumptions
about the future course of events, and about the situa-
tion and opportunities that will confront him, if he is
to form intentions, whether they are unconditional or
1 206
conditional
.
This inductive component of intentional knowledge, the implicit assump-
tions concerning circumstances and future events which are incorporated
in an agent's intentions or plans, is what differentiates practical
207intentions from mere wishes, hopes, dreams or vague ambitions. It
is also because of this interdependence of the two types of knowledge
that Hampshire argues that someone cannot truly intend or try to do
208
something which he knows is impossible to do. Finally, this is the
reason that he treats as peculiar and ambiguous those cases where an
agent declares his intention to do something no matter what obstacles
209
he may face.
Of course, the more difficult problems concerning the relationship
between intentional and empirical knowledge arise in connection with
how an agent uses his empirical knowledge of himself and his own past
behavior in formulating intentions. This points to a third possible
misunderstanding of Hampshire's thesis. Although he does argue that a
first person statement of what someone will do or try to do is the ex-
pression of a decision or an intention and not the expression of a
prediction, he does not hold that an agent cannot make predictions
about what he will do or attempt to do. This latter thesis is advanced
by those who would use the distinction between prediction and decision
to mark two completely autonomous realms: one in which we explain and
predict events and behaviors according to causal laws and the other in
which we explain and criticize human action in terms of reasons, in-
tentions, and decisions.
Hampshire's distinction between decision and prediction should not
be read as a variant of this reasons-causes dichotomy. He acknowledges
that the "categories of causal explanation" have deep roots "within our
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experience of ourselves as agents." Again, he stresses that de-
cision and prediction are mutually dependent and that the formulation
and interpretation of an agent's intentions are intimately tied to our
predictions of future events and actions. For example, when an agent
announces his intentions, he provides an observer with information
which can be used to predict the agent's future behavior. The observer
must, of course, assess this statement of intention against the back-
ground of other information, including the necessarily limited know-
ledge of the future situation which the agent possesses and his history
of reliability in carrying out his stated intentions.
Any one can readily adopt this "spectator's attitude" or point of
view of an observer toward his own probable decisions and actions when
considering "theoretical" situations which are purely hypothetical or
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remote from his present situation. However, the case where an agent
adopts this spectator's attitude toward and attempts to predict his own
immediate, "practical" decisions and actions is much more problematic.
To a certain extent, each agent must assume such a stance if he is to
formulate his intentions self-consciously and carefully, avoiding the
kinds of errors or mistakes he has made in the past. He must consider,
much like an observer who uses an agent's announced intentions to
predict his decisions or behavior, how the limits of his own knowledge
of future circumstances and events might condition his plans and in-
tentions as well as review his own record of reliability or unreliabil-
ity in acting upon stated intentions under similar circumstances.
In such practical situations, the distinction between decision and
prediction is not clear-cut and apparent and can only be clarified by
examining the related distinctions between one's role as an agent and
one's role as an observer and between theoretical and practical ques-
tions. Of course, definitive answers to questions about this relation-
ship between decision and prediction are not going to emerge from
analysis of ordinary language since none of these distinctions are
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clearly drawn in ordinary language. Hampshire's most complete
statement of his position on this issue is worth quoting at length:
These are points in our discourse at which we are
compelled to think dialectically, that is, to acknow-
ledge the possibility of an objective contradiction,
which arises when two lines of thought, each legitimate
within their limits, are pressed too far beyond their
limits. The contradiction is objective, in the sense
that it does not arise merely from carelessness or
ignorance in the use of words. The contradiction here
arises from the situation of a speaker speaking about
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himself as he would commonly speak about others; and
simultaneously making a double reference to himself;
first as the observer of himself, who is the author of
the statement, and, second, as the independent agent
observed. ... I may become aware of myself as someone
who is trying to annoy somebody else; 1 suddenly observe
myself doing this. But as soon as I become in this way
self-conscious about my own activity
,
the situation as I
see it, that is, the situation to which my action is
adapted, changes. The situation, as viewed by an in-
formed outside observer, has also changed, because of
the additional factor of my self consciousness. ... I
cannot escape the burden of intention, and therefore of
responsibility, which is bestowed upon me by knowledge
of what I am doing, that is, by recognition of the sit-
uation confronting me and of the difference that my
action is making. As soon as I realize what I am doing,
I am no longer doing it unintentionally. Any impartial
and concurrent awareness of the tendency and effect of
my own activities necessarily has to this extent the
effect of changing their nature. In virtue of this new
awareness, my action may need to be re-described, even
though I continue with 'the same' activities as before
—
'the same,' that is, when externally viewed, without
regard to the intention. That which began as impartial
observation turns into something else ; the knowledge
becomes decision .^^
The boundaries between decision and prediction have been redrawn
repeatedly in the history of Western thought. A representative example
of the general direction that such boundary change has taken in con-
junction with the rise and growth of the social and behavioral sciences
is provided by Freud, who showed that many actions which had previously
been considered the product of an agent's decisions were actually
determined by forces which were neither recognized nor controlled by
the agent. Hampshire acknowledges that this general trend will
probably continue, and that the discovery of new facts about human
motivation and behavior will continue to undercut the traditional
337
picture of rational human beings who determine their own actions and
lives through autonomous decisions.
At the same time, Hampshire holds that the continuing discovery of
basic psychological and sociological forces influencing human behavior
is not sufficient to support the view that we can now or will in the
future adopt, systematically and completely, the spectator's attitude
toward our own decisions and actions. As long as an agent has the
means of uncovering or infering those forces which influence his behav-
ior, the possibility of "doubling" his references to himself (as both
agent and observer) as well as the "dialectical movement" between pre-
214diction and decision remain.
One way of looking at this dialectical relationship is to focus on
the situation of an agent who uncovers new knowledge about the psycho-
logical or sociological factors which have, up to the present,
determined certain of his thoughts, mental states, motives or behav-
iors. Hampshire's claim is that this situation presents the agent with
another possible uncertainty, namely the intentional uncertainty con-
cerning his attitude toward this newly discovered fact about himself or
the factors influencing his character, motivation and behavior. This
claim is the central feature of his account of the relationship between
the two types of knowledge:
My argument is that any knowledge which a man acquires
from experiment and observation about his own present
and future states presents him with another potential
uncertainty and with the need of knowledge of another
215
kind, and that this is a feature of knowledge itself.
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In other words, such additions in an agent's empirical knowledge
of the "internal" psychological or the "external" sociological factors
determing his thought and behavior always leaves open the "normative"
question, "Do I want them to be otherwise?"^ It is an essential
feature of all such discovery or knowledge of the basic determinants of
human thought and action that it presents the agent with at least the
possibility of utilizing this empirical knowledge in trying to alter
the basic pattern of causal factors which have determined his thought
and behavior in the past. Of course, it may be that the agent cannot
successfully alter this pattern even with his increased knowledge of it
and his intentional efforts to do so. At the same time, the normative
question of whether or not one should make this attempt cannot be
resolved by further empirical discoveries about one's character or a
prediction based upon one's empirical knowledge of his own motivation
and behavior. Rather, this normative question and the intentional
uncertainty attached to it can only be answered by a decision or the
217
formulation of an intention.
This intentional uncertainty or normative question about an
agent's attitude toward his recently acquired knowledge of himself lies
at the center of Hampshire's conceptions of self-consciousness and of
the relationship between reason and the passions. He holds that when
an agent raises such reflective questions about his own desires,
emotions and so on, his states of mind are thereby changed or altered,
and that this marks the essential difference between self-knowledge and
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knowledge of the external world. Again, he is following the philos-
ophical path explored by Spinoza in examining how a person's knowledge
of the causes of his present states of mind, including his desires,
intentions beliefs and emotions, modifies these states of mind.^''^
The ever-present possibility of raising such reflective questions,
as for example concerning the desirability of certain desires, is what
Hampshire is referring to when he discusses the "necessary regress of
self-consciousness" in Thought and Action :
Every influence bearing upon me is added to the factors
in the situation confronting me, as soon as I become
219
aware of the fact of the influence.
It is also what he characterizes, in Freedom of the Individual , as the
process of "stepping back" or the "recessiveness of I" which "is built
220
into the concepts of action and of knowledge."
This regress of consciousness or recessiveness of I is not the
product of some mysterious inner power or exercise of will, but rather
is a product of the intellect in that it follows directly from the re-
lationship between empirical and intentional knowledge. The process of
stepping back or reflex iveness is a natural outcome of an advance in
our understanding of the causes of our own thought and behavior, which
is provided not only by scientific psychology but also by increasingly
sophisticated classifications and distinctions used in ordinary lan-
guage and everyday conduct. In much the same way that one person can
use scientific and practical knowledge about another to manipulate or
control him, any individual who can criticize and reflect can use such
3U0
knowledge in trying to achieve self-control over or attempting to alter
certain of his own mental states and behaviors
Hampshire is clearly not advancing a position which "idolizes"
decisions and intentions or which substitutes a model of persons as
perfectly rational agents for the empiricist conception of reason as
222the servant of the passions. In the first place, he is not sug-
gesting that all human action is preceeded by a prior stage of self-
conscious doubt, deliberation, and decision or intention-formula-
223
tion. Intentions can, like beliefs, be "unquestioned and silently
formed" and are not necessarily the results of self-conscious reflec-
22U
tion. Moreover, there is much variety in intentions in that they
may be either firmly fixed or highly tentative, unconditional or con-
225ditional, specific or vague. Finally, there is the central distinc-
tion between those intentions which, even when firm and fixed, are
essentially indescribable (such as the intention of an artist or
craftsman in creating a piece of art) and those intentions which are,
at least in part, mediated and constituted by a particular description
226
of an object or activity.
In short, an adequate theory of mind and action can be achieved
only if we move away from simplistic conceptions of intentionality and
come to terms with a vast range of complex combinations and inter-
actions of these different kinds of intentions. In addition, a co-
herent account of intentionality and rationality must allow for those
"mixed, confused situations" where an agent "drifts into a course of
action," apparently perceiving his course of action to be determined by
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his given character and past behavior while not denying that he could
alter his conduct through decision and effort.^^"^ Also, even when
someone does self-consciously reflect on the forces which have
influenced his behavior and states of mind and carefully considers the
alternative actions and policies open to him, he may be unable to reach
a decision or lack the power to carry out his sincere intentions to
change present facts about himself.
Hampshire focuses on deliberation and decision not because they
characterize all or even most thinking and behaving, but rather because
we must understand those occasions when human beings do deliberate and
decide if we want to understand the crucial role of reflexivity in
human behavior and social life. While his account of mind certainly
challenges the notion that reason is the servant of the passions, it
does not move to the opposite extreme by viewing the passions or
emotions as essentially rational and purposive objects of choice or by
ignoring the roles of imagination and feeling in thought and action.
Hampshire specifically contrasts passions, feelings and desires with
actions as things which typically happen to us rather than things that
229
we do or choose.
Of course, an agent can, using the more sophisticated forms of
language and classification which develop interdependently with self-
consciousness, characterize his own passions and desires as, like
physical objects, either instruments or obstructions of his purposes
and intentions. But when we characterize certain passions, inclina-
tions or dispositions in this metaphorical way as objects which we can
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"watch" rather than simply experience, we are treating them as objects
in relation to the will of an agent who can formulate intentions and
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make decisions. Although an outside observer may criticize someone
when he is in a position to recognize that certain of his desires and
feelings are "squalid and evil" and fails to make the attempt to
inhibit or control the influence of these baser passions over his
calculation and behavior, this does not mean that an agent is free to
choose his passions. They remain the material upon which his will,
informed by rational criticism and reflection, must act, rather than
the direct products of his will or his decisions .^^^
In this account of mind, self-consciousness is clearly identified
with the active as opposed to the passive states of mind. The major
unifying theme in this account is the notion that the more a person
knows about the causes of his own states of mind, character and behav-
ior, the better the chance that the gap between attempt and achievement
can be closed. However, this does not entail the view that there is
some realm of perfect autonomy, total rationality and full knowledge
which, when attained, marks the final elimination of those factors
outside an agent's control and understanding that determine his thought
processes and actions. Such complete rationality and total knowledge
remain ideal goals which can be sought but never actually attained.
There are always limits to reason and knowledge imposed not only by the
basic features of one's physical existence as a self-moving object in a
world of objects, but also by one's language and system of classifica-
tion, culture and form of life, and one's own desires and interests
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which are themselves the products of a social environment. The
fundamental prerequisite of any adequate account of mind and human
nature is that it comes to terms with these sets of the necessary
limits within which human beings know, reflect and act in the world.
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CHAPTER V
A REEXAMINATION OF THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN MIND AND POLITICS
Freedom and Responsibility
The alternative account of mind which Hampshire outlines, with its
emphasis on the unique features of self-knowledge, has significant
implications for political inquiry and political theory. In several of
his essays, such as "Russell, Radicalism, and Reason" or "Political
Theory and Theory of Knowledge," he specifically examines certain of
the connections between fundamental issues in philosophy and the con-
cerns of the political scientist and political theorist.'' But these
essays invariably fail to capture the full scope of the challenge to
the most basic assumptions underpinning the dominant conception of a
science of politics which is presented by this alternative view of
thought and action. In addition, even his extensive work on freedom
and responsibility, which is clearly relevant to the traditional inte-
rests of political theory and which is the one topic where his position
is developed most thoroughly, is widely ignored or mischaracterized
.
In Thought and Action
,
Hampshire states that his main goal is
"(t)o show the connection between knowledge of various degrees and
2
freedom of various degrees. ..." Analysis of this connection is,
either explicitly or implicitly, the principal unifying theme through-
out all his work. Not only Thought and Action but also Freedom of the
Individual and the collection of essays presented in Freedom of Mind
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revolve around the linkages between questions concerning the peculi-
arities of intentional knowledge and problems regarding freedom of will
and freedom of mind. He repeatedly and consistently argues that the
major issues concerning human freedom "arise at the points of inter-
section" between intentional and empirical knowledge, or between de-
cision (or intention) and prediction.
The key to understanding Hampshire's analysis of freedom and
responsibility thus lies in the dual face of action as attempt and
achievement. His central claim, which is set out most fully in Thought
and Action , is that an agent is free and can be held responsible for
his actions to the extent that his achievements correspond to his in-
tentions and decisions. An agent becomes increasingly free and respon-
sible through knowing what he is doing, "in every sense of this
phrase," and through acting "with a definite and clearly formed inten-
tion." According to this view.
He is a free agent, in so far as his behaviour is con-
stantly correlated with his evident or declared thoughts
and intentions at the time of action rather than with
5
antecedent conditions of some other kind.
Such a general and consistent fit between an individual's intentions or
decisions and his actions is the best single indicator that he is
behaving as a free and responsible agent.
As we have seen, Hampshire treats the distinction between decision
or intention and prediction quite differently from those linguistic
theorists who draw sharp distinctions between reasons and causes or
between action and causation. His position is thus fundamentally
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different from those offered by philosophers, both within and outside
of the linguistic tradition, who have attempted to make room for human
freedom by positing a realm of autonomous human action which cannot be
explained or predicted according to causal models. Such attempts have
frequently led philosophers defending a free will position to charac-
terize free action as action which is not governed by laws and there-
fore unpredictable. But this identification of free action with random
or chance action does make the conception of human freedom appear to be
an illusion which is out of step with our scientific knowledge of the
environmental and genetic determinants of human behavior.^
In contrast, Hampshire holds that the accurate prediction by an
outside observer of what an agent will do or try to do before he him-
self knows or has decided what he intends to do is "not by itself a
7
threat to the reality of human freedom. ..." Just because an
agent's decisions and actions can be predicted on the basis of an
observer's knowledge of that person's general character, his past
decisions or actions on similar occasions, his avowed or inferred
desires and interests, and other such information, this does not mean
that the agent is neither free nor responsible. It is only when a
person's sincere declarations of his intentions and decisions are not
reliable guides to his future actions that he is clearly at the mercy
of forces outside his control and cannot be considered a free and
responsible agent. The central indicator of free action remains the
fit between an agent's intentions and his actions, or whether his
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sincere declarations of his intentions provide a basis for making
accurate predictions of what he will in fact do.
In short, the idea of freedom is dependent not upon unpredicta-
bility but rather upon the capacity to formulate and implement
intentions. Of course, in order to formulate intentions which can be
carried out, an agent must know what he is doing, which includes em-
pirical knowledge of himself and of the situation confronting him.^
Thus, one of the necessary conditions for someone's being a free and
responsible agent is that he possesses some minimum of such predictive
knowledge
.
In addition,
. . .
there must be a comparatively wide range of
achievements open to him, in which he would succeed if
he tried, none of which have been made ineligible by
9human actions and institutions.
Although he does not equate increased freedom with a larger number of
alternative choices, Hampshire acknowledges that free choice is
fundamental to the notions of freedom and responsibility. As has been
emphasized in traditional discussions of the topic, it is essential to
the idea of freedom that a free action is one which is performed by
choice rather than as the result of coercion or constraints imposed by
another individual or some authority.
Hampshire maintains that these two conditions (knowing what one is
doing and the absence of external constraints and limitations on free-
dom of choice) are necessary, but not jointly sufficient, for claiming
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that someone is a free and responsible agent. For in order to for-
mulate and carry out intentions, an agent must also be able to discover
and perhaps alter the causal influences which have, up to the present,
determined his thought and action. The conceptions of freedom and
responsibility can only be fully understood if one examines the kind of
reflexive or intentional knowledge through which agents can actively
intervene in the complex causal sequence connecting thought and action.
This position clearly has very real affinities with that set out
by Spinoza, who portrayed the idea of freedom in terms of the active
exercise of the powers of the mind and who presented a picture of the
free agent as an active, self-determining being. In this view, freedom
and responsibility are inextricably connected to the processes of
deliberation and decision involved in practical reasoning as well as
the processes of criticism and correction involved in self-conscious
reflection on one's own past attempts and achievements.
The presentation of this account of freedom and responsibility
suffers from many of the same problems evident in the treatment of the
conception of mind to which it is attached. His most systematic dis-
cussions of the topic move rapidly through a series of complex issues
and draw upon the support of the more detailed analyses of those issues
provided in various of his essays. Also, as before, Hampshire fre-
quently fails to identify exactly which positions he opposes or which
positions support or are similar to his own. At the same time, his
work offers some important contributions to the analysis of the concept
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of freedom and is certainly not as simplistic and one-dimensional as
many of his critics have portrayed it.
In particular, Hampshire clearly does not, as some of his critics
have asserted, revive the doctrine that "freedom is the knowledge of
1
1
necessity." As he states.
It is not true that as soon as I understand why I behave
in a certain way, where the 'why' connects my behaviour
with some regular and general causal pattern, I imme
diately become, by virtue of this knowledge alone, an
12
exception to the causal law.
Just because someone discovers a law-like generalization linking cer-
tain of his own states of mind or behaviors with certain antecedent
conditions, he does not automatically become free of this pattern of
influence. Moreover, this does not mean that a free agent always or
even generally has the capacity for the kind of detached observation
and critical reflection necessary in order to recognize and then alter
the influences which presently determine his character and his behav-
ior .
However, the discovery of additional knowledge of the causal
factors, both external and internal, which influence one's ideas and
behavior does open up new possibilities of self-conscious choice and
action.''^ For example, when an agent makes such a discovery, he recog-
nizes additional potential obstructions to the achievement of his
consciously formed intentions and decisions. He is now in a better
position to formulate plans to circumvent such obstructions or to
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attempt to change the conditions which have made his thought and be-
havior the product of forces outside his control. The possibility of
such intervention in the causal pattern which has determined one's be-
havior in the past is yet another necessary (but again not sufficient)
1
4
condition of free and responsible action.
Hampshire aligns himself with Spinoza in holding that the kind of
reflexive self-knowledge which underpins the formulation and imple-
mentation of intentions is aboslutely central to the idea of freedom.
He is siding with Spinoza against the accounts of freedom and respon-
sibility, most systematiclly set out in the doctrine of abstract indi-
vidualism, which have dominated political and moral theory in the
liberal tradition. In addition, he is suggesting that the major weak-
nesses inherent in this liberal treatment of freedom and responsibility
can be directly attributed to the neglect of such reflective self-know-
ledge in the empiricist view of mind. Again, Hampshire's principal
concern is assessing the overall coherence of the conceptual framework
with which the liberal theorists have addressed the problems centering
in the concept of freedom.
In general, representatives of the liberal-empiricist tradition
have identified freedom with an absence of coercion or constraints
imposed upon an individual by another person, the state or some other
external agent. Freedom itself is typically defined in terms of a
person's capacity to pursue and satisfy his own desires and prefer-
ences.^^ A person is considered a free and responsible agent as long
as he is not being forced to do what he would not otherwise choose to
do and he is not being prevented from gratifying his desires by the
imposition of external obstacles.
This focus on so-called "negative freedom," or the definition of
freedom as the absence of external constraints, is only natural given
the basic assumptions incorporated in the empiricist account of mind.
In the first place, there clearly are no significant obstacles to free-
dom inherent in the workings of the mind of the abstract individual.
Free choice is simply the translation of given and transparent desires
into action. Likewise, free or voluntary action is simply action in
accordance with the agent's strongest desires or aversions, or action
which expresses the agent's particular ordering of his desires and
preferences
.
Of course, if someone's understanding of the relevant facts or of
the proper means for satisfying his desires was faulty, he might be
less able to gratify his desires. Such a lack of knowledge would
constitute, in a sense, an obstacle to greater freedom. Similarly,
additional knowledge might increase an agent's freedom to the extent
that knowledge of causal laws provides one with more sophisticated and
productive strategies for attaining what he wants.
However, the connection between knowledge and freedom as under-
stood by the liberal theorist ends here because the empiricist account
of mind portrays the ends or goals of human behavior as being dictated
by the desires and passions. Since one's passions and desires cannot
be opposed or modified by his rational beliefs, they are immune to
rational criticism and correction. Given such an account of mind, it
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is not surprising that the only real limitations on freedom which
concerned the classical liberals are the possible external constraints
on agents' attempts to satisfy those given desires, passions or
inclinations which are the common denominators of an unchanging human
nature
.
Another central component of the classical liberal treatment of
freedom and responsibility is the "soft determinist" view that the
so-called problem of free will is essentially a verbal difficulty and
that freedom is compatible with determinism. This view hinges, in
large part, on the Humean view of causation, according to which, what
we call causes and effects are merely changes or events that are found
to be constantly conjoined. Thus, there is, contrary to Spinoza's
treatment of causation, no necessary connection between causes and
events. Since human actions are caused in the same way that every-
thing else is caused, the laws of psychology do not entail necessity.
Of course, underlying this position is the view of human action as
bodily behavior which is caused by some kind of internal event such as
desire, a volition or an act of will. It is this interpretation of
action and causation which underpins the classical empiricist stance
that freedom and responsibility are not incompatible with determinism
17
but rather presuppose it.
The conceptions of freedom and responsibility which follow
directly from the classical empiricist account of mind have been modi-
fied or challenged on the basis of those changes in our understanding
of human nature discussed in the third chapter. For example, many
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developments in sociological theory and research have, either directly
or indirectly, undercut the characterization of individual freedom as
the power to gratify universal desires and preferences. This early
liberal view of freedom clearly incorporates an inadequate, pre-socio-
logical conception of human nature that does not acknowledge the extent
to which an agent's desires and preferences are the product of his
social environment, including his roles and place in the social order.
Studies of socialization processes, educational systems and commu-
nication networks have shown the ways in which these can be used by
members of one class, group or segment of society to restrict the
freedom of others. One of the consequences of such work has been an
increased understanding of how the manipulation or limitation of the
range of alternatives available to an agent when he deliberates or
chooses may constitute an even more severe and effective restriction of
his freedom than external constraints on his actions.
Such an emphasis on the historical and social context within which
"sociological man" must make his choices and exercise his freedom has
had an extensive influence on political and social thought concerning
freedom and responsibility. Certain liberal theorists, beginning with
Mill, have used such a perspective in pressing for a more "positive"
conception of freedom v^^ich acknowledges the importance of an agent's
1
8
awareness of possibilities of choice. According to this "positive"
conception, freedom does not simply mean the absence of external con-
straints, but also encompasses the freedom to shape one's own life
course and to realize one's own potential. The free individual is seen
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as a subject rather than an object, as being self-directed rather than
determined by forces outside his control. Focus thus shifts from an
agent's freedom of opportunity to implement his given choices to an
agent's freedom to conceive of or explore various alternative choices
19
or courses of action.
Of course, this distinction between "positive" and "negative"
treaments of freedom can be overstated. After all, the classical
liberal theorists did offer a picture of political institutions and
social arrangements as not only operated but also designed by essen-
tially autonomous, free and rational (in a prudential or utilitarian
sense) individuals. This idea of the autonomous, rational citizen or
consumer who deliberates and acts so as to maximize his own self-
interest or utility has long been central to the liberal conceptions of
liberty, democracy and the free market. At the same time, there is a
marked difference between those discussions of freedom and autonomy
which start from the model of asocial, abstract individuals with given
desires and passions and those which work from a model that emphasizes
the possibilities of choice, growth and change inherent in "sociolog-
20
ical man."
In addition, several social scientists and theorists have, on the
basis of the modern conception of "sociological man," launched a more
fundamental and far-reaching attack on this traditional liberal para-
digm of free, responsible and autonomous action. According to their
reading of the findings of the contemporary social sciences, the phi-
losophical views of freedom and responsibility advanced by the early
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liberals are at odds with our scientific knowledge of the social fac-
tors influencing an individual's thought and behavior. Some have
advanced variations of a moderate thesis such as criticism of liberal
historians and social theorists who attempted to explain and evaluate
the decisions and actions of historical figures or agents in alien
cultures without considering the social and historical forces shaping
each person's choices and behavior.
In addition, the more radical sociological determinists suggest
that every individual's desires, choices and behaviors are simply the
products of that person's roles, class, status and other social fac-
tors. In either case, the conceptions of freedom, responsibility and
autonomy which we have inherited from the early liberals must be sub-
21
stantially revised.
This sociological challenge to the notions of freedom and respon-
sibility defended by the classical liberals has been reinforced by an
even more vigorous critique of these conceptions inspired by develop-
ments in modern psychology and psychiatry. The position known as psy-
chological determinism asserts that all human behavior is the product
of psychological causes of various kinds. Such determinism is thought
to hold not only in the cases of pathological disorders and various
kinds of deviant behavior, but also across the entire spectrum of the
thought and action of normal agents.
According to this view, all of an individual's conscious desires,
choices and behaviors are determined by unconscious forces, defense
mechanisms, inner compulsions and so on, over which he has no control
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and of which he has no knowledge. The "hard determinist" position
follows this claim to its logical conclusion, maintaining that while
the conceptions of freedom, responsibility and autonomy may have played
a central role in earlier philosophical speculation about man and mind,
these terms are no more applicable to an empirical approach to human
behavior than they are to physics. In short, determinism cannot be
22
reconciled with free will, moral responsibility and moral judgment.
Of course, although this problem is now frequently posed in lan-
guage and examples emerging from the modern social and behavioral
sciences, the basic dilemma is not a new one. The free will-deter-
minist debate has been with us since the beginning of philosophy and
has reemerged again and again in the clashes between competing theories
of human nature. However, there have been some significant changes in
this debate, and these also make the early liberal attempted recon-
ciliation of determinism and free will much less attractive than it
once seemed.
For example, much of the recent philosophical debate has proceeded
from Kant's forceful statement of the tension between determinism on
the one hand and freedom, responsibility and other moral notions on the
other. When we say that someone performed an action of his own free
will or hold him responsible for what he has done, we are not claiming
simply (as the early liberal reconciliation requires) that he could
have done otherwise if the factors influencing his action (e.g., his
desires) were different. Rather, we are claiming that he could have
chosen to do otherwise or taken a different course of action under
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exactly the same set of conditions. The notion that all events, in-
cluding human choices and actions, are completely determined by other
events seems incompatible with the assumption, which is basic to our
moral judgments, that persons are free to choose among two or more
23possible courses of action.
In sum, both the "negative" conception of freedom as the absence
of external constraints as well as the classical liberal attempt to
reconcile determinism with the ideas of freedom and responsibility seem
much less tenable in the prevailing climate in the modern social and
behavioral sciences and in post-Kantian philosophy. In addition, this
summary only briefly characterizes two of a number of different issues
and problems where there has been extensive revision of the classical
liberal conceptions of freedom and responsibility. The contemporary
treatment of questions centering around freedom and responsibility is
marked by significant changes in prevailing views concerning the logic
of moral discourse and the status of moral judgments, the basic
components of an adequate theory of human nature and several other
24
relevant issues.
Hampshire himself emphasizes and attempts to build upon the con-
tributions to our understanding of human action and freedom offered by
the developments represented by the conceptions of "sociological man"
and "psychological man." Thus, although he does not specifically
discuss the contributions of sociology, his analysis emphasizes that
the issues concerning freedom, autonomy and action must be confronted
not in the context of an artificial world of abstract individuals but
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rather as they apply to a truly social world in which particular lan-
guages and forms of life, as well as economic and political arrange-
ments, shape human thought and action. Also, he examines in detail the
challenge posed to the idea of human freedom by Freudian psychological
theory and explores Freudian theory as a framework for dealing with
questions concerning self-knowledge and individual autonomy.
At the same time, Hampshire suggests that the treatment of the
problem of freedom within liberal political theory and positivist
social science remains flawed because of deeply embedded assumptions
centering in the empiricist conception of mind. Despite empirical
discoveries and increased knowledge of human motivation and behavior,
the background conceptions of mind, agency and rationality incorporated
in the classificatory framework into which the data are fitted have not
been carefully analyzed and reassessed. This is the principal reason
why characterizations of freedom and responsibility which are directly
linked to a discredited theory of mind continue to exert a pervasive
influence throughout American social science and social theory. The
development of more viable accounts of freedom, autonomy and respon-
sibility presupposes systematic reexamination of these conceptual and
philosophical assumptions which underpin contemporary attempts to
explain and evaluate human behavior.
Hampshire's central indictment of the contemporary account of
freedom and responsibility is that modern theory and research follows
classical liberal theory in ignoring the essential connections between
knowledge and freedom. This claim is likely to strike most social
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scientists and liberal theorists as blatantly false. To cite but one
example, Peter Berger closes his Invitation to Sociology with a charac-
terization of our increasing knowledge of the sociological determinants
of behavior in terms of a "puppet theater." Although we may "for a
moment" perceive ourselves as puppets being manipulated on a stage, we
soon recognize that there is "a decisive difference" between our own
position and that of the puppets:
Unlike the puppets, we have the possibility of
stopping in our movements, looking up and perceiving the
machinery by which we have been moved. In this act lies
25
the first step towards freedom.
Neither the acceptance of the modern conception of "sociological man"
nor of "psychological man" necessarily commits one to a "hard"
determinist position which dismisses the possibility that human beings
can use their knowledge of causal laws to augment their freedom and
autonomy.
In addition, Hampshire's charge seems to have little merit in
relation to liberal political thought. After all, recognition of the
connection between knowledge and freedom has been a major driving force
behind the repeated resurgence of the theme of "positive" freedom
within the liberal political tradition. Both classical and modern
liberal theorists have emphasized the values of liberty and autonomy
and, at least implicitly, acknowledged that human beings can use their
discoveries about themselves and their environment to become more
self-determining. As Berlin suggests, this liberal notion of "posi-
tive" freedom comes very close to Rousseau's idea that it is sometimes
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a necessary condition of becoming free to recognize one's chains for
what they are rather than decking them with flowers. It is thus
nothing new or particularly challenging to the liberal theorist to
suggest that knowledge of one's chains is, in many cases, the first
step toward freedom.
Yet, in order to make sense of any such notion of becoming more
free or becoming more self-determining through additional knowledge of
the determinants of one's own thought and behavior, we need some co-
herent account of the connections between knowledge and action. More
specifically, Hampshire's argument is that we need adequate accounts of
self-knowledge as a form of knowledge and of the powers and limits of
self-reflection and deliberation. In short, we cannot account for
freedom and autonomy in the absence of more sophisticated conceptions
of mind and agency than the dominant empiricist framework provides.
Hampshire's analysis of free and responsible action clearly
stresses the roles of deliberation, decision and conscious reflection
in human action. Yet, he is not suggesting that an agent is free only
when he is actually deliberating and choosing or when he is actually
acting to carry out clearly-formed intentions. Rather, he emphasizes
the fundamental point that our notions of freedom, autonomy and respon-
sibility all require a distinction between thought and action which are
an agent's own rather than the product of forces outside his control.
In turn, this distinction requires not unpredictability of decisions
and actions, but that an agent has the capacity to reflect upon his
current situation and to formulate intentions. It is in this sense
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that the model of free and responsible action is provided by the pic-
ture of an agent who examines his desires, interests, roles and so on
in a self-conscious manner and then formulates intentions and acts on
27the basis of such rational reflection.
One of Hampshire's major interests is in clearing away some of the
common misunderstandings which make this paradigm of free action seem
incompatible with the causal explanatory models used in the social and
behavioral sciences. In the first place, acceptance of this model of
free and responsible action does not entail a denial of the vast body
of empirical evidence demonstrating the extent to which human behavior
is determined by psychological impulses or inclinations outside of the
agent's control. Instead, this model simply requires that we regard
agents who acquire knowledge of such causal influences as being con-
fronted with the "normative" choice of either acquiescing in or at-
tempting to resist these factors.
Although it may be impossible for the agent to overcome or suc-
cessfully resist a particular temptation or inclination, it is always
possible that he can try or formulate an intention to do so. It cannot
be "impossible" for an agent to intend to do something in the same way
that it might prove "impossible" for him to do something. As Hampshire
states
,
. . . there is no sense in which it is impossible for
him to intend to do something, provided that he knows
28
what would be involved in doing it.
375
In addition, this model of free and responsible action does not
necessarily rest upon the assumption that individuals are asocial,
ahistorical beings whose choices and actions are independent of their
social environment. In fact, Hampshire emphasizes that the range of a
person's thought or the range of possible alternative actions which he
can conceive of and consider is limited by social and historical
forces. Historians and social scientists who are concerned with ex-
plaining a particular person's decisions and actions must start, not by
assuming that an infinite range of possibilities is open to every
individual, but rather by examining "the genuine possibilities of
action" which are available to agents in a particular culture, time and
29
social situation. Each person's thoughts, ideas, interests, and in
turn his actions are always restricted not only by such general factors
as his language and culture but also by more particular factors such as
his education, upbringing, class and status.
However, we must not confuse saying that someone could not have
been expected to conceive of certain alternatives or to take certain
actions given his background and environment with saying that it was
impossible for him to have chosen or acted otherwise given his back-
ground and environment . It is exactly this confusion which underpins
the "misleading metaphor" of a person being "imprisoned" within his own
set of thoughts, interests and classifications. Unlike the neurotic
who is, in a sense, a prisoner to his obsessions,
. . .
the man whose thoughts and interests in fact
revolve within a particular narrow circle is not
honestly to be described as imprisoned within this
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circle, even if we can explain very clearly why his
interests are so narrow by reference to his past and to
historical causes.
No matter how tightly this circle may be closed, it is always possible
that an agent can attempt to break free of it and achieve at least a
partial extension of the range of his thought.
We hold human beings responsible for their decisions and actions,
despite the limitations imposed by social and historical forces, pre-
cisely because they are intentional agents capable of reflection.
Whenever an agent recognizes that certain factors in his background or
environment have limited his own thoughts, intentions and actions, he
faces the "normative" question of either simply accepting these
limitations or attempting to alter them. In short, the regress of
consciousness confers a corresponding regress of responsibility.
An agent can thus be held responsible not only for the more ob-
vious "sins of commission" but also for the less obvious "sins of
omission" in thought and action. If an agent's discoveries concerning
the psychological and social determinants of his past behavior have
given him the potential power to intervene in this pattern of influ-
ence, or even to move a step closer to such intervention, he must be
held responsible for failures to use this knowledge in attempting to
correct or alter any morally defective aspects of his behavior or char-
acter. Although the original pattern of influence shaping his charac-
ter and behavior is not something which he consciously chose or even
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had any control over, he is now responsible for any aspect of his char-
acter and behavior which he could change if he actually tried.
This constitutes a central aspect of the asymmetry between the way
in which an agent judges and excuses his own conduct as opposed to the
Oil
manner in which we judge and excuse the conduct of others. When we
criticize and evaluate another person's decisions and actions, we do
consider that individual's upbringing, educational opportunities,
social position and other factors in his environment which may have
limited his thought in certain ways. It would be unreasonable to hold
an agent fully responsible for decisions made or actions -performed when
his background and social environment have made it highly unlikely that
he v/ould even conceive of or consider some of the alternatives availa-
ble to him. In short, we do offer excuses on the basis of, or make
allowances for those limitations on an agent's thought and action which
are the result of his language, culture and environment.
Of course, agents frequently adopt such a spectator's attitude
toward their own past decisions and actions. Examination of the way in
which one's own thought and behavior have been shaped by environmental
factors is in fact one of the principal avenues to increased under-
standing of one's own failures and successes and of possible changes in
one's own habits of thought and character. Thus, a person might at-
tempt to explain, and at least in part excuse, his past acts of dis-
crimination toward members of a particular race through examing the
unrelective prejudices which had had acquired in his own upbringing.
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In such cases, an agent uses the same standards of criticism and cor-
rection which are applied to the decisions and actions of others in
explaining and evaluating his past patterns of thought and behavior.
As we saw in the preceeding chapter, Hampshire maintains that an
agent cannot completely adopt this kind of spectator's attitude toward
his present and future choices and actions. For example, an agent
cannot excuse his continuing to behave on the basis of racial prejudice
by arguing that, given his background and environment, this is the only
kind of thought and behavior which can be expected of him. To adopt
the spectator's attitude in this way is to disclaim responsibility for
one's actions by denying that one has any freedom of choice. When
someone attempts to explain and predict his future choices and behavior
from this spectator's point of view, he is characterizing his decisions
and actions as not freely taken, as determined by forces over which he
has no control.
Hampshire's analysis of this kind of attempt to escape the burden
of responsibility by adopting the spectator's point of view should not
be confused with the type of position taken by Sartre in his discussion
of "bad faith." Sartre characterizes "bad faith" in terms of an
agent's attempts to escape from the "anguish" of freedom and the burden
of responsibility by viewing his own decisions and actions as the
products of either internal or external forces over which he has no
control. He and Hampshire both appear to be arguing that each agent
must ultimately accept responsibility not only for his own decisions
and actions but also for his own character which is ultimately the
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product of his own choices among a variety of different possibilities
open to him.
However, from Hampshire's perspective, it would be a mistake to
portray a person's patterns of thought, his emotions, desires and
interests, and the other features of his character as the products of
deliberate, conscious choices or of his will. Human beings are not
free and responsible in the sense that they can completely determine
what they are and what they will become through autonomous decisions.
Instead, they are free and responsible in the sense that the process of
"backward stepping"—the exploration of new alternatives based upon
additional understanding of the factors shaping past and present deci-
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sions and behaviors—can never be completely closed off. The essen-
tial point of this model of free and responsible action is that the
development of habits of self-conscious relection and criticism may
modify prevailing habits of thought and behavior. This stress on habit
is important because freedom is not something directly experienced at
some existential moment of choice but rather the end product of a long-
term and difficult policy of self-reflection.
This analysis suggests that one of the most serous deficiencies of
liberal moral and political thought is a preoccupation with weakness of
will as the major problem regarding freedom and responsibility. The
alternative being advanced shifts the focus to freedom of mind or free-
dom or intellect, recognizing that agents frequently act irresponsibly
in the moral and political realms not because of weakness of will but
rather because they have too narrow or limited an understanding of
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themselves, their situations or their alternatives. In other words,
each person necessarily decides and acts, in political as well as in
ethical matters, within the context of a particular frame of reference
or system of classification and thought. It is always possible that
this sytem of classification and belief may blind him to significant
features of his own situation, factors influencing his decision-making
and behavior, or consequences of his decisions and actions.
The self-conscious agent is one who recognizes that his own
thought and action is enclosed within such a system of classification
and meaning. He realizes that this system is, for the most part,
something which he has inherited from his own culture and language and
that it is the product of historical and social conditions. He at-
tempts to guard against potential blind spots inherent in his framework
by exploring alternative systems of classification and thought and
evaluating his own on the basis of such comparisons. The self-con-
scious agent is constantly testing his own perceptions and classifica-
tions as well as his own intentions and actions in the political and
social world in light of these alternative characterizations or de-
scriptions.^^ It is in this sense that freedom of mind or freedom of
thought is the central dimension of what it means to be a free and
responsible agent.
Certain of Hampshire's critics have argued that this analysis of
freedom represents not a direct challenge to the liberal tradition but
rather is merely an extension of the same basic liberal framework. The
main question they pose is, what is there in this account which has not
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been long recognized or emphasized by liberal theorists? For example,
Mill's On Liberty
,
the classical statement of the individualistic,
"negative" conception of freedom, incorporates many of the same themes
which Hampshire stresses. After defining the free individual as one
who deliberates and chooses. Mill emphasizes the need for expanding
possibilities of choice and celebrates the ideal of "individual spon-
taneity" as well as discussing the dimensions of "negative" freedom.
Moreover, he argues that human beings are most likely to exercise such
freedom of choice in a pluralistic society in which individuals are
able to pursue different ends and experiment with different ways of
life and in which power is widely distributed. Finally, he like Hamp-
shire advances a notion of individual self-development, suggesting that
each person has the power to shape his own character as he wants it to
be.
Hampshire's emphasis on intentions, this line of criticism con-
tinues, is a minor alteration rather than a significant change in the
liberal conceptions of mind and freedom. He has simply substituted a
portrayal of freedom as the power to implement clearly formed inten-
tions for the earlier picture of freedom as the power to satisfy
emerging desires. One of the indicators that this slightly modified
definition of freedom incorporates the same deficiencies inherent in
the classical liberal definition is the manner in which it remains open
to the same kind of objection standardly raised against the liberal
conception of freedom. If we define freedom in terras of the ability to
satisfy desires or implement intentions, it follows that individuals
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can become more free simply by scaling down their desires or their
intentions
.
More fundamentally, it appears that Hampshire's work rests on the
same individualistic premises which underpin the classical liberal
conception of free and responsible action. The individual is for
Hampshire, as for the classical liberals and utilitarians, the real
center of all value. Morality becomes the private domain of indivi-
dually chosen values as contrasted with the public world of determinate
facts. Politics, or more specifically liberal democratic politics,
becomes a method of offering alternatives to rational individuals who
can be held responsible for the choices they make. In short, despite
the modifications, Hampshire has not moved beyond the picture of the
abstract individual set out by the early liberals. These essentially
liberal conceptions of mind and freedom continue to ignore not only the
ways in wtiich society, culture and custom confer meaning on human
actions and human life, but also the ways in which consciousness and
ideology enter into our understanding of ourselves and our society.
A forceful example of one variant of this line of criticism is
provided by Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good . She argues that
Hampshire's portrayal of the free and responsible agent is not really a
challenge to the dominant liberal framework, but rather is simply a
more comprehensive statement of the same conception of man which is
unreflectively and partially present throughout modern liberal thought.
Hampshire's ideally rational man not only is the dominant figure in
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contemporary writing on moral philosophy and politics, but also "is the
42hero of almost every contemporary novel."
The central problem with this account of man is that the center of
personality and individuality is ultimately identified with the
choosing will, which is completely divorced from reason and belief.
Given this view of mind or man, the only kind of freedom which really
counts is individual freedom of choice, whether one is choosing between
political candidates, deodorants or moral values. Moreover, respon-
sibility becomes merely a function of an agent's "impersonal knowledge
based upon a scientific model of knowledge and of his completely per-
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sonal will."
Murdoch is most directly interested in the implications of this
view of man for our conception of morality, but her arguments clearly
concern the liberal conception of politics as well. She argues that
Hampshire's conception of free and responsible agents assimilates
morality (and politics) to a visit to a shop:
I enter the shop in a condition of totally responsible
freedom, I objectively estimate the features of the
goods, and I choose. The greater my objectivity and
discrimination the larger the number of products from
44
which I can select.
According to this typical liberal portrayal of human nature and human
excellence, an individual's primary struggle to increase his freedom is
to conceive of as many different alternatives of choice and action as
45
he can or "having as many goods as possible in the shop."
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According to this interpretation, Hampshire's treatment of human
freedom and moral responsibility is nothing more than a revised state-
ment of "bourgeois capitalist morals." Although Murdoch does not
explore this theme further, this suggests that his conception of poli-
tical freedom remains preoccupied with the same abstract principle of
freedom of choice which is championed by liberal democratic theory and
the capitalist market economy. Indeed, if Murdoch is right, his entire
analysis of freedom of thought remains tied to the standard liberal
metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, where ideas, like political
parties or economic producers, must be free to compete for the alle-
giance of consumers.
Murdoch suggests that the basic problem with Hampshire's analysis
of the free and responsible agent is that he is unable to break away
from the liberal conception of human nature. The image of man pre-
sented in Thought and Action is at once, "behaviorist , existentialist
and utilitarian," but above all it is a summary statement of the con-
ception of "linguistic analytical man" which is pervasive in modern
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analytic philosophy. The virtues of this model of man are its em-
phasis on freedom (although defined in terms of detachment and a utili-
tarian rationality) as well as "responsibility, self-awareness, sin-
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cerity, and a lot of utilitarian common sense." However, one of its
chief defects is that it omits such notions as sin, love and other
concepts which are deeply embedded in human customs, habits and
traditions. In addition, it excludes Marx's insights concerning the
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possibilities that ideological distortions must affect an agent's
capacity for free and responsible action.
Hampshire's account of freedom and responsibility does appear to
be overly abstract and very much in line with the standard
liberal-utilitarian treatment of the topic as long as it is severed
from other central points in his argument. In order to assess
Murdoch's criticism, we must examine the principal supports for this
conception of freedom of mind.
Description and Evaluation
At the end of Thought and Action
.
Hampshire sketchily explores
certain of the implications of his analysis of knowledge and freedom in
a brief discussion focusing on morality and art. Although he makes
only a few passing references to politics or political decision making,
several of his main arguments bear directly on the attempt to explain
political behavior. In this section, I will focus on drawing out those
claims which are most relevant to the tasks of the political scientist
and political theorist. I believe that, contrary to Murdoch's cri-
tique, these themes represent significant and sometimes revolutionary
departures from the standard set of assumptions and positions under-
pinning not only liberal political theory but also the positivist model
of a science of politics.
In the first place, Hampshire's policy of testing one's percep-
tions and intentions by alternative descriptions and classifications is
not compatible with just any kind of moral or political theory. Indeed,
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it is directly contradictory to those accounts of how we describe and
evaluate human actions which rest upon the empiricist notion that
reality comes pre-divided into units independently of our classifi-
catory and descriptive schemes. It is because of this empiricist
conception of social reality, that behavioral political scientists have
tended to portray human conduct as a series of distinct, easily-labeled
actions. They have retained a notion of "the facts" as setting out or
defining an individual's political, social or moral situation and
choices .^^
However, in the attempt to describe as well as to evaluate human
behavior, it is misleading to think of "the facts of the situation" as
a closed set of propositions which precisely determines or defines the
situation or activity. There is no one description which uniquely
captures or directly corresponds to the particular moral or political
situation in which someone must decide how to act or not act. The
situations that confront agents, as well as their actions themselves,
remain "open" in the sense that they are susceptible of an indefinite
50
number of alternative descriptions.
Many of the central problems and most fundamental debates in poli-
tical inquiry as well as in ethics concern the proper description of
particular situations and particular actions. The subject of contro-
versy is what constitutes an adequate characterization or description
of "the facts" in a particular case. Hampshire cites the example of a
Marxist who challenges a liberal by arguing that the liberal's actions
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have "a political significance and intention" which he does not rec-
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ognize. The Marxist's argunent is that the liberal has too narrow
and restricted a conception of politics and that his classification of
political behavior must be redrawn. His descriptions of political
situations and actions omit certain of the central features of, or the
most important facts about the actual situation he confronts or the
actions he performs.
The difference between the Marxist and the liberal is not simply a
matter of contrasting political opinions or differing evaluations of a
set of given and established facts. Rather, the difference is between
two competing conceptual systems through which political phenomena are
individuated and classified. There is here a contrast between two
incompatible ways of thinking about the political world and the kinds
of practical decisions which political agents must make in this
world.
Of course, both the Marxist and the liberal do make appeals to the
facts, but in each case such appeals pass through the particular de-
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scription of the facts which that side offers. Each proponent
remains enclosed within a certain system of thought and belief, a
conceptual system designed for describing and evaluating political
situations and action. When such conceptual systems are radically
different, there is a sense in which the combatants are not discussing
"the same" action at all, even though they may be considering the same
5U
agent and the same phase of his activity.
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In order to understand the nature of such fundamental conceptual
disputes, we must abandon the notion that either the physical or the
social world is already divided up into "facts" or atomic units, inde-
pendently of the methods we establish for identifying and differen-
tiating its aspects. In addition, we must give up the closely-related
idea that when the social scientist describes this world, he is simply
naming particular distinctions, similarities and differences which are
provided by "the facts" or the elements of reality and experience
themselves. Hampshire is suggesting that when we describe an event,
situation or action, we are actually characterizing it from a partic-
ular perspective or point of view. His analysis builds upon the work
of Wittgenstein and other linguistic philosophers who maintain that
descriptions are instruments used for particular purposes. If this
account of description is correct, we must examine the human purposes,
interests and so on that comprise the points of view from which we
describe the world and that enter into the concepts which we use to
55describe this world.
The proposed alternative account of description is based upon an
analysis of descriptive concepts which is fundamentally opposed to the
notion that our concepts simply mirror elements in the world. In
Thought and Action
,
Hampshire seems to return to the Greek notion that
something can only be defined in terms of the end or purpose which
things of this particular type are designed to serve. He states:
'Same church' and 'same building' have a sense that is
specified by the sense of the concept of a church and of
the concept of a building. ... The criterion of
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identity for churches is part of the sense of the
concept of a church: the criterion of identity for
buildings is part of the sense of the concept of a
building.
Hampshire does not expand upon this claim but rather moves rapidly
through a number of related arguments
,
many of which require more
support than he provides.
Among the various points he makes is the notion that our classi-
ficatory concepts necessarily involve some kind of "contrast between
the central and unquestionable specimens falling under the concept and
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the border-line and challengable cases. . . ." In our application
and use of these concepts, we must distinguish between those standard
and normal cases where something clearly falls under the concept and
those abnormal and imperfect cases where there is doubt that the
concept legitimately applies.
The grounds of the classif icatory concepts used in ordinary dis-
course are typically provided by the part that the things being classi-
fied under the concept in question play in human life. In other words,
our common sense vocabulary evolves and is used against the background
of standard human interests, needs and purposes. Given that human
beings are purposive and intentional agents, it is only natural that
they standardly classify objects as potential instruments to be used or
as obstacles to be avoided in carrying out their purposes and inten-
tions .
The conditions of application of most of the concepts used in
day-to-day human life are in this way tied to normal human acitivities
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and the practical uses of things. It is thus inevitable that people,
in their use of such concepts, make "evaluative" comparisons of various
objects "as serving their typical purposes, or playing their typical
CO
part in human life, more or less well." Of course, if human beings
v;ere only passive observers rather than agents, it might well be the
case that they would classify things simply on the basis of observable
similarities and differences and not make such "evaluative" compari-
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sons
.
A similar analysis of descriptive concepts, which is presented
more systematically and in greater detail, is found in Julius Kovesi's
Moral Notions . Using the concept of 'table* as an example, Kovesi
argues that concepts cannot, either historically or logically, be
viewed as constructed out of various perceivable qualitites (or what he
calls the "material element" of the concept) such as hardness, smooth-
ness, shape, number of legs, and so on.^^ In order to understand the
concept, we must focus on the "guiding principle" or "formal element"
of the concept which we use in calling some objects 'tables' and re-
fusing to call other objects 'tables'.
Thus, we cannot sketch the relevant features which we use in
determining what is and what is not a table unless we consider our
reasons for having tables, our need for tables in a way of life, or the
purposes which tables are designed to serve. In general, what makes a
particular term or concept "descriptive" is the point or purpose served
by selecting and grouping certain features of the world or of our
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behavior. Moreover, we cannot provide a final and closed characteri-
zation of this point or purpose of the concept because our reasons for
having tables and our uses of tables may change along with changes in
our needs and social conventions.^''
Certainly, this notion of defining something in terms of its end
or purpose seems to be more problematic when we move away from dis-
cussing objects which are designed for definite human purposes
('church' and 'table') and turn to examining the concepts used to char-
acterize the political and moral dimensions of human action ('legiti-
macy', 'freedom', 'murder' or 'good'). However, both Hampshire and
Kovesi hold that those more "abstract" concepts used to describe
thought and action are also classificatory and descriptive concepts.
Here, as before, we must examine the point or purpose of grouping
certain elements of the world or of our behavior under a particular
concept. They are expressly abandoning the notion that our concepts
simply mirror corresponding elements in reality and insisting upon
investigating the point of view from which each of our concepts, in-
cluding political and moral ones, are formed and used.
In the preceeding chapter, we saw how Hampshire tied the condi-
tions of application of concepts such as 'pain' and the various emotion
concepts to the manner in which these concepts function in a form of
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life and a shared set of meanings. The emotion concepts are not
unique in this respect, for our entire political and moral vocabulary
is also embedded within a particular web of shared meanings which
constitutes a common view of the world, society and human nature. In
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the process of determining the proper rules for the application and use
of these concepts, one must examine the rules inherent in the set of
social practices and the way of life in which these concepts
function.
Hampshire's account of mind emphasizes that certain emotional
states enter into human motivation and behavior only if the agents
possess the concepts for identifying and characterizing such states of
mind. Similarly, it is only because agents share certain political and
moral concepts that there can be particular types of social action and
political behavior. Social actions and practices are, in this way,
partially constituted by the concepts and beliefs held by the agents in
a particular society and period of time. In addition, just as a proper
understanding of a certain vocabulary of the emotions requires exami-
nation of the form of life and social practices in which these emotion
concepts function, an adequate understanding of a particular political
vocabulary is dependent on investigation of the form of life and social
practices in which these political concepts function. Inherent in
Hampshire's analysis of descriptive and classificatory concepts, par-
ticularly political and moral concepts, is an approach to political
inquiry which challenges the empiricist assumptions supporting the
positivist conception of a science of politics.
One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of this approach as
applied to the social sciences is that it blinds the social scientist
to conflict by assuming that meanings, beliefs, actions and social
practices are always consistent and have an inherent rationality of
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their own. However, such a neglect of conflict does not necessarily
follow from the kind of approach to political inquiry suggested in
Hampshire's work. In fact, his analysis emphasizes and illuminates
central dimensions of political conflict which are frequently ignored
by contemporary political scientists. In particular, his analysis
suggests why conceptual disputes in ordinary political discourse as
well as in political science are not necessarily minor terminological
disagreements, but rather frequently express significant political
issues .
Returning to the example cited above, we find Marxist and liberal
theorists divided over the proper boundaries of the concept of 'poli-
tics'
.
Such conceptual debates tend to be heatedly contested precisely
because the classification of certain activities as 'political' or
'non-political' has important political repercussions. In classifying
certain activities and decisions as 'economic' rather than 'political'
in nature, the liberal establishes a framework in which it is taken as
self-evident that such activities should not be regulated by political
institutions and that such decisions should be left in the hands of
private individuals or organizations. Part of the force of the Marxist
redescription of these activities and decisions as 'political' is to
raise questions concerning social control of these activities or the
extension of the process of public decision making.
More generally, the revision or overthrow of a person's conception
of 'politics' changes his view of his situation and opens up or
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restricts his range of possible actions. While such conceptual dis-
agreement and conceptual change do not constitute the whole of
politics, they are certainly central aspects of political conflict and
political change.
Hampshire further argues that final resolution of conceptual
debates concerning 'politics' and similar notions is not to be ex-
pected. The concept of 'politics' is among those
. . . that are permanently and essentially subject to
question and revision, in the sense that the criteria
of their application are always in dispute and are
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recognized to be at all times questionable.
These "essentially disputed concepts" have two main characteristics.
First, they are intimately tied to human desires, interests and emo-
tions as well as to social practices and forms of life. Thus, the
grounds of these classificatory concepts will change with changes in
human emotions, interests and social practices and arrangements.
In addition, essentially disputed concepts tend to be "very gene-
ral and abstract" such that changes in their use and application have
broad-ranging effects throughout the entire conceptual framework. A
dispute about where to draw the boundary between political activities
and decisions and other kinds of activities and decisions quickly
escalates into a number of disputes concerning other concepts. These
general-level concepts embody or are integral parts of a complex clas-
sificatory system and to reject a particular interpretation of the
proper boundaries of the concept is to reject central components of
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that system of classification.
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Many of the central concepts in ordinary discourse about politics,
which must be incorporated into a science of politics (concepts such as
'polities', 'democracy' and 'freedom'), are essentially disputed in the
manner Hampshire describes. He suggests that a comprehensive analysis
of these concepts should proceed on the assumption that there are
certain "nuclear contexts" in which there is general agreement
concerning the application of the concept and various related notions
despite disputes which might arise at the "periphery" of the concept.
One of the central questions confronted in such conceptual analysis
thus concerns whether and how a particular concept is to be applied in
new, changed or unusual circumstances. Of course, the attempt to
answer this question, and thereby differentiate between the "super-
ficial" and the "essential" features of a concept, ultimately aims at
"uncovering the point or purpose of the concept, the ultimate ground of
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the classification" it embodies. We can clarify and initiate ra-
tional discussion of a conceptual dispute only if we examine the point
or purpose which the selection and classification of certain features
of the world, of ourselves, or of our behavior is designed to serve.
The analysis of essentially disputed concepts, of "competing
possibilities of classification," of the connections between related
concepts, and of the consequences of accepting one system of classifi-
es ^.
cation rather than another is essentially a philosophical task. This
notion of essentially disputed concepts thus constitutes one of the
most significant of the various linkages between philosophical analysis
and political inquiry identified in Hampshire's work. That central
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concepts of our political vocabulary are open-ended and always subject
to challenge is one of the major reasons why we cannot treat modern po-
litical science as having made a complete and final break with philos-
ophy. This is also one of the ways in which the work of the tradi-
tional political philosophers, who typically analyzed key terms in the
prevailing political and moral vocabulary, remains relevant to the
modern task of explaining political behavior. In short, the specula-
tive and normative issues addressed by traditional political theorists
continue to enter into modern political inquiry at its foundation
through the basic concepts with which we describe and explain political
behavior
.
Political inquiry continues to have what Hampshire calls a "spec-
ulative" dimension, in part, because its concepts and classifications
remain tied to inherently speculative accounts of mind and man. As
investigation of any of the essentially disputed concepts in politics
demonstrates, competing explications and definitions of central con-
cepts are ultimately rooted in competing classifications of human
powers, characteristics and activities. For example, the Marxist
challenge to the liberal account of liberty ultimately rests on a
conception of the free individual as someone who has the possibility of
realizing certain potential abilities and powers. Freedom can also be
recharacterized from a Freudian perspective by presenting a model of
the free individual as one who has, at least in part, freed himself of
the influence of certain desires and fixations acquired in infancy. In
each case, the debate concerning competing accounts of freedom is
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directly linked to controversies concerning the proper characterization
and classification of the powers of the human mind and the essential
activities of human beings.
It is in this sense that Hampshire considers the concept of 'man'
to be the "natural starting-point" in the analysis of essentially
disputed concepts and competing classif icatory systems. The concepts,
distinctions and classifications which make up our political and moral
vocabulary are bound to human interests, powers and activities as well
as in social practices and forms of life. Since the philosopher or po-
litical theorist who undertakes the analysis of such concepts and clas-
sifications must set out or make assumptions concerning the division
and classification of human powers and activities, philosophy itself
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can be characterized as "a search for 'a definition of man'" Al-
though the traditional political theorists were frequently mistaken in
identifying this search with a search for "an immutable essence," they
correctly perceived the connections between their attempts to under-
stand society and politics and their attempts to set out coherent
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accounts of man and mind.
This emphasis on the "speculative" dimension of political philos-
ophy and political inquiry in general, or the claim that ultimately the
enterprise of political inquiry is like philosophy involved in a "spec-
ulative" search for "a definition of man" in particular, is so alien to
the prevailing mode of thought in contemporary political science that
it almost invites misinterpretation. Yet, Hampshire's claims do have
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significant implications for political inquiry, and it is worthwhile to
separate carefully his argument from mistaken characterizations of it.
In the first place, it must be reemphasized that it would be a
serious mistake to interpret his position as a call for the substi-
tution of the kind of metaphysical system-building identified with
Hegel for the empirical study of political phenomena. The most basic
point which underpins his analysis is not that "speculative" political
theory must replace empirical research, but rather that, in Hannah
Pitkin's words, "empirical investigation presupposes conceptual defi-
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nition." If a political scientist is to investigate the "political"
characteristics of modern corporations and corporate behavior or the
various "interests" advanced during the formulation of a particular
public policy, he must have an adequate conception of what 'politics'
or 'interests' are. In other words, it is the conceptual framework
utilized by the researcher, including the explicit or implicit defi-
nitions of key concepts, which provides the basis for classifying
certain facts as relevant and other facts as irrelevant to the study of
a particular topic.
Yet, most political scientists would find nothing which is es-
pecially revolutionary in this emphasis on conceptual frameworks and
would certainly challenge the idea that this introduced a speculative
dimension into political inquiry. Mainstream political science has
long recognized the importance of concepts as the basic building blocks
of an empirical social science and has devoted much attention to con-
cept formation. Of course, Hampshire's perspective does seem to place
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strong emphasis on utilization of the techniques developed in linguis-
tic philosophy in the clarification of concepts used in political
inquiry.
Moreover, if he is correct, it is clear that examination of the
concepts used in everyday political thought and action is the necessary
starting point when addressing the basic problems of conceptual clari-
fication and definition found in political inquiry. His analysis does
suggest that the distinctions and classifications embodied in the
everyday language of politics (including such concepts as authority,
freedom, equality, democracy, justice, power and coercion) capture or
express some of the most important features of political life. Thus,
the clarification or explication of these concepts is, at the very
least, a necessary prerequisite to the empirical study of politics.
Although this emphasis on analysis of the concepts of everyday po-
litical discourse raises little controversy, Hampshire's characteriza-
tion of this enterprise as inherently "speculative" seems problematic.
Certainly, as Hampshire himself acknowledges, the process of clarifying
or explicating concepts necessarily involves more than simply reporting
the ways in which people define political concepts, and philosophers
engaged in this enterprise frequently recommend the modification of a
concept in order to eliminate ambiguity or confusion.
Hampshire's use of the term "speculative" seems to suggest that
there is something mysterious about this process or its results: that
it does not utilize public criteria of adequacy, that it involves some
kind of uncheckable, intuitive procedures, or that the results of
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concept clarification remain essentially vague and mysterious. How-
ever, as practioners of linguistic analysis repeatedly point out, the
explication and modification of concepts are attempted on the basis of
an examination of the rules which people implicitly use in applying the
concept in certain cases and not others, or in classifying certain
things and not others as falling under a particular concept. Thus, the
explication of political concepts proceeds not by any abstract specula-
tion but rather by attempting to make these rules explicit, by
identifying the essential features of a concept, and by examining the
logical relationships among a particular concept and related con-
cepts J'^
However, Hamphsire maintains that the definitions of essentially
disputed concepts utilized by the researcher or the explications of
these concepts provided by the theorist are "speculative" not because
these concepts remain vague and mysterious despite our attempts at
clarification, but rather because these concepts are essentially pro-
visional, open-ended and normative. Since the vocabulary of thought
and action (a vocabulary which includes such fundamental, essentially
disputed concepts as man, mind, need, want, intention, etc.) is a
central part of our political vocabulary and our political life, the
concepts we use to describe and evaluate political life exhibit the
same open-ended quality which is characteristic of these mental terms.
In part, this open-endedness of our political concepts simply
reflects the ever-present possibility of social change. With the
development of new forms of human association or fundamental changes ii
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social forms and practices, there is change in the human interests,
needs and purposes which our political vocabulary must serve. '^"^ Be-
cause human society is dynamic rather than static, and our concepts
evolve as they are applied to new or changed circumstances, the most
central concepts in our political vocabulary are inherently open-ended.
In addition, Hampshire's analysis connects this open-endedness of
our political concepts with the human powers of self-reflection or the
reflexivity of human life. As numerous social theorists and philos-
ophers have acknowledged, our vocabulary of thought and action con-
tinues to evolve with the discovery of additional empirical knowledge
as well as, although this is not so frequently recognized, through the
impact of the creative powers of the arts. However, this is not always
simply a m.atter of change in the conceptual framework through which we
understand the world and our place in it. Rather we ourselves are
changed to the extent that part of what we consider human nature, par-
ticularly the spectrum of human emotions and feelings, changes along
with changes in our forms of knowledge and self-consciousness.
In short, any account of an essentially disputed concept such as
politics or freedom remains provisional despite advances in our empir-
ical understanding of political behavior and political phenomena as
well as in our philosophical analyses of the problems connected to
these concepts. Hamshire argues that the work of social theorists and
philosophers must be continually reexamined, not simply because their
analyses may be mistaken in certain ways, but also because thier char-
acterizations of thought and action may not be adequate to later stages
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of human knowledge, self-understanding and social life. This same
qualification applies to the conceptual frameworks which guide empiri-
cal political inquiry, and the explanatory frameworks used in the
social sciences are no less "speculative" than the classical models in
this sense of the term. Since the possibility of change in either our
understanding of human nature or in the basic subject matter, human
nature itself, is always open, no particular classificatory scheme
concerning thought and action, including those used by the researcher
studying political behavior, can be allowed to stand uncriticized and
7 ft
unchallenged
.
Hampshire's analysis also advances a second claim concerning the
"speculative" nature of contemporary political inquiry: the normative
and evaluative dimensions of traditional political philosophy have not
been eliminated by adopting scientific methods and procedures. This
normative dimension enters political inquiry not through a limited set
of questions concerning the "just state" or the best form of govern-
ment, but rather through the concepts which are used to describe as
well as to evaluate political behavior. The political researcher and
theorist, like the citizen and politician, must apply and use a broad
range of essentially disputed concepts in order to characterize politi-
cal life. The adoption of a particular definition or use of one of
these concepts is not an isolated, technical problem concerning only
the usefulness of this definition in a particular context. Rather, to
adopt a particular definition or use of an essentially disputed concept
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is to make a choice among competing systems of classification, a choice
where "systematic judgements of value have to be made."''"''
It is at this point, where Hampshire makes the claim that there is
an ineradicable normative dimension built into the language of poli-
tics, that the disagreements between Hampshire and the adherents of the
dominant model of a science of politics come to a head. According to
this prevailing positivist model, it is clear that the political scien-
tist cannot use the ordinary language of politics exactly as it stands
because it is unsuitable for the scientific purposes of political
inquiry. After all, one of the basic prerequisites of scientific
inquiry in any field is the establishment of objective, scientific
criteria for the application and use of key concepts. Clearly, such
criteria must be acceptable to various users of these concepts despite
any normative differences which might divide them. In short, the
everyday language of politics with its normative dimensions must be
restructured into a neutral descriptive language which is suitable for
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a science of politics.
From this perspective, any approach to the study of politics which
ignores this distinction between facts and values, failing to separate
empirical discourse about what is from normative discourse about what
ought to be, will fall into the same errors and confusions which marred
traditional political philosophy. This positivist conception of a
science of politics does not rest upon the claim that normative con-
siderations must be totally excluded from political inquiry, but rather
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that these two types of discourse or sets of concepts are analytically
distinct and must be kept separate.
Implicit in this view of the fact-value dichotomy is a notion of
political inquiry as the product of a two-stage process. At the first
stage, that of empirical political inquiry, the political scientist
utilizes descriptive concepts in order to construct neutral descrip-
tions of political phenomena which are acceptable to any investigator
regardless of his ideology or values. Only after this task has been
completed can the political scientist undertake the second stage of the
process, normative political inquiry: making normative judgments about
79the described phenomena.
From the perspective of those who accept this fact-value dichotomy
and the two-stage model of political inquiry, Hampshire's analysis of
essentially disputed concepts and the speculative dimension of politi-
cal inquiry seems fundamentally confused and mistaken. For Hampshire's
treatment fails to distinguish those descriptive concepts with regard
to which intersubjective agreement among different observers can be
attained from those normative concepts which are value-laden and
necessarily controversial. The first and essential step in political
inquiry is formulating a neutral descriptive language by eliminating
the predominantly normative concepts from this descriptive vocabulary
and by eliminating any normative criteria in the application of all
concepts which are primarily descriptive. Presumably, the end product
of this process will be a neutral, descriptive language formed from the
point of view of the scientific observer.
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The major thrust of Hampshire's argument is that this notion of a
value-neutral, descriptive language of politics as the foundation of a
value-free empirical science of politics is underpinned by mistaken
views of how we describe, of how we evaluate, and of the relationship
between description and evaluation. As we have seen, the task of de-
scription is much more complicated than simply picking out or naming
certain given and obvious facts and actions which make up the real
world and social life. We select and group certain features of ob-
jects, states of affairs and actions under the rubric of a particular
concept because such classification serves general as well as partic-
ular human purposes, interests, and needs.
Among the various purposes and interests which enter into the con-
cepts, distinctions and classifications used to characterize political
phenomena and behavior are those which are evaluative and normative.
For example, just as in the case of classificatory concepts such as
'table,' we cannot, in our use of concepts like 'freedom' and
'politics,' avoid the contrast between those situations, activites and
so on which advance standard human interests and those which do not.
It is in this sense that our political vocabulary as well as our moral
vocabulary revolves around some notion of the contrast between:
. . .
activities that are essential to men as men and
those that are essentially destructive and that prevent
men from realizing their potentialities as human
beings
.
The argument is not that the political scientist has an ethical
obligation to address certain normative issues raised by such a
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contrast, but rather that this contrast is an essential feature of the
concepts we use to describe and explain political behavior and events.
In other words, many of the concepts used to describe or characterize
those aspects of human motivation and behavior which are of interest to
the political scientist are formed from a normative point of view.
This is true not only of the general-level concepts such as
'rights,' 'justice' or 'good' which have been typically stressed in
analyses of moral concepts in analytic philosophy, but also of a whole
host of more specific concepts as well. We describe 'political actors
as making promises, owing debts, lying, committing treasonable acts or
being corrupt. We characterize the general policies of governments or
the acts of governmental officials as being legitimate, dictatorial,
tyrannical, racist or sexist.
The claim that these and other such concepts describe from a
normative point of view is not an attempt to construct a particular
system of ethics which provides a set of norms guiding human conduct.
Rather, the point is that we would not have these concepts at all, that
they would never have been formed, if it were not for the basic norma-
tive human interests and purposes which these terms embody. In other
words, these concepts do not group a set of certain activities under a
rubric on the basis of purely descriptive considerations which are
detached and separate from the evaluation of these activities. More-
over, the evaluative or normative force of such concepts does not come
from the expression of an attitude or the making of a value judgment
about a particular set of facts already and independently collected.
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The attempt to eliminate the normative dimension of such concepts would
necessarily destroy the point or purpose which these concepts serve in
our discourse.
For example, as Hampshire's analysis of the concept of freedom
demonstrates, our characterizations of particular political activities
as "free" or "unfree" is hardly divorced from normative criteria. When
we use the concept of freedom, we are describing from a point of view
which involves a notion of autonomy or the extent to which a person's
thought and action is his own rather than determined by external forces
(and Hampshire emphasizes the extent to which this includes the ca-
pacity to form intentions and purposes as well as the absence of ex-
ternal constraints), a notion of human dignity or the value of the in-
dividual, and a notion of opportunity for self-development of one's own
potential.
Of course, it is possible for the political scientist to redefine
'freedom' such that these normative dimensions are eliminated. But to
the extent that theorists and researchers, in the interest of construc-
ting a value-free science of politics, successfully eliminate the
normative elements attached to such concepts as 'freedom,' they destroy
the very point or purpose which these concepts serve in our political
discourse
.
It is largely due to the fact that such reformulations of basic
concepts have focused on one concept or a narrow range of concepts that
the radical nature and consequences of this enterprise have not been
realized. Yet, if we take this position seriously, it mandates a
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systematic purge of the normative dimensions of the entire complex web
of interrelated concepts which make up our political vocabulary, and it
calls for a revolutionary reformulation of our language.
If Hamshire's analysis is correct, the aim of this radical pro-
ject, a purely descriptive language of politics which reflects the
point of view of a detached scientific observer, is a false ideal. In
pursuit of this false conception of a purely descriptive conceptual
framework, such an approach would restructure our language by elimi-
nating or gutting those concepts which are most useful in describing
the more significant and sophisticated froms of political behavior. We
would be left with a conceptual framework which might be adequate for
describing crude physical movements, but certainly could not deal with
the kinds of complex human actions which are of greatest interest to
the political scientist.
In addition, it should be noted that such a radical reformulation
of our political vocabulary would involve much more than simply a
•change in our terminology. The evaluative and normative interests and
purposes which our concepts incorporate are themselves the products of
our nature as human and social beings, of our social practices and
forms of life. This redefinition of concepts thus involves not simply
a change in the words we used to describe the world around us, but also
a basic change in the way we think about ourselves, our social rela-
tionships with others and our social life. Given that reflexivity is a
central dimension of human life, this is ultimately a proposal for
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revolutionary change in human nature, social relationships and
Q q
politics.
Certainly, few political scientists have explicitly advocated the
kind of radical reformulation of our political vocabulary which would
ultimately result from their treatment of concepts. However, the basic
assumptions, particularly the fact-value dichotomy, which remain per-
vasive in contemporary views of the scope and methods of political
science, do incorporate this same limited view of political discourse.
Indeed, these contestable accounts of description, evaluation, and the
relation between the two continue to be serious obstacles in our at-
tempts to develop more adequate and accurate explanations of political
behavior, to understand the potential biases and distortions incor-
porated in the conceptual frameworks which guide empirical research,
and to come to grips with the issues and problems raised by the search
for objectivity in political inquiry.
The Reflexive Relation Between Theorv and Fact
Hampshire makes no attempt to set out a systematic political
theory or a model of political inquiry, and he nowhere offers a com-
prehensive statement of the implications of his work for political
theory or political inquiry. Yet, it is clear that his analyses of the
connections between knowledge and freedom, essentially disputed con-
cepts, and related topics are directly revlevant to a number of ques-
tions which concern the political theorist and researcher, including
such questions as "What kinds of concepts are admissible in political
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inquiry?" and "What is the relationship between fact and value or de-
scription and evaluation?" It is also clear, contra Murdoch, that this
work challenges certain standard assumptions, such as the fact- value
dichotomy, which have underpinned liberal political theory and the
positivist model of a science of politics or society.
However, it might still seem that Hampshire's analysis of these
philosophical issues remains peripheral to those questions which are
now at the forefront in political theory and political inquiry. After
all, political scientists are generally agreed that political inquiry
involves more than simply collecting and recording "facts" or pieces of
information, and that it involves more than simply doing case studies
or presenting the kinds of descriptions of political behavior and
institutions offered by the journalist. The aim of political inquiry
is to provide explanations of political phenomena, to provide adequate
and coherent accounts of political behavior, political life, and poli-
tical change.
As we have seen, the dominant account of such explanation remains
that provided by the positivist model, according to which there are no
fundamental differences in method between the natural and the social
sciences. This model portrays the many seemingly different kinds of
explanation used by political scientists as but variations of one model
of scientific explanation, the covering-law model, which dictates that
scientific explanation requires genuine, law-like generalizations.
At the same time, this model of political inquiry is not accepted
universally and there is now growing debate concerning what constitutes
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an adequate explanation of political behavior. Adherents of an al-
ternative, so-called "interpretative" or "interpretive" model of poli-
tical inquiry hold that there are basic methodological differences
which set the social sciences or human sciences apart from the physical
sciences. In brief, their main contention is that the phenomena
studied by the social scientist, human actions, are fundamentally
different from the phenomena studied by the physcial scientist because
they are constituted, at least in part, by the concepts, intentions,
and purposes of, or meanings for, the agents involved in the
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activity.
From the perspective of the political scientist, Hampshire's work
on thought and action must be judged largely on the basis of its con-
tributions to this discussion. It might well seem that Hampshire has
very little to offer here, that his philosophical treatment of thought
and action is for the most part irrelevant to the central questions
concerning the structure of an adequate or proper explanation. Al-
though he discusses extensively the concept of action and its relation
to intentions, purposes and beliefs, he makes no real effort to relate
these to major problems in political theory or research.
Indeed, his primary concern seems to be with the problems of the
individual moral agent who is deciding between alternative courses of
action or who is criticizing and evaluating the actions of others, not
with the problems of the scientific observer who is trying to give an
accurate and adequate account of the political behavior. Moreover,
while he does stress the centrality of intention to action, he offers
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no specific criticism of the covering-law model and makes extensive use
of causal explanations in his own accounts of human behavior. In
short, Hampshire's position, at least as it relates to this debate,
seems ambiguous and unclear, and he seems unaware of the questions
concerning the explanation of human action which are most important to
political inquiry.
If Hampshire' s contributions to this debate concerning the proper
structure of scientific explanations of human action seem minimal, his
contributions to a second significant topic, the role of theories in
political inquiry, seems virtually nonexistent. Most political scien-
tists continue to accept the view that the development of adequate
explanations of political phenomena is ultimately dependent upon the
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discovery of genuine, testable theories of politics. According to
the positivist model, singular events or facts are explained in
reference to empirical generalizations or laws, and these laws are in
turn explained in reference to a theory. The accepted model of a
genuine scientific theory remains that of a hypothetico-deductive
system in which the laws of generalizations subsumed under the theory
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can be deduced from the basic principles of the theory.
However, the role and structure of theories in scientific expla-
nation in general and in explanation of social phenomena in particular
is also a topic of controversy. In contemporary philosophy of science,
various critiques of the covering-law model of explanation have gen-
erated a number of serious challenges to the positivist conception of a
scientific theory. The debates stimulated by these criticisms involve
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a number of complex, technical issues, particularly controversies
surrounding the validity of the distinction between theoretical and
observation terms which has underpinned the standard or "orthodox" view
of theories as well as debates over the difficulties regarding the
8fttestability or falsiflability of theories.
In regard to political inquiry or the social sciences in general,
certain advocates of the interpretive model have argued that the study
of politics or society requires a different type of explanation which
neither leads to nor depends upon the development of the kinds of
89theories of politics envisioned by the positivists. In contrast,
while most political scientists admit that we cannot, at least at
present, claim to have discovered any theories of politics in the sense
of the "high-level" model of theory sketched above, we can continue to
utilize a "lower-level" notion of theory as a collection of empirical
generalizations which functions to organize and systematize knowledge
90
in a particular field, such as the study of voting behavior.
Moreover, according to this pragmatic approach to the problem of
theory, political researchers can utilize models and various other
heuristic devices, which, while not genuine theories of politics, can
be used to guide research and generate hypotheses that can be tested.
Accordingly, we can point to a number of different "theories" in the
sense of conceptual frameworks, paradigms or approaches to the study of
political phenomena, (psychological theory, game theory and decision-
making theory, role theory, group theory, communications theory, the
power approach and systems analysis) which have promise as explanatory
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or potentially explanatory devices.^ Of course, basic problems con-
cerning theory development, the construction of operational defini-
tions, the relationship between theoretical and observational concepts,
and the testing and evaluation of rival conceptual frameworks remain.
This brief summary of the controversies surrounding the question
of the role of theory in political inquiry suggests a second general
criterion for judging the significance of Hampshire's work for the po-
litical scientist. As we saw in the case of the controversy over
explanation of human action, he does raise and examine a number of
different issues, in particular the notion of "the given" which under-
pinned past attempts to provide scientific theories with a bedrock of
certainty, that are relevant to questions concerning the role of theory
in science. But his treatment of these issues not only includes no
specific discussion of the theoretical difficulties confronted in the
social sciences, but also seems unclear, unorganized and written in the
language of outdated philosophical discussions of such issues rather
than in the terminology which prevails in contemporary philosophy of
science or empirical political theory. Again, Hampshire's analysis
seems to have little to offer, either in relation to the fundamental,
general-level debate concerning whether a genuine theory of politics is
essential or possible, or in relation to more specific problems con-
cerning the testability of theories or the assessment of competing
theories
.
I have been considering a possible line of criticism of
Hampshire's work offered from the perspective of mainstream political
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science: namely, that although some of his theses bear indirectly on
issues which are of some concern to political inquiry, his work fails
to make any kind of precise, lasting contribution to attempts to deal
with the most significant and troublesome problems we now face in the
discipline. The controverises concerning the explanation of human
action and the related questions regarding the role and structure of
theory in political inquiry are rather obvious examples of these more
crucial concerns. However, I believe that this line of criticism is
mistaken and that Hampshire's analysis, v/hich covers a broad range of
philosophical and conceptual problems, offers important insights
concerning the nature of political inquiry and political theory.
In particular, his work makes a valuable contribution to on-going
efforts to clarify and resolve the complex problems concerning the
methodological sameness or distinctiveness of the social sciences and
the physical sciences. One of his principal claims, which is implicit
in such works as Thought and Action and is stated expressly in his
essay "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," is that any
explanation or theory or political behavior, because it must account
for human thought and action, faces a set of difficulties which are
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fundamentally different from those in the physical sciences. At the
very least, his views provide a valuable corrective to the continuing
tendency within contemporary political science to assimilate, auto-
matically and uncritically, explanation and theory in political inquiry
to models from the physical sciences. In addition, his analysis
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identifies and examines the central issue separating the positivist and
interpretive models of political inquiry.
Hampshire's argument that theory and explanation in political
inquiry, or more broadly, in the social or human sciences, are essen-
tially different from the models of theory and explanation appropriate
to the physical sciences rests upon a general point and a more specific
point. The general point is simply that Hampshire, like the tradi-
tional political theorists, recognizes and addresses the crucial con-
nections between certain theories of knowledge and mind on the one hand
and a particular theory of politics on the other.
In his view, the explanations and theories generated in political
inquiry are more accurately characterized as conceptual frameworks
rather than deductive systems. They must be characterized in this way
not because they represent a pre- theoretical
,
preliminary stage in a
process which culminates in a genuine theory of politics but rather
because they necessarily rest on a number of philosophical and essen-
tially contestable positions. More specifically, the explanatory
frameworks and theories utilized in political inquiry are distinct from
those in the physical sciences in that they presuppose a conception of
mind or a model of human nature: a set of fundamental, provisional as-
sumptions concerning human motivation and behavior, human knowledge and
self-knowledge, the nature of society and social relationships, and
human rationality.
This general point about political and social theory and the
explanatory frameworks used in the social sciences is ultimately
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grounded upon Hampshire's thesis concering the distinctiveness of
mental and physical concepts. As we have seen, Hampshire holds that
there is an element of prescriptive and speculative choice inherent in
our selection and definiton of the mental concepts used to describe and
explain human motivation and behavior. However, most of the commentary
on his work has focused on the implications of this for the fact-value
dichotomy and ignored its more general implications for political
inquiry. One of the few social scientists to recognize the broader
significance of Hampshire's thesis is W. G. Runciman, who in Social
Science and Political Theory
,
acknowledges:
What this means, in the context of these present essays,
is that a political sociology— that is, an explanation
or set of explanations of political behavior—must
depend even for its vocabulary on some kind of philos-
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ophical position.
Although such philosophical positions underpinning explanation and
theory in the social sciences vary widely in the extent to which their
component parts are expressly articulated or even acknowledged, they
necessarily include some basic assumptions about the nature of reality,
knowledge and mind,
Runciman correctly links this general point concerning the metho-
dological distinctiveness of the social and physical sciences with the
frequently stated but seldom understood "fact that the social sciences
deal with actions and not events." Moreover, he, again correctly,
notes that this fact imposes real limits on the "validity of positivist
methods" in the social and behavioral sciences. But Runciman fails to
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examine in sufficient detail exactly what Hampshire means when he
claims that explanations of human activities (unlike explanations of
events) and political and social theories (unlike theories in the phy-
sical sciences) pre-suppose a philosophical, provisional view of mind
or human nature. In short, Runciman fails to identify and discuss the
more specific point which Hampshire makes about these differences as
they relate to the difference between mental and physical concepts.
In addition, this claim that the explanatory frameworks used in
the social sciences presuppose a philosophical conception of mind or
human nature is highly susceptible to misinterpretation. In the first
place, Hampshire is not arguing that any such model is immune, or
should be treated as if it were immune, to modification or correction
on the basis of future discoveries emerging from empirical research.
He also certainly does not take any existing model of mind or human
nature, including any model which is implicit in our ordinary discourse
about thought and action, as providing definite limits on the possible
future developments in the study of human motivation and behavior.
Finally, he does not hold that there is a model of human nature which
establishes clear limits on what the future holds in political inquiry
or sociology, precluding for example, the possibility of the discovery
of fundamental social determinants of human behavior or social change
which are not now recognized or understood.
In contrast, Hampshire maintains that the kind of a priQri anthro-
pologies, with their static and limited views of human nature and
social forms of life, which dominated traditional political philosophy
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will be displaced as the human and social sciences advance. However,
as he notes, advances in psychology, sociology and other disciplines
have not, up to this point, yielded a "powerful theory, empirically
tested, and confirmed and to a high degree exact. "^^ Also, he points
out that the very possibility of the development of an empirical theory
of human nature or political behavior, which fundamentally alters our
everyday classifications and explanations of human thought and action,
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IS a matter of dispute.
Hampshire's central thesis is that no matter how this debate turns
out, no matter what the future holds for the social and human sciences,
there remains an essential and ineliminable difference which will
always set explanation and theory in the social sciences apart from
explanation and theory in the physical sciences. In short, this basic
difference is that there is a special kind of interplay between theory
and fact which is unique to the social sciences. The argument is not
only that the scheme of classification and categorization attached to
any political theory or explanatory framework incorporates contestable
assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, but also that a political
theory, and the theories of knowledge and mind embedded within it, "are
part of the consciousness, and of the self-conscious attitudes, which
they also interpret," In other words, the theories which are used to
explain political attitudes, political behavior and the political
process modify political attitudes, political behavior and the politi-
cal process when they become part of the consciousness of political
agents
.
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The paradigm for understanding this interplay between theory and
fact is provided by Hampshire's account of the relationship between our
emotions, desires, attitudes and other mental states on the one hand
and the theories which we use to classify and explain these states on
the other. One of the most important insights offered by Hampshire's
account of mind is that human emotions, desires and so on change as our
understanding of the classification and causes of these various states
of mind change. In short, the acceptance of a modification in the
prevailing theory or explanatory framework used to characterize and
Qft
explain human emotions alters the emotions themselves. This basic
difference between such mental concepts and our physical concepts is
crucial to understanding the fundamental difference between the ex-
planation of human action, including political action, and the
explanation of animal behavior or physical events.
The social scientist must confront this same reflexive relation-
ship in the theories used to classify and explain social action and
social structure, and this is the source of a whole set of difficulties
which are peculiar to the social sciences. Clearly, this position in
no way implies the idealist view that simply changing people's beliefs
about power relationships or institutional structures automatically
changes the distribution of power or the institutional arrangements.
In addition, Hampshire expressly acknowledges that social scientists
must continue to look for the causes of social change in basic economic
and social relationships, institutional arrangements and historical
QQ
conditions rather than in beliefs or mental states. This analysis of
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social explanation and theory calls not for a radical shift in what
social scientists study, but rather for change in the approach to the
study of social phenomena, particularly in the prevailing lack of
awareness or self-consciousness of this relationship between these phe-
nomena and the theories by which they are explained.
The reevaluation of the role of political and social theory which
Hampshire demands begins, not with a radical restructuring of the scope
and aims of such theory, but rather with an emphasis on exactly those
functions of theory which are still stressed in contemporary social
science. Accordingly, the major general function of political or
social theory is to provide a coherent and accurate world view or image
of social reality. At the very least, this entails analysis of the
existing social structure, including its component parts and how they
are related to one another. Also, the theory attempts to account for
the basic mechanisms or causes of social change, placing the contem-
porary social order in some kind of historical and comparative con-
. , 100
text.
However, according to Hampshire, the basic explanatory function of
political and social theory, or the activity of political and social
analysis, cannot be considered completely separate and divorced from
practical life and everyday politics. Every political agent is a poli-
tical or social theorist in the sense that he requires some conceptual
scheme, no matter how crude or mistaken, for classifying and explaining
what is happening in the world around him and why. This political
theory, which he uses to characterize his own political situation and
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his political attitudes and actions, is in part constitutive of his po-
litical situation, attitudes and activities. Thus, his theoretical
understanding of the basic divisions in society, of his own position in
relation to these divisions, and of his own political interests and
purposes of others provides the basis of his group identifications,
loyalties and basic political attitudes. In other words, his self-
consciousness of those interests and attitudes, including his knowledge
of their sociological causes, is part of the process through which
these interests and attitudes are formed. ""^^
To the extent that political actors accept a new political theory,
using it to characterize their own political situation and political
activities, and using its explanatory power to understand what is
happening within and to themselves as well as what is happening in the
world around them, their political situation and potential range of po-
litical activities is changed as well. A rather abstract but still
powerful example of exactly this kind of change can be drawn from the
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first chapter of C. Wright Mill's The Sociological Imagination .
It starts with the picture of a group of people who, accepting the
classifications and explanations inherent in a prevailing political
theory, perceive themselves as isolated individuals whose basic politi-
cal interests and purposes are in conflict with those of all others be-
cause of a war of all against all for scarce resources. Given this
individualistic perspective, each person interprets the fundamental
difficulties and problems which he confronts in daily life as personal
troubles, essentially unrelated to the personal troubles of others or
H23
to more general social conditions. Moreover, since these troubles are
viewed as the consequences of individual decisions, actions and omis-
sions, the individual must take full responsibility for them, and any
possible resolution of his personal troubles must be achieved through
individual effort.
These individuals are now exposed to a rival political theory
which, incorporating what Mills calls "the sociological imagination,"
provides a more sophisticated analysis of the social structure, its
component parts, the process of change, and how an individual is
affected by all this. As a particular individual begins to apply the
classifications and explanations offered by this alternative theory, he
becomes aware of other individuals in social situations which are
similar to his own, and begins to realize that the troubles which he
experiences in his personal life are commonly experienced by others in
similar social circumstances. In other words, as he comes to a deeper
understanding of the causal mechanism that links the problems which he
confronts in daily life to basic structural and institutional arrange-
ments, he comes to see these problems as not simply the consequences of
individual failings. Given his new understanding of the political and
social system, it is clear not only that individuals cannot be held
fully responsible for the problems which pervade their daily lives, but
also that any real solution to these problems must somehow alter the
basic social and structural causes of these difficulties.
In short, the same problems which were previously viewed as per-
sonal troubles are now seen as a social issue. The individual, on the
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basis of the more sophisticated social theory which is now available to
him, recognizes that he is a member of a group with common interests
and purposes in eliminating or alleviating shared problems, and begins
to identify with this group and its common goals. Hampshire's analysis
emphasizes a particular feature of this transition: that theoretical
self-consciousness or awareness of common interests and purposes in
dealing with this social issue is part of the process through which
political attitudes are changed and new interests and purposes are
formed
.
Both Hampshire and Mills suggest that further examination of this
special kind of interplay between theory and fact is an essential task
103facing contemporary American social science. Hampshire, in partic-
ular, contends that neglect of this interplay between theory and fact
has been a central deficiency common to both liberal political theory
and positivist social science. As we saw in the second chapter, the
early empiricist accounts of knowledge and mind lacked an adequate
conception of self-knowledge and consciousness, thereby precluding
recognition of the central role of self-consciousness or reflexivity in
human action. As a result, liberal political theory largely ignored
the central function of consciousness of common interests and purposes
or of a particular historical role in social groups and classes.
Hampshire, of course, also maintains that this remains a central
deficiency in contemporary social science. In short, Wrong's vision of
a dialectical union of the conceptions of "sociological man" and "psy-
chological man" has not been achieved because American social science
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continues to rely on a methodological approach which incorporates
fundamental empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind,
thereby neglecting or distorting the role of self-consciousness and
reflexivity in human action and social life. Thus, his principal
charge in relation to political inquiry is that the dominant model of a
science of politics, founded on empiricist conceptions of knowledge and
mind as these were reformulated by the positivists, ignores the crucial
reflexive relationship between fact and theory.
Most political scientists would reject this charge as being fun-
damentally confused and completely unfounded. After all, Hampshire's
point that human beings sometimes modify their political behavior as a
result of gaining new knowledge of or an alternative theory of politi-
cal processes and social structures is hardly innovative. It has long
been recognized that political theories can and do become ideologies,
and that, as ideologies, they are significant factors affecting politi-
cal behavior and social change.
On the micropolitical level, it is clear that the acceptance of
certain beliefs about the political structure or political change may
result in the formation or alteration of particular attitudes, inter-
ests, or other states of consciousness which, in turn, affect an indi-
vidual's political behavior. Likewise, on the macropolitical level,
political scientists have long acknowledged that ideologies, when
widely shared, are part of the complex causal mechanism which accounts
for social change. In short, most social scientists consider this
feature of human behavior to be a rather minor difficulty which can be
426
safely ignored in most cases or which can be controlled for when ne-
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cessary
.
Yet, Hampshire's contention is that, although political scientists
acknowledge political beliefs, theories, attitudes and states of con-
sciousness as separate parts of the causal chain explaining political
behavior or political change, they ignore the "more intimate reflexive
relation, in which the theory is part of the state of consciousness
v/hich it interprets. ..." Because positivist social science rests
on an epistemology which shares the same fundamental flaws inherent in
the theory of knowledge of the Enlightenment, modern political scien-
tists like the Enlightenment thinkers neglect:
. . . questions about reflexiveness , the complicated
loop that intelligibly connects the theory of the
changes in one's own society with oneself, together with
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a group or class, as the agent of change.
In short, reflexivity is a crucial feature of political behavior and
political life, and the same models of theory and explanation which
have been used quite successfully in the physical sciences cannot
adequately account for this feature of human activity.
There is a basic disagreement here between Hampshire and those who
accept the basic tenets of the positivist model of a social science
concerning the importance of this reflexive relation and of the prob-
lems it presents to the social scientist. Defenders of the positivist
conception challenge the theses that this notion of reflexivity repre-
sents a problem which is unique to the social sciences and that it
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reveals any real deficiencies in prevailing models of theory and ex-
planation.
Ernest Nagel provides a systematic and comprehensive statement of
this position under the heading "Knowledge of Social Phenomena as a
Social Variable" in his The Structure of Sciencp J^^ Nagel holds that
what Hampshire calls the reflexive relation actually presents two
different problems to the social scientist: one concerning the actual
study or investigation of social phenomena and another concerning the
validity of the conclusions reached in the study of social phenomena.
The first difficulty can be clearly illustrated by considering
survey research concerning voting behavior, attitudes toward minority
groups and so on. The problem, briefly stated, is even if we are
satisfied that all the established guidelines for survey research are
followed (including research design, construction of the questionaire
,
interviewing techniques, and so on) and that the data have not been
distorted through improper methods or procedures, it is still possible
that the respondent's knowledge that he is being interviewed, or more
generally, that he is the object of a study, radically affects the
responses he gives. In other words, it remains problematic whether the
social scientist has produced changes in the subject matter through his
investigation of the subject matter.
While Nagel acknowledges the seriousness of this problem, he
argues that it is neither unique to the social sciences nor insurmoun-
table. He notes that when a physical scientist immerses a thermometer
into a liquid to measure its temperature, this procedure introduces
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some change in the temperature of the liquid. Moreover, physical
scientists have become much more aware of the extent of this general
problem of producing change in the subject matter through the
investigation process in connection with the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle in quantum mechanics,
Nagel's argument is that the only real difference between the
physical and the social sciences is found in the specific mechanism
through which such changes are introduced. In the social sciences,
this mechanism is simply more complex, involving a subject's knowledge
that he is the subject of a scientific investigation. But this dif-
ference in the mechanism of change does not have any bearing on the
nature of the problem presented by such changes. In either case, the
investigator must search for independent evidence concerning the extent
of change introduced by certain investigative procedures. In the
social sciences, this search requires the use of techniques insuring
that subjects remain unaware that they are being studied or making it
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impossible for them to know the precise objectives of the study.
The second part of Nagel's treatment of problems raised by the
reflexive relation focuses on arguments challenging the validity of the
conclusions reached in a social science which adopts the same methods
used in the physical sciences. On this topic, Nagel, like those social
scientists who accept the positivist model, focuses on the so-called
problem of the "self-fulfilling prediction" and its counterpart, the
problem of the "suicidal prediction." The perceived difficulty here is
that the subjects' awareness of a prediction about their behavior may
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serve to validate or invalidate the prediction itself. More generally,
the problem as typically stated is that people, again in light of their
knowledge of the results of certain research concerning human behavior,
may alter the basic patterns of behavior which provided the data upon
which the original research conclusions were reached.
As before, Nagel argues that this factor merely complicates the
attempt to discover valid generalizations about human behavior and
social phenomena and that it does not, as critics of the positivist
model maintain, rule out the possibility of discovering general laws or
genuine law-like generalizations concerning human behavior and social
phenomena. He presents three different counterarguments against this
interpretation of the factor of reflexivity in human knowledge and
action.
First, since laws or law-like generalizations are conditional in
form, a generalization based on the investigation of certain patterns
of behavior or social processes is not shown to be invalid if one of
the conditions stated or. assumed in the law, namely the subjects' lack
of knowledge of these behavior patterns or social processes, is
changed. Secondly, although it may prove to be impossible to predict
precisely the exact effects of new knowledge on specific behaviors or
social processes, there are no a priori grounds for excluding the
possibility of discovering genuine law-like generalizations regarding
the acquisition of such knowledge and its general effects on human be-
havior and social processes.
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Finally, even though it is always possible that action based on
knowledge of behavior patterns or social processes can result in the
modification of these patterns or processes, this possibility can be
legitimately ignored in most cases of interest to the social scientist
because "such action does not generally transform radically the over-
all pattern of habitual social behavior." In other words, Hamp-
shire's position overemphasizes the role of deliberate and reflective
choice in human action and neglects other significant determinants of
human behavior and of the outcomes of social action which are operative
in any actual social setting, including unintended consequences as well
as the basic confines of habit, custom, social structure and institu-
tional arrangements.
Nagel's position has been set out in detail because it illustrates
the superficiality of the treatment of the interplay between theory and
fact and of the connection between thought and action in even the most
extensive analyses of these issues by defenders of the positivist
model. As we have seen, the whole question of reflexivity is reduced
to the relatively minor "difficulties" that a subject's awareness of
his being an object of a scientific study might affect the responses or
behaviors which are being investigated or that awareness of a predic-
tion about human behavior may serve to validate or invalidate the
prediction itself.
Nagel argues that to make the notion of reflexivity into a central
point about human behavior and social philosophy is to fall into the
trap of adopting an over- rationalized conception of human nature, human
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action and social processes. To push the reflexivity thesis beyond the
problems he identifies is to return to a philosophical rationalism
which treats human behavior and social action as solely determined by
reflective deliberation and conscious choice. Such an account, he
notes, is certainly at odds with what v/e have discovered about human
motivation and behavior, particularly the manner in which habit, insti-
tutional and social roles, and other such factors establish boundaries
1 12
on what individuals think and do.
However, this line of criticism as well as the other arguments
Nagel presents fail to confront Hampshire's main thesis concerning how
the reflexive relation challenges basic assumptions underpinning the
positivist conception of explanation and theory in political inquiry.
Certainly, with regard to questions concerning the concept of indivi-
dual freedom, Hampshire emphasizes that the philosopher or social
scientist must recognize the potential roles of self-knowledge and
reflection in extending an individual's range of thought and action.
But this analysis of reflective thought on the individual level does
not fully capture the interplay between theory and fact which Hampshire
identifies. This point becomes clear if one carefully examines his
account of reflection in moral reasoning.
Hampshire maintains that practical reasoning concerning moral
issues is much like the process involved in perceptual identification
and illustrates "a very general feature of human activity and func-
tioning."^ This general feature is that while an agent's attention
is concentrated on at most a few features of his situation or activity,
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he brings to any task or activity a vast store of background knowledge
which has been acquired through imitation, language and learning in
1 14general. In short, a typical social actor confronts the social
world with a body of background knowledge consisting of an extensive
set of concepts, beliefs, categories, internalized rules and conven-
tions. For the most part, he is not even conscious of, let alone
reflective about, this store of knowledge. He does not even identify
and separate the various steps or stages involved in a particular
activity or mental process (although these may have been clearly dis-
tinct during the learning process) except in rare cases of "difficulty
1 15
and breakdown."
This point is important to social inquiry because it is this body
of background knowledge which is used to identify and classify the
situations which a social actor confronts as well as the various
actions which he and the others are performing or can perform. In
other words, a social actor does not confront a social world of "brute
facts" in which social situations or processes are already broken up
into "a definite and final set of elements" or in which the flow of
human action is already divided up into patterns of basic actions or
observable behaviors.
In addition, the background knowledge which each agent draws upon
to classify and identify the features of social reality cannot be
thought of either as simply corresponding to given and independent
features of this reality or as attempting to characterize this reality
from a purely descriptive point of view. This background knowledge is
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itself a product of the reflexive character of theory and fact in the
sense that the situations, actions and so on which make up our social
world have been identified and classified according to the interests
and purposes of social beings engaged in common practices and sharing a
particular form of life.
It is this "deeper level" of the reflexive relation between theory
and fact which Nagel in particular and positivist social science in
general fail to confront. In order to understand fully this reflexive
relation, we must consider not only the conscious, reflective processes
of individuals but also the general importance of reflexivity in human
1 17life and activity. If we are to understand the political behavior
of social actors, we must come to terms with their shared reflexive
characterization of the world, or more specifically, with the reflexive
relation between the concepts and meanings which identify and classify
social reality on the one hand and social reality itself on the other.
Certainly, this alternative view of the nature of the social
reality which the political scientist investigates poses more funda-
mental challenges to the dominant accounts of the proper study of human
action and social processes and of the role of theory in social inquiry
than Nagel acknowledges in his discussion of the notion of reflexivity.
Hampshire stands in fundamental agreement with other advocates of
the so-called interpretive model of social inquiry in holding that
human actions are fundamentally different from the phenomena studied by
the physical scientist because they are constituted, at least in part,
by the concepts, ideas, beliefs and thoughts of the agents themselves.
This account of human action and social inquiry maintains that human
action is distinct from animal behavior or physical events in that it
is intentional, conventional and meaningful.
Thus, whereas the physical scientist studies events which can be
supposed to exist independently of the concepts we used to describe and
explain these events, the relationship between the kinds of sophisti-
cated actions which are of interest to the social scientist and the
concepts which are used to characterize and explain these actions is
more complex. For example, Peter Winch contrasts the relationship
between the concepts of command and obedience and acts of command
obedience on the one hand with the relationship between the concepts of
thunder and lightning and claps of thunder and flashes of lightning on
the other. With regard to the latter, it makes sense to think of the
phenomena of thunder and lightning as existing prior to and
independently of the concepts used to describe the phenomena.
But it does not make sense to suppose that:
. . . human beings might have been issuing commands and
obeying them before they came to form the concept of
command and obedience. For their performance of such
acts is itself the chief manifestation of their pos-
session of those concepts. An act of obedience con-
tains, as an essential element, a recognition of what
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went before as an order.
To characterize particular acts as acts of command or obedience
presupposes that the human agents whose behavior we are describing or
explaining share the concepts, conventions or meanings which constitute
these activities.
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Although it makes sense to talk about a distinction between physi-
cal reality and the concepts which are used, in a particular society or
a certain era, to describe and explain this reality, this kind of
distinction is much more problematic in social inquiry. There can be
no such clear distinction between social reality and the concepts which
are used to characterize that reality because the concepts used in
social life and human activities are essential constituent parts of
1 1
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that social reality. The concepts which people in a particular
society use in communicating and interacting with one another, or which
they use in thinking and talking about themselves, their activities and
their social life, are essential parts of what they, their activities
and their social life actually are.
The approach to social inquiry which follows from such a perspec-
tive clearly focuses on the fundamental concepts or "constitutive
meanings" which support, unify and embody any particular society or
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form of life. Moreover, as Hampshire's account of mind emphasizes,
such an approach must treat concepts of language not just as a des-
criptive tool used by passsive observers of the world but rather as a
medium of human activity and social practices. The concepts or concep-
tual schemes which are used to characterize human activities and social
life are not only essential components of these activities and form of
life, but also are grounded in (in the sense that their point or pur-
pose is determined by) these activities, practices or form of life.
This is, of course, a central aspect of the reflexive relation
between theory and fact. Changes in the activities and practices
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characteristic of a particular society will be reflected by and indeed
require modification of the concepts through which these activities and
practices are carried on. In addition, successful change in the con-
cepts or conceptual scheme, including prevailing theories of human
nature or politics, through which we characterize and conduct various
forms of social activity modifies the very nature of that activity.
This analysis of the reflexive dimension of political behavior and
social life does not simply identify a set of technical difficulties
which must be confronted in survey research of the type Nagel
discusses. Rather, it poses a fundamental challenge to the assumptions
supporting such an approach to the study of political thought and be-
havior. As we saw earlier, the survey research approach presupposes
that beliefs and attitudes are essentially private mental phenomena
which can be treated as brute data about individuals and which are
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contingently related to individual political behavior.
If Hampshire's analysis of the interplay between theory and fact
if correct, these presuppositions and this approach to investigating
beliefs and attitudes are suspect when we are considering the most
fundamental beliefs, attitudes and other mental states which unify a
form of life. Accordingly, the central deficiency of a positivist
social science with its empiricist conception of knowledge, as repre-
sented by the survey research approach, is its inability to deal with
the fundamental concepts or constitutive meanings which support and
unify a particular society.
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This is not to deny that individuals may hold certain beliefs and
attitudes (regarding the redistribution of income, confidence in exist-
ing political leadership, and so on) which are properly treated as
1 22in(jivi(jugl beliefs and attitudes. These beliefs and attitudes are
certainly significant for political inquiry because they do influence
political behavior. Moreover, with regard to these individual beliefs
and attitudes, it is appropriate to talk about whether or not there is
a "consensus" or general agreement among separate individuals concern-
ing their ideas or thinking on a particular topic. It would seem then
that survey research can adequately deal with this type of "subjective"
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meanings and values.
However, the challenge to the survey research approach, which is
implicit in Hampshire's analysis of reflexivity and which has been
forcefully pressed by Charles Taylor, is that the prevailing treatment
of "consensus" as always and essentially a convergence of individual
beliefs and attitudes is mistaken. Their point is that we can talk
about the presence or absence of a "consensus" of these individual
beliefs and attitudes only in the context of that vast store of back-
ground knowledge, consisting of common concepts, beliefs, categories,
internalized rules, conventions or norms, which is shared by every
competent political actor in a particular society. In Taylor's ter-
minology, the very possibility of agreement or disagreement concerning
individual beliefs and attitudes is itself dependent upon the common
possession of a complex set of "intersubjective meanings," or a "common
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language of social and political reality in which these beliefs are
expressed .
"
These intersubjective meanings, unlike the subjective meamings and
values discussed above, cannot be adequately studied or understood if
the social researcher is searching for a convergence of various indivi-
dual ideas, attitudes, and beliefs. Intersubjective meanings are
different from individual beliefs and attitudes in that they cannot be
treated as brute data or basic facts about individuals or individual
states of consciousness. The basic or constitutive meanings cannot be
the property of a single individual any more than the concepts, lan-
guage or background knowledge which embodies them can belong to a
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single individual. They are both grounded in and constitutive of
social practices and forms of life— shared forms of social interaction
and interpersonal relationships which cannot be coherently characteri-
zed as simply a composite of essentially individual attitudes and be-
haviors. In sum, these intersubjective meanings, which are central to
any adequate analysis of "consensus," cannot be captured by surveys of
people's avowed beliefs and attitudes and "fall through the net of
•
.
•
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mainstream social science."
In addition, Hampshire's analysis challenges the standard
counter- argument which has been made against this thesis: even if it
was granted that the above account of social reality is essentially
correct and, therefore, the political scientist must examine those
intersubjective meanings which underlie and constitute the political
practices and political relationships of a particular society, the most
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crucial features of the positivist account of a science of politics
remain intact. The argument, in short, is that although the study of
human action and social processes may require an interpretation on the
part of the investigator, surely this interpretation must be verified
1 27
according to public, objective standards. The study of social phe-
nomena and human actions may involve specific techniques which differ
from those used in the physical sciences, but the end-product or con-
clusions of this process must still be assessed and evaluated according
to the same procedures and standards used in any scientific enterprise.
Essentially the same argument can be pressed by granting that the
investigation of a particular society or political system involves some
kind of interpretation of shared concepts or meanings, but insisting
that the essential task of political inquiry is to offer generaliza-
tions or theories whose application is not limited to a single politi-
cal system or one set of political practices and relationships. Again,
the point is that these generalizations or theories must be tested and
assessed, and the positivist conception of a social science identifies
these standards of evaluation and assessment.
Such a counter-argument is based, of course, upon the standard
distinction between the generation and evaluation of theories or be-
tween the context of discovery and the context of justification in the
scientific enterprise. The general claim is that it is the process
of critical appraisal and assessment according to public standards, no1
the process of discovery or theory generation, which constitutes the
essential core of the scientific method. ^ Since the criteria which
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govern the appraisal of theories or hypotheses are not a product of how
these are generated, the interpretive challenge leaves untouched the
most crucial components of the positivist account of explanation and
theory in the social sciences. Perhaps social inquiry must utilize
certain interpretive procedures in discovering generalizations and
theories about human behavior and social phenomena, but these generali-
zations and theories must still be appraised in exactly the same way we
appraise theories in the physical sciences.
Hampshire's analysis of the interplay between theory and fact
undercuts this notion that the same standards of evaluation and as-
sessment which apply in the physical sciences are also appropriate in
political inquiry. As we have seen, he emphasizes the reflexive re-
lation between political theory and political reality, particularly in
the sense that a political theory which has become part of the con-
sciousness of political actors is "a partial determinanat of what they
1 30
intend to achieve and of what they actually achieve." Certainly,
this does not mean that we must abandon all attempts to assess a par-
ticular theory on the basis of its adequacy in providing an accurate
and complete account of the political behavior and political phenomena
which it is supposed to explain. In other words, it does make some
sense to talk about whether or not a given theory actually "corres-
ponds" to political reality.
But, of course, the central thrust of Hampshire's thesis concern-
ing the nature of social reality is to deny that we can talk about the
absence or presence of such a "correspondence" between social theory
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and social reality in the same way as in the physical sciences. As he
argues, the physical scientist can properly use the term "correspon-
dence" in the sense of "the ordinary truth relation" between two com-
131pletely independent terms. The example he cites is the relation
between the statement "The snow is white" and the white snow. Here,
unlike the relations between theory and fact in social inquiry, therr
is clearly no causal relationship between people's beliefs or attitudes
concerning reality and the nature of that reality itself. Merely
changing the description or characterization of the reality, or al-
tering the way that people think about this reality by introducing new
concepts or altering the concepts used to describe it, cannot change or
modify the external reality.
However, since the shared concepts, intersubjective meanings, and
common ways of thinking about social reality are essential features of
the social reality which both participants and social scientists must
try to understand, these same conditions do not hold in social inquiry.
The so-called problem of self-fulfilling prophecies is not a minor
difficulty which social scientists must occasionally face, but rather a
fundamental , more general problem concerning the assessment and
evaluation of theories which play an essential role in their own veri-
fication or falsification. Hampshire concludes:
A political theory has to be assessed in a more complex
way than a theory in the physical sciences; for it
becomes itself part of the social conditions which it
132
simultaneously diagnoses and predicts. . . .
HM2
Hampshire makes no attempt to offer a definitive account of how we
are to evaluate and assess theories in the social sciences. But his
analysis suggests that we can make little progress toward achieving an
adequate and coherent account of the assessment of theories in social
inquiry until we carefully examine the empiricist philosophical assump-
tions underpinning the dominant conception of a science of politics or
society. In particular, political scientists must recognize that part
of the reality which they seek to describe and explain is constituted
by the conceptual scheme through which the agents in that society
classify and characterize themselves, their behavior and their social
lives
.
The widespread acceptance of a new social or political theory
provides these agents with a new form of self-understanding or self-
consciousness, opening up (or closing off) possibilities of new forms
of activity, and thereby changing the very patterns of thought and be-
havio'- which the theory was designed to explain. This means, at a
minimum, that the role of theory in political science in particular and
the social and behavioral sciences in general is very different from
the role of theory in the natural sciences. It also directly chal-
lenges any notion of the social theorist or social scientist as a
neutral observer of an external reality and raises questions concerning
the role of the social scientist and social theorist. Hampshire's
analysis suggests that these questions cannot be answered in isolation
from the fundamental issues concerning the relationship between know-
ledge and freedom.
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CHAPTER VI
AN "INTERPRETIVE" MODEL OF POLITICAL INQUIRY
Knowledge and Politics
In the preceeding chapter, I argued that Hampshire's critique of
the positivist conception of a social science, focusing on its empiri-
cist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, places him within the
camp of the proponents of the so-called interpretive model of social
inquiry. This is particularly evident in his analysis of the reflexive
relation between theory and fact, or knowledge and action, and in his
discussion of the implications of this relation for political theory.
The treatment of the notion of reflexivity, the relation between theory
and fact , or the connections between knowledge and action constitutes a
crucial dividing line between positivist and interpretive accounts of
. , . . 1
social inquiry.
Hov/ever, this does not mean that Hampshire is to be considered
either a "representative" or a "full-fledged" member of the group of
social theorists who champion the interpretive model of social inquiry.
In th3 first place, Hampshire presents no detailed examples of the
kinds of actual explanatory and theoretical frameworks which are to be
used in the explanation of human behavior and social phenomena. More-
over, he offers no systematic account of the logic of the social scien-
tific method which presumably must replace the positivist conception of
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the methods appropriate to social inquiry. What he does present is a
powerful critique of empiricist assumptions which provides a foundation
for reexamining and revising present notions of the scientific methods
and standards to be used in the study of human actions and social phe-
nomena. While his work certainly recommends a reexamination of the
present trends and hidden assumptions of contemporary social science,
no cl3ar and definitive picture of either the results of such an ana-
lysis or of the likely future of the human and social sciences is
offered.
In addition, there is simply no single, unified "school" of inter-
pretative social inquiry to which Hampshire or anyone else can belong.
The label of "interpretive social inquiry" is used to group a number of
diverse social theorists whose common opposition to positivist social
science is grounded in completely different philosophical traditions:
Winch's and Pitkin's attempts to apply the philosophical techniques of
Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy to problems in political
theory and social inquiry; Schutz's phenomenological sociology and
Garfinkel's ethnomethodology , which are grounded in phenomenological
philosophy; and the work of Habermas , Apel and others in the Frankfurt
school of social philosophy. certainly, the work of all these theo-
rists places a common emphasis on human activity, intersubjectivity and
reflexivity as central aspects of social phenomena which require an in-
terpretive understanding. Moreover, it may also be true that these
different theorists have focused on essentially the sajne problems and
3
are moving toward some general synthesis of their various approaches.
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But there remain a number of serious methodological and philosophical
divisions which separate these proponents of an interpretive model of
social inquiry. In short, at the present, there is no definite inter-
pretive approach to social inquiry which is underpinned by a common
philosophical perspective.
Finally, and most importantly, the notion of an interpretive
understanding of human behavior and social phenomena, particularly that
variant of it which has emerged from linguistic philosophy, has not
been accurately characterized or adequately analyzed in recent dis-
cussions of the philosophical and methodological issues concerning
social inquiry. As might be expected, philosophers and social scient-
ists who accept the basic tenets of the positivist model of a social
science have not given arguments for the necessity of an interpretive
understanding of the subject a sympathetic hearing. The interpretive
approach to social inquiry is treated as a misguided return to the
notion of verstehen in the study of social action, which ultimately
relies on subjective and impressionistic techniques rather than empi-
rical methods. Moreover, even those who claim to be sympathetic to at
least some of the of the claims or aims of this call for an interpre-
tive understanding of social phenomena, frequently fail to present an
5
accurate or complete account of this approach.
In short, this chapter will focus on examining Hampshire's sug-
gestions concerning the establishment of an alternative philosophical
base for political inquiry and completing the sketch of his analysis o
the special difficulties faced by the social scientist which was begun
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in the preceeding chapter. My major concern is not to attempt to
sketch a comprehensive model of an interpretive approach to social
inquiry, but rather to analyze Hampshire's contributions to the cur-
rent, preliminary discussions regarding the principal features of such
a model. Thus, the topic of possible affinities between Hampshire's
views and those of other advocates of the interpretive aproach will not
be addressed, although Hampshire's critique of the philosophical foun-
dations of Marxist social theory will be briefly considered. Moreover,
because so much of the contemporary discussion of an interpretive
understanding of social- phenomena has been marked by oversimplifica-
tion, confusion and stereotyping, the bulk of this chapter will focus
on assessment of the standard criticisms of the interpretive model as
they apply to Hampshire's position.
As we saw in the last chapter, a crucial weakness of the dominant
approach to the investigation of social phenomena is that it rests upon
a philosophical framework which neglects the special role of self-
knowledge and self-reflection in human conduct and the reflexive re-
lation between theory and fact in social life. In other words, the
proper starting point for the construction of an adequate model of
social inquiry is the articulation of a "critical theory of knowledge"
which acknowledges these basic features of human action and human
life.*^ At a minimum, such a critical theory of knowledge must, unlike
the empiricist epistemological tradition inherited from Locke and Mill,
7
include an adequate conception of the role of self-consciousness.
457
Hampshire acknowledges that a promising and fruitful place to
begin this search for a critical theory of knowledge is the "Hegel-
QMarxist doctrine of self-consciousness." Although Marx himself was
not really concerned with epistemological issues, implicit in the
Hegelian conceptual framework, which was taken over, refined and ap-
plied to the analysis of social phenomena by Marx, is a powerful chal-
lenge to the major components of the spectatorial theory of knowledge
Q
and the dualistic account of mind set out by the empiricists. In the
first place, Marxist theory stresses the connections between conscious-
ness and human activity (this is of course, a crucial dimension of the
concept of praxis ) portraying people's perceptions, beliefs, and ways
of thinking about themselves and their world as being linked to and
conditioned by their practical activity in the world, especially their
economic activity. Moreover, Marx views human agents as self-conscious
beings who can become aware of the nature of their own activities and
modes of thought, including the external forces which have determined
this thought and activity in the past, thereby opening up new possi-
bilities of thought and action.
In sharp contrast to the liberal conception of human nature,
Marx's account acknowledges that human nature changes through history,
or more specifically, that established patterns of motivation and be-
havior can be altered with changes in consciousness. The Marxist
theory of human nature is developmental, portraying human agents as
beings who become fully human in and through history, particularly witb
the achievement of greater self-conscious control over the environment
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and over society. Moreover, Marx, again in sharp contrast to the
liberal view, conceives of society not as an external, independent
reality which confronts human beings as a given set of fixed laws and
forces, but rather as a product of human activity and consciousness.
In short, both human nature and society are themselves social produc-
tions, not in the sense that human beings always have full control over
what they or their social lives actually are, but in the sense that
consciousness and activity, whether reflectively directed or not, are
fundamental components of human nature and society.
The implications of this implicit theory of knowledge, with its
emphasis on self-consciousness, for political theory seem clear. In
particular, any application of the concept of self-consciousness to the
study of historical or contemporary individual actions or social pro-
cesses imposes a distinction between an observer's and a participant's
accounts of what an individual or group was actually trying to do and
of their actual role in bringing about the end result. The historian
or social scientist must now confront those cases in which his own more
powerful explanatory framework or social theory can provide a more
comprehensive account of the actual role of either an individual agent
or a social group in the social process than the participant's more
limited understanding of his situation or activities will allow.
Marxist theory attempts to provide an explanatory framework with which
we can identify and correct illusionary and distorted forms of con-
sciousness where real human needs and purposes are masked by false
needs and purposes. In short, the reflexive relation between theory
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and fact and the problems concerning self-knowledge and consciousness
ignored in the liberal political tradition and positivist social sci-
ence are brought to center stage.
It is this emphasis on the problems of self-knowledge and the
interplay between theory and fact that leads Hampshire to focus on the
Marxist doctrine of consciousness rather than empiricist epistemology
as the proper starting point for an analysis of those problems in the
theory of knowledge which are directly linked to social inquiry. Yet,
despite its usefulness in identifying problems and issues ignored in
liberal political theory and positivist social science, Marxist theory
fails to provide an adea.uate philosophical framework for dealing with
these problems and issues. Hampshire, in his essay, "Unity of Civil
and Political Society: Reply to Leszek Kolakowski," identifies three
closely-related, problematic features of Marxist theory, all of which
are the direct inheritance of Hegelian idealism.^''
First, Marxism is an "all-embracing philosophy" which, like
Hegel's philosophical system, attempts to embrace the totality of human
experience, including all the basic purposes, interests and goals of
human beings as well as the entire subject matter of the human and
social sciences. Of course, Marx explicitly rejects the abstractness
and spiritualism of Hegelian idealism, attempting to remake his phi-
losophical speculations into a scientific examination of human action
and social phenomena in their historical and material settings. More-
over, in Marx's later work on the dynamics of the capitalist economic
system, he seems to move toward empirical analysis and away from this
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type of all-embracing philosophy. Yet, despite his general focus on
social phenomena and social change or his more detailed work on spe-
cific historical periods, Marx's overall aim remains that of providing
1
P
a comprehensive and complete theory of human nature.
Secondly, Marxism remains, again like Hegel's philosophy, "a
doctrine of the total salvation and redemption of man" or "a doctrine
of the ultimate redemption of alienated mankind." Marxist theory
aims at resolving all the essential problems facing human beings which
have their origins in social forces, relationships, or structures.
Certainly, Marx's vision of salvation is fundamentally different from
that of religious thinkers in that it is to be achieved through po-
litical means and within the course of human history. Yet, his con-
ception of the future, communist society and the fully human, communist
individual is no less a radical vision: alienation and the division of
labor are eliminated, people work for self-realization rather than
material rewards, all class conflict and political conflict disappear,
and the state itself vanishes. In short, Marx's theory envisions and
calls for the final and total liberation of all human beings.
Finally, and most significantly, Marx's analyses of human behav-
ior, social processses and historical change rest upon a "quasi-
historical metaphysics" rather than a coherent theory of knowledge (and
mind) . The problem here is not simply that Marx fails to set out in
detail an adequate critical theory of knowledge, but that he does not
even provide a base for launching the search for such a theory. Ac-
cording to Hampshire, "Marx's theory of men and of the social order did
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not start from any theory of knowledge, explicitly worked out and
14defended. ..." Hampshire views this as a fundamental deficiency in
Marx's theory and a principal source of fundamental conceptual,
theoretical, and methodological problems that have plagued socialist
analysis and theory to the present.
In the first place, although Marx is in a real sense the founder
of what we now call "the sociology of knowledge," his theory makes no
allowance for the possible limits of the knowledge of human nature and
social phenomena which might infect his own theoretical framework.
Moreover, Marxist theory ignores the possibility that there are in-
herent barriers to our potential knowledge of human beings and social
processes, which even our future investigations of human behavior and
15
social phenomena will not break down. By ignoring the possible
limits of our understanding of ourselves and our social world, Marxism
neglects temporary or permanent limits on what can be achieved or
accomplished through social and political activity, including socialist
politics
.
Thus, even though Marxist theory stresses the reflexivity of the-
ory and fact in relation to understanding past historical periods and
as an aspect of the process of social change and revolutionary
activity, the Marxist theory of human nature and of the social struc-
ture remains fixed and unalterable in fundamental ways. For example,
Marx's social theory diagnoses social problems and prescribes solutions
as if we already possessed comprehensive knowledge of the basic causes
of historical change and economic activity. His analysis of capitalism
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and his sketch of the future communist society presuppose that we al-
ready fully understand the principal social causes of alienation,
exploitation, oppression and dehumanization. ''^
In addition, Marx's theory of human nature, though developmental,
remains tied to a teleological conception of universal human progress
toward a goal of complete human liberation which is apprehended only by
the Marxist. Marxist theory allows no room for "diverse and disputable
philosophies of mind," holding that our knowledge of the basic deter-
minants of human motivation and behavior, of the universal interests,
needs and purposes shared by all human beings, and of the fundamental
1
7
goals and ends of human life is complete. It is on the basis of this
comprehensive model of human nature that the Marxist claims to be able
to differentiate between true and false human needs and interests, to
show how the development of true needs and interests is blocked in
capitalist society, and to knowr. how the fully human personality can be
realized in the communist society of the future.
In short, because the philosophical premises underpinning Marx's
own work exclude a critical theory of knowledge, Marx treats his theo-
ries of human nature and social structure as final and complete,
ignoring the possibility of future progress in the human and social
sciences in any other direction than that plotted by his own
theoretical framework. This tendency in Marx's own work has had per-
vasive and lasting negative effects throughout subsequent socialist
analysis and doctrine. Acoording to Hampshire, these inadequacies in
the philosophical foundations of Marxist theory are not unrelated to
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continuing confusion and ambiguity regarding the socialist conception
of social planning and the vision of social life in a socialist or
communist society.
First, the notion that Marxist theory provides the social planner,
the policy-maker, or the bureaucrat with a comprehensive theory of
society and human nature automatically minimizes the difficulties and
possible dangers inherent in social planning and the policy-making
process. Marx's philosophical framework suggests that a planner or
decision-maker has available the kind of comprehensive understanding of
social processes and human beings which makes possible fully rational,
comprehensive social planning. However, since the state of knowledge
in the social sciences has remained, to the present, fragmentary and
uncertain, the planner or policy-maker, no matter what his theoretical
or ideological perspective, is typically faced with the task of making
decisions in the absence of all the information or even sufficient
information to make a rational choice between recognized alternatives.
Thus, Marxist theory distorts our picure of the planning or policy
process by minimizing the problem of the unintended consequences which
result when our theoretical understanding of social process or human
behavior is deficient or incomplete.
In addition to neglecting the more visible practical difficulties
confronted in social planning, Marxist theory, with its supposed
comprehensive understanding of man and society, is fundamentally flawed
in its basic conceptions of the social sciences and their relationship
to social planning. Lacking a critical theory of knowledge, Marx fails
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to draw, or even provide a basis upon which one could draw, a clear
distinction between the physical and the social sciences Marxist
theory acknowledges the central role of self-consciousness in human
history and social action, but it also exhibits pervasive positivist
elements, particularly when it professes to possess exactly the same
kind of predictive and explanatory power as the physical sciences J
^
These positivist elements in Marxism not only lead to the same kind of
methodological difficulties already discussed, but also generate rather
terrifying conceptions of social science and its uses in social
planning.
The Marxist philosophical framework suggests a view of the social
scientist or planner as someone who, using his scientific knowledge of
the social world, operates on social processes, institutions and cus-
toms in the same way that the physical scientist, using his scientific
knowledge, manipulates events and processes in the physical world. In
other words, just as a doctor diagnoses and treats individual illness,
the social theorist and planner diagnose and treat social illness,
which includes all institutional arrangements, systems of belief and
thought , and habits and customs which are identified as obstacles to
the full realization of human happiness and human freedom. In this
way, Marxist episteraology and social theory support exactly the kind of
a social engineering conception of politics which the many critics of
. .
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Marxism find so horrifying.
Of course, Marx holds that the end or goal of socialist planning
and policy is the liberation of mankind. This final liberation of all
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human beings is to be accomplished through the construction of a class-
less society in which all deep-seated political conflict has been
eliminated and in which all social members are unified by a common
purpose and a common vision of the new social order. Yet, Hampshire
contends that such a conception of liberation, with its emphasis on
such notions as freedom, autonomy, and spontaneity, requires at a
minimum, some "diversity and independence of forms of life,
. .
."
The problem is that this diversity and independence in human thought,
activity and life, which are fundamental requisites of as well as the
justification of liberation, are not compatible with the kind of
"comprehensive and shared vision of a desirable social order ..."
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which is to be the unifying force of communist society. Either the
common purposes or shared vision must be less comprehensive and com-
plete than Marxist theory requires, or such purposes and vision must
necessarily be limited to fewer than all of the members of the new
society. In short, the Marxist end of liberation and the related goals
of individual autonomy, community and so on, are incomplete and incon-
sistent because of the absence of an adequate theory of knowledge and
mind to support them.
Hampshire does not argue that the kind of totalitarian politics
associated with Stalin inevitably and necessarily follow from Marx's
philosophical premises. He does suggest that there are basic tensions
within Marxist theory, particularly between the moral ideals of Marx
and the socialist tradition on the one hand and Marx's positivist
tendencies and the social engineering conception of politics on the
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other. Moreover, Hampshire's analysis locates the roots of these
tensions in the philosophical underpinnings of Marx's social theory,
especially his implicit theory of knowledge. Reexamination of Marxist
philosophical assumptions concerning knowledge, thought and action and
the attempt to set out a more coherent and more adequate conception of
knowledge, mind and action are placed at the top of the agenda for
modern socialist analysis.
Hampshire's analysis suggest that neither the positivist model of
a science of politics based upon empiricist epistemology nor Marxist
social theory grounded in a metaphysical philosophy of history can
provide an adquate conception of political inquiry. Both the Marxist
and positivist positions, suffering from what Alasdair Maclntyre has
called "epistemological self-righteousness," fail to face up to the
problems and limitations inherent in our understanding of human ac-
23
tivity and social phenomena. Only a critical theory of knowledge
offers the kind of philosophical foundation that fully confronts the
complexities which must be allowed for in explanation and theory in the
social and psychological sciences. It is the task of a critical theory
of knowledge to identify and examine the present limits in our know-
ledge of human beings and society, to explore the reasons for our
failure to generate comprehensive theories and explanations in social
inquiry, to analyze the possibilities of discovering genuine law-like
generalizations despite the unique problems linked to human activity
and self-consciousness, and to develop strategies for dealing with the
24
epistemological limitations of the social and human sciences.
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Hampshire does not present a systematic list of the guidelines
which such a critical theory of knowledge, even as it stands in its
preliminary stages, provides for the political scientist. Yet, his
analysis of the complex relationship between thought and action iden-
tifies basic difficulties that will infect any discipline which offers
explanations of human action. More specifically, his analysis suggests
that political inquiry, despite its utilization of a vast array of
scientific methods and procedures, remains fundamentally interpretive
in nature, relying on essentially the same kind of interpretive under-
standing of human behavior and social phenomena which is sought by
ordinary political agents. In other words, the principal problems of
possible distortion, ambiguity, incoherence and incompleteness which
the political scientist confronts in attempting to explain political
behavior and political phenomena are basically the same problems which
each political actor faces in his attempts to understand and deal with
the world around him. Thus, if Hampshire's analysis of thought and
action is correct, a possible starting place for developing an inter-
pretive approach to political inquiry based on a critical theory of
knowledge is systematic examination of the methods, problems and limits
involved in an ordinary agent's attempts to understand the actions of
25
others as well as basic social institutions and relationships.
Hampshire's most comprehensive statement of his position concern-
ing these difficulties confronting each social agent and the techniques
which can be used in dealing with them is provided in Thought 9hd
Action . His discussion here focuses on these problems and techniques
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as they impact upon the practical reasoning and activity of moral
agents and upon moral theory in general. Yet, the same basic points
can be usefully applied in comparing the difficulties and limitations
attached to a political agent's interpretive understanding of his
political world with those which are confronted by the political scien-
tist in his analysis of political phenomena. A brief summary of these
points brings together the various themes which have been set out in
the preceeding two chapters and illustrates the rough outline of an
interpretive model of political inquiry which emerges from Hampshire's
treatment of thought and action.
In the first place, Hampshire's analysis focuses on the serious
difficulties confronting a social agent as he identifies, classifies,
and describes the various features of his social environment. In his
attempt to understand and function within a particular social setting,
an agent must necessarily utilize some system of classification and
description which distinguishes various types of social situations and
circumstances, different social roles and positions, various modes of
thought and social action, and so on. This essential task of iden-
tifying and distinguishing features of the social world, which is
imposed upon the agent in his daily activities, is certainly not
problem- free.
One common problem that faces an individual actor when he clas-
sifies and describes political phenomena is that this ability to
identify and characterize the significant features of his political
environment is typically limited by particular immediate interests and
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concerns as well as his ovm powers of observation and discrimination.
In other words, political agents typically provide only a limited de-
scription of what is happening to them or what they are doing at a par-
ticular point in time because they concentrate on a few relevant fac-
tors selected on the basis of their practical interests and individual
powers. As we have seen, each agent unreflectively relies on basic
habits of classification or the background knowledge which is embodied
within a particular vocabulary and from of life. Of course, agents can
and do, particularly when confronted with new and unusual situations or
under the pressure of criticism and questioning, direct more attention
to the shared rules and principles of classification which they stan-
dardly use but seldom examine.
However, even if an agent was able to overcome completely the
limitations imposed by his practical concerns and individual attri-
butes, he still confronts a second, more fundamental difficulty. The
system of identification and classification provided by his vocabulary,
which is the necessary starting point when an individual attempts to
distinguish and characterize various features of his political life and
surroundings, is never comprehensive, complete and final. One of the
principal claims in Thought and Action concerns:
. . . the contrast between the unlimited multiplicity of
things and activities, and of features of things and
activities, and our limited power to identify and
27
distinguish them in a language.
In short, the first crucial problem confronted by the reflective
political agent is the ever-present possibility that the fundamental
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system of classification, through which he views the world of politics
and which he has inherited and internalized, omits significant aspects
of political behavior or other political phenomena. This is a funda-
mental limitation on his characterization and understanding of politics
imposed by what Hampshire calls the inexhaustability of description.
No particular political situation, action, institution or process can
ever be completely and definitively characterized by an agent. There
is always the possibility of redescribing the phenomenon in such a way
that essential features of the situation, activity, institution or
process which were previously ignored or not recognized are now re-
vealed .
Similar difficulties are encountered in the identification, clas-
sification and characterization of political phenomena by the political
scientist. Of course, the political scientist has available a number
of techniques for dealing with the potential distortions or inadequa-
cies in his classifications and characterizations of political pheno-
mena which result from practical, personal interests or limited powers
of observation. Political science like other forms of scientific
inquiry, detaches the scientific observer from personal interests and
concerns, attempts to specify and systematize the principles and con-
ventions governing the identification and classification of phenomena,
emphasizes detailed and comprehensive techniques of observation, and so
on
,
Yet, the political scientist like the political agent must also
confront those limitations in his ability to classify and characterize
471
which are the result of his vocabulary or conceptual scheme rather than
individual interests or attributes. Political inquiry has certainly
developed more systematic and comprehensive classifications and charac-
terizations of political phenomena than those which are available to
the typical actor. However, the same contrast between the unlimited
variety of political phenomena and the conceptual limitations inherent
in our power to identify and distinguish these phenomena applies to the
epistemological situation of the political scientist as well as to that
of the average political actor.
The political scientist is no different- from the political agent
in that his observations, classifications and characterizations of
political phenomena are structured by an elaborate conceptual frame-
work. Certainly, the conceptual frameworks used in political inquiry
are not identical to the ordinary vocabulary of political agents (the
question of the relationship between these two frameworks will be taken
up next) . But the political scientist is in the same position as the
political actor in that he cannot claim that his system of classifi-
cation or conceptual framework is final and complete either because it
simply names corresponding elements in a given and independent reality
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or because it is presuppositionless. Both the political scientist
and the political actor must recognize that there are alternative,
often competing classificatory systems and vocabularies, and that the
possiblity of reclassifying or recharacterizing a particular political
situation, institution, or activity is always open. In short, in
political inquiry as in practical politics, there is no such thing as a
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definitive system of classification or conceptual framework to be used
in the analysis of political phenomena.
In addition to these problems concerning classification and des-
cription in general, there is an additional set of difficulties and
limitations which are unique to the classification and explanation of
human action. As we have seen, Hampshire maintains that to charac-
terize a particular human action is not to describe a set of observable
movements or behaviors. Human actions are constituted in part by the
intentions, beliefs and concepts held, or the meanings attached to the
activity in question, by the agents themselves. This presents any
observer (whether a political scientist concerned with explaining this
individual's behavior or another political agent concerned with the
practical problems of interacting with this individual) who is trying
to understand another person's actions with a number of serious diffi-
culties. As before, Hampshire's work suggests that the most fruitful
place to begin an examination of these difficulties, the limitations
they impose, and possible strategies for dealing with them is consi-
deration of the situation of the typical actor.
Because he is immersed in a political environment which requires
some minimum of cooperation and also presents the constant possibility
of serious conflict, every political agent must make some attempt to
classify and understand the actions of other agents. Of course, one of
the primary methods he uses to accomplish this is simply to observe the
behavior of others. In many cases, the classification and interpreta-
tion of observed behavior is unproblematic because so much human
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activity is rule-governed and routinized, clearly fitting certain
institutional or social roles or established patterns of custom,
manners and convention. Moreover, a political agent can frequently
characterize a given kind of behavior as falling under a certain
action-heading, even though he does not have direct access to the
thoughts of others, on the basis of analogy, rules of inference, and
31his own experience.
At the same time, there are serious problems and real limitations
inherent in an agent's efforts to classify and interpret the behavior
of others. First, any particular behavior, such as raising one's arm,
can express a variety of different intentions, thoughts and meanings,
so that the actual nature of the action (such as voting, signaling, or
surrendering) cannot be determined solely on the basis of observing
external movements. Also, as we have seen, any particular action is
open to an indefinite number of different characterizations. More
importantly, since human agents do classify and characterize their own
behavior, it is not always clear which of a set of alternative des-
criptions of an action, if any, enter into the agent's own intentions,
decisions or thought processes. As a consequence of these and other
such difficulties, an agent's ability to classify and interpret another
person's political activity is necessarily limited and subject to
error.
In short , a relective agent who is faced with the task of inter-
preting the actions of others (as well as his own), recognizes that the
"nature and quality" of a particular act, whether his own or someone
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else's, "may not lie simply on the face of it, to be read off from a
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single description," He, as an observer of another person's acti-
vity, may be able to provide a description which could be accepted as a
neutral, true description of the activity and which captures, in some
sense, the purposive and intentional nature of the action. However,
it is still possible that such a description is misleading and incom-
plete because it fails to grasp:
. . . the inner intention of the other, where the 'inner
intention' is represented by the preferred description
that the agent himself would give of what he was trying
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to do.
In those cases where an agent's own classificatory system and descrip-
tions enter into his thoughts and decisions about his activity, or
where the agent's intentions are mediated by his classification and de-
scription of his own activity, an observer can easily misinterpret his
action by imposing a different classification and description on it.
As the earlier discussion of the distinction between individual,
subjective meanings and common, intersubjective meanings suggests, an
observer's interpretation of an agent's political activities can go
wrong on two different levels. First, an observer can mischaracterize
or misinterpret another person's political behavior because he does not
fully understand the individual political beliefs, interests, attitudes
and values which enter into and are expressed in that agent's acti-
vities. By projecting his own individual beliefs, interests, etc., on
another agent, the observer can misconstrue, sometimes radically, the
point or purpose of that agent's behavior.
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This is, of course, the most common practical problem that a
political agent confronts in his efforts to classify and interpret the
actions of others with whom he interacts on a daily basis. Thus, there
are certain inherent limitations in his ability to understand the
actions of other agents who share the same basic concepts, language,
and intersubjective meanings. In addition, a political actor confronts
a deeper set of problems when he attempts to identify and interpret the
political actions of a foreigner who thinks and acts within an alien
set of concepts and intersubjective meanings.
In this latter type of case, the agent-observer may systematically
miscategorize another person' s activities by imposing the clas-
sificatory system of one vocabulary and set of social practices upon
conduct which reflects a different classificatory system, language and
form of life. The analogies and rules of inference drawn from personal
experience, which serve a political agent well when he interprets
political behavior within a shared vocabulary and common social prac-
tices and relationships, may prove to be systematically misleading as
guides to comprehending action grounded in an alternative set of inter-
subjective meanings. In this kind of case, the interpretive powers of
political agents are so limited that Hampshire states, "The skeptical
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doubt reasonably occurs at the meeting of cultures."
As in the case of the more general problems concerning classifi-
cation and description, Hampshire's analysis suggests that examination
of the rather obvious problems and limitations inherent in the clas-
sification and characterization of human action by ordinary social
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agents is directly relevant to assessing the political scientist's task
of classifying and explaining political behavior. The political scien-
tist, like the political actor, is concerned with human actions, which
are partially constituted by intentions, beliefs, thoughts and mean-
ings, and not simply with observable behaviors or physical movements.
While there are no a prj,orj. reasons why the political scientist should
not use classifications and characterizations of actions that the
actors themselves have not or cannot provide, these classifications and
explanations are not immune to the same potential sources of error and
distortion found in the accounts offered by ordinary political agents.
For example, a political scientist's classification and charac-
terization of political behavior may be misleading because it ignores
or misunderstands individual beliefs, attitudes and intentions or the
subjective meanings of these activities for the individual actors
involved. More significantly, since the political scientist seeks
cross-cultural generalizations about political behavior and genuine
theories and explanations of political phenomena, he is engaged in the
systematic examination of human action in different historical periods
and various societies. In short, the political scientist attempts to
observe, classify and explain political activities and institutions in
which the participants themselves classify and characterize their own
activities and institutions within a set of intersubjective meanings
not shared by the observer. The difficulties involved in such an
enterprise have been long recognized; as Hampshire states.
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These are the familiar difficulties of an historian in
finding a narrative that does not misrepresent the
conduct of men whose behavior, naively and externally
viewed, is familiar and whose thought is unfamiliar .-^^
What is not widely acknowledged or understood, at least within the
empiricist tradition, is that the social scientist and historian are
necessarily involved in the same interpretive task, though typically at
a deeper level, which is confronted by the ordinary social agent when
he tries to make sense of the behavior of others around him. Both the
social scientist and the historian must recognize that the prevailing
modes and limits of social action in a particular society or historical
period are established by the concepts or intersubjective meanings
available to agents to classify and describe their own thought and
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action. Thus, the political scientist like the historian must con-
front the potential sources of error in his limited capacity to clas-
sify and explain human action in alien social and historical settings
in the same way that the reflective moral agent confronts this diffi-
culty. Hampshire, describing one of the steps taken by the reflective
moral agent, states:
Reading history, I learn that to ascribe certain in-
tentions, now familiar, to men living in earlier cen-
turies would be to put words into their mouths and minds
38
which could not possibly have occurred there.
Similarly, the political scientist must learn that to impose a fixed
classificatory and explanatory framework on political activities,
institutions and processes which are embedded in different forms of
life and intersubjective meanings is to invite systematic distortion
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and misunderstanding of alternative modes of political behavior and
political life.
If Hampshire's analysis of thought and action is correct, the
political scientist, again like the ordinary political agent, can
prevent such distortion and misrepresentation only by immersing himself
in the alternative framework of intersub j ective meanings and social
practices. The task of classifying and explaining political behavior
and political practices in a given social setting cannot be divorced
from an interpretive understanding of the basic conceptual scheme and
form of life which constitute that social setting.
Finally, Hampshire's analysis expressly rejects the claim that the
political scientist's superior powers to theorize, generalize or pre-
dict have freed him from difficulties. He suggests that while the
theories, generalizations and predictions offered by the political
scientist are clearly more sophisticated, systematic and comprehensive
than those relied upon by ordinary political agents, they remain sub-
ject to essentially the same problems and limitations. Although his
analysis does not rule out completely the possibility of eventually
developing genuine law-like generalizations and theories concerning
political behavior and structures, he maintains that this possible if
unlikely development is dependent upon identifying and dealing with the
complex problems inherent in making generalizations or predictions
about human behavior. Whatever the future outcome of such efforts, the
political scientist now confronts the same episteraological limitations
faced by the reflective social agent and must proceed by utilizing the
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same strategies which reflective agents use in countering these limi-
tations
.
As we saw in the fourth chapter of this essay, Hampshire contends
that every social agent must have a policy which provides some con-
tinuity to his different activities and which integrates them into his
life. Certainly, this policy is not a theory either in the sense that
it constitutes a comprehensive set of moral, political and practical
norms which can be used to direct an agent's entire life and activity
or in the sense that it is as systematic and formalized as the type of
theory which is the goal of political inquiry. However, this policy
does constitute a theory in the sense that it necessarily provides a
basis for making some predictions and generalizations about the behav-
ior of others. Without this kind of theoretical understanding of the
general patterns of human motivation and behavior and the general
patterns of behavioral response to certain kinds of situations and
interactions, a social agent simply cannot adequately perform the
practical tasks of planning for the future, making decisions and
choices, acting appropriately and effectively as circumstances change,
and so on
,
There are, of course, serious limitations on a social agent's
ability to predict, make accurate generalizations, or develop adequate
theories about the behavior of others. Many of these limitations flow
from his lack of empirical knowledge of human beings or the world
around him or from his lack of knowledge of what other agents intend or
plan to do. But one of the most crucial difficulties he faces in
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making predictions or generalizations about human behavior follows not
simply from the lack of such knowledge but rather from the fact that
reflexivity is a central component of human behavior.
Any competent social agent understands that those patterns of be-
havior or predictable responses which he has identified and now relies
on can and will change if the beliefs and thinking of other agents,
including their beliefs and thoughts about him and his activity and in-
39tentions, change. Thus, an agent may keep certain of his intentions
or activities secret because he realizes that the responses of others
will be different if they understand the true nature of his intentions
or actions. In fact, secrecy, lying and other such common features of
human activity, which increase the problems of predictability and gen-
eralization, are themselves practical strategies for dealing with the
factor of reflexivity in human life.
In addition to these problems in predicting other individual's be-
havior, the reflective moral agent, as he is portrayed by Hampshire,
must also recognize the limits of his understanding of himself and
others which are imposed by the interplay of theory and fact at its
deeper levels. He understands that his own classification of the moral
and political dimensions of human life as well as his theoretical
understanding of himself, his society, and how he is linked to his
society are the products of a particular time and place. Thus, a re-
flective agent must acknowledge that the theoretical framework that
generates the predictions and generalizations which he and others now
rely on may well be overthrown as basic beliefs or thinking about human
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behaviors and social phenomena are modified. Moreover, he recognizes
that many such changes in the basic conceptual framework used to cate-
gorize and classify thought and action are themselves unpredictable and
surprising because they cannot be conceptualized or imagined in the
present framework. In particular, Hampshire's analysis of these deeper
limitations upon our ability to make predictions and generalizations
about social action emphasizes the creative power of the arts which,
through the invention of new forms of expression, are a fundamental
component of the reflexive dynamic which remakes human beings and
society.
In short, the most crucial difficulties which the political scien-
tist confronts when he attempts to make generalizations and predictions
about political behavior, like the problems which he faces when he
attempts to classify and characterize political behavior and political
phenomena, are essentially the same difficulties inherent in the situ-
ation of the ordinary political agent. The political scientist cannot
escape the epistemological limitations imposed by the nature of human
activity and human life and, like the reflective moral agent, is pre-
sented with the basic alternative of ignoring these limitations and
proceeding as if he were studying something completely different from
human conduct and social life or confronting these limitations head-on
and developing a set of strategies for dealing with them. Hampshire
holds that the latter alternative is by far the superior path if we are
to place political inquiry on an adequate philosophical grounding.
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Moreover, he suggests the proper strategy for dealing with these epis-
temological problems and limits, whether in political inquiry or in
practical political activity, is provided by the model of the reflec-
tive moral agent.
The common goal of the political scientist and the reflective
moral agent is to develop self-consciousness of these limitations and
their effects upon our understanding of political behavior, processes
and institutions. In the first place, the political scientist like the
reflective agent must acknowledge that his own classification and char-
acterization of political phenomena is the product of a particular
vocabulary or conceptual scheme. He attempts to set out in detail the
various components of this conceptual framework, particularly those
assumptions and presuppositions which are contestable or open to chal-
lenge. The primary method which is available to either the political
scientist or the reflective agent to accomplish this difficult task is
the systematic investigation of alternative classificatory systems or
frameworks for political analysis. Based upon this investigation of
alternative systems of classification, he tries to identify the most
significant differences which separate these competing conceptual
frameworks and to develop criteria which can be used in evaluating and
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assessing alternative conceptual schemes.
In the social and human sciences, as well as in moral theory, this
analysis and evaluation of competing classificatory systems and con-
ceptual frameworks necessarily focuses on the concept of action itself,
or the relation between thought and action in general and the relation
463
42between intention and action in particular. It is at this point that
the political scientist, like the reflective agent, must come to terms
with the other major concerns of a critical theory of knowledge: the
difficulties concerning the characterization and explanation of human
action and the reflexive interplay between theory and fact. Hampshire
makes no further effort to complete this conception of an interpretive
political inquiry which requires a self-conscious examination of one's
own theoretical perspective. However, his analysis does suggest that
the political scientist, again like the reflective agent, cannot di-
vorce the empirical investigation of political phenomena from funda-
mental philosophical questions, such as those concerning human
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rationality and freedom.
Criticism of the Interpretive Model
Certainly, the kind of broad-scale reevaluation and reformulation
of the philosophical and methodological orientation of contemporary
political science which Hampshire advocates remains in its preliminary
stages, and there is still much work to be done. At the same time, his
analysis does offer some promising, if not adequately developed, pro-
posals for clarifying and perhaps resolving the long-standing debates
about the nature, methods and scope of political inquiry. However, his
work, along with that of the other social theorists who are classified
as adherents of the interpretive approach, has been largely ignored in
mainstream political theory and political science. This is so not only
because he challenges some of the most central features of the
dominant
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positivist model but also because the interpretive approach itself has
been widely mischaracterized and misrepresented. The interpretive
approach to political inquiry which follows from Hampshire's analysis
of thought and action becomes more clear through consideration of the
criticisms and objections which are standardly raised against any such
model of social inquiry.
In the first place, philosophers and social scientists who accept
the positivist model of a social science challenge the legitimacy of
the interpretive approach by identifying all the various accounts of an
interpretive understanding of social phenomena with the most primitive
verstehen accounts of explanation. For example, Richard Rudner argues
that any social scientist who attempts an interpretive understanding of
social action necessarily commits what he calls the "reproductive
fallacy," the fallacy of assigning to social science the task of some-
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how reproducing "the conditions or states of affairs being studied."
Similarly, Ernest Nagel characterizes this "subjectivist" approach as
one which mistakenly requires the social scientist "to project himself
by sympathetic imagination into the phenomena he is attempting to
he
understand." In short, the dominant positivist response to the in-
terpretive model continues to portray this approach as an attempt to
use sympathetic imagination or empathy to "get inside" the subject's
mind or to relive the subject's experiences.
Such criticism clearly has merit when one is assessing early
statements of the verstehen position, such as R. G. Collingwood' s IJi£
Idea of History which advances the notion that "... the historian
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must re-enact the past in his own mind." However, the positivist
contention that contemporary accounts of the notion of interpretive
understanding, while not as simplistic as Collingwood' s position, still
commit the same reproductive fallacy is fundamentally mistaken.
Rudner, for example, acknowledges that Winch's presentation of an
interpretive approach rests upon the claim that social phenomena are
rule-governed and that the social scientist, if he is to understand
these phenomena, must "learn the rules." Rudner offers the following
objection:
But coming to learn the rules, in turn, entails knowing
the phenomena from the "inside," i.e., having the ex-
47perience of behaving in conformance with those rules.
In other words, the analysis of interpretive understanding which
emerges from linguistic philosophy, like the more primitive conception
of verstehen
^
retains the reproductive fallacy by treating social
scientific understanding as the recreation of the psychological ex-
periences of those being studied.
This critique of the notion of interpretive understanding as
always and essentially an effort to "get inside" the subject's mind or
to recreate the subject's private experiences presupposes that Winch,
Hampshire and other modern proponents of the interpretive model share
the same dualistic account of mind and body which underpinned the
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classical view of verstehen . Yet, as we have seen, one of the prin-
cipal themes of Hampshire's analysis of thought and action in particu-
lar and of recent linguistic philosophy of mind in general is that such
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a dualistic account is mistaken. Hampshire contends that we cannot
treat intentions, beliefs, desires and other "mental states" as private
mental events which cause observable behaviors but remain hidden behind
these behaviors. According to his view, actions cannot even be iden-
tified independently of beliefs, intentions and so on, and the pre-
vailing dualistic account of the relation between thought and action
must be abandoned. In short, Hampshire's philosophy of mind and the
interpretive approach to political inquiry which it supports are found-
ed on systematic rejection of the same dualistic framework for clas-
sifying and characterizing actions that Rudner and other positivists
implicitly attribute to all advocates of an interpretive understanding
of social action.
In addition, Rudner and other defenders of the positivist con-
ception of a social science are clearly distorting Winch's and
Hampshire' s views when they characterize interpretive understanding as
some kind of psychological experience, Hampshire, for example, cer-
tainly does not argue that a social scientist's, or an ordinary social
agent's understanding of another individual's intentions or his inter-
pretation of social activities and practices rests upon a psychological
process giving him access to the subject's "inner" states. The focus
of the notion of interpretive understanding is not upon the subjective
experiences of individuals but rather upon those intersubjective mean-
ings which are shared by members of a particular society or form of
life. To "understand" a system of such meanings is not to capture or
reproduce the psychological experience of what it is like to live and
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act within a particular set of concepts, social practices and relation-
ships, but rather to grasp the public rules, conventions and norms
which assign the point or purpose of various actions and which inte-
grate different practices and relationships into a single form of
life. ^9
While this misleading characterization of any interpretive model
of political inquiry as a regression to a primitive verstehen approach
remains dominant among mainstream political scientists, there are also
more powerful objections raised against this model. These more
forceful criticisms of the notion of an interpretive understanding of
political behavior and social life have been typically advanced by phi-
losophers and social theorists who believe that some revision of the
positivist conception of a science of politics or society is necessary.
Such theorists as J. Donald Moon, Brian Fay and Anthony Giddens ac-
knowledge deficiencies in the positivist model and recognize that the
interpretive approach cannot be dismissed simply on the mistaken
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objection that it commits the reproductive fallacy. At the same
time, they present several other objections to the notion of an inter-
pretive understanding of social life as a legitimate approach to poli-
tical inquiry.
The criticisms of the interpretive model advanced by Moon, Fay and
Giddens must be examined carefully because they are based on a more
sophisticated and more accurate analysis of this approach than the
shallow caricature of the notion of interpretive understanding which
remains pervasive in the mainstream of positivist social science.
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However, even their characterizations and criticisms of this alter-
native model of social inquiry drastically distort the account of an
interpretive analysis of politics and society which is grounded in
post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy. One of the major causes of
this distortion is a failure to distinguish between criticism of the
most radical presentations of this approach, such as Peter Winch's, and
criticism of those features of the interpretive model which necessarily
follow from its philosophical and methodological foundation. The
necessity of such a distinction becomes clear when three of the major
themes of their critique of the interpretive model are examined in
light of Hampshire's analysis of knowledge and politics.
One of the central objections raised by these critics is that the
interpretive approach to political inquiry, like the analysis of
thought and action upon which it is based, focuses exclusively on the
role of intentional human action in political and social life. As a
result, the interpretive model automatically excludes all the features
of social life and politics which cannot be explained in terms of
individual intentions. An example of this line of criticism is
provided by Moon's claim that the methodological distinctiveness of the
social and physical sciences cannot be as great as advocates of the in-
terpretive approach claim,
. . . for some of the things that happen in social life
are things no one does , and so we cannot think of them
simply in terms of the categories of intentional ac-
tion.
Moon cites such examples as a stock market crash and the outbreak of
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war to illustrate the social scientist's concern with events which
cannot be viewed as the results of individual or collective intentions.
In short, the argument is that the interpretive model, by mistakenly
construing the task of social inquiry as the classification and ex-
planation of intentional human action, systematically ignores the
problem of unintended and unanticipated consequences.^^
Similarly, Fay holds that one of the major failings of the inter-
pretive model is its neglect of:
. . . the explanation of the pattern of unintended
consequences of actions
,
a feature of social life which,
by definition, cannot be explained by referring to the
intentions of the individuals concerned.
Moreover, he identifies a particular feature of the problem of unin-
tended consequences which is of special interest to the social scient-
ist and which is necessarily ignored if one adopts an interpretive
approach to social inquiry. By focusing exclusively on human inten-
tions and intentional activity, the interpretive approach neglects the
ways in which individual beliefs, roles and actions as well as poli-
tical institutions and practices may serve functions and purposes that
are not even recognized by, and certainly not intended by the indivi-
duals who hold these beliefs or the participants in these practices.
In other words, the interpretive model with its focus on intentional
actions completely ignores the most fundamental insight of the func-
tional analysis of politics and society: namely that the rules, con-
ventions and norms which people follow may perform functions for the
social and political system which are radically different not only from
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the participants' intentions but also from the purposes which they
think these rules, norms and conventions fulfill.
Full understanding of the force of this objection to the inter-
pretive model requires examination of the other criticisms raised by
Fay and the others. In particular, this claim that the interpretive
model's preoccupation with intentional human action excludes consi-
deration of other important dimensions of political behavior and po-
litical life is closely linked to a point which Fay lists as a separate
criticism of the interpretive approach. Fay contends that the inter-
pretive approach:
. . . leaves no room for an examination of the condi-
tions which give rise to the actions, rules and beliefs
which it seeks to explicate, and, more importantly, it
does not provide a means whereby one can study the
relationships between the structural elements of a
social order and the possible forms of behavior and
55beliefs which such elements engender.
In short, the social scientist is concerned not only with the meanings,
beliefs and intentions which are expressed in and are part of social
activity, but also with the various environmental and social factors-
demographic, economic, psychological, political, religious and so
on—which limit the scope and modes of social action and which influ-
ence individual decisions and behaviors. Thus, an interpretive ap-
proach to political inquiry ignores the task of identifying and ana-
lyzing the specific mechanisms through which the social structure
channels the thought and action of members of that society as well as
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the task of investigating the influence of such environmental factors
as technology on social action and the social structure itself .^^
Giddens voices this same objection when he argues that it is a
"characteristic error" of those concerned with philosophy of action to
neglect any kind of structural analysis of the social context within
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which all action takes place. Thus, he criticizes Winch in particu-
lar and the kind of interpretive approach which emerges from post-
Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy in general for treating forms of
social life as given. Although the interpretive approach to social
inquiry correctly requires the social scientist to immerse himself in
the conventions and practices which comprise a form of life, it leaves
the origins and nature of social conventions and practices shrouded in
mystery. Social structure loses its rightful place on the center of
the stage of social inquiry and becomes merely a back drop for the
investigation of intentional actions.
This is clearly one of the most powerful objections to the kind of
interpretive approach to political inquiry which is linked to post-
Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy, and Hampshire's position must be
carefully analyzed and assessed in relation to this line of criticism.
Beginning with Moon' s more specific charge that the interpretive model
necessarily treats all human activity and social life in terms of in-
tentional actions and systematically ignores unintended and unantici-
pated consequences, it is clear that Hampshire does not portray indivi-
dual actions, let alone the outcomes of the actions and interactions of
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several individuals, as always and essentially the result of conscious
planning and fully formed intentions.
As we saw in the fourth chapter of this essay, Hampshire maintains
that the dual force of action as attempt and achievement is inelimin-
able. In other words, the contrast between what an agent intends or
tries to do and the actual outcome or consequences of his action is a
central and constant feature of Hampshire's account of the relationship
between thought and action. Thus, according to this philosophy of
mind, a characterization of an agent's activities solely in terms of
his intentions would account for only one face of his actions, and
would ignore that face of his actions which consists of the actual
consequences of his activity, including those which were unforeseen and
unintended
.
Certainly, Hampshire's account of mind places great emphasis upon
an agent's capacity to form and act upon intentions, and he regards the
concept of action as inextricably bound to the concept of intention.
But this thesis entails neither the claim that we must focus exclu-
sively on intentional action if we want to understand human behavior
and human life nor the claim that the philosopher or social scientist
is concerned only with what people do and never with what happens to
them. In contrast, Hampshire's position is that the concept of inten-
tion is crucial to making this distinction between what people do and
what happens to them and that neglect of the connections between the
notions of intention and action lies at the roots of the prevailing
lack of exactly this distinction in contemporary accounts of social
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behavior and social life. However, this does not mean that the social
and behavioral sciences must focus exclusively on one side of this
distinction and dismiss those things which are properly characterized
as happening to people as unimportant.^^
In addition, whereas it may be true that certain linguistic philo-
sophers and social theorists influenced by linguistic philosophy have
treated rational, intentional and self-conscious action as the paradigm
for classifying and characterizing all social activities, institutions
and processes, Hampshire clearly does not advance or imply such a model
of human activity and social life. His analysis does not presuppose
that agents can achieve full knowledge of the possibilities of action,
become fully rational, and become completely autonomous of their social
and physical environment.^^
What he does suggest is that there is a vast spectrum of human
thought and action confronting the social and human sciences. At one
end of this spectrum are found cases where human agents act rationally
on the basis of their intentions and beliefs. On the other end of this
spectrum are located those cases where the connection between an
agent's intentions and beliefs on the one hand and his actions on the
other is inconsistent and incomplete. It is only in these latter
cases that the social scientist can explain human thought and action as
determined by social forces, environmental conditions, and so on in
exactly the same way that the physical scientist explains an event as
determined by natural forces and conditions. In the overwhelming
majority of often complex cases which fall in between these two
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extremes, the social scientist must make significant departures from
the physical sciences model and utilize an alternative type of expla-
nation which allows for the mediating factors of self-consciousness and
reflexivity.
Of course, if this account of thought and action is correct, the
social scientist like the philosopher must direct his attention to the
description and explanation of intentional action. Yet, such a concern
with intentional action does not rest on the assumption that all sig-
nificant social activity is purely or even primarily intentional in
nature or that all social phenomena must be explained in terms of in-
tentions. Rather, this focus is dictated by the nature of the subject
matter of the social sciences in that the classification and explana-
tion of intentional action does present the social scientist with a
number of difficulties which are not confronted by the physical
scientist
.
Finally, in relation to Fay's criticism that an interpretive
approach "leaves no room" for analysis of the relationship between
elements of a social order and the beliefs and behavior of individuals
within that order, there is no exclusion of such analysis inherent in
Hampshire's position. As we have seen, Hampshire repeatedly emphasizes
that the range of an individual's thought and the possibilities of
action which he finds available to him are established by "his up-
bringing and social environment." Moreover, he acknowledges that the
intentions which an agent forms are typically limited not only by such
individual attributes as his intelligence and imagination (which
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themselves are, in part, a product of his environment and learning),
but also by the set of concepts and intersubjective meanings which are
embedded in his society and form of life.
In addition, there is nothing in Hampshire's position to suggest
that the social scientist or historian cannot examine the range of
thought and modes of activity which typify a given historical period or
society, including the manner in which various cultural, social and
political factors limit or channel the beliefs and behaviors of members
of that society. In fact, he acknowledges that on the basis of such
an analysis, what a particular agent will do, try to do, or even think
about doing "may sometimes be predictable with almost perfect accu-
racy .
"
Yet, if this leaves open the possibility of pursuing the type of
analysis which Fay correctly identifies as absolutely central to the
study of politics and society, Hampshire does not push exploration of
this opening very far. Although he is very much concerned with exami-
ning the various factors which limit thought and action, his more
detailed work consistently focuses on the psychological rather than the
sociological dimension of this problem. More generally, as Giddens
notes, he does not launch the kind of structural or institutional
analysis which is necessary in order to trace the connections among the
possibilities of thought and action within a particular society, the
established norms, values and so on in that society, and the basic
distribution of power and divisions of interest within that particular
social order.
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Giddens holds that it is necessary to complement the linguistic
focus on the study of "the production of social life," the manner in
which social structures are constituted by human activity, with an
analysis of "the social reproduction of structures," the ways in which
social structures are the medium of this process, In Giddens view,
this simply reestablishes the standard sociological emphasis on the
point that human beings make society but not under conditions of their
own choosing. However, as Giddens recognizes, the interpretive
approach typically ignores this aspect of social life and activity, but
it does not preclude recognition or analysis of it. Hampshire, for
example
,
clearly acknowledges that his conception of increased human
freedom through increased self-knowledge or self-understanding requires
certain social conditions. One of the principal tasks of the social
scientist working from this approach is to focus on analysis of such
conditions.
At this point, we must carefully examine a second line of criti-
cism directed against the interpretive model by Fay, Moon, Giddens and
others. Any adequate analysis of the nature of intentional activity
and the problem of unintended consequences is closely connected to a
set of questions concerning what constitutes an adequate or proper
explanation of human behavior, social practices and the structure of a
social or political system. Hampshire's position maintains that an in-
terpretive understanding of social action and social phenomena is
necessary if the social scientist is to be able to explain the acti-
vities, practices, and social order of self-interpreting, intentional
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agents. Moon and other critics of this notion of an interpretive
understanding of social life challenge its adequacy as a model of
explanation for social inquiry, claiming that such a model unneces-
sarily requires a total and complete break with the model of scientific
explanation provided by the physical sciences.
These critics acknowledge the usefulness of the notion of an in-
terpretive understanding of social life in the analysis of a particular
political and social system, which is historically and socially unique.
However, they contend that it provides no basis for making comparisons
and generalizations about political attitudes, behaviors and structures
in different social and historical settings. Moon, for example, admits
that interpretive explanations are necessary in order "to explicate the
meanings of particular actions, texts, practices, institutions, and
other cultural objects
. . .", but also argues that "... such ex-
planation does not provide a sufficient basis for the construction of
more general comparisons and theories. "^^
Of course, this second objection to the interpretive approach is
not unrelated to the first line of criticism: that even in the ana-
lysis of particular cases, the interpretive model neglects central
features of particular situations and activities (such as unintended
and unanticipated consequences) , and therby precludes examination of
general patterns of thought and behavior and the relationship between
such patterns and structural and environmental factors. But this
second objection presses the attack upon the notion of an interpretive
understanding of social phenomena even further. Thus, Giddens argues
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that the interpretive model grounded in post-Wittgensteinian linguistic
philosophy, as exemplified by Winch, ignores the problem of how the
rules, norms and conventions which constitute one set of social prac-
tices and form of life are related to those which embody different
practices and different forms of life. He claims that:
. . , this easily terminates in a relativism which
breaks off just where some of the basic issues which
confront sociology begin; problems of institutional
change and the mediation of different cultures.
In other words, the interpretive approach to social inquiry not only
generates a kind of cultural relativism, which eliminates the very
possibility of making cross-cultural generalizations, but also neglects
completely the historical change of institutions, meanings and prac-
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tices
.
The general claim that the interpretive approach to political
inquiry leads to a form of relativism and neglects institutional and
social change is underpinned by two more specific and interdependent
criticisms of the interpretive model. The first of these charges is
that the interpretive model rests upon the mistaken assertion that
human actions and social phenomena cannot be causally explained. For
example, Moon states:
The interpretive model of political inquiry insists that
laws and generalizations are not necessary to an under-
69
standing of human actions and institutions.
According to Moon, the interpretive model asserts that an interpretive
understanding of social phenomena is fundamentally different from and
incompatible with the physical scientist's explanation of natural
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phenomena because "such understanding does not require generalizations,
and it certainly does not require 'causal' laws."'^° In short, accord-
ing to the mistaken dichotomy presented by the interpretive model of
explanation, an interpretation of an agent's actions in terms of inten-
tions, reasons, meanings, rules or conventions is mutually incompatible
with explanation in terms of causes.
This of course, is the major reason why Moon and the others find
the interpretive model so deficient in its treatment of social struc-
ture, institutional development and change. Although all of these
critics agree that explanation in the social sciences does not fit the
pattern dictated by the deductive-nomological model, they insist that
the interpretive model goes too far because it rejects completely all
causal explanations. Fay and Moon follow G. H. Von Wright in holding
that "quasi-causal accounts" of the linkages between elements in the
social structure and natural environment on the one hand and human
thought and action on the other remain a legitimate and essential part
7
1
of social inquiry. They believe that the interpretive model must be
extensively revised or combined with other approaches to social inquiry
because it allows no causal or quasi-causal explanations.
This charge that the interpretive model concentrates exclusively
on explanations in terms of rules, intentions and reasons and rejects
completely causal explanations is closely tied to another basic ob-
jection to the adequacy of the interpretive approach to social inquiry.
This second criticism focuses on the interpretive model's insistence
that social activities and practices must always be understood "in
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their ovm terms," Giddens lays cut this challenge in detail in his
critique of Winch's analysis of social inquiry, particularly as it is
presented in his article on magic and witchcraft among the Azande.
In "Understanding a Primitive Society," Winch argues that the
requirement that a society must be understood in its own terms means
that we cannot interpret or assess Zande beliefs and practices
according to the standards of Western science and rationality.'^^ More
generally. Winch's position is that the social scientist can interpret
or "make sense of" beliefs, actions and practices which comprise a par-
ticular society or form of life only by grasping or understanding the
rules and conventions which are shared by the members of that society.
The outcome of such an interpretive approach is, according to Giddens,
the imposition of extensive and highly suspect restrictions on the con-
cepts which are admissible in the social scientist's attempts to clas-
sify and explain social actions and practices in different cultures.
For Winch acknowledges that the social scientist may introduce tech-
nical concepts, which are not used by the participants in a particular
set of social practices or form of life, in order to reclassify or
recharacterize their behavior or practices, but he insists that all the
concepts used in social scientific explanations of a particular society
must be in some way "logically tied" to the concepts used by the
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members of that society.
Winch's analysis of Zande culture thus illustrates one of the
fundamental problems inherent in an interpretive approach to social
inquiry: a basic and far-reaching confusion about the relationship
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between the technical concepts used by the social scientist and the lay
concepts used by social agents in a given society. The interpretive
model's requirement that the concepts used by the social scientist be
limited to those which are available to social agents or those tech-
nical concepts which are logically tied to lay concepts, necessarily
results in the total elimination of any classifications, comparisons or
generalizations which cannot be formulated in the terms employed by the
members of a particular society. But Giddens points out that the
reconceptualization and recharacterization of social actions and prac-
tices by social scientists are designed to carry out their "principal
task," which is . .to correct and improve upon notions which are
used by actors themselves in interpreting their own actions and the
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action of others." The social scientist introduces technical con-
cepts in an attempt to construct new classifications and descriptions
which, in turn, generate comparisons and generalizations that go beyond
the participants' understanding of social activities and practices.
In short, the artificial limits on the vocabulary of the social
sciences which are imposed by the interpretive model reduce social
science to the redescription of that which is already known to social
agents. According to Giddens, the interpretive model of social inquiry
presented by Winch, like that variant of it advanced by Gadamer,
. . .
places out of court the possibility—which is
actually a necessity—of analyzing social conduct in
terms which go beyond those of actors situated in par-
ticular traditions, and which are of explanatory sig-
75
nificance in relation to them.
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This mistaken account of the nature and foundation of the conceptual
framework used by the social scientist is, of course, a crucial aspect
of what these critics perceive as the implicit relativism and neglect
of change inherent in the interpretive model.
This second line of criticism correctly identifies crucial
deficiencies in Winch's conception of the scope and methods of social
inquiry. Given Winch's treatment of causal explanation and the con-
cepts which are used by the social scientist, his conception of social
inquiry is thoroughly relativistic and cannot account for institutional
change. However, as careful examination of Hampshire's position
clearly shows, this critique of Winch cannot be taken as a critique of
the conception of social inquiry which necessarily follows if one
accepts the legitimacy of the notion of an interpretive understanding
of social life.
In the first place. Winch does treat explanation in terms of
rules, intentions or reasons and explanation in terms of causes as
mutually exclusive, and, in effect, excludes causal explanation from
the social and human sciences. Moreover, there is some justification
for identifying such a position with recent linguistic philosophy of
mind since a number of linguistic philosophers have advanced similar
theses concerning the relationship between causal explanations and the
explanation of thought and action in terms of reasons, rules and so on.
Thus, Charles Landesman contends that the linguistic attack on
Cartesian dualism has spawned "a new dualism" in linguistic philosophy
of mind, which claims that there are "... two mutually exclusive
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language games or conceptual schemes which we use to talk about human
beings." Many of these philosophers, like Winch, have argued that
these two conceptual schemes are mutually exlusive and that the explan-
ation of human action is necessarily teleological in form and incompa-
tible with the type of causal explanations appropriate to the physical
sciences
.
riowever, more recent analyses of the so-called problem of reasons
and causes have, under the pressure of a barrage of criticism directed
at the kind of position taken by Winch, moved away from the dichotomous
treatment of understanding in terms of reasons and rule- following on
77the one hand and causal explanations on the other. Although
Hampshire has sometimes been identified with this "new dualism" on the
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basis of some of his statements in Thought and Action / his most
recent work clearly indicates that he does not treat causal explan-
ations and explanations in terms of reasons, intentions and so on as
mutually exclusive or reject the use of causal explanations of human
thought and action. For example, the list of "familiar propositions"
which he accepts as true that is provided in the postscript to the
expanded edition of Freedom of the Individual includes the following:
Not all interesting explanations of mental events, and
of the behaviour of persons, are causal explanations;
other forms of explanation may be satisfactory in their
appropriate contexts. But the availability of these
alternative forms of explanation does not by itself
preclude the possibility of normal causal explanations
of the same phenomena, identified under the same de-
79
scriptions.
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Certainly, Hampshire does maintain that the social and human
sciences face serious
. . .
obstacles to carrying through standard types of
causal explanation applicable to physical states, when
desires, beliefs and other thoughts are in question.
As we have seen in his account of a critical theory of knowledge,
Hampshire believes that these obstacles center in the "indefinite
8
1
reflexiveness of thought." Yet, as he explicitly points out, his
argument concerning such obstacles is not to be confused with the
thesis that because human action is intentional or rule-governed, we
cannot construct causal explanations of human behavior or social pheno-
mena. His argument admittedly focuses on the language of intentions,
purposes, etc. which social actors use in characterizing themselves and
others, but he states:
My argument will contain no suggestion that human beings
are as a species unique in the world in not being sus-
ceptible to strictly scientific understanding to any
degree or in any way.
Of course, this position must be set out and analyzed in greater
detail, a task which will be undertaken in the next section in relation
to the materialist challenge to Hampshire's account of mind. But at
this point it is important to note that the objection that an inter-
pretive approach automatically rules out causal explanations of human
behavior and social phenomena is mistaken. Hampshire's philosophical
premises, unlike Winch's, do not bar theoretical generalizations and
causal explanations from political inquiry. Instead, Hampshire's
position is that the social scientist cannot provide an adequate causal
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explanation of human actions and social practices unless he accounts
for the beliefs, intentions and reasons of the agent's involved. As
Alasdair Maclntyre concludes in his review of Winch' s The Idea of 3
Social Sciftncp,
. . .
true causal explanations cannot be formulated
where actions are concerned—unless intentions, motives,
and reasons are taken into account.
Of course, even if this point were granted, it still might seem
that Hampshire's analysis, like Winch's, encounters serious difficul-
ties concerning the relationship between the concepts used by social
agents and the concepts available to the social scientist. After all,
Hampshire like Winch clearly holds that a society or a set of acti-
vities and practices must be understood in its own terms. However,
there is a significant difference in how far each theorist is willing
to press this claim.
One of the major problems with Winch's conception of social
inquiry is that he treats this attempt to characterize a society in its
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own terms as the only legitimate and proper task of a social science.
In contrast, Hampshire's position suggests that this interpretive
understanding of activities and practices in terms of the participants'
own concepts, classifications and descriptions is the proper starting
point in social inquiry and not the entire enterprise of social in-
quiry. His principal contention is that unless the social scientist
immerses himself in the conceptual framework which mediates a particu-
lar set of activities and practices, his descriptions and explanations
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of a particular activity or practice in that society may well distort
or miss its basic point or purpose. But this thesis is certainly not
identical with either the claim that every reclassification or rede-
scription of social activities and practices introduced by the social
scientist necessarily results in such distortion and error, or the
claim that classifications and descriptions used by social agents must
be accepted by the social scientist.
As Hampshire repeatedly acknowledges, social agents often "mis-
describe and misconceive" their own situations and activities in a
variety of different ways, and the beliefs and intentions which then
guide their actions "incorporate this misapprehension or misdescrip-
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tion." Consequently, an observer (whether a social scientist or
another social agent) may rule that an agent's characterization of his
own circumstances or activities is "improper or unacceptable" because
it rests upon basic errors in the agent's explanation of his own scheme
of identification and classification. More importantly for social
inquiry, Hampshire notes that an agent may be unable to provide an
acceptable and proper characterization of his own activities because
his own conceptual framework and classificatory system completely omit
".
. . those features of the actions that seem to the observer the
86
salient and distinguishing features." In other words, social agents
can and frequently do lack the concepts, distinctions and classifi-
cations which are necessary in order to recognize and identify essen-
tial aspects of their own social activities, practices and institu-
tions.
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Yet, while it is possible that agents engaged in a certain type of
activity lack the concepts which are necessary for identifying and
understanding significant features of their activity, it is impossible
that they lack the concepts which are necessary for carrying on these
activities. This is why the interpretive model of social inquiry
requires that the social scientist begin his study of a particular
social system with an analysis of the concepts used by members of that
society to classify, characterize and carry on their activities. Such
an approach does not necessarily rest , as Winch' s account of it sug-
gests, on the assumption that the conceptual scheme used by the members
of a particular society is complete, unchallengeable and inherently
superior to any reconceptualization and reclassification of their
activities and practices provided in the explanations of the social
scientist. It does rest on the proposition that the social scientist
cannot discover or uncover a social reality in a particular society
which is completely independent of the vocabulary of that society.
Misunderstanding of this point has been a contributing factor to a
third general objection which has been raised against the interpretive
model of social inquiry. This line of criticism charges that the in-
terpretive approach is inherently conservative because it systemati-
cally ignores the pervasiveness of conflict and power in social and
political life. For example, Giddens argues that the interpretive
model not only takes forms of life, traditions conventions and prac-
tices as being "internally unified and coherent," thereby reducing the
problem of order and conflict to essentially problems of communication
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but also ignores how asymmetries of power infect the communication
87process itself. Linguistic philosophy of action and the interpretive
approach which is built upon it over-extend Wittgenstein's game ana-
logies, treating all social systems of rules and norms as if they were
closed and unquestioned in the same way as the rules of games or ritu-
alistic and ceremonial forms of human behavior. However, it cannot be
assumed that this is typical of the rule systems which most concern the
political scientist for:
They are less unified; subject to chronic ambiguities of
'interpretation,' so that their application or use is
88
contested
,
a matter of struggle . . . .
These struggles concerning interpretation of a system of rules, con-
cepts and meanings are, moreover, connected to fundamental divisions of
interest .^^
Likewise, Fay charges that the interpretive approach, by presup-
posing that meanings, beliefs, practices and actions are "congruent
with one another," precludes the possibility of even identifying, much
less analyzing, possible conflicts or contradictions "between certain
actions, rules, and common meanings, or between these and their causes
90
or results." In particular, the interpretive model ignores those
cases where social agents cannot adequately characterize or understand
their own social position and activities because their concepts, ideas
and beliefs are part of a mechanism which functions so as to distort or
conceal significant features of social reality. By rejecting the kinds
of conceptual distortion which are rooted in deep-seated social
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division and conflict of interest, the interpretive approach to social
inquiry
.
.
leads to reconciling people to their social order ..."
and supports the status quo.^^ Moreover, because it does not come to
terms with the ideological obstacles which social agents confront when
they try to examine and evaluate alternative theories or conceptual
frameworks, the interpretive model spawns a naive political theory
based upon the assumption "... that the simple presentation of ideas
will foster a change in social actors' self-conceptions.
. .
."^^
In large part, this line of criticism is based upon the assertion
that the interpretive model presupposes that the vocabulary used by
social agents always and necessarily captures the most significant
features of their social activities, relationships and practices. But,
as we have seen, Hampshire neither makes nor implies any such claim.
In addition, Hampshire explicitly acknowledges the point which Giddens
stresses in his critique of the interpretive model: that within a
shared conceptual framework there are disputes over the application and
use of the central concepts with which agents characterize their poli-
tical activities and practices, and that such disputes are frequently
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political contests reflecting conflicting interests and purposes.
Also, Hampshire's account of thought and action clearly does not pro-
vide the kind of simplisitic and naive view of changes in consciousness
and self-consciousness which Fay attributes to the interpretive model.
Finally, careful examination of Hampshire's analyses of moral
conflict and of the relationship between ethics and politics dispels
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the notion that the philosophical assumptions underpinning an inter-
pretive approach to social inquiry are inherently conservative. His
entire approach to the ethical problems confronting agents when they
must decide about future courses of conduct or when they evaluate the
decisions and actions of others emphasizes that "... morality ori-
ginally appears in our experience as a conflict of claims and a di-
vision of purpose." Also, as he expressly acknowledges, political
and governmental decision-making typically involves similar conflicts
among competing claims, needs and values.
Most importantly, Hampshire rejects the notion, which has been
pervasive in liberal and utilitarian discussions of such conflict, that
all moral and political conflict can be portrayed as always and es-
sentially a matter of calculable trade-offs and compromises within a
closed system of universal principles. He recognizes that such con-
flict can involve two different and incompatible ways of life, or that
particular decisions or courses of action sometimes entail commitment
to a certain way of life as opposed to another. In his analysis of the
relationship between public and private morality, he states:
Conflict between competing ways of life— religious,
ideological, national, family and class conflict— has
been perpetual and conflict is always to be expected;
and the conflicts are not only in the realm of ideas,
but are often also political conflicts, involving force
and the threat of force. A way of life is protected and
maintained by the exercise of political power, and that
way of life will evolve, and will change with the
changing forms of knowledge, as long as sufficient
96
political protection of it lasts.
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While this clearly does not provide answers to all the questions con-
cerning conflict, politics, morality and ways of life which are of
interest to the political theorist, it certainly is not the case that
Hampshire's account of knowledge and mind precludes any further
analysis of such questions.
The Displacement Hypothesis
There is an even more fundamental objection to the interpretive
approach to political inquiry than those which have been considered
thus far. This challenge is directed at the notion that explanations
in terms of purposes, meaning, intentions, goals, etc., are proper or
necessary in the social and human sciences. As we have seen, such ex-
planations necessarily include the concepts and classifications through
which agents understand themselves and their world and in terms of
which they formulate the intentions and plans that guide their actions.
Of course, this does not mean that the social scientist can utilize
only those concepts which are actually used by social agents in a par-
ticular social and historical setting in his attempts to explain human
behavior and social phenomena. However, once the admissibility of
technical, causal concepts is acknowledged, how can defenders of the
interpretive model maintain that the explanatory framework which is
built upon the concepts used in ordinary discourse about thought and
action cannot be eventually replaced with a strictly scientific explan-
atory framework? Moon, who expressly confronts this objection to an
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interpretive social science, characterizes it as simply an insistence
that we have open the possibility
. . .
that we may replace the concepts of ordinary lan-
guage, of action, purpose, intention, meaning, etc., by
scientifically acceptable terms, thereby obviating the
need for an interpretive understanding of social
life[ J^*^
In other words, there is nothing immutable and final about a
teleological explanation of human behavior in terms of the concepts and
categories of ordinary discourse. The social scientist must seek a
conceptual framework that can provide deeper and more basic explan-
ations of human behavior and social phenomena than the typically
incomplete and unsystematic explanations available to ordinary social
agents
.
According to this line of criticism, even if advocates of an in-
terpretive social science reject Winch's strict limitations on the con-
cepts which are admissible in social inquiry, they are still guilty of
placing artifical and ^ priori limits on what will be or can be
achieved in the social and human sciences. This closed view of social
inquiry is the inevitable consequence of treating intention, purpose
and other concepts used in ordinary discourse about thought and action
as essential and ineliminable components of any conceptual framework
used in explaining human action and social phenomena. On the basis of
a conceptual analysis of past and present vocabularies of thought and
action, advocates of an interpretive approach to social inquiry are
making highly questionable claims about possible future conceptual
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frameworks which will emerge from psychology and the other social
sciences. Taken seriously, the interpretive approach becomes an
obstacle to further progress in our understanding of social action
because it institutionalizes and insulates from empirical falsification
a conceptual framework which may eventually prove to be as irrelevant
to social science as the purposive, anthropomorphic, Aristotelian
framework overthrown in the development of the natural sciences.
Moon rejects this objection to an interpretive social science,
treating it as less serious than the criticism that the interpretive
model rests upon the reproductive fallacy. In replying to this new
line of criticism, he focuses on the familiar contrast between the
subject matter of social inquiry ("social relations and the ideas
consituting these relations . . .") and the phenomena studied in the
physical sciences. In short, his argument is that "we cannot conduct
political science, as we understand it today . . .", if we completely
neglect the meanings, intentions, purposes and so on which are express-
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ed in and are part of social activities and practices. Any attempt
to eliminate intentional and purposive concepts from political inquiry
in its present state would automatically discard some of the most
significant features of our existing understanding of political behav-
ior and political phenomena. Although it is not clear exactly what we
would be studying after such a purge of our conceptual framework, it is
clear that we would no longer be studying political activity in polit-
99ical contexts.
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Of course, as Moon admits, such an argument applies only to the
present stage of political inquiry, and certainly does not rule out the
logical possibility of generating "some kind of neurophysiological the-
ories of 'behavior'" or "a 'behavioral' science modeled on a strict
scientific ideal, eschewing the use of intentional concepts.
. .
But Moon insists,
Discussion of such an ideal seems to be quite pointless,
however, since it is completely programmatic at this
time, and totally foreign to the methodologies and
interests of virtually all contemporary political
101
scientists.
As he argues elsewhere in his essay, the nomological model of scien-
tific explanation, when applied to the explanation of political pheno-
mena, represents "... little more than a promissory note." Since we
lack not only laws of the nomological form, but also the spectators in
terms of which such laws are to be constructed, "... the demand that
we cast our explanations in these terms can only express a pious faith
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in the future of a naturalistic social science."
Although Moon's response to this objection is, I think, essen-
tially correct, this line of criticism of the interpretive approach to
social inquiry does present a more serious and far-reaching challenge
than he acknowledges. In the first place, it is exactly this type of
objection which characterizes the most pervasive and entrenched op-
position to the notion of an interpretive understanding of political
phenomena among mainstream political scientists. For example, re-
searchers examining political behavior typically reject the ordinary
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terminology which political actors use in characterizing and explaining
their own thought and action as dominated by crude, unsystematic and
pre-scientific theories of human motivation and behavior. While such a
framework may be adequate for carrying on certain social activities and
practices, it is certainly not the proper starting place for developing
a comprehensive, empirical theory of political behavior.
Such a view is particularly evident in Wahlke's critique of the
behavioral methodology which is presently utilized by researchers in
political science. As we have seen, he argues that political research
remains in what is essentially a "pre-behavioral stage." The basic
problem is that political scientists continue to work with concepts
which are "deficient and inappropriate," chiefly because they are not
really "behavioral" but rather "attitudinal" or "mentalistic" con-
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cepts. In other words, political science can advance only once it
substitutes genuinely behavioral concepts for the kind of ordinary lan-
guage concepts which the interpretive model retains as essential to the
explanation of political behavior.
Wahkle further indicates his basic differences with the inter-
pretive approach when he states:
The people whom political scientists study are, after
all, no more exempt from the laws of behavioral dynamics
than from the laws of gravity.
The major obstacle to the political scientist's recognition and utili-
zation of such laws or uniformities of human behavior is the over-
rationalized model of the social actor which figures so predominantly
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in both the conceptual framework available to ordinary agents and in
the interpretive approach to social inquiry. According to Wahkle's
analysis, progress in political science is dependent upon elimination
of this flawed conception of human nature which is linked to the con-
cepts of intention, purpose, meaning and so on. A genuine political
science will be systematically grounded in the laws of the "biobehav-
ioral sciences" in the same way that astronomy builds upon the laws of
physics and chemistry
,
Wahkle's article clearly illustrates the pervasive impact of be-
havioralism upon the prevailing conception of what constitutes an
adequate explanation of political attitudes and behavior. It has long
been a basic tenet of behavioralism that explanation in terms of inten-
tions, reasons, goals, purposes, meanings and so on is inherently non-
scientific. Moreover, Wahkle's view of conceptual advance in the
social and human sciences as principally a step from mentalistic, pur-
posive concepts to truly behavioral concepts is simply a less radical
statement of B. F. Skinner's vision of a conceptual framework from
which even such basic concepts as freedom and responsibility have been
eliminated through scientific advance. Finally, Wahkle's use of bio-
politics and "the application of psychophysiological and psychophysical
concepts and methods to the study of political attitudes" at Stony
Brook as examples of how the political scientist is to apply basic
"biobehavioral knowledge" exemplifies another basic assumption of be-
havioralism: that we will eventually discover a set of mechanistic
laws operating on the physiological level from which the mechanistic
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laws of human behavior identified in psychology and the other social
sciences can be derived
In addition, while not all political scientists share this behav-
ioralist vision of a political science founded on the laws of the
"biobehavioral sciences," similar resistence to explanations of human
behavior in terms of intentions, purposes, and meanings is inherent in
prevailing positivist and empiricist assumptions concerning scientific
method and explanation. The positivist model of a science of politics
also pictures the eventual disappearance of analyses of political
change and processes which offer explanations involving intentions and
purposes with the discovery of a truly scientific vocabulary which
captures the "deep structure" of political processes. According to
this conception of scientific advance, political science remains in its
infancy, or perhaps at the stage of alchemy in constrast to chem-
107istry. Thus, an interpretive approach to political inquiry, which
holds that certain of the purposive, intentional concepts and explan-
ations used in ordinary discourse about politics must remain essential
to any future analysis of political structure or change, is perceived
as freezing political science in its present state.
In short, the positivist and empiricist accounts of the scientific
method, like behavioralism, treat explanation in terms of intentions,
purposes, goals, reasons and so on as inherently nonempirical . Again,
the prevailing assumption is that only mechanistic, causal explanation
is the truly scientific form of explanation, Behavioralism, positivism
and empiricism present a common view of scientific progress in the
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social and human sciences which is modeled on the defeat of the teleo-
logical, purposive mode of description and explanation in the physical
108
sciences
.
As we have seen, Hampshire's suggestions concerning an alterna-
tive, interpretive approach to political inquiry are founded on a the-
ory of mind and knowledge that challenges the assumptions regarding
mind and knowledge which underpin this positivist conception of scien-
tific progress in the social and human sciences. However, in recent
analytic philosophy, the type of philosophy of mind and knowledge which
Hampshire defends, as well as the kind of conceptual analysis which
supports this position, have themselves been challenged by essentially
the same objection posed against the interpretive model. Hampshire
holds that we cannot provide a coherent or adequate account of mind or
action unless we focus on the concept of intention and related concepts
such as belief, desire, goal and so on. The standard objection to any
account of mind or action which treated such concepts as essential and
ineliminable has been, of course, that these concepts could be reduced
to or translated into a logically more primitive or purely observa-
tional language. Since no such reductions or translations have been
successfully completed, the force of this objection to theories of mind
and action which insist upon the nonreducibility of intentional and
J 109purposive concepts has dissipated.
Yet, according to several contemporary analytic philosophers, this
question of reducibility or nonreducibility is actually a side issue
when considering the relationship between ordinary discourse about
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thought and action on the one hand and the scientific vocabulary used
to explain human motivation and behavior on the other. The central
issue concerns rather the possibility of providing superior descrip-
tions and explanations of human motivation and behavior which will
replace the central concepts and classifications in our present con-
ceptual system. These advocates of what Richard Bernstein has labeled
the "displacement hypothesis":
. . .
maintain that the conceptual framework in which we
now think of ourselves and others as agents can be
displaced by a radically different scientific frame-
,
110
work.
This challenge to the account of mind and action provided by conceptual
analysts in general and Hampshire in particular is based on the con-
tention that such a displacement is possible and that scientific mate-
rialism is the most promising candidate to replace our present con-
ceptual framework. Thus, this challenge centers in varieties of
"eliminative materialism," the "displacement view" or the "disappear-
ance form" of the identity thesis advanced by Paul Feyerabend, Richard
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Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars and J. J. C. Smart.
Of course, the central claims of materialism, such as that human
beings are simply complex physical mechanisms or that whatever can be
described or explained in psychological terms can also be described or
explained without loss in purely physical terms, are certainly not new
to philosophy. In order to understand the recent resurgence of ma-
terialist theories of mind in contemporary analytic philosophy, one
would have to examine a series of problems concerning the accounts of
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consciousness and "inner states" provided by Ryle and other conceptual
analysts. In addition, fully sorting out the differences between
classical materialists and contemporary displacement theorists as well
as the differences among the various displacement theorists, would
require careful examination of a complex set of issues regarding "the
status of persons; the nature of thought and intentionality ; and the
nature of sensations and feelings."^
However, Bernstein contends that the most basic, common challenge
which the displacement hypothesis presents to the type of account of
mind and action advanced by Hampshire and other linguistic philosophers
is quite clear. The displacement thesis represents a "radical turn" in
the discussion of the relationship between accounts of action in terms
of intentions, reasons, beliefs, desires, goals and so on and accounts
of action in terms of causes. Up to this point, it had been a major
tenet of analytic philosophy, both in its earlier reductive form and in
more recent conceptual analysis, that many of the ordinary statements
which human beings make about their own mental states and activities
are "meaningful and true." In contrast, the displacement theorists:
. . . maintain that
,
despite our strong convictions to
the contrary, the most pervasive and basic types of
assertions we make about our intentions, actions,
1 1
4
reasons, motives are (or may be) false .
Although conceptual analysis may be useful in setting out the most
basic components of the conceptual framework which agents use in clas-
sifying and characterizing their own thought and actions, it cannot
establish that these basic concepts and categories are essential,
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ineliminable and unchallengable features of any adequate explanation of
human behavior. In short, the displacement hypothesis challenges the
conclusions which are drawn on the basis of conceptual analysis, par-
ticularly the accounts of mind and action constructed upon such an
analysis, and, ultimately, the interpretive conception of social
inquiry.
For example, Feyerabend, who is certainly no defender of posi-
tivist philosophy of science, offers one of the most radical and sweep-
ing statements of this displacement hypothesis. He acknowledges that
the basic structure of the conceptual framework which materialists
propose for characterizing and explaining sensations, thoughts,
actions, etc., is "incompatible with the structure of the idiom in
1 15
which we usually describe pains and thoughts." But this incompati-
bility alone certainly does not refute materialism because the fact
that a particular conceptual framework for classifying and charac-
terizing thought and action is in common use is simply "an irrelevant
1 1
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historical accident." In order to refute the materialist thesis,
the defender of the prevailing conceptual framework must demonstrate
its superiority in describing and explaining human motivation and be-
havior. Moreover, if he is to disprove the materialist philosophy of
mind, the defender of the existing mode of discourse about thought and
action must confront the "fully developed materialistic idiom" (which
Feyerabend predicts will one day replace existing mental and action
concepts), not simply "the bits and pieces of materialese which are
1 17
available to the philosophers of today."
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Feyerabend rejects the claim that "the practical success" of the
existing classification and characterization of thought and action
constitutes a legitimate argument supporting this conceptual framework.
He contends that:
. . .
such idioms are adapted not to facts
,
but to
MiisXs.. If these beliefs are widely accepted; if they
are intimately connected with the fears and the hopes of
the community in which they occur; if they are defended,
and reinforced with the help of powerful institutions;
if one's whole life is somehow carried out in accordance
with them— then the language representing them will be
regarded as most successful. At the same time it is
clear that the question of the truth of the beliefs has
118
not been touched.
In his "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," this point is
applied in a detailed analysis of the claim that the materialist thesis
must be false because of the fact of knowledge by acquaintance. Oppo-
nents of materialism have frequently attempted to counter the materi-
alist suggestion that our present understanding of mental processes and
our use of mental concepts may be inadequate and mistaken by arguing
that persons are directly acquainted with, or possess direct and cer-
tain knowledge of their own sensations, thoughts, intentions, actions
and so on. However, Feyerabend argues that this "alleged fact of
nature" is not a fact at all, but rather "... the result of certain
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peculiarities of the language spoken and there fore alterable." In
other words, the notion of direct, certain knowledge by acquaintance is
a "philosophical invention" made possible only because of the lack of
content ("No prediction, no retrodiction can be inferred from them
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. .
.") of these ordinary language concepts and our everyday state-
ments concerning thoughts, sensations, feelings and so on. As our
mental concepts are "enriched" by the application of empirical know-
ledge of ".
. .
mental events, their causes, and their physiological
concommitants
. . .
"
,
the idea that we can directly know mental states
121
and processes collapses.
In short, the conceptual framework used to classify and charac-
terize thought and action in ordinary discourse constitutes a false,
empirically inadequate, and dualistic theory of mind. This dualistic
theory is not set out openly and systematically and is not presented as
a hypothesis to be tested:
It is rather incorporated into the language spoken in a
fashion which makes it inaccessible to empirical cri-
ticism—whatever the empirical results, they are not
used for enriching the mental concepts which will there-
fore forever refer to entities knowable by acquain-
122
tance
,
This conceptual framework and any philosophy of mind and action based
upon analysis of it are completely circular. The dualistic theory
embodied in ordinary discourse and conceptual analysis cannot be really
tested by examining "the facts" because the most crucial facts "...
are formulated in terras of the idiom and therefore already prejudiced
in its favor."^^^ Feyerabend concludes that it essential to develop
alternative theories of mind and action, and that such alternative
theories cannot be judged and evaluated on the basis of established
modes of thinking and talking about mind and action.
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As Bernstein acknowledges, there are weaknesses in Feyerabend's
position. Moreover, the stronger and more subtle versions of the
displacement hypothesis, such as Rorty's, focus on examining the possi-
bility of the displacement of the existing conceptual framework rather
than on attacking the legitimacy of ordinary statements about mental
124processes and states. Yet, Bernstein contends that Feyerabend's
analysis does provide a useful perspective from which one can assess
the accounts of mind and action that have emerged from conceptual
analysis. In brief, the displacement hypothesis, even in its crudest
form, poses a powerful and essentially correct challenge to " . . . the
deep priori bias of many ordinary language philosophers."
Bernstein acknowledges that linguistic philosophy has demonstrated
that such concepts as action, intention, goals and responsibility are
central and essential rather than peripheral and incidental to our con-
ceptual framework. But he argues that no matter how useful and suc-
cessful this conceptual scheme may be for practical human activities
and social life, no matter how inconceivable the kinds of fundamental
conceptual revisions implied by the materialist thesis may seem at the
present , the linguistic philosopher cannot legitimately claim that his
analysis of the existing conceptual scheme establishes conceptual or
necessary truths vrfiich are immune to refutation or revision on the
basis of empirical evidence. The a priori bias of contemporary lin-
guistic philosophy is that it dismisses the possibility of providing
mechanistic, causal explanations of human thought and behavior on the
grounds that the notions of intention, purpose, etc., are essential to
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our present ways of thinking and talking about ourselves and our
activities. It is this 3. priQri bias which undercuts the accounts of
mind and action presented by linguistic philosophers and, in turn, the
interpretive approach to social inquiry which has emerged from linguis-
tic philosophy.
The basic deficiency of linguistic philosophy of mind and action
is that it continues to treat the vocabulary of reasons, intentions and
other concepts used in ordinary language accounts of human behavior as
logically incompatible with the terminology used in mechanical, causal
explanations of behavior. It is on the basis of this mistaken dicho-
tomy of two mutually exclusive, nonreducible conceptual schemes that
linguistic philosophers have typically drawn a highly contestable
ontological conclusion about human nature and human behavior. Because
human thought and action cannot be adequately characterized solely in
terms of a completely mechanistic terminology, linguistic philosophy
concludes that the thesis that a human being is nothing but a mechanism
1 26
subject to the same physical laws as other mechanisms is false.
Bernstein focuses briefly on the work of Charles Taylor in an
attempt to demonstrate that even those linguistic theorists who recog-
nize that such a conclusion is illegitimate lapse into the same kind of
^ priori philosophical anthropology. Since they treat teleological and
mechanistic explanations as incompatible rivals, the linguistic the-
orists inevitably detach their conceptual analyses of mind and action
from empirical psychological investigations. Even if they do not
explicitly reject the materialist thesis because it conflicts with our
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present conceptual framework, linguistic philosophers neglect the
dialectical relationship between conceptual analysis and empirical
analysis, or between philosophy and science. In short, the conceptual
analysts, like the practioners of reductive analysis before them, reify
conceptual distinctions into dichotomies and "necessary truths,"
thereby neglecting the manner in which even our most fundamental con-
cepts, distinctions and classifications are modified by the discovery
1 27
of new facts or the development of new theories.
If Bernstein's reading of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind
and action is correct, the displacement hypothesis challenges the
central core of the interpretive approach to social inquiry: the views
concerning the characterization and explanation of human thought and
action which flow from conceptual analysis. However, it should be
clear from what has already been said about Hampshire's accounts of
knowledge, mind and action that Bernstein's characterization of con-
ceptual analysis does not accurately or adequately reflect Hampshire's
position. More generally, Bernstein's account of conceptual analysis,
particularly his sketch of the "new dualism" in linguistic philosophy,
misrepresents or ignores the most important recent analytic treatments
of such issues as reasons and causes, agency and intention, and so
on,^^^ Bernstein's summary of analytic philosophy of mind and action
ignores not only Hampshire's work but also the work of Donald Davidson,
Alasdair Maclntyre and others who have made extensive contributions in
this area.
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Bernstein, like many other critics of recent linguistic philosophy
of mind and action, seems to take the position advanced by Norman
Malcolm in "The Conceivability of Mechanism" as representative of con-
ceptual analysis in general. ""^^ Yet, Hampshire, Davidson, Taylor and
Maclntyre clearly do not take the same stands as Malcolm on such issues
as the relationship between explanations in terms of reasons, inten-
tions, purposes, etc, and causal explanations, the conceivability of
mechanism or the identity theory, whether there are precise psycho-
physical laws, and whether mental phenomena can be explained in purely
physical terms. Thus, whereas Bernstein has a case when he maintains
that Malcolm's thesis rests upon certain a priori assumptions chal-
lenged by the displacement theorists, the positions taken by other
linguistic philosophers are not open to the same criticism. In the
remainder of this chapter, Hampshire's analysis of the problems con-
fronted in the attempt to explain human thought and action will be set
out by contrasting his position with that criticized by Bernstein.
One of Bernstein's principal criticisms of conceptual analysis is
that it treats the explanation of thought and action in terms of
reasons, intentions, purposes and other central concepts in ordinary
language as fundamentally incompatible with causal, mechanistic
explanations of mental processes and human behavior. In other words,
for the conceptual analyst, explanation in terms of reasons, intentions
and purposes and causal explanations are always and essentially
competing or rival forms of explanation. Of course, given such a
dichotomy, the materialist claim that one can or will eventually
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provide causal, mechanistic explanations of mental events or human be-
haviors is automatically a rejection of our everyday explanations of
thought and action as completely mistaken and false.
Malcolm's argument against the materialist thesis does rest upon
this view of causal and purposive explanations of mental processes or
states and human behavior as logically incompatible rivals. ""^^ How-
ever, as we saw in contrasting Winch's and Hampshire's views on the
reasons-causes distinction, Hampshire's account of the difficulties
faced when providing causal explanations of human thought and action
131presupposes no such dichotomy, Hampshire expressly rejects the
claim that explanation of human thought and action in terms of reasons,
intentions, etc., constitutes a different kind of explanation than
causal explanation as " . . . unclear, and insofar as it is clear,
132
undemonstrated .
"
Certainly, this is not to deny that there are significant dif-
ferences or that there is potential conflict between the terminology
used in ordinary discourse to classify and characterize human thought
and action on the one hand and, on the other, a terminology developed
for the scientific explanation of mental processes and human behavior.
For example, in ordinary language, mental states and processes are
identified and distinguished
... by reference both to their effects in behavior and
to their causes in stimulating conditions, and by refe-
rence to typical contemporary thoughts, which the sub-
133ject may or may not reveal.
Since this is, of course, a vocabulary which serves a number of
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different social purposes beyond explanation, it should come as no
surprise that the criteria of application of these concepts does not
meet the exacting requirements of a terminology to be used in scien-
tific explanations.
In contrast, a terminology designed for the scientific explanation
of human behavior is limited to "publicly observable and exactly speci-
fied features" of behaviors and their "stimulating conditions. "^^^
While such a vocabulary would not adequately serve the more general
social and communicative purposes of ordinary discourse, "it could
reasonably be expected" to generate causal accounts of human behavior
which are properly supported by covering laws or law-like generali-
zations and to provide explanations of behavior which, unlike ordinary
1 35
accounts of human action, are "deterministic in form," Clearly,
Hampshire does hold that there are certain obstacles to the application
of the same types of causal explanation used in the physical sciences
to the explanation of human thought and behavior. Moreover, he does
argue that such obstacles are presented by special features of the
ordinary vocabulary which social agents use in classifying and charac-
terizing mental states and behavior, particularly when these involve
beliefs and desires. However, there are fundamental differences
between this argument and Malcolm's claims concerning the inconceiv-
ability of a mechanistic account of human thought and action.
Malcolm contends that we can rule out the possibility of a com-
pletely mechanistic explanation of mental processes and human behavior
because such a terminology is incompatible with, and would require the
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total rejection of, the ordinary framework which is used to charac-
terize thought and action. Hampshire's analysis rejects the two most
essential stages of this argument: the claim that our ordinary lan-
guage terminology and the causal, mechanistic terminology are always
rivals, and the claim that mechanism is "inconceivable." In the first
place, Hampshire acknowledges that the same mental event, process or
state, or the same behavior or pattern of behavior, can be explained in
either of these terminologies. Thus, one might explain a sequence of
thought in terms of the standards of rationality appropriate to ar-
gument
,
in terms of the associative connections which are peculiar to
human thought processes, or in terms of other such explanations which
do not fit the pattern of causal explanation. As he points out, this
does not mean that this same sequence of thought cannot be explained by
tracing the causal connections between certain "mental states" and
1 ^6
other states, "mental" or "physical." Although such different ex-
planations sometimes prove to be incompatible (this is particularly
evident when either mental processes or behaviors that are character-
ized in our ordinary terminology as fully under an agent's control are
revealed, under the alternative pattern of explanation, to be influ-
enced by external or unconscious factors over which the agent has no
137
control)
,
this is not always and necessarily the case.
Hampshire admits that a number of philosophical problems and
confusions arise when we attempt to reconcile such explanations of the
same mental state or process, or the same behavior, in different termi-
nologies which express and reflect fundamentally different points
of
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view. Yet, he has clearly undercut the basic leverage which Malcolm
attempts to apply against the materialist thesis in order to resolve
these difficulties. In general, Hampshire accepts the proposition
which has been stressed by Malcolm's critics: "... that no limits
can be set a priori on the scope of scientific explanation.
. .
.
"^^^
More specifically, there is no a, priori basis for doubting that scien-
tific explanations of mertal events and human actions will actually be
found. As he states in his essay "Freedom of Mind,"
But I am ready to agree that, given that we have any
true statement of fact about a state of mind, e.g. that
Jones believes that there is a lectern in the next room,
then we can always look for, and may expect ultimately
to find, an explanation of this fact by reference to
some set of initial conditions, which will, in normal
circumstances, constitute sufficient conditions of
Jones' having this belief. I am also ready to agree
that this request for an explanation of psychological
fact, if pressed far enough, and pressed successfully,
will always include, as one element in the whole explan-
ation, an experimentally confirming covering law. I am
ready to agree that there is no ^ priori reason why,
given that a psychological fact is specified by a
description, and given that we hold this description of
the explicandum constant, we should not find an
explanation under a covering law, experimentally
140
confirmed
.
In contrast to Malcolm's inconceivability of mechanism thesis,
Hampshire maintains that there are no ^ priori reasons for ruling out
the identity thesis or materialism. Much like Feyerabend, he argues
that ordinary language is "so thoroughly dualistic and Cartesian" that
it is difficult to even make sense of an alternative, materialist con-
ception of mind.^^^ Moreover, he accuses "Cartesians and common-sense
dualists" of constructing a philosophy of mind based upon our present
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state of ignorance concerning the "physical mechanisms of thought. "^^^
In short, he is willing to accept a version of the materialist "...
doctrine that the physical states of an organism determine uniquely
corresponding states of mind," and that "... changing states of mind
are instances of lawlike regularities, and are the effects of assign-
able causes, no less than their physical states.
. .
."''^^ Or, as he
states in the Preface to his Freedom of Mind
,
Not only the power of thought, but the actual use of
this power by any individual on any particular occasion,
are naturally held to be in principle explicable by
antecedent conditions in the organism, which determine
how this power will be used in any particular
occasion
.
However, Hampshire contends that few defenders of such a materi-
alist theory have followed Spinoza's lead in setting out comprehen-
sively and consistently the implications of this doctrine, particularly
for a theory of human nature or personality. With the exploration of
these implications, materialism emerges as a very different kind of
doctrine than that which is championed by either the classical materi-
alists or the contemporary displacement theorists. In short, because
of the special difficulties in the application of mechanistic, causal
explanations of human thought and action which were identified by
Spinoza
,
There is ... an unclarity, or even an ambiguity, in
the otherwise acceptable statement that the occurrence
of any state of mind can in principle be explained like
any other natural phenomenon, by reference to an
experimentally confirmed covering law, which correlates
such an occurrence with some set of initial
conditions
.
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For this reason, the version of materialism which Hampshire defends is
expressly divorced from several of the major theses or assumptions
which are standardly associated with the identity thesis or
materialism.
First, discussion of the materialist doctrine or, more generally,
of the problems confronted in explaining human thought and action, must
be detached from the general thesis of determinism. Hampshire states:
A general thesis of determinism, applying to all events
without restriction, is too general to be either fal-
sified, or confirmed, or rendered probable, and is empty
and uninteresting, until it is in some way restricted,
146
or placed in a context within a theory.
This is, of course, not the same as the thesis that there are certain
events, such as those we classify as mental events, which do not have
causes. Hampshire expressly notes that questions about what caused a
particular event, whether the event is classified as a physical event
or a mental event, are always in order. Rather, the point is that such
statements as "every event has a cause" or "every event is an instance
of some natural law, which explains its occurrence by reference to some
set of initial conditions" are so general and vague that it is not at
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all clear what the thesis of determinism is. It is best to begin an
analysis of the materialist theory of mind or the conceivability of
mechanism by setting aside this vacuous thesis of determinism.
Of course, this does not resolve the apparent incompatibility
between the materialist claim that mental states and processes and
human behaviors are the effects of assignable causes and the freedom of
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thought and action which is attributed to human beings in our daily
discourse and activities. However, the point is simply that we can
deal with this difficulty by careful analysis of human thought and
action, not by falling back on general ontological statements or ar-
guments about determinism and free will.
Secondly, this alternative materialism breaks completely with
those versions of materialism or the identity thesis which maintain or
suggest that the physical mechanisms associated with all the mental
powers and capacities characteristic of human beings can be explained
in terms of physical structures and processes identified and understood
at the present stage of scientific advance. Certainly, the kind of
materialism which Hampshire considers tenable does take what can be
termed a "mechanistic" view of man in the sense that it treats human
beings as "complex organisms which function in accordance with the laws
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of physics and of chemistry, as do all other biological systems."
The materialist presumes that there are organic or physical mechanisms
involved in even the most highly advanced mental powers and capacities
of human beings, including various kinds of thought processes and the
use of language. Thus, it is in principle possible to discover speci-
fic organic or physical states which are associated with particular
mental states or powers.
However, this brand of materialism is "open-ended" because it
acknowledges that the physical mechanisms associated with the most
sophisticated types of human thought and activity are too complex to be
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adequately dealt with given our present knowledge of biology, physi-
ology and so on. It anticipates that the organic or physical mecha-
nisms which are involved with the more advanced mental states and
processes embody physical structures and processes "which are not yet
recognized, or even envisaged in contemporary physics. Although we
have no a priprj reasons for doubting that various mental states and
processes are determined by certain sets of antecedent condtions, we
definitely possess no exact and detailed knowledge of these postulated
determinants of mental events. Despite the continuing growth of our
scientific knowledge, the modern materialist, like Spinoza, must con-
front the fact that:
The relation between specific organic states and speci-
fic processes of thought is still a dark area of ig-
151
norance
.
In short, on the basis of the materialist thesis that mental
states and processes involve some kind of organic and, ultimately,
physical mechanism, we cannot draw any conclusions about the nature of
this mechanism. The mechanisms involved in the higher functions of the
human organism may prove to be radically different from any account of
mechanism which can presently be given or imagined, and they may prove
to be too complex to be adequately explained even if much more sophis-
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ticated physiological and biological theories are developed. Any
materialist who maintains or assumes that the mechanisms discovered by
future developments in physics, physiology, biology and so on will fit
some pattern presently understood or anticipated at the existing state
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of the physical sciences is guilty of the same kind of illegitimate, ^
priori theorizing as Malcolm.
Finally, and most importantly, this alternative version of materi-
alism follows Spinoza in attempting to come to terms with the tension
between the materialist belief that all mental states involve or are
dependent upon physical states, and therefore must be the effects of
assignable causes and conform to law-like regularities, and the common
sense belief that there is an essential indeterminacy in human thought
and action because human beings possess the unique power of reflec-
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tion. In other words, this materialism does differ from the stan-
dard doctrine advanced by classical materialists as well as the dis-
placement theorists in insisting that there are features of the
ordinary vocabulary used to identify, classify and characterize mental
states and processes which present very real obstacles to the explan-
ation of human thought and behavior in terms of the same causal model
applicable to physical states and processes. This view further
detaches the materialist theory considered by Hampshire f-^om major
components of the standardly-accepted version of a materialist con-
ception of mind or the identity thesis.
In the first place, this alternative kind of materialism calls for
a radical reformulation of the displacement hypothesis or the thesis
that it is likely or possible that our present psychological vocabulary
will be replaced by a deterministic scientific framework. Clearly,
Hampshire does not ignore the possibility of change in the meaning and
use of the concepts used to characterize and explain human thought and
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behavior in ordinary discourse as a result of empirical and theoretical
advances in the sciences. In fact, he acknowledges that . .a
terminology adapted to precise causal judgements can be expected some-
times, and for some purposes, to replace the common place terminol-
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ogy." At the same time, there are certain discernable limits which
any such future scientific terminology, even a materialist one, must
encounter. In brief, these limits are presented by the use of inten-
tional knowledge as well as empirical knowledge by ordinary social
agents and by the pervasiveness of prepositional attitudes, expressed
by such concepts as believing, intending, planning, knowing, perceiv-
155ing
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remembering and desiring, in our psychological vocabulary.
Although Hampshire's analyses of these limits invariably cut
across several different issues and are, at least in certain parts,
fragmentary, the major points he makes are clear. In part, he simply
argues that any such displacement of our ordinary vocabulary by a
strictly scientific vocabulary is highly unlikely. The kind of termi-
nology envisaged by the displacement hypothesis does provide the basis
for deterministic explanations, and is therefore necessary in order to
develop a technology, "a reliable method of control and manipulation .
.
."^^^ In contrast, our existing psychological terminology serves a
number of other interests and social purposes besides the collection,
communication and application of empirical knowledge. Moreover, as we
have seen, the concepts which constitute the basic core of our present
conceptual scheme are themselves essential constituents of existing
social practices, social relationships and a form of life. While such
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a displacement of our present concept scheme by a causal, deterministic
framework is logically possible, it posits an unlikely future where
fundamental human interests and purposes as well as basic social acti-
vities, practices and relationships are discarded, presumably because
"an interest in scientific accuracy and in social engineering" becomes
1 S7totally pervasive and predominant in human life.
This general line of argument is, in turn, supported by a more
detailed analysis of our psychological terminology and psychological
explanations which indicates additional difficulties in the standard
versions of materialism and the displacement hypothesis. As we have
seen, the alternative materialism drawn from Spinoza accepts the thesis
that mental states involve, are associated with, or are dependent upon
physical states as well as the thesis that no ^ priori limits can be
set on the possibilities of the scientific explanation of physical
states. However, Hampshire holds that it does not follow from these
claims that thoughts, beliefs, sentiments and so on can be explained by
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reference to physical states and processes alone. Thus, he rejects
one of the central claims traditionally associated with materialism:
the claim that purely physical explanations can be provided for mental
phenomena.
This means, of course, that Hampshire repudiates any kind of
reductive materialism which asserts that psychological explanations can
be reduced to explanations in terms of a deterministic physical voca-
bulary. Moreover, his analysis challenges one of the central under-
pinnings of modern statements of the displacement hypothesis.
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Defenders of the displacement or identity theory have standardly argued
that support for their theory will be provided by the eventual
discovery of deterministic psychophysical laws which link mental and
physical states. Yet, if Hampshire's analysis of psychological con-
cepts and psychological explanation is correct, the discovery of such
nomological psychophysical laws is not to be expected. Although he
admits that "it is entirely natural that psychological explanation
should be modelled to some degree on physical explanation," Hampshire
maintains that:
There are too many independent reasons for insisting
upon the indeterminacy of psychological explanations
when compared with explanations of physical states and
159processes
.
More specifically, beliefs, desires and other prepositional
attitudes, which are essential to explanations of human behavior, have
three features that set them fundamentally apart from physical pheno-
mena. First, as we have already seen.
In every case the subject's belief about the nature of
his attitude or sentiment, and also his belief about its
cause, in part determines what his attitude or sentiment
actually is. A man's attitudes and sentiments are modi-
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fied by his beliefs and doubts about their causes.
In other words, while we certainly can provide causal explanations of
beliefs, desires and other prepositional attitudes, such causes have a
unique and ineliminable feature. A person's own belief about the
causes of his desires, sentiments, beliefs and so on is itself a causal
factor affecting these prepositional attitudes. This absence of a
"clear independence of cause and effect" imposes a complexity on the
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cause-effect relationship in the realm of human thought and behavior
which is not present in the cause-effect relationship in the sphere of
physical states and processes .
^
Secondly, human beings constantly evaluate and assess their own
beliefs, attitudes and other states of mind, including analysis of
their origins or causes, and this process of reflection and criticism
frequently changes their mental states. Since such reflection on the
causes and effects of particular mental states is "indefinitely open-
ended," the attempt to explain mental states in terms of the covering
law model of causation collapses completely. Again as we have already
seen, Hampshire considers this reflexiveness of thought as marking the
single most important difference between the explanation of human
thought and behavior and the explanation of physical phenomena. He
states
,
The really distinguishing feature of the causes of
belief, and of mental causes generally, is the incal-
culable regress of reflection by the subject who in-
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vestigates his own state of mind.
Moreover, such reflection and reflexivity is so central to the iden-
tification and classification of mental states that there is a further
"indeterminacy" inherent in human thought which has no parallel in the
physical world. In short, the explanation of human thought and behav-
ior is complicated by the ever-present possibility that a person's
state of mind:
. . may at some specific time be indeterminate, in the
sense that no clear and definite account of it is true.
541
and that the only true account is one that shows con
tradiction and confusion, because the subject's mind is
not made up.
A third barrier to deterministic explanations of human thought and
behavior is that the causal determinants of beliefs and other preposi-
tional attitudes and desires include a complex network of other
thoughts, beliefs, attitudes and desires, most of which lie below the
level of consciousness. Psychological explanations must take into
account not only those thoughts, beliefs and attitudes of which a
subject is aware but also the vast store "... of collateral know-
ledge, beliefs, suppositions and assumptions which are all the time
164having their effects on behavior." The identification and analysis
of such connections between thought and behavior is an extremely com-
plex and difficult enterprise, and this constitutes yet another major
difference between the explanation of human thought and action and the
explanation of physical events.
In short, Hampshire's argument is that these three features common
to all beliefs, prepositional attitudes and sentiments, and belief-
dependent or thought-dependent desires impose an indeterminacy or
"looseness" on explanations of human thought and behavior that stands
in sharp contrast with "the strictness and reliability of counterfac-
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tual judgments which an applied science requires." The terminology,
particularly such concepts as belief and desire, which is absolutely
essential to the explanation of human behavior is simply incompatible
with the standard type of deterministic explanation appropriate to the
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physical sciences. Thus, we have solid reasons for rejecting that
picture of a future science of human behavior resting on deterministic
psychophysical laws which is expressly championed or implicitly assumed
by behaviorists, positivists and displacement theorists.
Neither the psychologist nor the political scientist can explain
the more sophisticated forms of human behavior unless he attributes
beliefs, desires, intentions, goals and so on to social agents. But in
order to do this, the social scientist must work within a conceptual
framework which includes the agent's own concepts, ideas and beliefs
and which is fundamentally different from the conceptual scheme used in
the physical sciences. The attempt to substitute another terminology
which meets the requirements of deterministic explanation can be
achieved only at the cost of changing the scope of inquiry from the
study of human behavior to the study of something else entirely.
Moreover, it is completely unrealistic to expect that the social
sciences will follow the same stages and direction of development
marked by the advance of the physical sciences.
Of course, it is possible to accept the basic thrust of
Hampshire's analysis of psychological concepts and psychological ex-
planation and, at the same time, insist that the displacement hypo-
thesis still has a legitimate point. For example, Donald Davidson
accepts a similar notion of "the nomological irreducibility of the
psychological" and also concludes that we cannot attain, in the study
of human behavior, the same degree of precision of explanation and
prediction which is in principle possible in the physical sciences.
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However, he states,
This does not mean there are any events that are in
themselves undetermined or unpredictable; it is only
events as described in the vocabulary of thought and
action that resist incorporation into a closed deter-
ministic system. These same events, described in ap-
propriate physical terms, may be as amenable to pre-
diction and explanation as any.^^^
In other words, the displacement hypothesis, properly restated, still
places restrictions of the kind of conclusions about the human and
social sciences drawn from an analysis like Hampshire's.
Davidson's work can thus be read as one of the most sophisticated
and powerful challenges to the philosophy of mind which Hampshire
advances and, in turn, of an interpretive model of political inquiry.
But before we turn to the specific objection touched upon above, it is
important to note the various ways in which Davidson' s analysis moves
away from the kind of displacement thesis championed by Feyerabend and
toward Hampshire's own position. In the first place, Davidson main-
tains that there are no strict psychophysical laws or, more specifi-
cally, that "there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of
1 67
which mental events can be predicted and explained. ..."
Rejecting the notion that support for the identity theory must come
from the discovery of such laws, he advances a position called
"anomalous monism." Anomalous monism, much like the kind of materi-
alism Hampshire discusses, holds that mental states are dependent or
subservient to physical states, but rejects the claim that mental
states and processes can be given strictly physical explanations.
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In addition, this thesis concerning the nomological irreducibility
of our psychological terminology is supported by an analysis of psycho-
logical concepts, particularly intentions, beliefs, desires and other
prepositional attitudes, which parallels Hampshire's work at several
points. For example, Davidson like Hampshire emphasizes "the holistic
character of the cognitive field":
Beliefs and desires issue in behavior only as modified
and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes
and attendings, without limit. Clearly this holism of
the mental realm is a clue both to the autonomy and to
1 6Qthe anomalous character of the mental.
Thus, in order to increase the explanatory power of our theories of
human behavior, we must provide increasingly comprehensive accounts of
170this "whole system of the agent's beliefs and motives. ..." As
Davidson expressly acknowledges, such a pattern of explanation neces-
sarily relies on standards of coherence, consistency and rationality
which are absent in standard deterministic explanations of physical
phenomena.
Finally, on the basis of this analysis of psychological concepts
and psychological explanation, Davidson draws conclusions about the
nature of the human and social sciences which are again similar to
Hampshire's. His own summary of the position which he sets out in his
article "Psychology as Philosophy" states:
. . .
the study of human action, motives, desires,
beliefs, memory and learning, at least so far as these
are tied to the so called ' prepositional attitudes',
cannot employ the same methods as, or be reduced to, the
more precise physical sciences.
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More generally, Davidson is critical of attempts to model the study of
human behavior and social phenomena on the same type of methodology
which is appropriate in the physical sciences. He explicitly notes
that the thesis of the nomological irreducibility of the psychological
means
:
. . .
that the social sciences cannot be expected to
develop in ways exactly parallel to the physical
sciences, nor can we expect ever to be able to explain
and predict human behavior with the kind of precision
172that is possible in principle for physical phenomena.
But it is, of course, precisely at this point that Davidson ap-
pears to have serious reservations about the kind of analysis of mind
and politics presented by Hampshire. For Hampshire seems to suggest
that there is something inherent in the nature of human behavior or
social phenomena which imposes these limits on the social and human
sciences. In contrast, Davidson maintains that;
The limit thus placed on the social sciences is set not
by nature, but by us when we decide to view men as
rational agents with goals and purposes, and as subject
173
to moral evaluation.
Certainly, Davidson is willing to admit that the conceptual framework
or common idiom with which we classify and characterize human thought
and behavior is "removed from the direct reach of physical law" because
it is composed of different constituent elements than a deterministic
174
conceptual scheme used to explain the physical world. However,
The constitutive force of the realm of behavior derives
from the need to view others, nearly enough, as like
175
ourselves
.
546
In other words, the anomalism of the mental follows not from some
intrinsic features of human beings, human thought, or human behavior,
but rather as a corollary of a conceptual scheme which portarys human
beings as autonomous, rational agents.
Clearly, Davidson's position represents a significant break with
those versions of materialism, the displacement hypothesis or identity
theory which envision the eventual discovery of deterministic psycho-
177physical laws. Moreover, his analysis documents how radical and
sweeping a displacement of our ordinary conceptual framework would be
and identifies the major reasons why such a displacement is not to be
expected. However, from Hampshire's perspective, Davidson still fails
to acknowledge fully the interdependence of the conceptual scheme which
we use to characterize thought and action on the one hand and funda-
mental human interests, purposes and goals as well as essential fea-
tures of human life on the other. This failure is especially evident
in his claim that the limits of the human and social sciences are not
established "by nature," but rather reflect some kind of decision or
choice to view human beings as rational, autonomous agents.
More specifically, Davidson fails to recognize the full impli-
cations of the fact that:
The defects of the psychological vocabulary, from the
point of view of deterministic explanation, are not to
be eliminated without frustrating the purposes that the
vocabulary serves.
Of course, our psychological terminology is suited to the
task of
explaining the motivation and behavior of others as well
as reporting
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or communicating information about our own thoughts, beliefs,
intentions and activities. At the same time, this vocabulary is also
designed to serve the purposes of human beings as agents rather than as
passive observers of themselves and others. In other words, this same
conceptual framework is essential to and linked to the basic interests
and purposes of beings who must confront situations where one is
uncertain or unclear about what he believes or desires and must make up
his mind about what he actually believes or wants to do, where one is
reflecting on his own beliefs or desires (including their origins or
causes) as part of a conscious process of criticism and correction, or
where one must formulate intentions or decide what he will try to do on
some future occasion.
It is this latter set of interests and purposes which are incom-
patible with and would be frustrated by a deterministic conceptual
framework. The classical materialists and the displacement theorists
posit the possibility or liklihood not simply of a changed psychologi-
cal vocabulary but also of a changed world in which these basic
interests and purposes, as well as the forms of life they relect, dis-
appear. It is not simply a world in which people no longer speak of
freedom and responsibility, but a world in which human beings are never
faced with conflicting beliefs and desires and never find themselves
confused or uncertain about what they believe or want. Moreover,
it is
a world in which human beings find that the sources and
nature of their
own thought processes and mental states are no longer
open to criticism
and correction through reflection, and in which
human beings are no
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longer capable of formulating intentions to intervene in the causal
pattern that has determined their thinking and behavior in the past.
Hampshire maintains that any such materialist vision of a future
where deterministic laws have displaced our psychological vocabulary is
fundamentally flawed because "... these are intrinsic features of
thought and mental processes generally," which are not to be eliminated
by any sort of refinements in our psychological vocabulary . ^"^^
Davidson's reservation about such an argument seems to be that one can
legitimately claim only that these are features of mental states and
processes as characterized within our psychological vocabulary. In
other words, the principle of the anomalism of the mental concerns only
events described as mental events within a vocabulary which has dif-
ferent conditions and commitments than that part of our conceptual
framework which is used to explain physical phenomena. Thus, Hampshire
cannot legitimately make such claims about "intrinsic features" or the
true nature of thought processes, mental states, human behavior or
anything else on the basis of an analysis of the psychological
vocabulary commonly used to describe and explain mental events.
However, this objection presupposes a dichotomy between our psy-
chological vocabulary and the actual nature of the beliefs, attitudes,
sentiments and other mental states of those who use this terminology
which is, according to Hampshire's account of knowledge and mind,
untenable. Davidson suggests that we must treat the psychological
vocabulary as simply part of a conceptual scheme which is used to
describe and explain a reality that is always and essentially
given am
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independent of the describer, observer or knower. Yet, if Hampshire is
correct, the principal difference between the psychological vocabulary
and the physical vocabulary is that the former encompasses a wide
spectrum of cases ranging from pain sensations, impulses and other
mental states which an individual passsively experiences to the kind of
reflective desires, interests and so on which are formed as the outcome
1 A
1
of a process of thought.
The central failing of crude materialism, in both its classical
and modern versions, is its neglect of this latter category of mental
states. Materialists focus exclusively on examining mental states from
the standpoint of the scientific observer and ignore the significant
question of what it would be like to be a materialist "... living and
acting with some of the specific knowledge that a materialist claims
1 82
must be obtainable," Davidson's analysis shares these failings
because he uncritically accepts contestable empiricist assumptions
concerning thought and the role of our psychological vocabulary in
reflexive thought processes.
Clearly, there are some significant differences between the ac-
count of mind and action offered by Hampshire and the alternative
analysis of mind and action presented by Davidson. Moreover, the
proceeding summary discussion only begins to get at these differences
and treats only a very small part of the extensive set of problems and
issues, centering in philosophy of mind but reaching into epistemology
and metaphysics, that surround the claims of materialism, the identity
thesis and the displacement hypothesis. In short, Davidson's work
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illustrates that Hampshire's account of mind remains open to challenge
and that it certainly does not resolve or dissolve all the problems
addressed in traditional and contemporary philosophy of mind.
At the same time, despite these differences, both Hampshire's work
and Davidson's analysis of mind and action pose similar challenges to
central empiricist, positivist and behavioralist assumptions under-
pinning the dominant view of the present state and future direction of
political inquiry, or of the social and human sciences in general. In
this, they are representative examples of one of the strongest currents
in recent linguistic philosophy. While there is clearly no consensus
among contemporary philosophers concerning the basic elements of a
viable philosophy of mind and action, there is wide-spread dissatis-
faction with the principal assumptions concerning mind and action which
are unreflectively incorporated in contemporary political theory and
research. Thus, the work of Davidson as well as that of Hampshire
illustrates the kind of reexamination and assessment of long accepted
philosophical premises which has nutured the interpretive model of
political inquiry. Moreover, careful analysis of this work indicates
the extent to which it has been mischaracterized and misunderstood by
both defenders of the positivist model as well as theorists who express
some sympathy with the linguistic turn and the interpretive model of
social inquiry.
First, in regard to the present stage of political inquiry, both
theorists raise strong objections to the notion that there are no basic
methodological differences between the social and physical sciences, or
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the notion that the social scientist can construct empirical social and
political theories in the same way as in the physical sciences.
Davidson holds that the psychologist, like the ordinary agent, cannot
explain complex human behavior without attributing beliefs, desires,
goals, intentions and meanings to agents. But beliefs, desires and
other parts of what Davidson calls the cognitive field cannot be dis-
tinguished and classified in the same way as physical events because
they form a complex, holistic system. An adequate explanation of human
behavior must provide some account of the overall pattern of this
system or field, and this requires the application of standards of
rationality, coherence and consistency. Moreover, the attribution of
beliefs and other prepositional attitudes is necessarily linked to the
concepts, distinctions and classifications which are available in our
language. Thus, in order to provide a coherent account of beliefs
and other components of the cognitive field, the psychologist presup-
poses some theory of meaning and language, however crude or unreflec-
tive it might be.
In short, the psychologist cannot escape the task of interpre-
tation and the philosophical issues and problems which are inherent in
this task. Psychologists, to the extent that they use concepts of
belief, desire and other prepositional attitudes, as well as the con-
cepts which are logically connected to these (e.g. perception, learn-
ing, action), cannot employ the same methods which are used in the
physical sciences .
""^^
There is no way for the psychologist concerned
with the explanation of the more advanced forms of human behavior
to
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escape the "necessarily holistic character of interpretations of prepo-
sitional attitudes" or the "normative element" which is always present
1 8rm the attribution of such attitudes.
Davidson's analysis thus challenges the notion of psychology as a
science of human behavior modeled on the physical sciences and traces
the linkages between psychology and philosophy. Hampshire's suggestion
that the explanatory frameworks and theories used throughout the social
sciences, including political inquiry, necessarily include some account
of human nature or theory of human motivation and behavior extends this
analysis. For if this is correct, the same interpretive task and the
same philosophcial issues and problems raised by this task, which
Davidson discusses in relation to psychology, are involved in all ex-
planations and theories of social and political phenomena. Both
Davidson and Hampshire demonstrate that there is a much closer rela-
tionship between philosophy and the social and human sciences than the
positivist conception of a science of politics or society acknowledges.
One of the major strengths of Hampshire's work is that he, much more
than Davidson in particular or analytic philosophy in general, explores
these connections between philosophy and social inquiry, or between
mind and politics.
Both Davidson and Hampshire emphasize that the kind of interpre-
tive task which emerges from their analysis of the connections between
philosophy and the social and human sciences is not a return to the
kind of A priori philosophical psychology and philosophical
anthro-
pology characteristic of traditional political philosophy.
Hampshire
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in particular notes that the generation of such grandiose, broad- scale
hypotheses or theories of human nature is not a promising path for
future advance in the social sciences. He suggests that the social
sciences will advance
, .by subdividing into the more specialized
sciences of human behavior and reaction, and by showing the complexity
of human, as of animal organization," and that such advance can be
1 ftft
expected to replace completely ^ priori anthropology.
At the same time, Hampshire and, to a lesser extent, Davidson,
express real reservations about the conception of such advance in the
human and social sciences which is tied to empiricism, positivism and
behavioralism. As we have seen, both Davidson and Hampshire reject as
fundamentally mistaken the vision of a future science of human behavior
or politics as grounded in a set of deterministic psychophysical laws
that is advanced by Wahlke and the behavioralists as well as many of
the materialists. But, at this point, Davidson seems to hold that to
say anything more about the probable limits of scientific advance in
the social sciences would be to impose ^ priori conceptual restraints
on empirical fields of inquiry. Moreover, he has nothing more to offer
about what the psychologist or social scientist can do or should do
about the difficulties concerning the explanation of human behavior
which he has identified.
In contrast, while Hampshire argues that we cannot claim to know ^
priori what the future of the social and human sciences holds, we can
certainly identify and analyze the most important problems which social
scientists face in attempting to explain human behavior and social
phe-
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nomena. In particular, we know that in the case of mental states,
unlike physical states, there is no clear independence of cause and
effect because mental states are modified by beliefs about their
187
causes. In other words, it is clear that it is the problem of re-
flexivity, or to use a more traditional terminology, self-conscious-
ness, which is the principal source of our present uncertainty about
the future of psychology in particular and the social sciences in
general. Certainly, it remains unclear:
, . . whether allowance can be made within a psycho-
logical or social theory for the effect upon the indivi-
dual or the society of a belief that the theory is true:
whether therefore laws of nature, of a precise and
applicable kind, can or cannot be formulated in psycho-
logy and sociology in spite of the complexities of
188
self-consciousness.
But the dominant model of scientific explanation and theory, with its
empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, does not even
provide a base for raising these issues and problems which center in
the reflexive relation between theory and fact in the social and human
sciences.
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